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Foreword 
 
It is my pleasure to introduce this new, fifth edition of the third e-book in the European 
Audiovisual Observatory’s IRIS Themes series, prepared in collaboration with our partner 
organisation, the Institute for Information Law (IViR) of the University of Amsterdam.  
 
The success of the first four editions has proved that a structured insight into the European Court 
of Human Rights’ case-law on freedom of expression and media and journalistic freedoms has 
been a widely appreciated vade mecum on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Our target group included lawyers, judges, law- and policy-makers, civil society actors, 
journalists and other media actors, academics, students, and indeed everyone with an interest in 
its subject matter. The high download figures (over 35,000 downloads in four years) as well as 
requests of translations have encouraged us to pursue on this path. The collection has therefore 
been widened to include the judgments or decisions that have been taken in the meantime. 
 
This revised edition contains summaries of over 315 judgments or decisions by the Court and 
provides hyperlinks to the full text of each of the summarised judgments or decisions (via 
HUDOC, the Court’s online case-law database). It can be read in various ways: for initial 
orientation in the steadily growing Article 10 case-law; for refreshing one’s knowledge of that 
case-law; for quick reference and checking, as well as for substantive research. 
 
The summaries included in the e-book have been reported in IRIS – Legal Observations of the 
European Audiovisual Observatory between 1994 and 2019 and can be retrieved from our legal 
database, IRIS Merlin. The summaries have not been re-edited for present purposes, although 
hyperlinks to other judgments or reference texts have been introduced, as relevant; subsequent 
developments (eg. referrals of Chamber judgments to the Grand Chamber) have been indicated, 
again as relevant, and the citational style has been standardised to conform with the Court’s 
official reporting guidelines. Please see the technical tips on page 3 in order to make optimal use 
of the navigational tools in this e-book.   
 
The structure of the e-book is as follows: 
 
1. Table of cases: an overview of all the cases summarised, including bibliographic data, 
keywords, hyperlinks to the individual summaries and hyperlinks to the full texts of the 
judgments or decisions. 
 
2. Introduction by Dirk Voorhoof to trends and developments in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ case-law on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
the period 1994-2019.  
 
3. Compilation of case-law summaries.  
 
4. Appendices: 
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I: Cases reported in IRIS, but not included in the main selection (i.e., cases that were struck 
off the list/in which friendly settlements were reached). 
II: Overview of cases in alphabetical order. 
III: Overview of cases by country. 
IV: The European Convention on Human Rights – full text (as amended by protocols). 
 
Again, my warmest thanks go to Tarlach McGonagle (IViR), who not only conceived the idea of 
this e-book, but also designed and formatted it. I would like to thank him for his initiative and 
commitment. I am also very grateful to Dirk Voorhoof (Human Rights Centre, Ghent University 
and Legal Human Academy), who took care of the summaries of the judgments and the decisions 
of the Court. He has been a steadfast IRIS correspondent since the very early days of the 
publication and this e-book demonstrates the vast extent of his coverage of Article 10 case-law 
in IRIS over the years.  
 
Thanks are also due to Rosanne Deen and Nanette Schumacher, former research interns at IViR, 
for their research assistance and for providing keywords and for standardising citations, 
respectively; to Ronan Ó Fathaigh, IViR, for providing keywords for new cases added to the third 
and fourth editions and for writing several of the new articles included in the present edition, 
and to Anne van der Sangen, research intern at IViR, who provided keywords for new cases in the 
present edition. 
 
I would also like to remind readers of the focuses of the first two volumes in the IRIS Themes 
series: standard-setting on freedom of expression and the media by the Council of Europe’s (I) 
Committee of Ministers and (II) Parliamentary Assembly.  
 
Strasbourg, April 2020 
 
Maja Cappello 
IRIS Coordinator 
Head of the Department for Legal Information 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
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EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
CASE-LAW ON ARTICLE 10, ECHR 
 
(arranged in chronological order) 
 
Please note: 
  
- Links in the first column lead directly to articles summarising the judgments or decisions in question. 
- To navigate back to the page you were on before clicking on a link, either use the “backward” button in your toolbar (if you have 
one), or else click simultaneously on <Alt> + [arrow pointing left on the right-hand-side of your keyboard]. 
- Click on the link at the bottom of each summary to access the full text of the judgment or decision via the European Court of 
Human Rights’ HUDOC database. 
- Blue hyperlinks are to texts within this e-book; red hyperlinks are to external sources. 
- In the ‘Outcome’ column: V = Violation; NV = Non-Violation; I = Inadmissible. > GC indicates that the case was subsequently 
referred to the Grand Chamber of the Court in accordance with Article 43, ECHR. Whenever mentioned, numbers refer to ECHR 
articles other than Article 10.  
 
 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
1 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. 
Austria  
13470/87 20/09
/1994 
NV Cinema, blasphemous film, religion, 
artistic expression, margin of appreciation, 
art house cinema 
Full text 47 
2 Jersild v. Denmark  15890/89 23/09
/1994 
V News reporting, interviews, anti-racism, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 48 
3 Vereiniging Weekblad 
Bluf! v. the Netherlands  
16616/90 09/02
/1995 
V National security, sensitive information, 
State secrets, impart information 
Full text 49 
4 Vereinigung 
Demokratischer Soldaten 
15153/89 19/12
/1994 
V Political expression, critical reporting, 
criticism, rights of others, reputation 
Full text 50 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
Österreichs & Gubi v. 
Austria 
5 Prager & Oberschlick v. 
Austria  
15974/90 26/04
/1995 
NV Critical reporting, offensive information, 
defamation, criticism, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 51 
6 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the 
United Kingdom  
18139/91 13/07
/1995 
V Defamation, libel, crime reporting, 
disproportionate damages 
Full text 52 
7 Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom 
17488/90 27/03
/1996 
V Protection of sources, public interest, 
responsible journalism, chilling effect, 
whistle-blowing  
Full text 53 
8 Wingrove v. the United 
Kingdom 
17419/90 25/11
/1996 
NV Blasphemous film, artistic expression, 
rights of others, general verification 
system for videos, political speech, public 
interest, margin of appreciation, morals or 
religion 
Full text 55 
9 De Haes & Gijsels v. 
Belgium 
19983/92 24/02
/1997 
V Defamation, criticism, duties and 
responsibilities, mode of expression, 
exaggeration, provocation, authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary, protection of 
journalistic sources, alternative evidence 
Full text 57 
10 Oberschlick (No. 2) v. 
Austria 
20834/92 01/07
/1997 
V Political expression, defamation, insult, 
offensive information, limits of acceptable 
criticism 
Full text 58 
11 Worm v. Austria 22714/93 29/08
/1997 
NV Authority and impartiality of the judiciary, 
journalism, prejudice, crime reporting, fair 
trial 
Full text 59 
12 Radio ABC v. Austria 19736/92 20/10
/1997 
V Private broadcasting, monopoly position 
of the media, positive obligations 
Full text 60 
13 Zana v. Turkey 18954/91 25/11
/1997 
NV Political expression, incitement to 
violence, terrorism 
Full text 61 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
14 Grigoriades v. Greece 24348/94 25/11
/1997 
V Military discipline, limits of acceptable 
criticism, insult 
Full text 61 
15 Guerra v. Italy 14967/89 19/02
/1998 
NV10; 
V8 
Right to receive information, positive 
obligations, effective protection, privacy 
Full text 61 
16 Bowman v. the United 
Kingdom  
24839/94 19/02
/1998 
V Political expression, monopoly position of 
the media, critical reporting 
Full text 62 
17 Schöpfer v. Switzerland 25405/94 20/05
/1998 
NV Limits of acceptable criticism, receive 
information, critical reporting, public 
interest  
Full text 63 
18 Incal v. Turkey   09/06
/1998 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, limits of acceptable criticism, 
public interest, hate speech 
Full text 64 
19 Ahmed & others v. the 
United Kingdom 
22954/93 02/09
/1998 
NV Impart information, political expression, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 65 
20 Hertel v. Switzerland 25181/94 25/08
/1998 
V Research paper, rights of others, necessity, 
commercial speech, academic freedom 
Full text 66 
21 Lehideux & Isorni v. 
France 
24662/94 23/09
/1998 
V Advertisement, reputation, rights of 
others, abuse of rights, historical research, 
second world war 
Full text 66 
22 Steel & others v. the 
United Kingdom  
24838/94 23/09
/1998 
V Necessity, public order, rule of law, 
authority of the judiciary, breach of peace, 
preventing disorder, rights of others 
Full text 67 
23 Fressoz & Roire v. France  29183/95 21/01
/1999 
V Confidential information, public interest, 
well-known information, privacy, 
journalistic ethics, tax reports, journalists 
committing offence and public interest
  
Full text 68 
24 Janowski v. Poland  25716/94 21/01
/1999 
NV Journalism, insult, necessity, offensive and 
abusive verbal attacks 
Full text 69 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
25 Bladet Tromso & Stensaas 
v. Norway 
21980/93 20/05
/1999 
V Secret information, presumption of 
innocence, critical reporting, defamation, 
honour and reputation, good faith, public 
watchdog 
Full text 71 
26 Rekvényi v. Hungary 25390/94 20/05
/1999 
NV Politically neutral police force, national 
security, prevention of disorder 
Full text 72 
27 Arslan v. Turkey 23462/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
28 Polat v. Turkey 23500/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
29 Başkaya & Okçuoğlu v. 
Turkey 
23536/94 
and 
24408/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
30 Karataş v. Turkey 23168/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
31 Erdoğdu and İnce v. 
Turkey 
25067/94 
and 
25068/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
32 Ceylan v. Turkey 23556/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
33 Okçuoğlu v. Turkey 24246/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
34 Gerger v. Turkey 24919/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
35 Sürek & Özdemir v. Turkey 23927/94 
and 
24277/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
36 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) 26682/95 08/07
/1999 
NV Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
37 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 2) 24122/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
38 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 3) 24735/94 08/07
/1999 
NV Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
39 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4)  24762/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
40 Dalban v. Romania 28114/95 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, exaggeration, 
criminal libel, duty of care for journalists, 
public function, privacy, public watchdog 
Full text 75 
41 Öztürk v. Turkey  22479/93 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, incitement to crime, 
hatred or hostility, public interest, 
prevention of disorder or crime 
Full text 75 
42 Wille v. Liechtenstein 28396/95 28/10
/1999 
V Political expression, insult, critical 
reporting, public debate, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 77 
43 Nilsen & Johnsen v. 
Norway 
23118/93 25/11
/1999 
V Police brutality, defamation, receive and 
impart information, exaggeration, public 
debate, limits of acceptable criticism 
Full text 77 
44 Hashman & Harrup v. the 
United Kingdom 
25594/94 25/11
/1999 
V Unlawful action, concept of behaviour 
contra bonos mores, foreseeability 
Full text 77 
45 T. v. the United Kingdom 24724/94 16/12
/1999 
V 6 Fair trial, public interest Full text 78 
46 V. v. the United Kingdom  24888/94 16/12
/1999 
V 6 Fair trial, public interest 
 
Full text 78 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
47 News Verlags GmbH v. 
Austria 
31457/96 11/01
/2000 
V Defamation, reputation, rights of others, 
public concern, publication of photos, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 79 
48 Fuentes Bobo v. Spain 39293/98 29/02
/2000 
V Offensive information, criticism, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations, reputation, rights of others, 
employment relations, dismissal 
Full text 80 
49 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey  23144/93 16/03
/2000 
V Critical media reporting, separatist 
propaganda, racism, political expression, 
positive obligations, horizontal effect of 
human rights 
Full text 80 
50 Andreas Wabl v. Austria  24773/94 21/03
/2000 
NV Political expression, defamation, Nazism, 
offensive information 
Full text 81 
51 Bergens Tidende v. 
Norway 
26132/95 02/05
/2000 
V Defamation, publication of photos, 
reputation, rights of others, good faith, 
public watchdog 
Full text 82 
52 Erdogdu v. Turkey 25723/94 15/06
/2000 
V Propaganda against the territorial integrity 
of the State, terrorism, access, receive 
information, prevention of disorder or 
crime 
Full text 83 
53 Constantinescu v. 
Romania  
28871/95 27/06
/2000 
NV Criminal defamation, criticism, public 
debate, interview, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 83 
54 Sener v. Turkey 26680/95 18/07
/2000 
V Vital role of press, positive obligations,  
political expression, public interest, 
receive information 
Full text 85 
55 Tele 1 
Privatfernsehgesellschaft 
MBH v. Austria 
32240/96 21/09
/2000 
V & 
NV 
Allocation of broadcasting licence, impart 
information, monopoly position of the 
media 
Full text 86 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
56 Lopes Gomes da Silva v. 
Portugal 
37698/97 28/09
/2000 
V Vital role of press, political expression, 
limits of acceptable criticism, 
exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 86 
57 Du Roy & Malaurie v. 
France  
34000/96 03/10
/2000 
V Public interest, secrecy during 
investigation and enquiry procedures, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 88 
58 Akkoç v. Turkey 22947/93 
and 
22948/93 
10/10
/2000 
NV Interview, disciplinary sanction, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence, armed 
resistance or an uprising 
Full text 89 
59 Ibrahim Aksoy v. Turkey  28635/95, 
30171/96 
and 
34535/97 
10/10
/2000 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence 
Full text 89 
60 Tammer v. Estonia 41205/98 06/02
/2001 
NV Privacy, private information, politician, 
public interest, defamation 
Full text 90 
61 Jerusalem v. Austria 26958/95 27/02
/2001 
V Political expression, public debate, facts 
or value judgments 
Full text 91 
62 B. & P. v. the United 
Kingdom 
36337/97 
and 
35974/97 
24/04
/2001 
NV Privacy, protection of vulnerable persons, 
necessity 
Full text 92 
63 Cyprus v. Turkey 25781/94 10/05
/2001 
V Conflict between State Parties, censorship 
of school-books, restricted distribution 
and importation media 
Full text 93 
64 VgT Vereinigung Tegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland 
24699/94 28/06
/2001 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 94 
65 Ekin Association v. France 39288/98 17/07
/2001 
V Insult of foreigners, discrimination based 
on foreign origin 
Full text 96 
 10 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
66 Feldek v. Slovakia 29032/95 12/07
/2001 
V Facts or value judgments, political speech, 
public interest, common knowledge, limits 
of acceptable criticism 
Full text 97 
67 Perna v. Italy 48898/99 25/07
/2001 
V, >GC Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest  
Full text 98 
68 Thoma v. Luxembourg 38432/97 29/03
/2001 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, quoting other media sources, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 100 
69 Marônek v. Slovakia 32686/96 19/04
/2001 
V Well-known information, public interest, 
rule of law, good faith, reputation, rights 
of others 
Full text 101 
70 Bankovic & others v. 
Belgium & others 
52207/99 12/12
/2001 
I NATO-bombing of TV station, 
inadmissible, jurisdiction, treaty 
obligations of State Parties 
Full text 102 
71 E.K. v. Turkey 28496/95 07/02
/2002 
V Book, political expression, vital role of 
press, receive information 
Full text 103 
72 Unabhängige Initiative 
Informationsvielfalt v. 
Austria 
28525/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, political debate, 
public interest, value judgment 
Full text 104 
73 Dichand & others v. 
Austria 
29271/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, offensive 
information, public interest, value 
judgments 
Full text 104 
74 Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. 
KG v. Austria  
34315/96 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, publication of photos, 
vital role of press, public interest, privacy 
Full text 104 
75 De Diego Nafría v. Spain 46833/99 14/03
/2002 
NV Defamation, criticism, limits of 
acceptable criticism, public interest, 
employment relation 
Full text 106 
76 Gaweda v. Poland 26229/95 14/03
/2002 
V Lack of clarity, accessible and foreseeable, 
printed media 
Full text 107 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
77 Nikula v. Finland 31611/96 21/03
/2002 
V Defamation, criticism, fair trial, potential 
chilling effect of criminal sanctions, 
lawyer 
Full text 108 
78 McVicar v. the United 
Kingdom 
46311/99 02/05
/2002 
NV Defamation, public interest, well-known 
sports figures, factual evidence 
Full text 109 
79 Colombani & others v. 
France 
51279/99 25/06
/2002 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public watchdog, public 
function of press 
Full text 110 
80 Wilson & NUJ v. the 
United Kingdom 
30668/96, 
30671/96 
and 
30678/96 
02/07
/2002 
V 11 Journalism, freedom of assembly and 
association, necessity  
Full text 111 
81 Yagmuredereli v. Turkey 29590/96 04/06
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
separatist propaganda, violence, national 
security 
Full text 112 
82 Seher Karatas v. Turkey  33179/96 09/07
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
incitement to hatred or hostility, national 
security 
Full text 112 
83 Stambuk v. Germany 37928/97 17/10
/2002 
V Medical advertising, rights of others, 
protect health, commercial speech, public 
interest 
Full text 113 
84 Ayse Öztürk v. Turkey 24914/94 15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, terrorism, incitement 
to violence, public debate, positive 
obligation 
Full text 115 
85 Karakoç & others v. 
Turkey  
27692/95, 
28138/95 
and 
28498/95 
15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, public watchdog, 
separatist propaganda, positive obligation 
Full text 115 
86 Demuth v. Switzerland 38743/97 05/11
/2002 
NV Allocation of broadcasting licence, media 
pluralism, margin of appreciation 
Full text 117 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
87  Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 28493/95 05/12
/2002 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, receive information, positive 
obligation 
Full text 119 
88 Dicle on behalf of DEP 
(Democratic Party) v. 
Turkey  
25141/94 10/12
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, positive 
obligation 
Full text 119 
89 A. v. the United Kingdom 35373/97 17/12
/2002 
NV 6, 
8, 13, 
14 
Political expression, right of access, 
defamation, discrimination, privacy 
 
Full text 120 
90 Roemen & Schmit v. 
Luxembourg 
51772/99 25/02
/2003 
V Protection of sources, search of homes, 
privacy, responsible journalism 
Full text 122 
91 Peck v. the United 
Kingdom 
44647/98 28/01
/2003 
V 8 Privacy in public areas, reasonable 
expectation of privacy, CCTV, media 
reporting 
Full text 124 
92 Cordova v. Italy (Nos. 1 & 
2) 
40877/98 
and 
45649/99 
30/01
/2003 
V 6 Defamation, insult, duties and 
responsibilities, public interest, reputation 
Full text: 
No. 1 
No. 2 
126 
93 Perna v. Italy [Grand 
Chamber] 
48898/99 06/05
/2003 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation 
Full text 127 
94 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark 
49017/99 19/06
/2003 
NV 10, 
6, >GC 
Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 129 
95 Murphy v. Ireland 44179/98 10/07
/2003 
NV Broadcasting prohibition, religious 
advertising, margin of appreciation 
Full text 130 
96 Ernst & others v. Belgium 33400/96 15/07
/2003 
V 10, 8 Protection of sources, journalism, 
overriding public interest 
Full text 131 
97 Karkin v. Turkey 43928/98 23/09
/2003 
V Political expression, hate speech, 
discrimination, racism 
Full text 132 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
98 Kizilyaprak v. Turkey 27528/95 02/10
/2003 
V Receive information, separatist 
propaganda, hate speech based on ethnic 
and regional differences 
Full text 133 
99 Gündüz v. Turkey 35071/97 04/12
/2003 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, religious intolerance, positive 
obligations, shocking or offensive 
information, live studio debate, hatred or 
hostility, pluralism 
Full text 134 
100 Abdullah Aydin v. Turkey 42435/98 09/03
/2004 
V Political expression, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, social, ethnic and regional 
differences 
Full text 135 
101 Radio France v. France 53984/00 30/03
/2004 
NV Privacy, good name and reputation, 
responsible journalism, exaggeration, 
provocation 
Full text 136 
102 Von Hannover v. Germany 59320/00 24/06
/2004 
V 8 Privacy in public areas, continual 
harassment, public interest, conflicting 
human rights   
Full text 137 
103 Österreichischer Rundfunk 
v. Austria (dec.) 
57597/00 25/05
/2004 
I Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 138 
104 Editions Plon v. France 56148/00 18/05
/2004 
V Privacy, public interest, medical 
confidentiality, journalistic ethics, rights of 
others 
Full text 139 
105 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark [Grand Chamber] 
49017/99 17/12
/2004 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 140 
106 Cumpana & Mazare v. 
Romania [Grand Chamber] 
33348/96 17/12
/2004 
V Defamation, insult, limits of acceptable 
criticism, factual basis or value judgments, 
reputation, privacy, chilling effect, public 
watchdog 
Full text 141 
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No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
107 Steel & Morris v. the 
United Kingdom 
68416/01 15/02
/2005 
V 10, 6 Defamation, libel, potential chilling effect, 
reputation, public debate 
Full text 143 
108 Independent News and 
Media v. Ireland 
55120/00 16/06
/2005 
NV Political expression, defamation, libel, 
chilling effect, margin of appreciation 
Full text 144 
109 Grinberg v. Russia 23472/03 21/07
/2005 
V Defamation, political expression, facts and 
value judgments, public function of press, 
public watchdog, limits of acceptable 
criticism, public function, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 146 
110 IA v. Turkey 42571/98 13/09
/2005 
NV Religious insult, rights of others, 
provocative opinions, abusive and  
offensive information 
Full text 148 
111 Wirtschafts-Trend 
Zeitschriften-Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria 
58547/00 27/10
/2005 
V Limits of acceptable criticism, political 
expression, defamation, high degree of 
tolerance, public interest  
Full text 149 
112 Tourancheau & July v. 
France 
53886/00 24/11
/2005 
NV Crime reporting, necessity, reputation, 
rights of others, presumption of innocence 
Full text 151 
113 Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. 
Denmark 
40485/02 08/12
/2005 
NV Protection of sources, vulnerable persons, 
positive obligations, major crime 
Full text 153 
114 Giniewski v. France 64016/00 31/01
/2006 
V Religion, defamation, religious insult, 
offensive information, hate speech 
Full text 155 
115 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey 64178/00, 
64179/00, 
64181/00, 
64183/00, 
64184/00 
30/03
/2006 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
Full text 156 
116 Stoll v. Switzerland 69698/01 25/04
/2006 
V, >GC Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog, exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 158 
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117 Dammann v. Switzerland 77551/01 25/04
/2006 
V Confidential information, public 
discussion, vital role of press, public 
watchdog, newsgathering 
Full text 160 
118 Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey  50692/99 02/02
/2006 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, positive obligations, religion 
Full text 161 
119 Erbakan v. Turkey 59405/00 06/07
/2006 
V Political debate, political expression, hate 
speech, intolerance, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, religion 
Full text 162 
120 Matky v. Czech Republic 19101/03 10/07
/2006 
I Receive information, access to public or 
administrative documents, positive 
obligations, rights of others, national 
security, public health, public interest 
Full text 164 
121 Monnat v. Switzerland 73604/01 21/09
/2006 
V Broadcasting, critical reporting, public 
interest, positive obligations, anti-
Semitism, politically engaged journalism, 
journalistic ethics, public watchdog 
Full text 166 
122 White v. Sweden 42435/02 19/09
/2006 
NV 8 Privacy, good name and reputation, 
defamation, exaggeration, provocation, 
journalistic ethics, positive obligation, 
public interest, conflicting human rights 
Full text 168 
123 Klein v. Slovakia 72208/01 31/10
/2006 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, religion, critically comment 
Full text 169 
124 Leempoel & S.A. Ed. Cine 
Revue v. Belgium 
64772/01 09/11
/2006 
NV Censorship, privacy, strictly confidential 
correspondence, public interest  
Full text 170 
125 Radio Twist v. Slovakia 62202/00 19/12
/2006 
V Privacy, political information, public 
interest, use of illegally recorded 
telephone conversation 
Full text 172 
126 Mamère v. France 12697/03 07/11
/2006 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation, libel, public 
Full text 174 
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interest, political expression, 
exaggeration, provocation 
127 Österreichischer Rundfunk 
v. Austria 
35841/02 07/12
/2006 
V Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 176 
128 Nikowitz & Verlagsgruppe 
News GmbH v. Austria 
5266/03 22/02
/2007 
V Defamation, value judgments, well-known 
information, humorous commentary, 
acceptable satire, public interest 
Full text 177 
129 Tønsberg Blad AS & Marit 
Haukom v. Norway 
510/04 01/03
/2007 
V Criticism, defamation, reputation, right to 
receive information, public interest, good 
faith, journalistic ethics, duty to verify 
factual allegations 
Full text 178 
130 Colaço Mestre & SIC v. 
Portugal 
11182/03 
and 
11319/03 
26/04
/2007 
V Interview, public interest, defamation, 
journalistic ethics 
Full text 180 
131 Dupuis & others v. France 1914/02 07/06
/2007 
V Confidential but well-known information, 
public interest, public watchdog, chilling 
effect, newsgathering 
Full text 181 
132 Hachette Filipacchi 
Associés v. France 
71111/01 14/06
/2007 
NV Rights of others, privacy, human dignity, 
very high circulation of information, 
accessibility and foreseeability 
Full text 182 
133 Lionarakis v. Greece 1131/05 05/07
/2007 
V 10, 6 Political expression, radio broadcast, 
defamation, facts or value judgments, 
value judgments with factual basis 
Full text 184 
134 Glas Nadezhda EOOD & 
Elenkov v. Bulgaria 
14134/02 11/10
/2007 
V 10, 
13 
Allocation of radio licence, religion, lack of 
motivation of the judgment, transparency, 
licensing procedure 
Full text 185 
135 Filatenko v. Russia 73219/01 06/12
/2007 
V Defamation, public interest, reputation, 
good faith, journalistic ethics 
Full text 187 
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136 Stoll v. Switzerland [Grand 
Chamber] 
69698/01 10/12
/2007 
NV Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog, exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 188 
137 Nur Radyo v. Turkey 6587/03 27/11
/2007 
V Broadcasting licence, religion, shocking or 
offensive information, hate speech 
Full text 190 
138 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey  11369/03 04/12
/2007 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
Full text 190 
139 Voskuil v. The Netherlands 64752/01 22/11
/2007 
V Confidential information, protection of 
sources, integrity of the police and judicial 
authorities, right to remain silent, public 
watchdog 
Full text 192 
140 Tillack v. Belgium 20477/05 27/11
/2007 
V Protection of sources, searches of homes 
and workplaces, public watchdog 
Full text 192 
141 Guja v. Moldova 14277/04 12/02
/2008 
V Whistleblowing, public interest, 
journalistic ethics, duties and 
responsibilities, good faith, chilling effect, 
employment relation 
Full text 194 
142 Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 
(No. 3) 
71353/01 22/04
/2008 
V Incitement to hatred or hostility, 
separatism, necessity 
Full text 196 
143 Meltex Ltd. & Mesrop 
Movsesyan v. Armenia 
32283/04 17/06
/2008 
V Non-discriminatory allocation of 
frequencies or broadcasting licences, 
licencing procedure 
Full text 197 
144 Flux (No. 6) v. Moldova 22824/04 29/07
/2008 
NV Criticism, sensationalism, defamation, 
journalistic ethics, unprofessional 
behaviour, chilling effect, lack of factual 
basis for allegations 
Full text 199 
145 Petrina v. Romania 78060/01 14/10
/2008 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, defamation, 
libel, reputation 
Full text 201 
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146 Leroy v. France 36109/03 02/10
/2008 
NV Public interest, artistic expression, 
glorifying terrorism, political expression, 
activism, cartoon 
Full text 202 
147 TV Vest SA Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v. Norway 
21132/05 11/12
/2008 
V Television, political advertising, positive 
obligation, margin of appreciation, 
pluralism 
Full text 204 
148 Khurshid Mustafa & 
Tarzibachi v. Sweden 
23883/06 16/12
/2008 
V Language of television, freedom to receive 
information, positive obligation, horizontal 
effect, disproportionality of the 
interference      
Full text 206 
149 Times Newspapers Ltd. 
(Nos. 1 & 2) v. the United 
Kingdom 
3002/03 
and 
23676/03 
10/03
/2009 
NV Internet, internet publication rule, 
defamation, libel, education, historical 
research, responsible journalism, news 
archives 
Full text 208 
150 Faccio v. Italy 33/04 31/03
/2009 
I Disproportionate measure, right to receive 
information, privacy, licence fee. 
Full text 210 
151 A. v. Norway 28070/06 09/04
/2009 
V 8 Crime reporting, defamation, presumption 
of innocence, privacy, margin of 
appreciation, moral and psychological 
integrity, protection of minors 
Full text 211 
152 TASZ v. Hungary 37374/05 14/04
/2009 
V Access to information, public or official 
documents, open government, indirect 
censorship, personal information of a 
politician, social watchdog 
Full text 213 
153 Kenedi v. Hungary 31475/05 26/05
/2009 
V 10, 
6, 13 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, public watchdog 
Full text 215 
154 Féret v. Belgium 15615/07 16/07
/2009 
NV Hate speech, insult of foreigners, political 
expression, election campaign, public 
debate 
Full text 217 
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155 Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland 20436/02 16/07
/2009 
V Public interest, pluralism, facts or value 
judgments, duties and responsibilities, 
good faith, employment relation 
Full text 219 
156 Manole & others v. 
Moldova 
13936/02 17/09
/2009 
V Broadcasting licences, political 
independence political independence of 
media, pluralism, censorship, public 
service broadcasting 
Full text 221 
157 VgT Vereinigung gegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland (No. 2) [Grand 
Chamber] 
32772/02 30/06
/2009 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 223 
158 Pasko v. Russia 69519/01 22/10
/2009 
NV Confidential information, state secrets, 
national security, military information 
Full text 225 
159 Ürper & others v. Turkey 14526/07, 
14747/07, 
15022/07, 
15737/07, 
36137/07, 
47245/07, 
50371/07, 
50372/07 
and 
54637/07 
20/10
/2009 
V Terrorism, suspension of publication and 
distribution of newspaper, public 
watchdog 
Full text 227 
160 Financial Times & others 
v. the United Kingdom 
821/03 15/12
/2009 
V Protection of journalistic sources, a source 
acting in bad faith, public interest 
Full text 228 
161 Laranjeira Marques da 
Silva v. Portugal 
16983/06 19/01
/2010 
V Political expression, defamation, facts or 
value judgments, reputation, public 
interest 
Full text 230 
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162 Alfantakis v. Greece 49330/0 11/02
/2010 
V Television interview, defamation, insult, 
reputation, live broadcasting, facts or 
value judgments 
Full text 232 
163 Flinkkilä & others v. 
Finland 
25576/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest 
Full text 233 
164 Jokitaipale & others v. 
Finland 
43349/05 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
165 Iltalehti & Karhuvaara v. 
Finland 
6372/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
166 Soila v. Finland 6806/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
167 Tuomela & others v. 
Finland  
25711/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
168 Renaud v. France 13290/07 25/02
/2010 
V Internet, political speech, criticism, 
emotional political debate, tolerance, facts 
or value judgments, chilling effect 
Full text 235 
169 Jean-Marie Le Pen v. 
France 
18788/09 20/04
/2010 
I Offensive information, hate speech,  
political debate, reputation, rights of 
others, exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 236 
170 Akdas v. Turkey 41056/04 16/02
/2010 
V Artistic expression, obscene or immoral 
information, fiction, 
exaggeration, humorous, duties and 
responsibilities, protection of morals  
Full text 238 
171 Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 40984/07 22/04
/2010 
V Sensitive and offensive information, 
defamation, terrorism, historical truth, 
public watchdog, disproportionate 
sanction, order of immediate release from 
prison 
Full text 239 
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172 Andreescu v. Romania 19452/02 08/06
/2010 
V 10, 6 Access, defamation, insult, reputation, 
facts or value judgments, public debate, 
good faith 
Full text 242 
173 Aksu v. Turkey 4149/04 
and 
41029/04 
27/07
/2010 
NV 14, 
8, >GC 
Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation, racial 
discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy 
Full text 244 
174 Sanoma v. The 
Netherlands 
38224/03 14/09
/2010 
V Protection of journalistic sources, public 
interest, public watchdog 
Full text 246 
175 Gillberg v. Sweden 41723/06 02/11
/2010 
NV 10, 
8, >GC 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 248 
176 Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon 
Yayıncıliğı A.Ş. v. Turkey 
(No. 2) 
42284/05 12/10
/2010 
V Broadcasting licence, religion, rule of law, 
positive obligations  
Full text 251 
177 MGN Ltd. v. United 
Kingdom 
39401/04 18/01
/2011 
V Public interest, privacy, chilling effect, 
disproportionality of interference 
Full text 252 
178 Yleisradio Oy & others v. 
Finland 
30881/09 08/02
/2011 
NV Defamation, confidential and sensitive 
information, privacy, private persons,  
Full text 253 
179 Otegi Mondragon v. Spain 2034/07 15/03
/2011 
V Political expression, insult, value 
judgments, honour, privacy, dignity, public 
debate, exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 254 
180 RTBF v. Belgium 50084/06 29/03
/2011 
V Broadcasting, patients’ rights, impart 
information, prior restraint, censorship, 
foreseeability of law 
Full text 255 
181 Mosley v. the United 
Kingdom 
48009/08 10/05
/2011 
NV 8 Privacy, positive obligation, 
prenotification, public interest, margin of 
appreciation, chilling effect 
Full text 256 
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182 Sigma Radio Television 
Ltd. V. Cyprus 
32181/04 
and 
35122/05 
21/07
/2011 
NV 10, 
14 
Rights of others, decisions by independent 
media regulators, budget neutrality, 
margin of appreciation, discrimination 
Full text 258 
183 Sipoş v. Romania 26125/04 03/05
/2011 
V 8 Journalism, defamation, insult, privacy, 
horizontal effect of human rights, positive 
obligations, chilling effect of criminal 
sanctions 
Full text 260 
184 Karttunen v. Finland 1685/10 10/05
/2011 
I Internet, possession and reproduction of 
child pornography, illegal content, artistic 
expression 
Full text 262 
185 Avram & others v. 
Moldova 
41588/05 05/07
/2011 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, undercover 
video, journalism 
Full text 264 
186 Standard News Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria (No. 3) 
34702/07 10/01
/2012 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, public figure, 
defamation, libel  
Full text 266 
187 Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany 
39954/08 07/02
/2012 
V Privacy, reputation, receive information, 
public interest, conflicting human rights 
Full text 260 
188 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 2)  
40660/08 
and 
60614/08 
07/02
/2012 
NV 8 Privacy in public areas, public interest, 
entertainment press, conflicting human 
rights 
Full text 268 
189 Tusalp v. Turkey 32131/08 
and 
41617/08 
21/02
/2012 
V Defamation, journalistic freedom of 
expression, value judgments, Prime 
Minister’s personality rights, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 270 
190 Aksu v. Turkey [Grand 
Chamber] 
4149/04 
and 
41029/04 
15/03
/2012 
NV 8 Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation, racial 
discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy  
Full text 272 
191 Vejdeland & others v. 
Sweden 
1813/07 09/02
/2012 
NV Hate speech, homophobia, insult 
homosexuals, pamphlets, school  
Full text 274 
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192 Gillberg v. Sweden [Grand 
Chamber] 
41723/06 03/04
/2012 
NV Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 276 
193 Frasilă and Ciocirlan v. 
Romania 
25329/03 10/05
/2012 
V Positive obligations, access, rights of 
others, public debate, public watchdog, 
pluralism 
Full text 277 
194 Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and 
Di Stefano v. Italy 
38433/09 07/06
/2012 
V 10, 
AP-
1(1) 
Dominant position over the audiovisual 
media, allocation of frequencies, media 
pluralism, right to receive information 
Full text 278 
195 Mouvement raëlien suisse 
v. Switzerland 
16354/06 13/07
/2012 
NV Internet, illegal content, poster campaign, 
aliens, proselytising speech, the protection 
of morals, health, rights of others and 
prevention of crime 
Full text 280 
196 Schweizerische Radio- 
und Fernseh gesellschaft 
SRG v. Switzerland  
34124/06 21/06
/2012 
V Television interview, political and 
economic expression, rights of others, 
public interest, privacy, security, margin of 
appreciation, public interest 
Full text 282 
197 Ressiot & others v. France 15054/07 
and 
15066/07 
28/06
/2012 
V Protection of sources, disproportionality of 
interference, searches of offices of 
newspapers, searches of homes 
Full text 284 
198 Szima v. Hungary 29723/11 09/10
/2012 
NV Internet, criticism, labour union, 
disciplinary sanction 
Full text 285 
199 Telegraaf Media 
Nederland Landelijke 
Media B.V. & Others v. the 
Netherlands 
39315/06 22/11
/2012 
V Protection of journalistic sources, 
intelligence and security services, 
surveillance, coercive measures, ex ante 
review 
Full text 287 
200 Nenkova-Lalova v. 
Bulgaria 
35745/05 11/12
/2012 
NV Dismissal of journalist, disciplinary 
sanction 
Full text 289 
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201 Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey 3111/10 18/12
/2012 
V Internet, defamation, blocking of Google 
Sites, disproportionate measure, 
prescribed by law 
Full text 291 
202 Ashby Donald & Others v. 
France 
36769/08 10/01
/2013 
NV Intellectual property, unauthorised 
reproduction of fashion photos, Internet, 
margin of appreciation, news reporting 
exception, commercial speech 
Full text 293 
203 Frederik Neij & Peter 
Sunde Kolmisoppi (The 
Pirate Bay) v. Sweden 
(dec.) 
40397/12 19/02
/2013 
I Copyright, The Pirate Bay, Internet file-
sharing service, illegal use of copyright-
protected music, conviction, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 295 
204 Eon v. France 26118/10 14/03
/2013 
V Insult of President, discussion of matters 
of public interest, private life or honour, 
satire, chilling effect 
Full text 297 
205 Saint-Paul Luxembourg 
S.A. v. Luxembourg 
26419/10 18/04
/2013 
V 10, 8 Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, identification of author, 
proportionality 
Full text 299 
206 Animal Defenders 
International v. the United 
Kingdom [Grand Chamber] 
48876/08 22/04
/2013 
NV Public debate, ban on political advertising, 
NGO, powerful financial groups, access, 
influential media, alternative media, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 301 
207 Meltex Ltd. v. Armenia 
(dec.) 
45199/09 21/05
/2013 
I Broadcasting licence, licensing body, 
arbitrary interference, procedural 
safeguards, domestic enforcement of 
Court’s judgment, fresh violation of 
freedom of expression 
Full text 303 
208 Youth Initiative for Human 
Rights v. Serbia 
48135/06 25/06
/2013 
V Access to documents held by public 
authorities, NGO, electronic surveillance 
measures, freedom of information 
Full text 304 
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legislation, public debate, public interest, 
public watchdog 
209 Nagla v. Latvia 73469/10 16/07
/2013 
V Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, chilling effect, safeguards 
against abuse, pressing social need 
Full text 305 
210 Węgrzynowski and 
Smolczewski v. Poland 
33846/07 16/07
/2013 
NV 10, 
8 
Personality rights, online news media, 
digital archives, public watchdog, privacy, 
libel, rectification 
Full text 306 
211 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 3) 
8772/10 19/09
/2013 
NV 8 Photograph, injunction prohibiting further 
publication, debate of general interest, 
public figure, privacy, freedom of the 
press, positive obligations 
Full text 308 
212 Belpietro v. Italy 43612/10 24/09
/2013 
V Freedom of parliamentary speech, 
parliamentary immunity, defamation, 
public officials, conviction, editorial 
control, chilling effect 
Full text 309 
213 Ricci v. Italy 30210/06 08/10
/2013 
V Satirical television programme, disclosure 
of confidential images, suspended prison 
sentence, ethics of journalism, chilling 
effect 
Full text 311 
214 Delfi AS v. Estonia 64569/09 10/10
/2013 
NV, 
>GC 
Internet news portal, grossly insulting 
remarks, readers’ comments, ISP liability 
(exemption), filter, notice-and-takedown, 
editorial control, economic interest 
Full text 313 
215 Ristamäki and Korvola v. 
Finland 
66456/09 29/10
/2013 
V Defamation, conviction, protection of 
reputation, public interest, tax inspection 
Full text 315 
216 Österreichische 
Vereinigung zur 
Erhaltung, Stärkung und 
Schaffung eines 
39534/07 28/11
/2013 
V NGO, gathering of information in public 
interest, public debate, right of access to 
information, positive State obligations, 
information monopoly, social watchdog 
Full text 317 
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wirtschaftlich gesunden 
land- und 
forstwirtschaftlichen 
Grundbesitzes v. Austria 
217 Perinçek v. Switzerland 27510/08 17/12
/2013 
V, >GC Genocide denial, Armenia, criminal 
conviction, racial discrimination, historical 
debate, public interest, negation of crimes 
against humanity 
Full text 319 
218 Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther 
v. Norway 
13258/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 8 Public figures, respect for private life, 
wedding, accessibility to public, image, 
personality, reputation, fair balance 
Full text 321 
219 Tierbefreier E.V. v. 
Germany 
45192/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 10, 
14 
Association, animal rights, film, website, 
injunction, personality rights of company, 
debate on matters of public interest, 
unfair means 
Full text 323 
220 Pentikäinen v. Finland 11882/10 04/02
/2014 
NV, 
>GC 
Press photographer, demonstration, police 
order, conviction, no confiscation of 
equipment or photos, public interest, fair 
balance 
Full text 325 
221 Bayar (nos. 1-8) v. Turkey 39690/06, 
40559/06,
48815/06, 
2512/07, 
55197/07, 
55199/07, 
55201/07 
and 
55202/07 
25/03
/2014 
V 10, 6 Criminal conviction, publication of 
declarations by illegal armed organisation, 
right to fair trial, fight against terrorism, 
no encouragement of violence, no hate 
speech 
Full text 327 
222 Brosa v. Germany 5709/09 17/04
/2014 
V Freedom of political expression, pre-
election, neo-Nazi organisation, private 
Full text 328 
 27 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
individual, public discussion, mayoral 
election, acceptable criticism, honour and 
social reputation, sufficient factual basis 
223 Salumäki v. Finland 23605/09 29/04
/2014 
NV Newspaper article, insinuation, criminal 
conviction, private life, reputation, fair 
balance, public interest, presumption of 
innocence, margin of appreciation 
Full text 330 
224 Taranenko v. Russia 19554/05 15/05
/2014 
V 10, 
11 
Freedom of assembly and association, 
leaflets, occupation of administrative 
premises, conviction, prison sentence, pre-
trial detention, chilling effect 
Full text 332 
225 Roşiianu v. Romania 27329/06 24/06
/2014 
V Right of access to public documents, 
public interest, journalism, efficient 
enforcement mechanisms, arbitrary 
restrictions, indirect censorship 
Full text 333 
226 Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany (No. 2) 
48311/10 10/07
/2014 
V Protection of reputation, private life, value 
judgment, former Chancellor, public 
figure, degree of tolerance, public 
watchdog 
Full text 335 
227 Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria 8429/05 30/10
/2014 
V 8 Private life, confiscation of computers, 
illegal software, illegal distribution and 
reproduction, search-and-seizure, arbitrary 
interference, sufficient guarantees 
Full text 337 
228 Matúz v. Hungary 73571/10 21/10
/2014 
V Whistleblower, journalist, confidential 
information, censorship, public 
broadcasting organisation, public interest, 
severity of sanction 
Full text 339 
229 Urechean and Pavlicenco 
v. Moldova  
27756/05 
and 
41219/07 
02/12
/2014 
V 6 Defamation proceedings, President, 
blanket immunity, right of access to courts 
Full text 341 
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230 Uzeyir Jafarov v. 
Azerbaijan 
54204/08 29/01
/2015 
V 3 Violent attack, journalist, favourable 
environment, participation in public 
debate, effective investigation, prohibition 
of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment 
Full text 343 
231 Bohlen v. Germany 53495/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, 
humour, satire, fair balance 
Full text 345 
232 Ernst August von 
Hannover v. Germany  
53649/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, 
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Introduction  
Prof. em. dr. Dirk Voorhoof 
(Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy) 
 
Since its inception in 1995, IRIS – Legal Observations of the European Audiovisual Observatory has 
given a prominent place to the European Court of Human Rights’ (‘ECtHR’, or ‘the Court’) 
jurisprudence on the right to freedom of expression and information, in particular as regards 
audiovisual media, film, journalism and more recently also online media. Its very first issue of 
January 1995 focused on two judgments with specific relevance for audiovisual media and film. 
The judgment in the case Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria (20 September 1994) concerned the 
seizure and forfeiture of a film (Das Liebeskonzil) considered blasphemous (at that time) by the 
Austrian authorities. The Court found no violation of Article 10 of the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’, or ‘the European Convention’), that 
guarantees the right to freedom of expression and information. The ECtHR accepted the reasoning 
that the overwhelming majority of Tyroleans would be offended in their religious feelings by the 
mere fact of announcing and showing the film in a special featured programme in a cinema. In Jersild 
v. Denmark (23 September 1994), the ECtHR came to the conclusion that it was not necessary in a 
democratic society to convict a journalist for aiding and abetting in the dissemination of racist 
remarks made by extremist youths in a television programme. The Court was of the opinion that the 
punishment of a television news journalist for assisting in the dissemination of racist statements 
made by another person in an interview would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to 
discussion of matters of public interest. It also stated that it was not for the courts or judges “to 
substitute their own views for those of the press as to what technique of reporting should be adopted 
by journalists” and that “news reporting based on interviews, whether edited or not, constitutes one 
of the most important means whereby the press is able to play its vital role as public watchdog”. In 
this case, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 10 ECHR by the Danish authorities. 
 
These were certainly not the first judgments of the ECtHR related to freedom of expression and 
information with special relevance for audiovisual media, film and journalism. Before 1995 when 
IRIS was launched, other landmark judgments on freedom of expression and media had already 
been delivered by the ECtHR, interpreting and applying the European Convention as a binding 
instrument of human rights protection in Europe. The ECtHR found violations of the right to 
freedom of expression and information in a series of interesting cases, such as: Sunday Times no. 
1 v. the United Kingdom (26 April 1979; pre-trial reporting in the media); Lingens v. Austria (8 July 
1986; right to criticise a politician and the distinction between allegations of facts and value-
judgments, the latter not being susceptible of proof), and Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland (25 June 
1992; the right to comment critically on alleged police brutalities).  
 
The very first judgments with specific relevance for the audiovisual media were Groppera Radio 
AG a.o. v. Switzerland (28 March 1990) and Autronic AG v. Switzerland (22 May 1990). In Groppera, 
a ban on the retransmission by cable networks of the programmes of a Swiss radio station, having 
evaded the Swiss broadcasting law by establishing its transmitters in Italy, was not considered 
to be a violation of Article 10 ECHR. In Autronic AG, the refusal by the Swiss authorities to grant 
an authorisation to install a satellite dish for receiving television programmes broadcast by a 
telecommunications satellite was considered a violation of Article 10 ECHR, thereby explicitly 
recognising the right to receive broadcast television programmes. Many years later, in Khurshid 
Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden (16 December 2008), the Court emphasised the importance of 
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the right to receive television programmes in one’s own language in a case where Swedish nationals 
of Iraqi origin had been forced to move from their rented flat as they had refused to remove a 
satellite dish in their flat after the landlord had initiated proceedings against them. The landlord 
considered the installation of a satellite antenna as a breach of the tenancy agreement that 
stipulated that “outdoor antennae” were not allowed to be set up on the house. The ECtHR, 
however, considered the eviction of the family as a disproportionate measure amounting to a 
violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
 
One of the first ECtHR judgments to be brought to the attention of the IRIS-readership (IRIS 
1996/4) was the judgment in the case of Goodwin v. the United Kingdom. A few months earlier, 
the editorial in IRIS 1996/1 had already announced this forthcoming “landmark judgment” on the 
protection of journalistic sources. In its judgment of 27 March 1996, the ECtHR came to the 
conclusion that a disclosure order requiring a journalist to reveal the identity of his source and 
the fine imposed upon him for having refused to do so, constituted a violation of the right to 
freedom of expression and information as protected by Article 10 ECHR.  
 
Another judgment reported in IRIS in 1996 was the case of Wingrove v. the United Kingdom (25 
November 1996): the decision by the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC) to reject 
classification of a blasphemous film (Visions of Ecstasy) and hence the prohibition to distribute the 
film in the United Kingdom was not considered to be a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. It 
was certainly a controversial judgment at the time. In January 2012, the BBFC gave the film an 
18-certificate, with no cuts or alterations to the original film's content, after the United Kingdom 
had repealed its blasphemy laws in 2008. 
 
Over the last 25 years, IRIS has highlighted a long series of ECtHR judgments relating to freedom 
of expression, illuminating important developments and their consequences for media regulation 
and policy in the Council of Europe and its member states. In the first period, 1995-2000, a 
substantial sample of the judgments dealing with freedom of expression, media and journalism 
could be reported on, selecting those cases with a general, important or innovative impact on 
the interpretation of Article 10 ECHR. Gradually, and especially since 2001, IRIS was confronted 
with an increasing amount of judgments being delivered by the European Court dealing with 
freedom of expression and information. As a strict selection had to be made every month, not all 
important judgments could be reported. Therefore, priority was given to those judgments with 
specific importance for the sector of film, broadcasting, audiovisual media services and later also 
the Internet. The selection of summaries of judgments dealing with Article 10 ECHR gives a 
valuable overview of the case-law in these fields, without excluding those judgments which are 
of general importance for the functioning of all media and journalism in a democratic society. 
The latter category of judgments includes the Court’s case-law dealing with: protection of 
journalistic sources (Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, Ernst a.o. v. 
Belgium, Voskuil v. the Netherlands, Tillack v. Belgium, Financial Times a.o. v. the United Kingdom, 
Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands, Ressiot a.o. v. France, Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke 
Media B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands, Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg, and more 
recently, Nagla v. Latvia, Görmüş a.o. v. Turkey, Becker v. Norway and Big Brother Watch a.o. v. the 
United Kingdom); access to public or official documents (TASZ v. Hungary, Kenedi v. Hungary, Gillberg 
v. Sweden, Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, 
Stärkung und Schaffung eines wirtschaftlich gesunden land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes 
v. Austria, Roşiianu v. Romania and particularly the Grand Chamber judgment in Magyar Helsinki 
Bizottság v. Hungary) and whistleblowing (Guja v. Moldova, Matúz v. Hungary and Görmüş a.o. v. 
Turkey). It also includes the case-law balancing the right to freedom of expression with the right 
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to privacy (Peck v. the United Kingdom, Radio France v. France, Von Hannover no. 1, no. 2 and no. 3 
v. Germany, Plon v. France, Tammer v. Estonia, Radio Twist v. Slovakia, Petrina v. Romania, White v. 
Sweden, Mosley v. the United Kingdom, Avram a.o. v. Moldova, Axel Springer AG no. 1 v. Germany, 
Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway, Bohlen v. Germany, Ernst August von Hannover v. Germany, 
Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, Sousa Goucha v. Portugal and Rubio Dosamantes 
v. Spain). Many other cases dealt with freedom of expression in relation to allegations of facts 
tarnishing the good name and reputation of others (Perna v. Italy, Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark, Thoma v. Luxembourg, Colombani v. France, Klein v. Slovakia, Mamère v. France, Standard 
Verlags GmbH v. Austria, Belpietro v. Italy, Ristamäki and Korvola v. Finland, Brosa v. Germany, 
Salumäki v. Finland, Axel Springer AG No. 2 v. Germany, Erla Hlynsdóttir v. Iceland (no. 3), Morice v. 
France, Niskasaari and Otavamedia Oy v. Finland, De Carolis and France Télévisions v. France and 
Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform, TOV v. Ukraine, Terentyev v. Russia, Pihl v. Sweden, Ólafsson v. 
Iceland, Milisavljević v. Serbia, Halldórsson v. Iceland, Ghiulfer Predescu v. Romania, Herbert Haupt v. 
Austria, Einarsson v. Iceland, Frisk and Jensen v. Denmark, Fuchsmann v. Germany, Faludy-Kovács v. 
Hungary, MAC TV s.r.o. v. Slovakia, GRA Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus v. Switzerland, 
Annen (nos. 2 and 5) v. Germany, Annen (no. 6) v. Germany, Egill Einarsson (no. 2) v. Iceland, Høiness 
v. Norway and Tamiz v. the United Kingdom) or disclosing confidential information (Fressoz and Roire 
v. France, Radio Twist v. Slovakia, Stoll v. Switzerland, Ricci v. Italy, Pinto Coelho v. Portugal (no. 2) 
and Bédat v. Switzerland). In a judgment of 28 June 2018, the ECtHR dismissed an Article 8 “right 
to be forgotten”-application in respect of online information on German media portals concerning 
a murder conviction of two persons (M.L. and W.W. v. Germany).  
 
The Court also dealt with the (ab)use of hidden cameras (Tierbefreier E.V. v. Germany, Haldimann 
v. Switzerland and Alpha Doryforiki Tileorasi Anonymi Etairia v. Greece) and with the making or 
publishing of pictures of suspects in crime or court reporting (Axel Springer AG no. 1 v. Germany 
and Axel Springer SE and RTL Television GmbH v. Germany). In other cases the Court determined 
the scope of the right of newsgathering by journalists and media workers, such as in Dammann v. 
Switzerland, Dupuis and others v. France, Pentikaïnen v. Finland, Selmani and others v. the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Butkevich v. Russia. In Szurovecz v. Hungary, the ECtHR has 
held that a refusal to grant a journalist access to an asylum seeker reception centre violated his 
right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. The ECtHR emphasized that 
newsgathering, including first-hand observation by a journalist reporting on a matter of 
significant public interest, is an essential part of journalistic research and press freedom. It also 
reiterated that the “watchdog” role of the media is a guarantee that the authorities can be held 
to account for their conduct. The Court’s findings in other cases show that journalists who commit 
(minor) offences during newsgathering activities, cannot invoke robust protection based on their 
rights to freedom of expression and information as guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR (Diamant 
Salihu a.o. v. Sweden, Brambilla a.o. v. Italy and Endy Gęsina-Torres v. Poland). 
 
In a case related to a violent attack on a journalist, the European Court reiterated that States, 
under their positive obligations of the Convention, are required to create a favourable 
environment for participation in public debate by all the persons concerned, enabling them to 
express their opinions and ideas without fear. Because of failures to carry out an effective 
investigation, the Court found that the criminal investigation of the journalist’s claim of ill-
treatment was ineffective and that accordingly there had been a violation of Article 3 (prohibition 
of torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention under its procedural limb 
(Uzeyir Jafarov v. Azerbaijan). In other cases the Court found a violation of Article 2 ECHR (right to 
life). In Huseynova v. Azerbaijan it concluded that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out 
an adequate and effective investigation into the circumstances surrounding the killing of a 
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prominent independent journalist, and it held that there has been a violation of Article 2 ECHR 
under its procedural limb. Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan reveals how powerful persons and their 
environment sometimes use clearly illegal and immoral techniques in order to intimidate 
investigative journalists to make them stop critically reporting about their actions, policy or 
corruptive activities. The case mainly concerns a smear campaign against a well-known 
journalist, reporting about corruption and human rights violations in her country. The ECtHR 
found that the authorities had failed to comply with their positive obligations to protect the 
journalist’s right to privacy and her freedom of expression under Article 8 and 10 ECHR. 
 
It also became obvious that the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights increased 
as a result of the growing number of State Parties to the Convention in the 1990s, after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Consequently, the first judgments in which the ECtHR decided on 
alleged violations of Article 10 in the new member states were soon reported on in IRIS. In the 
new member states’ transition towards democracy, transparency, pluralism and diversity, the 
Court’s case-law demonstrated that the authorities in those states did not always adequately 
respect the right to freedom of expression and information (e.g., Dalban v. Romania, Feldek v. 
Slovakia, Gaweda v. Poland, Grinberg v. Russia, Klein v. Slovakia, Glas Nadezhda EOO & Elenkov v. 
Bulgaria, Meltex Ltd. & Mesrop Movsesyan v. Armenia, Filatenko v. Russia, Manole a.o. v. Moldova, 
Taranenko v. Russia, Roşiianu v. Romania, Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform, TOV v. Ukraine, Terentyev 
v. Russia, Selmani and others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Milisavljević v. Serbia, 
Ghiulfer Predescu v. Romania, Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia, Huseynova v. Azerbaijan, Magyar Jeti Zrt v. 
Hungary, Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, Brzeziński v. Poland and Szurovecz v. Hungary). Reflecting 
the Court’s case-law output, very often cases were reported in which the Court had found 
violations by the Turkish authorities regarding freedom of the media, the right of critical media 
reporting and freedom of (political) expression, such as in Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, Müslum Gündüz 
v. Turkey, Nur Radio and Ozgür Radio v. Turkey, Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey, Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon 
Yayinciligi AS v. Turkey and in Bayar (Nos. 1-8) v. Turkey. In Tuşalp v. Turkey, a case about a 
defamatory article criticising the Turkish Prime Minister, the Court came to the conclusion that 
the domestic courts had failed to establish convincingly any pressing social need for putting the 
Prime Minister’s personality rights above the journalist’s rights and the general interest in 
promoting the freedom of the press where issues of public interest are concerned. In 2018, the 
ECtHR delivered two important judgments in cases brought by two journalists detained in Turkey 
after the attempted coup d’état of 15 July 2016. In both cases, Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey and 
Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, it found a violation of the journalists’ right to freedom of expression. The 
ECtHR clarified that the existence of a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation” must 
not serve as a pretext for limiting freedom of political debate, which is at the very core of the 
concept of a democratic society. Apart from Turkey also the record of the Russian Federation in 
terms of violations of the right to freedom of expression shows a deplorable approach by the 
authorities (see e.g. most recently Kablis v. Russia, Rebechenko v. Russia, Butkevich v. Russia, 
Stomakhin v. Russia, Mariya Alekhina and others v. Russia,  Savva Terentyev v. Russia and 
Pryanishnikov v. Russia). 
 
In other judgments, the Court has made clear that hate speech is intolerable in a democratic 
society, whether it is directed against foreigners (Féret v. Belgium) or homosexuals (Vejdeland a.o. 
v. Sweden), or whether it concerns religious insult (I.A. v. Turkey, Fouad Belkacem v. Belgium and 
E.S. v. Austria) or incitement to violence or terrorism (Roj TV A/S v. Denmark). Also a conviction for 
having published Nazi-symbols, accompanied with a picture and a quote from a notorious SS 
officer, as part of a vulgar and offensive blog post was not considered as a breach of Article 10 
ECHR, the Court accepting that the German ban on symbols of unconstitutional organisations 
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was justified to maintain political peace and to prevent the revival of Nazism (Hans Burkhard Nix 
v. Germany). In Richard Williamson v. Germany, the ECtHR found that the statements in an interview 
broadcast on Swedish television, published on YouTube and reported in German media, in which 
the applicant explicitly denied the existence of gas chambers and grossly minimized the killing 
of Jews under the Nazi regime could not count on the protection of the right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 ECHR.  
 
Some judgments found that too far-reaching restrictions had been imposed on political 
advertising on television, such as in Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland and in TV Vest SA and 
Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, while the Court accepted a general ban in Ireland on the 
broadcasting of religious advertising (Murphy v. Ireland) and a ban in the United Kingdom on 
political advertising on television (Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom). In 
Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, the ECtHR found in favour of an advertising company’s freedom of 
commercial speech. The company had been imposed a fine for running a commercial campaign 
with religious symbols, containing a depiction of Christ and Mary likely to offend the feelings of 
religious people. According to the ECtHR, the advertisements did not appear to have been 
gratuitously offensive or profane, and nor had they incited hatred on the grounds of religious 
belief or attacked a religion in an unwarranted or abusive manner.  
 
In Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia, the Court dealt with an application of the Russian Electoral Rights 
Act aimed at transparency of elections, including campaign finances, as well as at enforcing the 
voters’ right to impartial, truthful and balanced information via mass media outlets. The Court 
found, however, that the application of the Electoral Rights Act interfered with a newspaper’s 
editorial choice to publish a text taking a critical stance and to impart information and ideas on 
matters of public interest. The case of Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v. Hungary concerned a mobile 
app which allowed voters to anonymously share photographs of their ballot papers. The ECtHR 
held that a fine imposed on a political party for distributing the app had violated the party’s right 
to freedom of expression. In Brzeziński v. Poland, the Court held that there has been a violation 
of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression as a politician, in election time. The case 
concerns in particular a provision in Poland’s election law which allows a court, within 24 hours, 
to consider whether “untrue information” has been published, and to issue an order prohibiting 
its further distribution. This judgment illustrates that taking action against (alleged) “fake news”, 
also in election periods, needs to respect the guarantees and safeguards of Article 10 ECHR. 
 
In Perinçek v. Switzerland, the Court ruled that Switzerland had violated Article 10 by convicting 
a Turkish politician of publicly denying the genocide against the Armenian people, distinguishing 
the genocide against the Armenian people from the negation of crimes of the Holocaust, 
committed by the Nazi regime. After referral, the Grand Chamber came to the conclusion that the 
statements at issue could not be regarded as affecting the dignity of the members of the 
Armenian community to the point of requiring a criminal law response in Switzerland. It 
confirmed the finding of a violation of Article 10 ECHR, while also emphasising that Article 17 of 
the Convention (abuse clause) can only be applied on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases, 
where it is “immediately clear” that freedom of expression is employed for ends manifestly 
contrary to the values of the Convention (Perinçek v. Switzerland). In some recent decisions, 
however, the Court has applied Article 17 ECHR. In Fouad Belkacem v. Belgium, the ECtHR 
considered that Belkacem had attempted to deflect Article 10 of the Convention from its real 
purpose by using his right to freedom of expression for ends that were manifestly contrary to the 
spirit of the Convention. As the leader and spokesperson of the organisation “Sharia4Belgium”, 
Belkacem had published a series of YouTube videos that incited to discrimination, hatred and 
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violence against non-Muslim groups and also promoted Sharia. In E.S. v. Austria, the ECtHR 
referred to Article 9 ECHR (freedom of religion) that obliges the member states’ authorities to 
ensure the peaceful co-existence of religious and non-religious groups and individuals under 
their jurisdiction by ensuring an atmosphere of mutual tolerance. The ECtHR agreed with the 
Austrian courts’ approach that presenting objects of religious worship in a provocative way 
capable of hurting the feelings of the followers of that religion could be conceived as a malicious 
violation of the spirit of tolerance. From this perspective a criminal conviction because of an 
abusive attack on an object of religious veneration can be justified as necessary in a democratic 
society. In the Pussy Riot-case (Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia) the ECtHR found that the 
feminist punk band’s pop-up performance in a cathedral could not be considered as incitement 
to religious hatred or violence. It also found that the punk band’s right to freedom of expression 
has been violated on account of declaring the Pussy Riot video material available on the Internet 
as extremist and banning it. In Stern Taulats and Roura Capellera v. Spain, the ECtHR came to the 
conclusion that the act of setting fire to a photograph of the royal couple during an anti-royalist 
demonstration neither constituted incitement to hatred or violence, as  an act of this type should 
be interpreted as the symbolic expression of dissatisfaction and protest. The ECtHR held that the 
criminal conviction of the applicants for insult of the Crown was not necessary in a democratic 
society. In Sinkova v. Ukraine, the ECtHR however concluded that a conviction for a performance-
art protest at a war memorial, which had been filmed and published online, legitimately aimed 
at protecting morals and the rights of others and did not violate Article 10 ECHR. 
 
Some cases relate to morality and forms of prior restraint. In KAOS GL v. Turkey, the Court found 
that the aim of protecting public morals relied upon by the Turkish authorities had been 
insufficient to justify the prior censorship of an LGBT-magazine for more than five years. In 
Unifaun Theatre Productions Limited and Others v. Malta, the ECtHR delivered a judgment regarding 
a peculiar application of the Maltese Cinema and Stage Regulations, banning the performance of 
a theatre play containing scenes that affected the morality and decency of the entire production. 
In Pryanishnikov v. Russia, the Court delivered a judgment about the refusal to grant a film 
reproduction licence to a Russian film producer on the ground that he was suspected of producing 
and distributing pornographic films. 
 
Other issues reflected in the ECtHR’s case-law that have been regularly reported in IRIS concern: 
media pluralism, non-discriminatory allocation of frequencies or broadcasting licences, decisions by 
independent media regulators and procedural safeguards against arbitrary applications of media 
law provisions (e.g. Demuth v. Switzerland, Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria, Meltex 
Ltd. & Mesrop Movsesyan v. Armenia, Nur Radyo v. Turkey, Özgür Radyo v. Turkey, Manole a.o. v. 
Moldova, Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayinciliği A.Ş. v. Turkey, RTBF v. Belgium and Sigma Radio 
Television Ltd. v. Cyprus). In Centro Europe 7 S.r.l. and  Di Stefano v. Italy, the Grand Chamber of the 
ECtHR clarified that a situation whereby a powerful economic or political group in society is 
permitted to obtain a position of dominance over the audiovisual media and thereby exercise 
pressure on broadcasters and eventually curtail their editorial freedom, undermines the 
fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic society, as enshrined in Article 10 
ECHR. In a decision, the ECtHR confirmed the competence of a media regulatory body to interfere, 
in a proportionate way, with a journalist’s or a radio station’s freedom of expression. In the case 
at issue Ofcom, the independent regulator and competition authority for the United Kingdom 
communications industries, had launched an investigation into a radio interview about which it 
had received a series of complaints. Ofcom concluded that the broadcast had breached the 
Broadcasting Code, as it had amounted to gratuitous and offensive insult without contextual 
content or justification. No sanction or penalty was imposed either on the radio station or the 
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journalist other than the publication of the decision by Ofcom (Jon Gaunt v. the United Kingdom). 
In another judgment the Court found Sweden to be in breach of the European Convention 
because it had denied access to court for a person who wanted to bring defamation proceedings 
in Sweden arising out of the content of a trans-border television programme service (TV3) 
resorting under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. The European Court is of the opinion that 
requiring a Swedish national to bring defamation proceedings in the UK courts following an 
alleged defamatory TV programme broadcast by the London-based company Viasat Broadcasting 
UK, but targeting mostly, if not exclusively, a Swedish audience, was not reasonable and violated 
Article 6 § 1 ECHR, guaranteeing access to court (Arlewin v. Sweden). 
 
In recent years, the cases reported in IRIS have also reflected the growing impact of the Internet 
and some of the specific legal issues related to it, such as in Times Newspapers Ltd., nos. 1 & 2 v. 
the United Kingdom, in which the Court accepted the application of the so-called “Internet 
publication rule”, a British common-law rule according to which each publication of a defamatory 
statement can give rise to a separate cause of action, with the implication that a new cause of 
action accrues every time the defamatory material is accessed on the Internet. The Court 
recognised the importance of the media’s internet archives for education and historical research, 
emphasising the duty of the media to act in accordance with the principles of responsible 
journalism, including by ensuring the accuracy of historical information (see also M.L. and W.W. 
v. Germany). Another relevant case, also reported on in IRIS, was Karttunen v. Finland, on the 
criminalisation of the possession and reproduction of child pornography, freely downloaded from 
the Internet, and its compatibility with freedom of (artistic) expression. In Mouvement raëlien 
Suisse v. Switzerland, the Court found that the (illegal) content on a website referred to on a poster 
distributed by an organisation could help to justify the Swiss authorities’ decision to ban a poster 
campaign by that organisation. In this judgment, the Court also reiterated that the authorities are 
required, when they decide to restrict fundamental rights, to choose the means that cause the 
least possible prejudice to the rights in question. In Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria the Court concluded 
that the confiscation of computers containing illegal software was not in accordance with the 
law and deprived the applicants of sufficient safeguards against abuse of their right to privacy. 
The Court has also delivered judgments with an important impact on Internet regulation and 
freedom of expression on the Internet, such as cases related to copyright protection in Ashby 
Donald a.o. v. France and Neij and Sunde Kolmissopi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, or in online 
defamation cases in Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, Terentyev v. Russia, Fuchsmann v. 
Germany, Annen (no. 6) v. Germany and Egill Einarsson (no. 2) v. Iceland.1 Delfi AS v. Estonia concerns 
the liability of an Internet news portal for offensive comments that were posted by readers below 
one of its online news articles. The news portal was found liable for violating the personality 
rights of a plaintiff, although it had expeditiously removed the grossly offending comments 
posted on its website as soon as it had been informed of their insulting character. The Grand 
Chamber of the Court found that the news portal was not exempt from liability for grossly 
insulting remarks in its readers’ online comments. As Delfi’s involvement in making public 
readers’ comments on its news portal went beyond that of a passive, purely technical service 
provider, the provisions on the limited liability of ISPs did not apply. Delfi’s activities reflected 
those of a media publisher, running a commercially organised internet news portal and it was 
therefore held liable for the manifest expressions of hatred and threats to other persons’ physical 
integrity as expressed in its readers’ online comments (Delfi AS v. Estonia). In Magyar 
 
1 More information on the case-law of the ECtHR dealing with online media and ICT can be found in the Fact Sheet, “New technologies”, 
European Court of Human Rights Press Unit.  Other interesting fact sheets focus on the Court’s case law regarding the protection of personal 
data, the right to the protection of one’s image, hate speech and the protection of journalistic sources. 
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Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary the Court decided that a self-
regulatory body and an Internet news portal were not liable for the offensive comments posted 
by their readers on their respective websites. The ECtHR found that by holding MTE and Index.hu 
liable for the alleged defamatory comments, the Hungarian courts had violated the right to 
freedom of expression. In Pihl v. Sweden, the Court also applied a crucial distinction between 
illegal hate speech and defamation, limiting the liability of the operator of a blog when it (only) 
concerns defamation, and not incitement to violence (see also Tamiz v. the United Kingdom and 
Høiness v. Norway). 
 
In Cengiz a.o. v. Turkey the Court found that the blocking of access to YouTube in Turkey for a 
period of more than two years amounted to a violation of the right to receive and impart 
information under Article 10 ECHR. The Court observed that YouTube as an Internet platform 
enabled information on political and social matters to be broadcast and citizen journalism to 
emerge. It found that there was no provision in the Turkish law allowing the domestic courts to 
impose the blanket blocking order of YouTube at issue. Also in Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey and in 
Kalda v. Estonia the ECtHR guaranteed the right of access to the Internet. 
 
Another interesting case is Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, on data 
protection and data journalism. A decision issued by the Finnish Data Protection Board that 
prohibited two media companies from publishing personal taxation data in the manner and to 
the extent the media companies had published these data before, was considered as a legitimate 
interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression and information. The European 
Court agreed with the Finnish authorities that the applicants could not rely on the exception of 
journalistic activities (compare with CJEU 16 December 2008, Case C-73/07), as the publication 
of a too large amount of taxation data was not justified by a public interest. In Ivashchenko v. 
Russia, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 8 ECHR (right to privacy) because of the inspection 
and copying of a journalist’s laptop and storage devices by customs officials, without a reasonable 
suspicion that the laptop or the devices contained any ‘extremist material’. In Catt v. the United 
Kingdom, the collection, retention and further use of personal data of a political activist, for 
purposes of police intelligence, was found in breach of Article 8, while two other cases on bulk 
interception of personal communications for intelligence purposes have been referred to the 
Grand Chamber of ECtHR (Centrum för Rättvisa v. Sweden and Big Brother Watch and Others v. the 
United Kingdom). 
 
The ECtHR has also dealt with a series of cases on radical or extremist speech on the Internet. In 
Rebechenko v. Russia, the ECtHR valued the statements of a blogger as those of a “public 
watchdog”. In Mariya Alekhina and others v. Russia, the Court was of the opinion that declaring 
Pussy Riot’s online video materials “extremist” and placing a ban on access to them violated 
Article 10 ECHR. In Savva Terentyev v. Russia, the ECtHR has recognized a very high level of free 
speech-protection for insulting comments about police officers published on a blog spot. It 
confirmed that some of the wording in the blog spot was offensive, insulting and virulent, but it 
found that the (emotional) comments as a whole could not be seen as inciting to hatred or 
violence against police officers. 
 
The ECtHR has recently issued another landmark judgment on freedom of expression in the 
digital environment. In the case of Magyar Jeti Zrt v. Hungary, it made clear that holding media 
companies automatically liable for defamatory content hyperlinked in their reports violates the 
right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. The Court emphasized the very purpose of 
hyperlinks to allow Internet users to navigate to and from online material and to contribute to 
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the smooth operation of the Internet by making information accessible through linking it to each 
other. 
 
The Court’s case law regarding audiovisual media, media pluralism and freedom of expression in 
the online environment confirm the importance of the application of Article 10 of the European 
Convention for the economic, technical and regulatory developments in the European media 
landscape. The central issue remains that there should not be any restrictive interferences with 
the right to freedom of expression and information, unless it can be pertinently justified that the 
inference at issue is “necessary in a democratic society”, without creating a risk of chilling effect. 
It is expected that the European Court of Human Rights will keep up its high standards of 
protection and promotion of the right to freedom of expression and information, also in the new 
media environment. Article 10 ECHR is a living and dynamic instrument for the protection of the 
right to freedom of expression and information in Europe’s democracies. IRIS and the European 
Audiovisual Observatory will therefore continue reporting on the Court’s case-law related to 
media, journalism and the Internet. This e-book has the ambition to be a useful tool for judges, 
prosecutors, lawyers, media professionals, policy makers and media regulators, as well as for 
students in journalism and law schools, to be informed and updated about the developments in 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on media, journalism and freedom of expression and to keep both 
a sharp eye and an aerial view over this domain of law and media practice which is crucial in our 
liberal democracies. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Seizure of "blasphemous" film does not violate Article 10 ECHR 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
In its judgment of 20 September 1994, the European Court of Human Rights held that the seizure 
and forfeiture of the film Das Liebeskonzil in May 1985 by the Austrian authorities, was not a 
violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In this case, the applicant - the Otto-Preminger-Institut für audiovisuelle Mediengestaltung (OPI) 
- had planned to show the film, in which God the Father is presented as old, infirm and ineffective, 
Jesus Christ as a 'mummy's boy' of low intelligence and the Virgin Mary as an unprincipled 
wanton. They conspire with the Devil to punish mankind for its immorality. 
 
At the request of the Innsbruck diocese of the Roman Catholic Church, the Public Prosecutor 
instituted criminal proceedings against OPI's manager on charge of "disparaging religious 
doctrines" and seized the film under section 36 of the Austrian Media Act. On 10 October 1986 
the Austrian Regional Court ruled that, since artistic freedom cannot be unlimited, in view of "the 
particular gravity in the instant case - which concerned a film primarily intended to be 
provocative and aimed at the Church - of the multiple and sustained violation of legally protected 
interests, the basic right of artistic freedom will in the instant case have to come second." The 
European Court of Human Rights accepted that the impugned measures pursued a legitimate aim 
under Article 10 par. 2, namely "the protection of the rights of others", i.e., the protection of the 
right of citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings by the public expression of views of 
others. The Court ruled that the Austrian courts, when ordering the seizure and subsequent 
forfeiture of the film, justfiably held it to be an abusive attack on the Roman Catholic religion 
according to the conception of the Tyrolean public. Since their judgments show that the Austrian 
courts had due regard to the freedom of artistic expression and the content of the film can 
support the conclusions arrived at by the national courts, the Court ruled that the seizure does 
not constitute a violation of Article 10. In view of all the circumstances in this case, the Court 
considered that the Austrian authorities had not overstepped their margin of appreciation. This 
reasoning was also applied to the forfeiture of the film, which is said to be the normal sequel to 
the seizure. 
 
• Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, Series A no. 295-A. 
 
IRIS 1995-1/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Journalistic coverage of racist statements protected by Article 
10 ECHR 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
On 23 September 1994 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the conviction and 
sentence of a fine to a Danish television journalist for aiding and abetting the dissemination of 
racist statements, constituted a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention for the 
protection on Human Rights. The journalist, Mr Jersild, had interviewed a group of young racists 
("the Greenjackets") for the Sunday News Magazine, which interview was broadcast on 21 July 
1985 on Danish television. The three youths interviewed by the applicant were charged with 
violating the Danish Penal Code for making racist statements and the journalist was subsequently 
charged with aiding them. On 24 April 1987 the Danish City Court sentenced the applicant to a 
fine of 1.000 Danish Krone because he had encouraged "the Greenjackets" to express their racist 
views and he had been well aware in advance that discriminatory statements of a racist nature 
were likely to be made during the interview. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights focussed on the question whether the measures against 
the applicant were "necessary in a democratic society". The Court said that news reporting based 
on interviews constitutes one of the most important means whereby the press is able to play its 
vital role of "public watchdog". The punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissimination 
of statements made by another person in an interview would seriously hamper the contribution 
of the press to the discussion of matters of public interest. Taking the circumstances of the case 
into consideration, the Court held that the reasons for the applicant's conviction and sentence 
were not sufficient to establish convincingly that the interference with Mr Jersild's right to 
freedom of expression was "necessary in a democratic society". In particular, the means employed 
were considered disproportionate to the aim of protecting "the reputation or rights of others". 
 
• Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, Series A no. 298. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Bluf! v. the Netherlands 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
On 9 February 1995, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the seizure by the Dutch 
authorities of the cirulation of an issue of a left-wing weekly, containing a report of the Dutch 
internal security service, constituted a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. In the Spring of 1987 
the weekly, called Bluf!, got access to a quarterly report of the Dutch internal security service, 
which Bluf! decided to publish as a supplement to the issue of 29 April 1987. However, the 
Amsterdam Regional Court (Rechtbank) ordered the seizure of the circulation of the issue 
concerned before it was sent out to subscribers. Because the police had failed to take away the 
offset plates from the printing press, the staff of Bluf! managed to reprint the issue. The reprinted 
issues were sold on the streets of Amsterdam the next day, which was the Queen's birthday, a 
national holiday. The authorities decided not to put a stop to this circulation so as to avoid any 
public disorder. The request for the return of the confiscated copies was dismissed; the Dutch 
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) held that the seizure of printed matter to be distributed was, in this 
case, justified under the Dutch Criminal Code. The European Court of Human Rights noted that 
the seizure amounted to an interference in Bluf!'s freedom to impart information and ideas. The 
Court ruled that, although the interference was "prescibed by law" and pursued a legitimate aim 
(the protection of national security), the seizure and withdrawal was not "necessary in a 
democratic society'" and therefore constituted a violation of Article 10 ECHR. The Court based 
this ruling on its doubt whether the information in the report was sufficiently sensitive to justify 
preventing its distribution, and furthermore on the fact that, since the issue was reprinted and 
distributed, the information in question was made accessible to a large number of people; as a 
result, protecting the information as a State secret was no longer justified and the withdrawal of 
the issue no longer necessary to achieve the legitimate aim pursued. 
 
• Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v. the Netherlands, 9 February 1995, Series A no. 306-A. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Vereinigung Demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v. 
Austria 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has held that the refusal of Austria to distribute a special 
interest magazine among Austrian soldiers, constituted a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The monthly magazine, called der Igel (the hedgehog) was aimed 
at the soldiers serving in the Austrian army; it contained information and articles - often of a 
critical nature - on military life. In 1987, the organisation that published der Igel requested the 
Austrian Federal Defence Minister to have der Igel distributed in the barracks in the same way as 
the other two military magazines. The minister decided that he would not authorise such a 
distribution. In his opinion, only publications adhering to the constitutional duties of the army, 
which did not damage its reputation and which did not lend column space to political parties, 
should be supplied on military premises. The second applicant in this case, Mr Gubi - at that time 
fulfilling his national service - had been ordered to stop the distribution of issue No. 3/87 of der 
Igel in his barracks. A disciplinary penalty for distributing the magazine was imposed on Mr Gubi, 
because of certain guidelines prohibiting the distribution of any publication in the barracks 
without prior authorisation of the commanding officer. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights held that the refusal by the Minister of Defence to allow 
the distribution of der Igel in the same way as other magazines distributed by the army was 
disproportionate of the legitimate aim pursued. Prohibiting Mr Gubi to distribute the magazine 
also constituted a breach of Article 10 of the Convention, since the interference was not 
"necessary in a democratic society". 
 
• Vereinigung demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria, 19 December 1994, Series 
A no. 302.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Prager and Oberschlick vs Austria 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
On 26 April 1995, the European Court of Human Rights held - by five votes to four - that Austria 
did not violate Article 10 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (freedom of expression) by fining a journalist and a publisher for 
publishing a defamatory article. 
 
On 15 March 1987 the periodical Forum published an article by Mr Prager, which contained 
criticism of the judges sitting in the Austrian criminal courts, including an attack on Judge "J". 
Following an action for defamation brought by judge "J"., Mr Prager and Mr Oberschlick - 
publisher of Forum - were sentenced to pay fines and damages. The Regional Court also ordered 
the confiscation of the remaining stocks of the relevant issue of Forum. The Court ruled that the 
interference in the applicants' freedom of expression was "prescribed by law" and that the aim 
pursued (protection of a reputation and maintenance of the authority of the judiciary) was 
legitimate. 
 
Although freedom of expression also applies to offensive information or ideas, the interference 
in this case was deemed not to be disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and was 
therefore held to have been "necessary in a democratic society". In conclusion, the Court found 
that no violation of Article 10 was established. 
 
• Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria, 26 April 1995, Series A no. 313.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Defamation Award of £1.5m Violates Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (Freedom of Expression) 
Ad van Loon 
European Audiovisual Observatory 
 
In its judgment of 13 July 1995, the European Court of Human Rights has held that a defamation 
award of £1.5m constituted a violation of Article 10. The Court found that the award, having 
regard to its size taken in conjunction with the state of national (UK-) law at the relevant time, 
was not 'necessary in a democratic society' and thus was a violation of the applicant's rights 
under Article 10. The applicant, count Tolstoy Miloslavsky, wrote in March 1987 a pamplet in 
which he accused lord Aldington of war crimes. An English jury awarded lord Aldington £1.5m in 
damages, which was approximately three times the largest amount previously awarded by an 
English libel jury. Having regard to the size of the award in this case in conjunction with the lack 
of adequate and effective safeguards at the relevant time against a disproportionately large 
award, the Court found that there had been a violation of the applicant's rights under Article 10 
of the Convention. 
 
• Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 13 July 1995, Series A no. 316-B.  
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European Court of Human Rights: The journalist's sources protected by Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In its judgment of 27 March 1996 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
with an 11 to 7 majority came to the conclusion that a disclosure order requiring a British 
journalist to reveal the identity of his source and the fine imposed upon him for having refused 
to do so, constitutes a violation of the freedom of expression and information as protected by 
Article 10 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
 
In 1990 William Goodwin, a trainee-journalist working for "The Engineer", was found guilty by 
the House of Lords of Contempt of Court because he refused to disclose the identity of a person 
who previously supplied him with financial information derived from a confidential corporate 
plan of a private company. According to the House of Lords, the necessity of obtaining disclosure 
lay in the threat of severe damage to the private company which would arise if the information 
contained in their corporate plan was disseminated while their refinancing negotations were still 
continuing. The disclosure order was estimated to be in conformity with Section 10 of the 
Contempt of Court Act of 1981, as the disclosure was held to be necessary in the interest of 
justice. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, is of the opinion that the impugned disclosure 
order is in breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Although the 
disclosure order and the fine imposed upon Goodwin for having refused to reveal his source are 
"prescribed by law" and pursue a legitimate aim ("the protection of the rights of others"), the 
interference by the English courts in Goodwin's freedom of expression and information is not 
considered as necessary in a democratic society. The majority of the Court, and even the joint 
dissenters, firmly underline the principle that "protection of journalistic sources is one of the 
basic conditions for press freedom" and that "without such protection, sources may be deterred 
from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest". In its judgment 
the Court emphasizes that without protection of a journalist's sources "the vital public-watchdog 
role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable 
information may be adversely affected". The Court considers that a disclosure order cannot be 
compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding requirement 
in the public interest. As the Court pointed out : "In sum, limitations on the confidentiality of 
journalistic sources call for the most careful scrutiny by the Court". The European Court in casu 
is of the opinion that the interests of the private company in eliminating, by proceedings against 
the source, the (residual) threat of damage through dissemination of the confidential information, 
are not sufficient to outweigh the vital public interest in the protection of the applicant 
journalist's source. 
 
The judgment of the European Court in the Goodwin case gives important and additional support 
in favour of the protection of journalistic sources as reflected already in some national laws and 
in international policy instruments on journalistic freedoms (see, for example, the Resolution of 
the European Parliament on the Confidentiality of Journalists' Sources, OJEC, 14 February 1994, 
No C 44: 34 and the Resolution on Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights, adopted in the 
framework of the Council of Europe's Conferrence of ministers responsible for media policies, 
held in Prague, 7-8 December 1994 (see: IRIS, 1995-1: 4). 
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• Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 27 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Banning of blasphemous video not in breach of freedom of 
(artistic) expression 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 25 November 1996, the European Court of Human Rights decided in the Wingrove case that 
the refusal to grant a distribution certificate in respect of a video work considered blasphemous, 
was not in breach of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (see also the 
decision by the European Court of Human Rights in the Case of Otto Preminger vs. Austria of 20 
September 1994, Series A vol. 295, IRIS 1995-1: 3). 
 
Nigel Wingrove, a film director residing in London, was refused a certificate by the British Board 
of Film Classification, because his videofilm "Visions of Ecstasy" was considered as blasphemous. 
The film evocates the erotic fantasies of a sixteenth century Carmelite nun, St Teresa of Avila, 
her sexual passions in the film being focused inter alia on the figure of the crucified Christ. As a 
result of the Board's determination, Wingrove would have committed an offence under the Video 
Recordings Act 1984 if he were to supply the video in any manner, whether or not for reward. 
The director's appeal was rejected by the Video Appeals Committee. Wingrove applied to the 
European Commission of Human Rights, relying on Article 10 of the European Convention for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
Although the Commission in its report of 10 January 1995 (see IRIS 1995-5: 4) expressed the 
opinion that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court comes to the 
conclusion, by seven votes to two, that there had been no violation of the applicant's freedom of 
(artistic) expression, the British authorities being fully entitled to consider that the impugned 
measure was justified as being necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights 
of others. The Court underlined that whereas there is little scope for restrictions on political 
speech or on debate of questions of public interest, a wider margin of appreciation is available 
to the national authorities restricting freedom of expression in relation to matters within the 
sphere of morals or especially, religion. The Court also took into consideration that the English 
law on blasphemy does not prohibit the expression, in any form, of views hostile to the Christian 
religion: it is the manner in which these views are advocated which makes them blasphemous. 
 
On the other hand the Court did not find a counter argument in the fact that legislation on 
blasphemy exists only in few other European countries and that the application of these laws 
has become increasingly rare. Furthermore, the Court had no problem with the fact that the 
English law on blasphemy only extends to the Christian faith. Neither did the Court estimate the 
measure as disproportionate, although it was recognised that the measures taken by the 
authorities amounted to a complete ban of the film's distribution. Such a far-reaching measure 
involving prior restraint, was considered as necessary, because otherwise in practice, the film 
would escape any form of control by the authorities. The measure in other words had to be far-
reaching in order to be effective. Having viewed the film for itself, the Court is satisfied that the 
decisions by the national authorities cannot be considered to be arbitrary or excessive. The Court 
ultimatily reached the conclusion that the British authorities did not overstep their margin of 
appreciation and that the impugned measure against "Visions of Ecstasy" was not a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, 25 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-
V.  
Back to overview of case-law 
58 
 
IRIS 1997-1/8 
Back to overview of case-law 
59 
European Court of Human Rights: The right of the press to criticise the courts 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 24 February 1997 the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of 
two journalists on Humo the weekly publication against Belgium. The case concerned the order 
that two journalists pay damages and interest for the defamation of four judges of the Antwerp 
Court of Appeal. The applicants had been ordered by the Brussels Court of Appeal to pay the 
token sum of one Belgian franc in non-material damages, and to have the judgment published in 
the weekly publication Humo and six daily newspapers, at the applicants' expense. The judgment 
was upheld by the Court of Cassation. The Belgian courts felt that the journalists were at fault in 
attacking the honour and the reputation of the complainant judges by unjustifiable accusations 
and offensive insinuations in the disputed articles printed in Humo. 
 
Like the Commission (see IRIS 1996-3:4), the Court felt that interference in the applicants' 
freedom of expression was not necessary in a democratic society, as demanded by Article 10, 
paragraph 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court recalled that the press 
plays a vital role in a democratic society and that its role, while respecting its duties and 
responsibilities, is to communicate information and ideas on all matters of general interest, 
including those which concerns the functioning of the judicial authorities. The Court held that, 
although the commentaries by the two journalists did indeed contain severe criticism, this was 
not out of keeping with the emotion and indignation aroused by the facts alleged in the articles 
at issue, in particular concerning incest and the way in which the courts were dealing with it. As 
regards the polemic, or indeed aggressive, tone used by the journalists, the Court recalled that, 
apart from the substance of the ideas and information expressed, Article 10 also protects their 
mode of expression. The Court therefore decided that "journalistic freedom also covers possible 
recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation". Lastly, the Court held that the 
journalists based their work on extensive research and the opinions of a number of experts, and 
that only one passage was unacceptable. In conclusion, and in general, the Court held that, in 
view of the gravity of the matter and the questions at stake, the need to interfere in the exercise 
of the freedom of expression and information was not demonstrated. Article 10 of the Convention 
had therefore been violated (7 votes to 2). 
 
Moreover, the Brussels Court of Appeal had rejected the journalists' application for 
communication of the contents of the case documents or to hear at least certain witnesses in 
order to assess the justification of the allegations made by the journalists. The Court held that 
this "outright rejection had put journalists at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the plaintiffs". 
This contravened the principles of equality of arms and therefore Article 6 of the Convention had 
also been violated (unanimous decision). 
 
• De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, 24 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-I.  
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European Court of Human Rights: The Freedom of Critical Political Journalism - Oberschlick No 2 
vs. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In its judgement of 1 July 1997 the European Court of Human Rights once more confirmed the 
high level of freedom of political speech guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention 
for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is the fourth condemnation of 
Austria on this issue (see also ECourtHR, 8 July 1986, Lingens, Series A, Vol. 103; ECourtHR, 23 
May 1991, Oberschlick Series A, Vol. 204; ECourtHR, 28 August 1992, Schwabe Series A, Vol. 242-
B). 
 
In October 1990 Jörg Haider, the leader of the Austrian Liberal Party (FPÖ), held a speech in which 
he glorified the role of the generation of soldiers in World War II, whatever side they had been 
on. Some time later this speech was published in Forum, a political magazine printed in Vienna. 
The speech was commented critically by Gerhard Oberschlick, editor of the magazine. In his 
commentary, Oberschlick called Haider an `Idiot' (Trottel). On application by Haider, Oberschlick 
was found guilty for insult (Beleidigung) by the Austrian courts (Art. 115 Austrian Penal Code). 
 
Oberschlick appealed to the European Commission of Human Rights, arguing that the decisions 
in which he was convicted for having insulted Mr Haider, had infringed his right to freedom of 
expression as secured by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. As the 
Commission in its report of 29 November 1995, the Court in its judgment of 1 July 1997 also 
comes to the conclusion that the conviction of Oberschlick by the Austrian Courts represented a 
disproportionate interference with the exercise of his freedom of (political) expression, an 
interference which is "not necessary in a democratic society". 
 
The Court reiterates that freedom of expression is applicable not only to information and ideas 
that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also 
the "those that offend, shock or disturb". The limits of acceptable criticism are wider with regard 
to a politician acting in his public capacity than in relation to a private individual. The Court takes 
into account that Mr Haider clearly intended to be provocative and consequently could expect 
strong reactions on his speech. In the Court's view, the applicant's article may certainly be 
considered polemical, but it didn't constitute a gratuitous personal attack, as the author provided 
an objectively understandable explanation why he considered Haider as an "Idiot". The Court 
comes to the conclusion that "it is true that calling a politician a Trottel in public may offend 
him. In the instant case, however, the word does not seem disproportionate to the indignation 
knowingly aroused by Mr. Haider". By seven votes to two, the Court decided that there is a breach 
of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 2), 1 July 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Restriction on the Freedom of Expression Permitted for 
Maintaining the Authority and Impartiality of the Judiciary - Worm vs. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In its judgement of 29 August 1997 the European Court of Human Rights has ruled on an 
interesting case in the field of media and justice. Mr Alfred Worm, an Austrian journalist writing 
for the magazine Profil , was convicted by the Vienna Court of Appeal because of the publication 
of an article reporting on a pending trial against the former Minister of Finance, Mr Androsch. 
The trial concerned a case of tax evasion. The Court convicted Mr Worm of having exercised 
prohibited influence on criminal proceedings and imposed on him a fine of ATS 48,000 or 20 
days of imprisonment in default of payment (Section 23 of the Austrian Media Act). According to 
the Vienna Court of Appeal there was no doubt that, at least with regard to the lay judges, the 
reading of the incriminated article published by Mr Worm was capable of influencing the outcome 
of the criminal proceedings against Mr Androsch. Mr Worm applied to the European Commission 
of Human Rights complaining that this conviction was in breach of Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (freedom of expression and information). In its report of 23 May 
1996 the Commission expressed the opinion that indeed there had been a violation of Article 10 
of the Convention. 
 
By a seven to two decision, the Court now reached the conclusion that the conviction of Mr Alfred 
Worm was not infringing Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights because this 
conviction is to be considered fully in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 10. The 
conviction as a matter of fact finds a legal basis in Section 23 of the Austrian Media Act which 
reads as follows : "Anyone who discusses, subsequent to the indictment (..) and before the 
judgement at first instance in criminal proceedings, the probable outcome of those proceedings 
or the value of evidence in a way capable of influencing the outcome of the proceedings shall be 
punished (..)". The conviction furthermore was aimed at maintaining the authority and impartiality 
of the judiciary, which means that it thus pursued a legitimate aim under the Convention. Finally, 
the Court comes to the conclusion that in casu the conviction was also necessary in a democratic 
society. Although the Court recognises that the States are not entitled to restrict all forms of 
public discussion on matters pending before the courts, it emphasises that every person, - 
including a public figure such as Mr Androsch -, is entitled to the enjoyment of the guarantees of 
a fair trial set out in Article 6 of the European Convention. 
 
According to the Court this means that journalists, when commenting on pending criminal 
proceedings, may not publish statements which are likely to prejudice, whether intentionally or 
not, the chances of a person receiving a fair trial. The Court also states that it is the public 
prosecutor's role and not that of the journalist, to establish one's guilt. The Court paraphrases its 
judgement in the Sunday Times (No 1) case (26 April 1979, Series A vol. 30) by considering that 
it cannot be excluded that the public is becoming accustomed to the regular spectacle of 
pseudotrials in the news media which might in the long run have nefarious consequences for the 
acceptance of the courts as the proper forum for the determination of a person's guilt or 
innocence on a criminal charge. Against this background the European Court agreed with the 
Vienna Court of Appeal that the interference in the applicant's right to freedom of expression 
was justified and subsequently the Court decided that there was no breach of Article 10. 
 
• Worm v. Austria, 29 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case Radio ABC vs. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Radio ABC (Alternative Broadcasting Corporation) in 1989 was refused a licence to set up a 
private local radio station for the Vienna region. After exhausting all national remedies, Radio 
ABC applied to the European Commission of Human Rights in 1991, relying on Article 10 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The 
Commission, in its report of 11 April 1996, considered unanimously that the refusal to grant a 
licence for private broadcasting was in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court now in 
its judgement of 20 October 1997 comes to the same conclusion. The Court refers to its 
judgement in the Case of Informationsverein Lentia vs. Austria (ECourtHR, 24 November 1993, 
Series A, vol. 276), in which it decided that the restriction on the freedom to impart information 
by prohibiting private broadcasting, as this was based on the Austrian Broadcasting monopoly, 
was not necessary in a democratic society and hence was in breach of Article 10, par. 2 of the 
Convention. As in the period before the entry into force of the Regional Broadcasting Act (1 
January 1994) there was no legal basis whereby an operating licence for a local radio station 
could be granted because of the broadcasting monopoly guaranteed to the ORF, the situation of 
Radio ABC was identical to that of the applicants in the Informationsverein Lentia case. 
Accordingly for this period it was undisputed that there was a breach of Article 10. But even in 
the next period, after the coming into force of the Regional Broadcasting Act in 1994, there was 
still a breach of Article 10 of the European Convention, because of the fact that the Constitutional 
Court in its judgement of 27 September 1995 annulled some provisions of the Regional 
Broadcasting Act, which led to the legal situation which existed before 1994, so that the violation 
of Article 10 was prolonged. 
 
The Austrian Government at the hearing of 27 May 1997 however informed the Court of the 
amended version of the Regional Broadcasting Act of 1 May 1997, according to which new licence 
applications could be lodged in the period between 1 May and 12 June 1997. Although the 
European Court doesn't rule in abstracto whether legislation is compatible or not with the 
Convention, the Court nevertheless "notes with satisfaction that Austria has introduced 
legislation to ensure the fulfilment of its obligations under Article 10" of the European 
Convention. The Austrian Broadcasting Law opening access for private broadcasting finally seems 
to be in accordance with the freedom of expression and information as guaranteed by Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (see also ECourtHR, 9 June 1997, Telesystem Tirol 
Kabeltelevision vs. Austria, see IRIS 1997-7: 4). 
 
• Radio ABC v. Austria, 20 October 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Four Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
1. Zana vs. Turkey, 25 November 1997 In this case the European Court of Human Rights comes 
to the conclusion that there was no breach of Article 10 of the European Convention for the 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Zana was convicted to several months of 
imprisonment in Turkey because of the publication of an interview in the newspaper Cumhuriyet, 
in which he said to support the PKK movement, although he disagreed with the massacres. And 
he added to this statement : "Anyone can make mistakes, and the PKK kill women and children 
by mistake...". 
 
According to the Court this statement is both contradictory and ambiguous, because it is difficult 
simultaneously to support the PKK, "a terrorist organisation which resorts to violence to achieve 
its ends", and to declare oneself opposed to massacres. The Court notes that the interview 
coincided with murderous attacks carried out by the PKK on civilians in south-east Turkey at the 
material time and that the publication of the interview had to be regarded as likely to exacerbate 
an already explosive situation in the region. The Court accordingly considers that the penalty 
imposed on Zana could reasonably be regarded as answering a "pressing social need" and hence 
as necessary in a democratic society. So there is no breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
2. Grigoriades vs. Greece, 25 November 1997 This case concerns the conviction of a lieutenant 
of the crime of insult to the army, insult which was contained in a letter the applicant sent to his 
unit's commanding officer. A sentence of three months was imposed on Grigoriades. According 
to the Court, Article 10 of the Convention which guarantees the freedom of expression and 
information, applies to military personnel as to all other persons within the jurisdiction of a 
Contracting State. The Court notes that the contents of the letter indeed included certain strong 
and intemperate remarks concerning the armed forces in Greece, but those remarks were made 
in the context of a general and lenghty discourse critical of army life and the army as an 
institution. Nor did the letter contain any insults directed against the recipient of the letter or 
any other person. The Court decides that the letter had no objective impact on military discipline 
and that the prosecution and conviction of Grigoriades cannot be justified as necessary in a 
democratic society. The Court comes to the conclusion that in this case Article 10 is violated by 
the Greek authorities. 
 
3. Guerra vs. Italy, 19 February 1998 In this case a group of inhabitants of Manfredonia 
complained of the fact that they had not received proper information from the authorities on the 
hazards of the industrial activity of a local chemical factory. Nor were they informed on the safety 
plans or emergency procedures in the event of an accident. The Court finds no infringment of 
Article 10 of the Convention. The Court argues that this article on the freedom of expression and 
information "basically prohibits a government from restricting a person from receiving 
information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him. That freedom cannot be 
construed as imposing on a State, in circumstances such as those of the present case, positive 
obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion". Hence, no violation of 
Article 10. However the Court is of the opinion that the Italian authorities, by not giving essential 
information to the population involved, did not take the necessary steps to ensure effective 
protection of the applicants' right to respect for their private and family life and consequently 
violated Article 8 of the Convention. 
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4. Bowman vs. United Kingdom, 19 February 1998 (see IRIS 1998-3: 3) Mrs Bowman was 
prosecuted in the UK following the distribution of leaflets in election time. As the executive 
director of the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child, Mrs Bowman campaigned against 
abortion. The leaflets contained information on the opinions of candidates standing for the 
general elections with regard to abortion. Mrs Bowman was charged with an offence under the 
Representation of the People Act 1983 which prohibits expenditure of more than five pounds 
sterling by an unauthorised person during the period before an election on conveying information 
to electors with a view to promoting of procuring the election of a candidate. Although Mrs 
Bowman at earlier occasions had been convicted for similar facts, this time she finally was 
acquitted by the Court. Nevertheless the European Court of Human Rights is of the opinion that 
the prosecution in itself can be regarded as an interference by the authorities in the applicants 
right of freedom of expression. The Court finds that the restrictive rule with regard to the 
distribution of leaflets in election time has the effect of a total barrier to Mrs Bowman's 
publishing information with a view to influencing the voters in favour of an anti-abortion 
candidate. At the same time there were no restrictions placed upon the freedom of the press to 
support or oppose the election of any particular candidate. The Court concludes that the 
restriction in question is disproportionate to the aim pursued ("securing equality between 
candidates") and hence violates Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Zana v. Turkey, 25 November 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII. 
• Grigoriades v. Greece, 25 November 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VII.  
• Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I.  
• Bowman v. the United Kingdom, 19 February 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I.  
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European Court of Human Rights: two recent judgements on the freedom of expression and 
information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
1. Schöpfer vs. Switzerland, 20 May 1998. 
Conviction of a lawyer who criticised the local administration of justice at a press conference: no 
breach of Article 10 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. In 1992, Mr. Schoepfer, a lawyer and former politician, held a press 
conference in Lucerne at which he declared that in his local district human rights were flagrantly 
disregarded. More specifically, he complained about the pretrial detention of one of his clients. 
According to Mr. Schoepfer his client was detained without an arrest warrant. Mr. Schoepfer 
demanded the immediate resignation of the prefect and the district clerks. He pointed out that 
he was addressing the press as a last resort. 
 
Shortly thereafter the Lucerne Bar's Supervisory Board started disciplinary proceedings against 
Mr. Schoepfer on the ground that his statements at the press conference breached his 
professional ethics as a lawyer. The Supervisory Board was of the opinion that the tone used by 
Mr. Schoepfer in his criticism was unacceptable and that he had made allegations which were 
untrue. Mr. Schoepfer was fined 500 Swiss francs. An appeal against this decision was dismissed 
by the Federal Court. 
 
Mr. Schoepfer appealed to the European Commission of Human Rights alleging that the 
disciplinary penalty imposed on him constituted a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. Similar 
to the European Commission in its report of 9 April 1997, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) has now come to the conclusion that there has been no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
With regard to the question whether the infringement of the applicant's right of freedom of 
expression was necessary in a democratic society in order to maintain the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary, the Court reiterates that the special status of lawyers gives them a 
central position in the administration of justice as intermediaries between the public and the 
courts and that the courts as guarantors of justice must enjoy public confidence. Considering the 
key role of lawyers in this field, the ECHR found it legitimate to expect lawyers to contribute to 
the proper administration of justice, and thus to maintain public confidence therein. The ECHR 
notes that Mr. Schoepfer first publicly criticised the administration of justice and only afterwards 
exercised a legal remedy which proved effective with regard to the complaint in question. 
 
Recognising that the freedom of expression also extends to lawyers, who are certainly entitled 
to comment in public on the administration of justice, the ECHR, at the same time, emphasised 
that criticism must not overstep certain bounds. The right balance needs to be struck between 
the various interests involved, which include the public's right to receive information about 
questions arising from judicial decisions, the requirements of the proper administration of justice 
and the dignity of the legal profession. The Court concurred with the findings of the Bar 
Supervisory Board because it is better positioned than an international court to determine how, 
at a given time, the right balance can be struck in this context. Having regard also to the modest 
amount of the fine imposed on the applicant, the ECHR comes to the conclusion that there is no 
breach of Article 10 (seven votes to two).  
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2. Incal vs. Turkey, 9 June 1998. 
Conviction for contributing to the preparation of a leaflet criticising the Government and 
supporting political action by the Kurdish population, is estimated a breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention. In 1992 Mr. Incal, a lawyer by profession but at the material time a member of the 
Izmir section of the People's Labour Party (HEP), was responsible for the editing of a leaflet 
criticising the local authorities for their campaign against the Kurdish population. Permission 
was asked to the Izmir prefecture in order to distribute the leaflet, but this was rejected because 
the leaflet was considered to contain separatist propaganda capable of inciting the people to 
resist the Government and commit criminal offences. Upon request of the public prosecutor's 
office, the National Security Court issued an injunction ordering the seizure of the leaflets and 
prohibiting their distribution. Criminal proceedings were started against Mr. Incal, who was 
sentenced by the Izmir Security Court to nearly seven months imprisonment and a fine, while the 
conviction also debarred Mr. Incal from the civil service and prevented him from participating in 
a number of political or social activities. 
 
Mr. Incal turned to the European Commission. In its report of 25 February 1997 the Commission 
came to the conclusion that Article 10 was violated, as was Article 6 (right to a fair trial). The 
ECHR has now come to the same conclusion. 
 
The Court reiterates its case law with regard to the essential role of the freedom of expression 
in a democratic society and emphasises the importance of this freedom particularly for political 
parties and their active members (see also ECHR, 30 January 1998, United Communist Party of 
Turkey and Others vs. Turkey). It is also underlined that the limits of permissible criticism are 
wider with regard to the Government than in relation to a private citizen, or even a politician. In 
a democratic system the actions and omissions of the Government must be subject to the close 
scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also of public opinion. The Court 
notes that the leaflet as a matter of fact contained virulent remarks about the policy of the 
Turkish Government and urged the population of Kurdish origin to band together to raise political 
demands and to organise "neighbourhood committees". According to the Court these appeals 
cannot, however, be taken as an incitement to violence, hostility or hatred between citizens. The 
Court also notes the radical nature of the interference by the Turkish police and by the judicial 
authorities and especially its preventive character. Referring to the problems linked to the 
prevention of terrorism in the region, the Court observes that the circumstances of the present 
case are not comparable to those found in the Zana case (see IRIS 1998-4: 3) and that Mr. Incal 
could not be held responsible in any way for the problems of terrorism in the Izmir region. The 
Court unanimously came to the conclusion that Mr. Incal's conviction was unnecessary in a 
democratic society and hence violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
It is to be underlined that the Court also found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention because 
Mr. Incal as a civilian had to appear before a court partly composed of members of the armed 
forces. The Court comes to the conclusion that the applicant had legitimate cause to doubt the 
independence and impartiality of the Izmir National Security Court. This accordingly means a 
breach of Article 6, par. 1 of the Convention which inter alia guarantees a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal in criminal cases. 
 
• Schöpfer v. Switzerland, 20 May 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III. 
• Incal v. Turkey, 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: One Recent Judgement on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Ahmed and others v. United Kingdom, 2 September 1998: Restrictions on the Political Activities 
by Local Government Officials  
 
This case concerns the application of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 and the Local 
Government Officers (Political Restrictions) Regulations 1990 according to which certain 
categories of (senior) local government officials are prohibited from taking part in certain kinds 
of political activities. Four local government officials and a trade union representing public sector 
workers applied to the European Commission alleging that the application of this legislation 
infringed, inter alia, their right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
Convention. The European Court recognises that the guarantees contained in Article 10 of the 
Convention extend also to civil servants and that the effects of the legislation under dispute in 
various ways restricted the right of freedom of expression and the right to impart information 
and ideas to third parties in the political context. However, according to the Court this 
interference does not give rise to a breach of Article 10 of the Convention, because these 
restrictions are to be regarded as necessary in a democratic society (six votes to three). Referring 
also to the margin of appreciation, the Court notes that the measures were directed at the need 
to preserve the impartiality of carefully defined categories of officers whose duties involve the 
provision of advice to a local authority council or to its operational committees or who represent 
the council in dealings with the media. Hence the restrictions imposed can reasonably constitute 
a justifiable response to the maintenance of the impartiality of the local government officers and 
are likely to avoid a situation where in the eyes of the public the local government officers are 
linked with a particular party political line. The Court also came to the conclusion that there was 
no breach of Article 11 of the Convention (freedom of assembly), nor of Article 3 of Protocol No. 
1 to the Convention (the right to fully participate in the electoral process). 
 
• Ahmed and Others v. the United Kingdom, 2 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1998-VI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Three Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
1. Hertel vs. Switzerland, 25 August 1998: the freedom of expression also extends to the 
criticising of certain economic goods, in casu microwave ovens. 
 
In 1992 in an article in the quarterly Journal Franz Weber referred a research paper of Mr. Hertel 
on the effects on human beings of the consumption of food prepared in microwave ovens. 
According to the journal the research findings of Mr. Hertel scientifically proved the 
(carcinogenic) danger of microwave ovens. In an editorial by Mr. Weber it was argued that 
microwave ovens should be banned. Some extracts of the research paper were also published. 
The Swiss Association of Manufacturers and Suppliers of Household Electrical Appliances started 
up proceedings against the editor of the journal and against Mr. Hertel under application of the 
Federal Unfair Competition Act (Section 3). While the application against the editor of the Journal 
was dismissed, in the case against Mr. Hertel the Berne Commercial Court allowed the application 
because the defendant had used unnecessarily wounding statements. Mr. Hertel was prohibited 
by the Court from stating that food prepared in microwave ovens was a danger to health and 
from using in publications and public speeches on microwave ovens the image of death. The 
imposed injunction was later confirmed by the Federal Court. Mr. Hertel applied to the European 
Commission for Human Rights, complaining especially of a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. Just like the Commission in its report of 9 April 1997, the European 
Court comes to the conclusion that Mr. Hertel's freedom of expression was violated by this ban 
imposed on him by the Swiss Courts. Although the interference in the applicant's freedom of 
expression was prescribed by law and had a legitimate aim ("the protection of the rights of 
others"), the Court is of the opinion that the impugned measure was not necessary in a democratic 
society. The Court notes that there is a disparity between the measure and the behaviour it was 
intended to rectify. According to the Court "the effect of the injunction was partly to censor the 
applicant's work and substantially to reduce his ability to put forward in public views which have 
their place in a public debate whose existence cannot be denied". And the Court emphasised : "It 
matters little that this opinion is a minority one and may appear to be devoid of merit since, in a 
sphere in which it is unlikely that any certainty exists, it would be particularly unreasonable to 
restrict freedom of expression only to generally accepted ideas" (par. 50). By six votes to three 
the Court reached the conclusion that Article 10 of the European Convention was violated.  
 
2. Lehideux and Isorni vs. France, 23 September 1998: a conviction because of an advertisement 
presenting in a positive light certain acts of Marshal Pétain is considered a violation of the right 
of freedom of expression.  
 
On 13 July 1984 the newspaper Le Monde published a one-page advertisement bearing the title 
"People of France, you have short memories". The text presented Philippe Pétain, first as a soldier 
and later as French head of State under the Vichy Government, in a positive light. After a 
complaint by the National Association of Former Members of the Resistance a criminal procedure 
was started against Mr. Lehideux as the president of the Association for the Defence of the 
Memory of Marshal Pétain and against Mr. Isorni as the author of the text. The advertisement 
finally was estimated a public defence of the crimes of collaboration with the enemy, under 
application of section 23-24 of the Freedom of the Press Act of 29 July 1881 (Paris Court of Appeal 
26 January 1990). The civil parties were awarded damages of one franc and publication of 
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excerpts from the judgment in Le Monde was ordered. The Court of Cassation in its judgment of 
16 November 1993 was of the opinion that this conviction did not infringe the right to freedom 
of expression protected by Article 10 of the European Convention. 
 
The European Court in Strasbourg, sitting in Grand Chamber (21 judges), has now reached a 
different conclusion. Although the interference in the applicants' right to freedom of expression 
was prescribed by law and pursued the protection of the reputation or rights of others and the 
prevention of disorder or crime, the criminal conviction of Lehideux and Isorni was not estimated 
as "necessary in a democratic society". Although the Court recognises that the litigious 
advertisement presented Pétain in an entirely favourable light and did not mention any of the 
offences for which he was sentenced to death by the High Court of Justice in 1945, the Court also 
underlines that the text explicitly contains a disapproval of "Nazi atrocities and persecutions" 
and of "German omnipotence and barbarism". Although the Court estimates the omissions in the 
advertisement of any reference to the responsibility of Pétain for the persecution and deportation 
to the death camps of tens of thousands of Jews "morally reprehensible", it evaluates the 
advertisement as a whole in the light of a number of circumstances of the case. Referring to the 
different decisions and judgments during the domestic proceedings, to the fact that the events 
in issue occurred more than forty years ago and to the circumstance that the publication in issue 
corresponds directly to the object of the associations which produced it without any other 
proceedings have ever been brought against them for pursuing their object, the Court reaches 
the conclusion that the impugned interference in the applicants' rights violates Article 10. The 
Court also refers to the seriousness of a criminal conviction for publicly defending the crimes of 
collaboration, having regard to the existence of other means of intervention and rebuttal, 
particularly through civil remedies. Taking all this into consideration, the Court reaches the 
conclusion that the criminal conviction of the applicants was disproportionate and as such 
unnecessary in a democratic society. Therefore, the conviction of Lehideux and Isorni has been a 
breach of Article 10 (fifteen votes to six). Having reached this conclusion, the Court does not 
consider it appropriate to rule on the application of Article 17of the Convention (prohibition of 
abuse of rights).  
 
3. Steel and others vs. United Kingdom, 23 September 1998: the arrest and detention of 
protesters for breach of the peace and the freedom of expression. 
 
The judgment of the European Court in the case Steel and others concerns 3 different cases with 
an analogue issue: the interference by the British authorities against protest and demonstrations 
by ecological or peace movement activists. In all 3 cases the applicants were arrested and kept 
in custody some time for reason of "breach of peace". The first applicant, Ms. Steel, took part in 
a protest against a grouse shoot. She walked in front of a hunter's shotgun, preventing him from 
firing. The second applicant, Ms. Lush, took part in a protest against the building of an extension 
to a motorway. Three other applicants had taken part in a protest against the sale of military 
helicopters : their protest took the form of the distribution of leaflets and holding up banners in 
front of a conference centre. The Court recognises that although the protest by the first and 
second applicant took the form of physically impeding the activities of which the applicants 
disapproved, this behaviour could be considered as the expression of an opinion within the 
meaning of Article 10. With regard to both cases the Court is of the opinion however that the 
detention and the imprisonment was to be considered as "necessary in democratic society" for 
the interest in maintaining public order, the rule of law and the authority of the judiciary. With 
regard to the detention of the protesters against the military helicopters, the Court is of the 
opinion that this interference was not "prescribed by law", since the peaceful distribution of 
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leaflets could not be considered as a breach of the peace. The Court does not find any indication 
that the applicants significantly obstructed or attempted to obstruct the conference taking place 
or that they took any other action likely to provoke others to violence. Additionally, the Court 
considered the interference in the applicants' right of freedom of expression as disproportionate 
to the aims of preventing disorder or protecting the rights of others. Unanimously the Court 
reached the conclusion that in this case there has been a violation of Article 10, just as there was 
a violation of Article 5, par. 1 of the Convention (right to liberty and security). 
 
• Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 August 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI.  
• Lehideux and Isorni v. France, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-
VII.  
• Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 
1998-VII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: First Judgments on Freedom of Expression and Information 
after Reorganisation of the Court 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
1. Fressoz and Roire v. France: the right of journalists to receive and publish confidential 
documents under the protection of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In its first judgment after the reorganisation of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 
(1 November 1998, Protocol No. 11), the Court decided in favour of the protection of journalists 
and emphasised the importance of the freedom of the press and its vital role in a democratic 
society. The case concerns important aspects regarding the limits of journalistic freedom in 
reporting on matters of general interest. The applicants were both convicted in France for the 
publication of an article in the satirical newspaper Le Canard enchaîné. The article and the 
documents it contained showed that the managing director of Peugeot had received large pay 
increases while at the same time the management refused the demands of the workers at 
Peugeot for a pay rise. Mr. Fressoz, the publication director of the magazine at that time, and Mr. 
Roire, the journalist who wrote the article, were convicted for receiving and publishing 
photocopies that had been obtained through a breach of professional confidence by an 
unidentified tax official. They both claimed that these convictions violate their freedom of 
expression as protected by Article 10 of the European Convention. The Court emphasised that in 
principle journalists cannot be released from their duty to obey ordinary criminal law on the 
grounds that Article 10 affords them protection of freedom of expression. However, in particular 
circumstances the interest of the public to be informed and the vital role of the press may justify 
the publication of documents that fall under an obligation of professional secrecy. 
 
Taking into consideration the fact that the article contributed to a public debate on a matter of 
general interest, that the information on the salary of Mr. Calvet as head of a major industrial 
company did not concern his private life, and that the information was already known to a large 
number of people, the Court was of the opinion that there was no overriding requirement for the 
information to be protected as confidential. It was true that the conviction was based on the 
publication of documents of which the divulgation was prohibited, but the information they 
contained was not confidential. The Court emphasised that in essence Article 10 of the 
Convention "leaves it for journalists to decide whether or not it is necessary to reproduce such 
documents to ensure credibility. It protects journalists' rights to divulge information on issues of 
general interest provided that they are acting in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and 
provide 'reliable and precise' information in accordance with the ethics of journalism" (par. 54). 
In the Court's view the publication of the tax assessments was relevant not only to the subject 
matter but also to the credibility of the information supplied, while at the same time the 
journalist had acted in accordance with the standards governing his profession as a journalist. 
 
The final and unanimous conclusion of the Court, sitting in Grand Chamber, as that there was no 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the legitimate aim pursued by the journalist's 
conviction and the means deployed to achieve that aim, given the interest a democratic society 
had in ensuring and preserving freedom of the press. The Court decided that there had been 
violated Article 10 of the Convention and awarded the applicants FRF 60.000 for costs and 
expenses.  
 
2. Janowski vs. Poland: insulting civil servants acting in their official capacity is not allowed.  
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Mr. Janowski, a journalist, was convicted because he insulted two municipal guards. He offended 
the guards by calling them "oafs" and "dumb" during an incident which took place in a square, 
witnessed by several bystanders. Mr. Janowksi argued before the European Court that his 
conviction violated his right of freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 of the 
Convention. In evaluating whether the interference in the applicant's right was necessary in a 
democratic society, the Court emphasised that civil servants must enjoy public confidence in 
conditions free of undue perturbation if they are to be successful in performing their tasks, and 
it may therefore prove necessary to protect them from offensive and abusive verbal attacks when 
on duty. According to the Court the applicant's remarks did not form part of an open discussion 
of matters of public concern and neither did they involve the issue of freedom of the press since 
the applicant, although a journalist by profession, was clearly acting as a private individual on 
this occasion. Not being persuaded that the applicant's conviction was to be considered as an 
attempt by the authorities to restore censorship and discouragement of the expression of 
criticism in the future, the Court decided by twelve votes to five that there had been no breach 
of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, ECHR 1999-I.  
• Janowski v. Poland [GC], no. 25716/94, ECHR 1999-I.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Two Recent Judgements on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
1. Bladet Tromso and Stensaas v. Norway: defamatory allegations, the publication of a secret 
document and article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights In 1992, 
the newspaper company Bladet Tromso and its editor, Pal Stensaas, were convicted by a Norway 
District Court for defamation. The newspaper had published several articles on seal hunting as 
well as an official - but secret - report that referred to a series of violations of the seal-hunting 
regulations (the Lindberg report). The article and the report more specifically made allegations 
against five crew members of the seal-hunting vessel M/S Harmoni who were held responsible 
for using illegal methods of killing seals. Although the names of the persons concerned were 
deleted, the crew members of the M/S Harmoni brought defamation proceedings against the 
newspaper and its editor. The District Court was of the opinion that some of the contested 
statements in the article and the report as a matter of fact were "null and void", and the 
newspaper and its editor were ordered to pay damages to the plaintiffs. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, reached the conclusion that the conviction by 
the Norwegian district court was in breach of Article 10 of the European Convention. The Court 
took account of the overall background against which the statements in question had been made, 
notably the controversy that seal hunting represented at the time in Norway and the public 
interest in these matters. The Court also underlined that the manner of reporting in question 
should not be considered solely by reference to the disputed articles but in the wider context of 
the newspaper's coverage of the seal hunting issue. According to the Court "the impugned articles 
were part of an ongoing debate of evident concern to the local, national and international public, 
in which the views of a wide selection of interested actors were reported". The Court emphasized 
that Article 10 of the Convention does not guarantee an unrestricted freedom of expression even 
with respect to media coverage of matters of public concern, as the crew members can rely on 
their right to protection of their honour and reputation or their right to be presumed innocent of 
any criminal offence until proven guilty. According to the Court some allegations in the 
newspaper's articles were relatively serious, but the potential adverse effect of the impugned 
statements on each individual seal hunter's reputation or rights was significantly attenuated by 
several factors. In particular, the Court was of the opinion that "the criticism was not an attack 
against all the crew members or any specific crew member". On the other hand, the Court 
underlined that the press should normally be entitled, when contributing to public debate on 
matters of legitimate concern, to rely on the contents of official reports without having to 
undertake independent research, because otherwise, the "vital public-watchdog role" of the press 
might be undermined. The Court reached the following conclusion: "Having regard to the various 
factors limiting the likely harm to the individual seal hunter's reputation and to the situation as 
it presented itself to Bladet Tromso at the relevant time, the Court considers that the paper could 
reasonably rely on the official Lindberg report, without being required to carry out its own 
research into the accuracy of the facts reported. It sees no reason to doubt that the newspaper 
acted in good faith in this respect.". It should be mentioned that 4 of the 17 judges dissented 
manifestly with the majority. In the dissenting opinions, annexed to the judgement, it is argued 
why the articles are to be considered as defamatory towards private individuals. According to the 
minority, the Court had not given sufficient weight to the reputation of the seal hunters. The 
minority opinion also disagrees with the publication of the secret report and the fact that the 
newspapers took the allegations formulated in the report for granted: "How could it have been 
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"reasonable" to rely on this report when the newspaper was fully aware that the Ministry had 
ordered that the report not be made public immediately because it had contained possibly 
libellous comments concerning private individuals?". In an unusually sharp conclusion, the 
minority held that the Court sends the wrong signal to the press in Europe and that the judgement 
undermines respect for the ethical principles which the media voluntarily adhere to. Their final 
conclusion was: "Article 10 may protect the right for the press to exaggerate and provoke but not 
to trample over the reputation of private individuals". 
 
However, let there be no misunderstanding: the judgement of 20 May 1999 in the case of Bladet 
Tromso v. Norway has far reaching implications for the interpretation of the balance between 
journalistic freedom and the protection of the rights or reputation of individuals. It is obvious 
that a clear majority of the Court argues in favour of the public watchdog-function of the media 
and the critical reporting of matters of public concern. And albeit that this freedom is not wholly 
unrestricted, according to the actual jurisprudence of the Court, the freedom with respect to press 
coverage of matters of serious public concern is very wide. 
 
2. Rekvényi v. Hungary: politics, police and freedom of expression  
 
This case concerns the constitutional ban in Hungary on political activities by police officers and 
members of the armed forces. According to Mr. Rekvényi, a police officer living in Budapest, the 
ban not only violates his freedom of assembly and association (article 11), but also his freedom 
of (political) expression (article 10). Although the Court agreed that the curtailing of the 
applicant's involvement in political activities interfered with the exercise of his right of freedom 
of expression, the Court was of the opinion that this interference is in accordance with the second 
paragraph of article 10. As a matter of fact, the Court held that the interference is prescribed by 
law, has a legitimate aim (the protection of national security and public safety and the prevention 
of disorder) and is necessary in a democratic society. The Court recognized that it is a legitimate 
aim in any democratic society to have a politically neutral police force. On the other hand, the 
Court stated that the ban on political activities by policemen is not an absolute one and that in 
fact police officers remain entitled to undertake some activities enabling them to articulate their 
political opinions and preferences, e.g., policemen may promote candidates, participate in 
peaceful assemblies, make statements to the press, appear on radio and television or publish 
works on politics. The Court unanimously reached the conclusion that there had been no violation 
of article 10 or of article 11 of the Convention. 
 
• Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, ECHR 1999-III.  
• Rekvényi v. Hungary [GC], no. 25390/94, ECHR 1999-III. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Thirteen Judgments on Freedom of Expression and Information 
(8 July 1999) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 8 July 1999 the European Court of Human Rights delivered judgments in thirteen cases 
against Turkey involving Article 10 of the Convention. In eleven of the thirteen cases the Court 
held that there was a violation of the freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. All the 
cases concerned various criminal convictions of the applicants arising from separatist 
propaganda against the Turkish nation and the territorial integrity of the State or (pro-Kurdish) 
propaganda against the indivisibility of the State contrary to the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
1991. In all of the cases the European Court reiterated the fundamental principles underlying its 
former judgments relating to Article 10, according to which freedom of expression constitutes 
one of the essential foundations of a democratic society (see also IRIS 1999-6: 3, IRIS 1999-2: 4, 
IRIS 1998-10: 4, IRIS 1998-9:3, IRIS 1998-7: 4, IRIS 1998-4:3). The Court emphasised once again 
that Article 10 of the Convention also protects information and ideas that "offend, shock or 
disturb" and recalled that there is little scope under Article 10 of the Convention for restrictions 
on political speech or on debate on questions of public interest. At the same time, the limits of 
permissible criticism are wider with regard to the government than in relation to a private citizen: 
in a democratic society the actions or omissions of the government must be subject to the close 
scrutiny of public opinion. According to the Court, the dominant position which the government 
occupies makes it necessary for it to display restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings, 
particularly where other means are available for replying to the unjustified attacks and criticisms 
of its adversaries. It is incumbent on the press to impart information and ideas on political issues, 
including divisive ones and the public has also a right to receive such information and ideas. On 
the other hand, the Court recognised the competence of state authorities to take measures to 
guarantee public order and hence to interfere with freedom of expression in cases of incitement 
to violence against individuals, public officials or a sector of the population. It was also 
emphasized that the duties and responsibilities which accompany the exercise of the right of 
freedom of expression by media professionals assume special significance in situations of conflict 
and tension and that particular caution is required when the views of representatives or 
organisations which resort to violence against the State are published. Such interviews involve a 
risk that the media might become a vehicle for the dissemination of hate speech and the 
promotion of violence. 
 
After a thorough examination of the wording and the content of the publications concerned, and 
after considering the context of the political and the security situation in south-east Turkey, the 
Court in eleven of the cases came to the conclusion that the conviction and sentencing of the 
applicants was not necessary in a democratic society and that accordingly there had been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. In all of these cases the Court was of the opinion that 
the impugned articles, news reporting, books or speeches could not be said to incite to violence. 
In most cases, the Court was also struck by the severity of the sanctions imposed (20 months 
imprisonment, substantial fines, seizures of books...): the nature and severity of the penalties 
were also factors which lead to the conclusion that the interferences were disproportionate. The 
Court also underlined that some of these convictions and sentences were capable of discouraging 
the contribution of the press to open discussion on matters of public concern. 
 
Back to overview of case-law 
77 
In most of the cases the Court also found a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. The applicants 
had been denied the right to have their cases heard before an independent and impartial tribunal 
as they had been tried by the National Security Courts, in which one member of the bench of 
three judges was a military judge. In two cases the Court found no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Court was of the opinion that the impugned letters and the news commentary 
in a weekly review must be regarded as capable of inciting to further violence in the region. 
Hence, the conviction of the applicant in these two cases (Sürek n°1 and n°3) could be regarded 
as answering a "pressing social need". The Court was of the opinion that what was at issue in 
these cases was "hate speech and the glorification of violence" and "incitement to violence". The 
two judgments that found no violation of Article 10 are also important from another point of 
view. It must be underlined that Sürek was convicted while he was the owner/publisher of the 
weekly review in which the readers' letters and the news commentary were published. Although 
he did not write the articles personally and only had a commercial and not an editorial 
relationship with the review, this could not exonerate him from criminal liability. Sürek was the 
owner and "as such he had the power to shape the editorial direction of the review", according 
to the Court, who held "that for that reason, he was vicariously subject to the "duties and 
responsibilities" which the review's editorial and journalistic staff undertake in the collection and 
dissemination of information to the public and which assume an even greater importance in 
situations of conflict and tension". The general importance of the judgments of 8 July 1999 lies 
in the fact that the Court again strongly emphasised the relation between freedom of expression, 
democracy and pluralism. In other case law of the Court it was underlined "that one of the 
principal characteristics of democracy is the possibility it offers of resolving a country's problems 
through dialogue, without recourse to violence, even when they are irksome. Democracy thrives 
on freedom of expression". 
 
Judgements:  
• Arslan v. Turkey [GC], no. 23462/94, 8 July 1999. 
• Polat v. Turkey [GC], no. 23500/94, 8 July 1999. 
• Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23536/94 and 24408/94, ECHR 1999-IV.  
• Karataş v. Turkey [GC], no. 23168/94, ECHR 1999-IV. 
• Erdoğdu and İnce v. Turkey [GC], nos. 25067/94 and 25068/94, ECHR 1999-IV.  
• Ceylan v. Turkey [GC], no. 23556/94, ECHR 1999-IV.  
• Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], no. 24246/94, 8 July 1999.  
• Gerger v. Turkey [GC], no. 24919/94, 8 July 1999.  
• Sürek and Özdemir v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23927/94 and 24277/94, 8 July 1999.  
• Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1) [GC], no. 26682/95, ECHR 1999-IV.  
• Sürek v. Turkey (no. 2) [GC], no. 24122/94, 8 July 1999.  
• Sürek v. Turkey (no. 3) [GC], no. 24735/94, 8 July 1999.  
• Sürek v. Turkey (no. 4) [GC], no. 24762/94, 8 July 1999.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information (28 September 1999) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 28 September 1999 the European Court of Human Rights delivered its final judgment in two 
cases concerning Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In the case of Dalban vs. Romania, the "grand chamber" of the Court unanimously reached the 
conclusion that there has been a violation of the freedom of expression by the Romanian 
authorities. The case concerned an application by Mr. Ionel Dalban who was a journalist and ran 
a local weekly magazine, the Cronica Romascana. In 1994, Dalban was convicted for criminal 
libel because of some articles that exposed a series of frauds allegedly committed by a senator 
(R.T.) and the chief executive (G.S.) of a State-owned agricultural company, Fastrom/State Farm. 
Dalban died on 13 March 1998. His widow continued the proceedings in Strasbourg in the 
applicant's stead. In the meantime, on 2 March 1999 the Romanian Supreme Court quashed the 
conviction of Dalban and acquitted the applicant of the charge of libelling G.S. The proceedings 
in the case on the charge relating to Senator R.T. were discontinued due to Mr. Dalban's death. 
In its judgment of 28 September 1999 the European Court was of the opinion that the applicant's 
conviction constituted an "interference by public authority" with his right to freedom of 
expression, without the interference being necessary in a democratic society. The Court 
underlines that the articles in issue concerned a matter of public interest and that the press has 
to fulfil an essential function in a democratic society. According to the Court there was no proof 
that the description of events given in the articles was totally untrue. It is also emphasised that 
Dalban did not write about aspects of the private life of senator R.T., but about his behaviour and 
attitudes in his capacity as an elected representative of the people. The European Court could 
not agree with the Romanian courts that the fact that there had not been a court case against 
R.T. or G.S. was sufficient to establish that the information contained in Dalban's articles was 
false. The Court reached the conclusion that the applicant's conviction of a criminal offence and 
the sentencing to imprisonment amounted to a disproportionate interference with the exercise 
of his freedom of expression as a journalist. 
 
The second case of 28 September 1999, Öztürk vs. Turkey, strongly reflects the Court's case-law 
of 8 July 1999 in the Turkish cases (IRIS 1999-8: 4-5). Öztürk was convicted for helping to publish 
and distribute a book that was considered by the Turkish courts to incite the people to crime, 
hatred and hostility. The book described the life (and torture in prison) of one of the founding 
members of the Communist Party of Turkey. While the publisher of the book was convicted, in a 
separate case the author of the book was acquitted. In evaluating the application of Article 10 of 
the Convention, the Strasbourg Court explicitly referred to its case-law of 8 July 1999, in which 
it emphasised that "there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on 
political speech or on debate on matters of public interest". The European Court was not 
convinced that in the long term the book could have had a harmful effect on the prevention of 
disorder or crime in Turkey. Nor was there any indication that Mr. Öztürk bore any responsibility 
whatsoever for the problems caused by terrorism in Turkey. Sitting in "grand chamber" the Court 
unanimously reached the conclusion that once again the Turkish authorities had violated the 
freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, ECHR 1999-VI.  
• Öztürk v. Turkey [GC], no. 22479/93, ECHR 1999-VI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information and on the Right of a Fair Trial and Media Coverage of a Court Case 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment delivered on 28 October 1999 in the case of Wille v Liechtenstein, the European 
Court of Human Rights held that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. On 
25 November 1999 the European Court of Human Rights delivered judgment in two cases with 
regard to Article 10 of the Convention, one in a case against Norway, another in a case against 
the United Kingdom. In two judgments of 16 December 1999 the media coverage and extreme 
press interest in a court case were considered by the Court as relevant factors in the evaluation 
of the right of a fair trial (article 6 § 1 of the Convention). 
 
The case of Wille v Liechtenstein has to do with a reprimand and the refusal by the Prince to re-
appoint the president of the High Administrative Court. This interference by the Prince was 
considered to be a reaction against the opinions that the judge in a public lecture had expressed 
on a dispute of constitutional law, opinions which were also published in a newspaper. The Court 
found that such an interference by a State authority can give rise to a breach of Article 10 unless 
it can be shown that it was in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 10. According to the Court, 
the element that the applicant's opinion had political implications was not in itself a sufficient 
reason for the impugned interference. Moreover, there was no evidence to conclude that the 
applicant's lecture contained any remarks on pending cases, severe criticism of persons of public 
institutions or insults to high officials or the Prince. Even allowing for a certain margin of 
appreciation, the Prince's action appeared disproportionate to the aim pursued and was 
considered by the Court as a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In the case of Nilsen and Johnsen v Norway, the Grand Chamber of the Court concluded that there 
was a violation of the applicants' freedom of expression. Nilsen and Johnsen, both policemen, 
were convicted in Norway because of defamatory statements published in the press. These public 
statements were made in response to various accusations of police brutality which were reported 
in a book and had received a lot of media coverage. The statements by Nilson and Johnson were 
considered by the Oslo City Court as having a defamatory character towards the author of the 
book, a professor of criminal law. According to the European Court in Strasbourg, the conviction 
by the Oslo City Court, upheld by the Norway Supreme Court, violated Article 10 of the European 
Convention for Human Rights. After referring to its classic principles with regard to the 
importance of freedom of expression and public debate in a democratic society, the European 
Court underlined that while there can be no doubt that any restrictions placed on the right to 
impart and receive information on arguable allegations of police misconduct call for a strict 
scrutiny on the part of the Court, the same must apply to speech aimed at countering such 
allegations since they form part of the same debate. In the Court's view, a degree of exaggeration 
should be tolerated in the context of such a heated public debate on affairs of general concern 
where professional reputations are at stake on both sides. The Court also noted that there was 
factual support for the assumption that false allegations of police brutality had been made by 
informers. For these reasons the Strasbourg Court was not satisfied that the litigious statements 
exceeded the limits of permissible criticism for the purpose of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The jugdment in the case of Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom is one of the very rare 
examples in which the Court is of the opinion that an interference by a public authoritiy with the 
freedom of expression and information is not "prescribed by law". In its judgment of 25 November 
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1999 the Grand Chamber of the Court had to evaluate the applicants' allegation of a violation of 
Article 10. Both applicants were held responsible by the Crown Court of Dorchester for unlawful 
actions and a deliberate attempt to interfere with fox-hunting. The behaviour of Hashman and 
Harrup was found to have been contra bonos mores, a behaviour which is to be considered as 
wrong rather than right in the judgment of the majority of contemporary fellow citizens. The 
applicants were bound over to be of good behavior for a period of one year. The Strasbourg Court 
however was of the opinion that the concept of behaviour contra bonos mores is so broadly 
defined that it does not comply with the requirement of foreseeability. The legal basis of such 
an interference by public authorities is imprecise and does not give the applicants sufficiently 
clear guidance as how they should behave in future. The Court also took into consideration that 
prior restraint on freedom of expression must call for the most careful scrutiny. With specific 
reference to the facts of the case the Court reached the conclusion that the interference did not 
comply with the requirement of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention that it be "prescribed by law". 
 
It is interesting to note that the media coverage of, and the extremely high levels of press and 
public interest in, a court case can be regarded as relevant elements in evaluating whether 
someone is denied a fair hearing in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In two judgments 
of 16 December 1999 in the cases T. v United Kingdom and V. v United Kingdom the Court came 
to the conclusion that the two applicants - who were both convicted for the abduction and murder 
of a two-year-old boy (James Bulger) - were not guaranteed sufficiently the right of a fair trial, 
taking into account that both were only eleven years old at the time of the trial before the Crown 
Court. According to the European Court, in respect of a young child charged with a grave offence 
attracting high levels of media and public interest, it is necessary to conduct the hearing in such 
a way as to reduce as far as possible the defendant's feelings of intimidation and inhibition. The 
Court inter alia took into consideration that the trial generated extremely high levels of press 
and public interest, to the extent that the judge in his summing-up referred to the problems 
caused to witnesses by the blaze of publicity and asked the jury to take this into account when 
assessing the evidence. In such circumstances the applicants were unable to participate 
effectively in the criminal proceedings against them. This led the European Court to the 
conclusion that in casu the applicants were denied a fair hearing in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Wille v. Liechtenstein [GC], no. 28396/95, ECHR 1999-VII.  
• Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no. 23118/93, ECHR 1999-VIII.  
• Hashman and Harrup v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 25594/94, ECHR 1999-VIII.  
• T. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24724/94, 16 December 1999.  
• V. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24888/94, ECHR 1999-IX.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgment on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information and the Publication of Photographs of a Suspect 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 11 January 2000 the European Court of Human Rights delivered judgment in the case News 
Verlags GmbH & CoKG v. Austria. The case concerns an injunction by the Vienna Court of Appeal 
prohibiting a magazine to publish photographs of a person (B) in the context of its court 
reporting. B was suspected of being responsible for a letter-bomb campaign in 1993. According 
to the Court, the prohibition on publishing such photographs in connection with reports on the 
criminal proceedings is to be considered as an interference with the applicant's freedom of 
expression and information. The Court agrees that the interference was prescribed by Austrian 
law and pursued a legitimate aim, as the injunction had the aim of protecting the reputation or 
rights of B as well as the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. The Court decided however 
that the injunction was disproportionate and hence violated article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The Court recalled that "it is not for the Court, or for the national courts for that matter, to 
substitute their own views for those of the press as to what technique of reporting should be 
adopted by journalists". Furthermore the media have not only the right, but even the duty, 
according to the Court to impart - in a manner consistent with their obligations and 
responsibilities - information and ideas on all matters of public concern, including reporting and 
commenting on court proceedings. The Court emphasised that the criminal case relating to the 
letter-bombs was a news item of major public concern at the time and that B was arrested as the 
main suspect. Although the injunction in no way restricted the applicant company's right to 
publish comments on the criminal proceedings against B, it was underlined, however, that it 
restricted the applicant's choice as to the presentation of its report, while undisputedly other 
media were free to continue to publish B's picture throughout the criminal proceedings against 
him. An absolute prohibition on publishing pictures of B in the press reports of the magazine 
"News" was considered by the Court to be a disproportionate measure. As the Court underlines: 
"The absolute prohibition on the publication of B's picture went further than was necessary to 
protect B against defamation or against violations of the presumption of innocence". It followed 
from these conclusions by the Court that the interference with the applicant's right to freedom 
of expression was not "necessary in a democratic society" and accordingly violated Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
 
• News Verlags GmbH & Co.KG v. Austria, no. 31457/96, ECHR 2000-I.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression and 
Information 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In the case Fuentes Bobo v. Spain the Court reached the conclusion that the dismissal of an 
employee of the public broadcasting organisation TVE was to be considered a violation of the 
right to freedom of expression. In 1993 Fuentes Bobo co-authored an article in the newspaper 
Diario 16 criticising certain management actions within the Spanish public broadcasting 
organisation. Later in two radio programmes Fuentes Bobo made critical remarks about some 
TVE-managers. These remarks led to disciplinary proceedings that resulted in the applicant's 
dismissal in 1994. In its judgment of 29 February 2000 the Court (Fourth Section) was of the 
opinion that the dismissal of the applicant due to certain offensive statements was to be 
considered an interference by the Spanish authorities with the applicant's freedom of expression. 
The Court pointed out that Article 10 of the Convention is also applicable to relations between 
employer and employee and that the State has positive obligations in certain cases to protect 
the right of freedom of expression against interference by private persons. Although the 
interference was prescribed by law and was legitimate in order to protect the reputation or rights 
of others, the Court could not agree that the severe penalty imposed on the applicant met a 
"pressing social need". The Court underlined that the criticism by the applicant had been 
formulated in the context of a labour dispute within TVE and was to be included in a public 
discussion on the failings of public broadcasting in Spain at the material time. The Court also 
took into consideration that the offensive remarks attributed to the applicant appeared more or 
less to have been provoked during lively and spontaneous radio shows in which he participated. 
Because no other legal action had been taken against the applicant with regard to the "offensive" 
statements and because of the very severe character of the disciplinary sanction the Court finally 
came to the conclusion that the dismissal of Fuentes Bobo was a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
In a judgment delivered on 16 March 2000 in the case of Özgür Gündem v. Turkey the European 
Court (Fourth Section) once more held that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention by the Turkish authorities. Özgür Gündem was a daily newspaper published in 
Istanbul during the period from 1992 to 1994, reflecting Turkish Kurdish opinions. After a 
campaign that involved killings, disappearances, injuries, prosecutions, seizures and confiscation, 
the newspaper ceased publication. The applicants submitted that the State authorities had failed 
to provide protection for the newspaper and complained of the convictions arising from its 
reporting on the Kurdish issue that was estimated as constituting separatist propaganda and 
provoking racial and regional hatred. In respect of the allegations of attacks on the newspaper 
and its journalists, the Court was of the opinion that the Turkish authorities should have better 
protected Özgür Gündem. The Court considered that although the essential object of many 
provisions of the Convention is to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by public 
authorities, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for the rights 
concerned. The Court stated that genuine, effective exercise of freedom of expression "does not 
depend merely on the State's duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of 
protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals". In the case of Özgür Gündem 
the Turkish authorities have not only failed in their positive obligation to protect the freedom of 
expression of the applicants. According to the Court the search operations, prosecutions and 
convictions for the reporting on the Kurdish problem and for criticising government policy 
violated Article 10 as well. The Court underlined that the authorities of a democratic State must 
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tolerate criticism, even if it may be regarded as provocative or insulting. The judgment also 
emphasised that the public enjoys the right to be informed of different perspectives on the 
situation in south-east Turkey, irrespective of how unpalatable those perspectives appear to the 
authorities. An important element was also that the reporting by Özgür Gündem was not to be 
considered as advocating or inciting the use of violence. The Court held unanimously that there 
was a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In a judgment of 21 March 2000 the European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) found no 
violation of the right to freedom of expression in the case of Andreas Wabl v. Austria. Wabl, a 
member of Parliament, has accused the newspaper Kronen-Zeitung of "Nazi journalism" after the 
newspaper had quoted a police officer calling for Wabl to have an AIDS-test. The police officer's 
arm had been scratched by Wabl in the course of a protest campaign. Proceedings against Wabl 
led to an injunction to prevent him repeating the impugned statement of "Nazi journalism". 
Although the article published in the Kronen-Zeitung was to be considered as defamatory, the 
Court had particular regard to the special stigma that attaches to activities inspired by National 
Socialist ideas and to the fact that according to Austrian legislation it is a criminal offence to 
perform such activities. The Court also took into account that the applicant was only prohibited 
from repeating the statement that the reporting in the Kronen-Zeitung amounted to "Nazi 
journalism" or the making of similar statements. Hence the applicant retained the right to voice 
his opinion regarding this reporting in other terms. The Court reached the conclusion that the 
Austrian judicial authorities were entitled to consider that the injunction was necessary in a 
democratic society and that accordingly there was no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, no. 39293/98, 29 February 2000.  
• Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, no. 23144/93, ECHR 2000-III.  
• Wabl v. Austria, no. 24773/94, 21 March 2000.  
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European Court of Human Rights: New Judgment on the Journalistic Freedom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment delivered at Strasbourg on 2 May 2000 the European Court of Human Rights (Third 
Section) found unanimously that in the case of Bergens Tidende the Norwegian authorities have 
infringed Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The daily newspaper Bergens 
Tidende, its editor-in-chief and a journalist were convicted in 1994 by the Norwegian Supreme 
Court because of defamatory articles on the issue of plastic surgery. The articles, some of them 
accompanied by large colour photographs, described in detail how women had experienced their 
situation after allegedly failed operations and a lack of care and follow-up treatment by a certain 
Dr. R. The latter instituted defamation proceedings against the newspaper which finally led to a 
conviction by the Supreme Court. Because some accusations at the adress of Dr. R. and the 
practices in his clinic were considered by the Court as not been proven, the newspaper, its editor-
in-chief and the journalist who wrote the articles were ordered to pay the plaintiff amounts 
totalling Norwegian Krone (NOK) 4,709,861 (approximately 4 million French francs) in respect of 
damages and costs. According to the Supreme Court the fact that the newspaper only repeated 
the accusations made by others did not constitute a sufficient defence. 
 
As so often, the dispute before the European Court related to whether the interference was 
"necessary in a democratic society" as it was undisputed that the interference was "prescribed by 
law", namely section 3-6 of the Norwegian Damage Compensation Act 1969 and pursued the 
legitimate aim of protecting "the reputation or rights of others". The Strasbourg Court observed 
at the outset that the impugned articles, which recounted the personal experiences of a number 
of women who had undergone cosmetic surgery, concerned an important aspect of human health 
and as such raised serious issues affecting the public interest. The Court also took note of the 
fact that the applicants had been acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable 
information in accordance with the ethics of journalism and attached considerable weight to the 
fact that in the present case the women's accounts of their treatment by Dr. R. had been found 
not only to have been essentially correct but also to have been accurately recorded by the 
newspaper. It was true that, as pointed out by the national courts, the women had expressed 
themselves in graphic and strong terms and that it was these terms which had been highlighted 
in the newspaper articles. However, reading the articles as a whole, the Strasbourg Court did not 
find that the statements were excessive or misleading. The Court also referred to its standard 
jurisprudence according to which "news reporting based on interviews constitutes one of the 
most important means whereby the press is able to play its vital role of "public watchdog" (..), it 
is not for the Court, any more than it is for the national courts, to substitute its own views for 
those of the press as to what techniques of reporting should be adopted by journalists". 
 
In these circumstances the reasons relied on by the respondent State, although relevant, were 
not sufficient to show that the interference complained of was "necessary in a democratic 
society". The Court considered that there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the restrictions placed by the measures applied by the Supreme Court on the applicants' 
right to freedom of expression and the legitimate aim pursued. Accordingly there was a violation 
of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Bergens Tidende and Others v. Norway, no. 26132/95, ECHR 2000-IV.  
IRIS 2000-5/1 
Back to overview of case-law 
86 
European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression. The Cases of 
Erdogdu v. Turkey and Constantinescu v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Once again the European Court of Human Rights has held that the Turkish authorities have acted 
in breach of Article 10 of the Convention, this time by convicting Ümit Erdogdu, the editor of the 
review Isçilerin Sesi ("The Workers' Voice"). In 1993 Erdogdu was sentenced to six months' 
imprisonment and fined by the National Security Court: an article published in the review was 
considered to be propaganda against the territorial integrity of the State, which is an offence 
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The Court especially took into account that the article 
referred to parts of Turkish territory as Kurdistan and applauded acts of violence and the national 
resistance against the State by the PKK. In 1997 the National Security Court deferred sentencing 
Mr. Erdogdu, ordering that he would be sentenced if, within three years from the date of deferral, 
he was convicted in his capacity as editor of an offence with intent. 
 
In a judgment delivered at Strasbourg on 15 June 2000 the European Court of Human Rights 
(Fourth Section) has found that by convicting Erdogdu the judicial authorities of Turkey violated 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the Strasbourg Court, the 
Turkish authorities did not take sufficient account of the freedom of the press or the right of the 
public to have access to a different perspective on the Kurdish problem. Although the Court 
underlined its awareness of the concerns of the authorities regarding the fight against terrorism, 
it was not persuaded that the litigious article would have highly detrimental consequences for 
the prevention of disorder and crime in Turkey. Nor was the article to be considered as an 
incitement to violence and hatred. As to the applicant's benefiting from a deferral of sentence, 
the Court was of the opinion that because this order only took effect if Mr. Erdogdu committed 
no further offences with intent as an editor, this was to be considered as a ban effectively 
censoring the applicant's exercise of his profession. The Court also regarded the ban as 
unreasonable, as it forced Mr. Erdogdu to refrain from publishing any article that would be 
considered contrary to the interests of the State. Such a limitation on freedom of journalistic 
expression was disproportionate because it meant that only ideas that were generally accepted, 
welcome or regarded as inoffensive or neutral could be expressed. Consequently, the Court 
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Turkish judge of 
the European Court of Human Rights, Judge Gölcüklü delivered a separate opinion. Although he 
voted with the majority of the Court, Judge Gölcüklü expressed his doubts on the political 
opportunity to protect the freedom of expression in a way that this freedom can be abused to 
undermine the democratic rights and freedoms itself. 
 
In the case of Constantinescu v. Romania, the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment 
of 27 June 2000 (First Section) found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The case 
concerns the applicant's conviction for criminal defamation. Constantinescu, the president of a 
teachers' trade union, was convicted by the Bucharest District Court in 1994 following the 
publication in the press of comments he had made regarding an internal dispute in the Union 
and the functioning of the judicial system. More specifically, in an interview with a journalist of 
the newspaper Tineretul Liber Constantinescu had referred to three members of the previous 
trade union leadership who had refused to return money belonging to the Union after the election 
of new leaders as delapidatori (receivers of stolen goods). It was also mentioned that the new 
leadership of the Union had lodged a criminal complaint against them. The Bucharest District 
Court considered these statements by Constantinescu as defamatory, as he must have been aware 
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when making this remarks in the presence of journalists that the prosecution had dropped the 
charges against the three teachers concerned. Before the Strasbourg Court Constantinescu 
alleged a violation of Article 6 (fair trial) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European 
Convention. He maintained that he had not been allowed to prove that his comments were true 
and had not been informed that the charges had been dropped by the prosecution when the 
article appeared. As a matter of fact, the European Court of Human Rights noted a violation of 
Article 6 of the Convention because the Bucharest District Court found the applicant guilty of 
defamation without affording him an opportunity to give evidence and defend his case. On the 
other hand, the Court found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The European Court of 
Human Rights underlined that the Bucharest District Court had based its conviction on the use 
of the defamatory word delapidatori by Constantinescu referring to the three teachers, and not 
on the fact that he had expressed opinions criticising the functioning of the system of justice in 
trade union disputes. The Court considered that Constantinescu could quite easily have voiced 
his criticism and contributed to a free public debate on trade union problems without using the 
word delapidatori, which explicitly refers to a criminal offence, of which the three teachers were 
never convicted. Accordingly, Constantinescu should have refrained from using this description. 
Hence, the Strasbourg Court reached the conclusion that the State's legitimate interest in 
protecting the reputation of the three teachers did not conflict with the applicant's interest in 
contributing to the aforementioned debate. The Court also found that the penalty imposed, 
namely a fine of 50,000 ROL (leu) and an award of 500,000 ROL (leu) to each teacher for non-
pecuniary damage, was not disproportionate. It was within their margin of appreciation for the 
Romanian courts to consider the conviction of Constantinescu "necessary in a democratic society" 
in order to protect the rights of others, which is fully in accordance with para. 2 of Article 10 of 
the Convention. In a partially dissenting opinion judge Casadevall (Andorra) expressed his 
opinion that the arguments developed by the Romanian authorities were neither pertinent nor 
sufficient to legitimise the interference in the applicant's freedom of expression. Casadevall inter 
alia referred to the judgment of the Romanian Supreme Court in 1999 which annuled the 
applicant's conviction because the motive of intent to defame was not proven. According to 
Casadevall this judgment in itself contained an implicit confirmation of a violation of Article 10 
of the European Convention. 
 
• Erdoğdu v. Turkey, no. 25723/94, ECHR 2000-VI.  
• Constantinescu v. Romania, no. 28871/95, ECHR 2000-VIII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Judgment on the Freedom of Expression in the Case Sener v. 
Turkey. 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Once again the European Court of Human Rights has held that the Turkish authorities have acted 
in breach of Article 10 (and Article 6) of the Convention, this time by convicting the owner and 
editor of the weekly review Haberle Yorumda Gerçek ("The Truth of News and Comments"). In 
1994 Sener was sentenced to six months' , imprisonment and a fine by the Istanbul State Security 
Court: an article published in the review was considered to be an offence under the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 1991. In the proceedings before the European Court, the Turkish government 
asserted that the applicant was responsible for separatist propaganda since the article 
encouraged terrorist violence against the State. In the government's opinion, the message that 
the article conveyed was that the only means of resolving the Kurdish problem was the 
maintenance of terrorist activities against the State. 
 
In its judgment of 18 July 2000, the European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) has 
summarised the basic principles established in its case law concerning Article 10 of the 
Convention, referring in particular to the essential role of journalism and the media in ensuring 
the proper functioning of political democracy. The Court also underlined, in line with its case 
law, that there was little scope under Article 10 paragraph 2 for restrictions on political speech 
or on debate on matters of public interest. In contrast with the Turkish judicial authorities, the 
European Court was of the opinion that although the impugned article contained certain phrases 
that were aggressive in tone, the article as a whole did not glorify violence, nor did it incite 
people to hatred, revenge or armed resistance. On the contrary, the Strasbourg Court considereds 
the article to be an intellectual analysis of the Kurdish problem calling for an end to the armed 
conflict. The Court was of the opinion that the domestic authorities failed to give sufficient 
weight to the public's right to be informed of a different perspective on the situation in south-
east Turkey, irrespective of how unpalatable that perspective might be for them. The Court finally 
came to the conclusion that by convicting Sener the Turkish judicial authorities infringed Article 
10 , of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The Court also reached the conclusion that because of the presence of a military judge on the 
bench of the Istanbul State Security Court, Sener was denied a fair , trial, in breach of Article 6 § 
1 of the Convention. 
 
The Turkish judge Gölcüklü expressed a dissenting opinion and argued that in the present case 
he did not find any violation imputable to the respondent State. 
 
• Şener v. Turkey, no. 26680/95, 18 July 2000.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 21 September 2000, the Austrian broadcasting legislation is once more being 
analysed by the Strasbourg Court (Second Section) from the perspective of Article 10 of the 
European Convention, this time after a complaint by a private organisation that did not obtain a 
licence to set up and operate a television transmitter in the Vienna area. In its judgment of 24 
November 1993 in the Informationsverein Lentia case, the European Court of Human Rights 
already decided that the monopoly of the Austrian public broadcasting organisation ORF was in 
breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
This point of view was confirmed in a judgment of 20 October 1997 in the case of Radio ABC v. 
Austria. The Court was of the opinion that at least until 1 May 1997 there was no legal basis 
whereby an operating licence could be granted to any radio station other than the Austrian 
Broadcasting Corporation, a situation which violated Article 10 of the European Convention (see 
IRIS 1997-10: 3). In its judgment of 21 September 2000, the European Court now notes that until 
1 August 1996 it was not possible to obtain a licence to operate a television transmitter in Austria. 
Hence, the situation of Tele 1 was not different from that of the applicants in the 
Informationsverein Lentia case. Accordingly, there was a breach of Article 10 during that period. 
The Strasbourg Court notes, however, that as of 1 August 1996 private broadcasters were free to 
create and transmit their own programmes via cable network without any conditions being 
attached, while terrestrial television broadcasting was still reserved to the ORF. The Court is of 
the opinion that cable television broadcasting offered private broadcasters a viable alternative 
to terrestrial broadcasting as almost all households receiving television in Vienna had the 
possibility of being connected to the cable net. Thus, the interference with the applicant's right 
to impart information resulting from the impossibility of obtaining a licence for terrestrial 
broadcasting can no longer be regarded as a breach of Article 10. The Court did not decide on 
the question whether or not the Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Act, which came into force on 
1 July 1997, is in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court underlines that the applicant 
has not made notification of any cable broadcasting activities nor had it submitted an application 
for a satellite broadcasting licence. Consequently, it is not necessary for the Court to rule on this 
period as it is not its task to rule in abstracto whether legislation is compatible with the 
Convention. The Court comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of Article 10 in the 
first period (from 30 November 1993 to 1 August 1996), while there has been no violation of this 
Article in the second period (from 1 August 1996 to 1 July 1997). 
 
In a judgment delivered at Strasbourg on 28 September 2000 the European Court of Human 
Rights (Fourth Section) has found that by convicting Lopes Gomes da Silva the judicial authorities 
of Portugal infringed Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Lopes Gomes da 
Silva, the manager of the daily newspaper Público, was sentenced by the Lisbon Court of Appeal 
for criminal libel through the press. The conviction was the result of a criminal complaint by a 
candidate for the local elections in 1993, Mr. Silva Resende. In an editorial published in Público 
shortly before the elections, Lopes Gomes da Silva referred to Resende as a "grotesque and 
clownish candidature" and as an "incredible mixture of reactionary coarseness, fascist bigotry 
and vulgar anti-Semitism". Lopes Gomes da Silva was ordered to pay PTE 150.0000 as a criminal 
fine and to pay PTE 250.000 to Silva Resende in damages. In a unanimous decision the Strasbourg 
Court held that this conviction was a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court once more 
emphasised the particular importance of the freedom of the press and underlined that the limits 
of acceptable criticism are wider with regard to a politician acting in his public capacity and that 
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journalists could resort to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation. By reproducing a 
number of extracts from recent articles by Silva Resende alongside his editorial, Lopes Gomes da 
Silva had complied with the rules of journalism, a matter to which the Court attached 
considerable importance. Although the penalty had been minor, the Court decided that the 
conviction for libel was not a measure that was reasonably proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued. Consequently, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Tele 1 Privatfernsehgesellschaft mbH v. Austria, no. 32240/96, September 2000.  
• Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal, no. 37698/97, ECHR 2000-X.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Finding against France on Violation of Article 10 
Charlotte Vier 
Légipresse 
 
Almost two years after the Canard Enchaîné case, the European Court of Human Rights has again 
found that France has violated the principles contained in Article 10 of the Human Rights 
Convention. 
 
The case concerned the finding against the director of a newspaper and a journalist who had 
reported on the proceedings brought by a company that managed hostels for immigrant workers 
against one of its former directors. It was taken on the basis of Article 2 of the Act of 2 July 1931, 
which prohibits the publication before the Courts reach a verdict, of any information concerning 
proceedings instigated by an individual. The Court of Appeal in Paris, to which the case had been 
referred, had considered that the ban contained in the 1931 act was compatible with Article 10 
of the Convention inasmuch as it was aimed at guaranteeing the presumption of innocence and 
therefore fell within the scope of the restrictions on freedom of expression authorised by the Act. 
 
As the Court of Cassation had rejected the appeal lodged against this decision, the plaintiffs took 
the case to the European Court of Human Rights ("Court"). In its decision of 3 October 2000, the 
Court recalled firstly that journalists writing articles on current criminal proceedings must respect 
the rights of the parties involved. In considering whether interference with the course of justice 
was involved, the Court noted that the disputed ban - which was absolute and general, covering 
any type of information - only concerned proceedings instigated by an individual and not those 
instigated by the Public Prosecutor or on the basis of an ordinary complaint. The judges expressed 
surprise at this difference of treatment, which did not appear to be based on any objective reason, 
since the ban prevents the press informing the public of facts which may be of public interest 
(here, the case brought against political figures and their allegedly fraudulent acts in managing 
a public-sector company). 
 
The Court held that there were other mechanisms for protecting secrecy during investigation and 
enquiry procedures, such as Articles 11 and 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and in particular 
Article 9-1 of the Civil Code, which provides that everyone is entitled to the benefit of the 
presumption of innocence. In addition, the latter provision states that in the event of a person 
against whom a charge has been brought and proceedings instigated by an individual being 
presented publicly, before any verdict is passed, as being guilty of the facts being investigated 
or enquired into by the courts, the judge may, even in urgent matters, order the insertion in the 
publication concerned of an announcement putting a stop to the infringement of the presumption 
of innocence. 
 
This range of provisions, which the Court found sufficient, made the total ban contained in the 
Act of 2 July 1931 unnecessary; France had therefore been found in violation of Article 10 since 
the ban was not proportionate to the pursuit of the legitimate aims intended. 
 
• Du Roy and Malaurie v. France, no. 34000/96, ECHR 2000-X.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgments on the Freedom of Expression 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 10 0ctobre 2000 the European Court of Human Rights (first section) has held in 
the case of Akkoç v. Turkey that a disciplinary sanction because of an interview published in a 
newspaper, was not in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant, a former teacher, 
received a disciplinary punishment in 1994 for a statement made to the press in which she 
declared that at a meeting some teachers were assaulted by the police. In 1998, however, the 
Supreme Administrative Court decided that the disciplinary sanction was unlawful. In 1999 the 
Administrative Court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Administrative Court and finally 
cancelled the disciplinary sanction imposed on the applicant. The Strasbourg Court decided that 
although five years and nine months is a considerable period of time, it did not deprive the 
domestic procedures of efficacy in providing adequate redress. The Administrative Court quashed 
the disciplinary sanction which thereby ceased, retrospectively, to have any effect, vindicating 
the applicant's right of freedom of expression. In such circumstances the applicant cannot longer 
claim to be a victim of an interference with her right of freedom of expression under Article 10 
of the Convention. 
 
In the same case, however, the Court found a violation of Article 2 of the Convention (right to 
life) and Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the torture of the applicant in police custody. 
 
In another judgment of 10 October 2000 the European Court of Human Rights (3rd section) in 
the case of Ibrahim Aksoy v. Turkey concluded that Article 10 of the Convention had been 
violated. The applicant, a writer and former Member of Parliament, was convicted several times 
in Turkey for disseminating separatist propaganda. Neither the speech at a regional congress, nor 
the publication of an article in a weekly magazine, nor the content of a leaflet, could justify these 
convictions according to the Strasbourg Court. The Court was of the opinion that the speech, the 
article and the leaflet did not constitute an incitement to violence, armed resistance or an 
uprising. The Court emphasised that one of the principal characteristics of democracy is the 
possibility to resolve a country's problems through dialogue and without recourse to violence, 
even when it is irksome. According to the Strasbourg Court, the conviction of the applicant could 
not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society and hence violated Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. This judgment is not final. Either party to the case may, 
within three months from the date of the judgment of a Chamber, request that the case be 
referred to the Grand Chamber (Art. 43-44 of the Convention). 
 
• Akkoç v. Turkey, nos. 22947/93 and 22948/93, ECHR 2000-X.  
• İbrahim Aksoy v. Turkey, nos. 28635/95, 30171/96 and 34535/97, 10 October 2000.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Judgment on the Freedom of Expression in the Case Tammer 
v. Estonia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment in the case Tammer v. Estonia the European Court of Human Rights held 
unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. In 1997 Tammer, 
a journalist and editor of the Estonian daily newspaper Postimees, was convicted of the offence 
of insult under Article 130 of the Criminal Code. He was found guilty and had to pay a fine of 220 
Estonian kroons because of the degradation of another person's honour or dignity in an improper 
form. Tammer was convicted after a private prosecution instituted by Ms. Laanaru, the second 
wife of Mr. Savisaar, the former Prime Minister of Estonia. The journalist had published an 
interview in his newspaper which contained some value judgments that were considered as 
insulting allegations with regard to Ms. Laanaru. More precisely, in an interview with the author 
who published a series of articles on the life of Ms. Laanaru, Tammer had raised the question if 
the publication of this kind of memoire did not make a hero of the wrong person. Tammer also 
formulated a critical value judgment in his question by putting it as follows : "A person breaking 
up another's marriage (abielulõhkuja), an unfit and careless mother deserting her child 
(rongaema): it does not seem to be the best example for young girls". After exhausting all national 
remedies before the Estonian courts, Tammer applied to the European Court of Human Rights 
alleging a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The Strasbourg Court however was of the opinion that the interference in the right of freedom 
of expression of Tammer met all three conditions of Article 10 paragraph 2. Tammer's conviction 
was prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and was to be considered as necessary in a 
democratic society. The Court noted the assesment of the domestic courts concerning the nature 
and use of the words in the circumstances of the case and considered that the applicant journalist 
could have formulated his criticism of Ms. Laanaru's actions without resorting to insulting 
language. The Strasbourg Court did not find it established that the use of the impugned terms in 
relation to Ms. Laanaru's private life was justified in terms of public concern or that they bore on 
a matter of general importance. The Court considered that the domestic courts properly balanced 
the various interests involved in the case. Taking into account the margin of appreciation, the 
Court reached the conclusion that the national authorities were indeed justified in the 
circumstances in interfering with the exercise of the applicant's right, noting also the limited 
amount of the fine imposed on Tammer as a penalty. Therefore, there had not been a violation 
of Article 10 of the European Convention. 
 
This judgment will become final in accordance with the circumstances set out in Article 44 
paragraph 2 of the Convention. 
 
• Tammer v. Estonia, no. 41205/98, ECHR 2001-I.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Recent Judgment on Freedom of Expression in the Case of 
Jerusalem v. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 27 February 2001, the European Court of Human Rights once again recognised 
the importance of freedom of political debate in a democratic society, while re-emphasising the 
difference between factual allegations and value judgments. In the case of Jerusalem v. Austria, 
the applicant, Mrs Susanne Jerusalem, a member of the Vienna Municipal Council, alleged that 
an injunction prohibiting her from repeating certain statements violated her right to freedom of 
expression. In a speech in the course of a debate in the Municipal Council on the granting of 
public subsidies to associations, she had sharply criticised two associations, describing them as 
"sects" which had "a totalitarian character" and "fascist tendencies". The Regional Court granted 
an injunction prohibiting Mrs Jerusalem from repeating the statements. The injunction was 
upheld by the Court of Appeal and by the Supreme Court, both of which essentially reasoned that 
allegations such as "fascist tendencies" or "sects with a totalitarian character" were statements 
of fact which the applicant had failed to prove. 
 
However, the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there had been a violation 
of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court observed that the applicant 
was an elected politician and that freedom of expression is especially important for elected 
public representatives. The applicant's statements were made in the course of a political debate 
and, although not covered by immunity as they would have been in a session of the Regional 
Parliament, the forum was comparable to Parliament insofar as the public interest in protecting 
the participants' freedom of expression was concerned. According to the Court, "Parliament or 
such comparable bodies are the essential fora for political debate [in a democracy]. Very weighty 
reasons must be advanced to justify interfering with the freedom of expression exercised 
therein". 
 
The Court regarded the statements of Mrs Jerusalem as value judgments and took into 
consideration the fact that she had offered documentary evidence which might have been 
relevant in showing that these value judgments were fair comment. By requiring the applicant to 
prove the truth of her statements, while at the same time depriving her of an effective 
opportunity to produce evidence to support them, the Austrian Courts had taken a measure that 
amounted to a disproportionate interference with her right to freedom of expression. The Court 
also stated that the requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is impossible to fulfil and 
infringes freedom of opinion itself, which is a fundamental part of the right secured by Article 10 
of the Convention. The Court concluded that the injunction preventing the repetition of the 
impugned statements was not necessary in a democratic society and hence violated Article 10. 
 
The judgment will become final in accordance with Article 44 of the Convention, which governs 
the finalisation of judgments by the Court. 
 
• Jerusalem v. Austria, no. 26958/95, ECHR 2001-II.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Cases of B. and P. v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In the cases of B. and P. v. the United Kingdom, the applicants complained that they had been 
barred from divulging information about the proceedings on custody rights over their children. 
The judge dealing with the case had ordered that no documents used in the proceedings should 
be disclosed outside the court. B. had also been warned by the judge that any publication of 
information obtained in the context of the proceedings would amount to contempt of court. As 
the case was not heard in public and the judgments were not publicly pronounced, B. and P. 
complained in Strasbourg that these restricting measures on the publicity of their court case 
ought to have been considered to be in breach of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) and 
Article10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In a judgment of 24 April 2001, the European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) noted that 
the proceedings in question concerned the residence of each man's son following the parents' 
divorce or separation, which were prime examples of cases where the exclusion of the press and 
public might be justified to protect the privacy of the child and parties and to avoid prejudicing 
the interests of justice. Concerning the publication of the judgments in question, the Court 
observed that anyone who could establish an interest was able to consult and obtain a copy of 
the full text of the judgments in child residence cases, while some of these judgments were 
routinely published, thus enabling the public to study the manner in which the courts generally 
approach such cases and the principles applied in deciding them. Under these circumstances, the 
Court reached the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 6 § 1, either regarding 
the applicants' complaints about the public hearing or the public pronouncement of the 
judgments. Finally, the Court held that it was not necessary to examine separately the applicants' 
complaint under Article 10 of the Convention, thereby implying that the Court did not find a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention either. 
 
• B. and P. v. the United Kingdom, nos. 36337/97 and 35974/97, ECHR 2001-III.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Cyprus v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber) of 10 May 2001 deals 
with one of the few cases in which the applicant is the government of another State Party to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In this 
case, the Government of the Republic of Cyprus alleged that due to Turkey's military operations 
in Northern Cyprus, and especially after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus in 1983 ("the TRNC"), the Government of Turkey was to be considered responsible for 
continuing violations of several human rights. One of the violations arising out of the living 
conditions of Greek Cypriots in Northern Cyprus concerned freedom of expression and 
information, as protected by Article 10 of the Convention. More specifically, it was asserted that 
the TRNC authorities engaged in excessive censorship of school-books and restricted the 
importation and distribution of media, especially Greek-language newspapers and books whose 
content they disapproved. Referring to the Commission's report, the Court was of the opinion 
that there was not sufficient evidence that restrictions were imposed on the importation of 
newspapers, the distribution of books or on the reception of electronic media. The Court, on the 
other hand, found that during the period under consideration, a large number of school-books, 
no matter how innocuous their content, were unilaterally censored or rejected by the authorities. 
According to the Court, the respondent Government failed to provide any justification for this 
form of wide-ranging censorship which far exceeded the limits of confidence-building methods 
and amounted to a denial of the right to freedom of information. These measures of excessive 
censorship were considered by the Court to be a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Cyprus v. Turkey [GC], no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In its judgment of 28 June 2001, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a remarkable 
approach with regard to the right of access to broadcast "non-commercial" television 
commercials. Although the judgment of the Court is essentialy declaratory, it can be interpreted 
as affording arguments for a "right to an antenna", ie a right of access to a particular media 
controlled by a third person. 
 
The case originates in an application against Switzerland because of the refusal in 1994 by the 
AG für das Werbefernsehen (Commercial Television Company, now Publisuisse) to broadcast a 
commercial concerning animal welfare at the request of the Verein gegen Tierfabriken 
(Association against industrial animal production - VGT). The television commercial was to be 
considered as a response to the advertisements of the meat industry, and ended with the words 
"eat less meat, for the sake of your health, the animals and the environment". The Commercial 
Television Company refused to broadcast the commercial, however, because it considered it to 
be a message with a clear political character, and Swiss broadcasting law prohibits political 
advertisements on radio and television. The applicant's administrative law appeal was dismissed 
by the Bundesgericht (Federal Court) on 20 August 1997, relying inter alia on the legitimate aim 
of the prohibition of political advertising stated in Section 18 Paragraph 5 of the Federal Radio 
and Television Act. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 28 June 2001 agreed that a ban on 
political advertisements on television as such can be considered to have a legitimate aim, in 
order to prevent financially-strong groups from obtaining a competitive advantage in politics and 
to spare the political process from undue commercial influence. Such a ban can also help to 
provide for a certain equality of opportunity between political movements in society, and to 
support the press which remained free to publish political advertisements. The Court also agreed 
that the commercial could be regarded as "political" within the meaning of Section 18 Paragraph 
5 of the Swiss Federal Radio and Television Act. Indeed, rather than inciting the public to 
purchase a particular product, it reflected some controversial opinions on an actual debate in 
society. 
 
On the decisive question of whether the refusal to broadcast the commercial was necessary in a 
democratic society, the Court took into account several factors. First of all, the Court observed 
that powerful financial groups obtain competitive advantages through commercial advertising 
and might therefore exercise pressure on, and eventually curtail, the freedom of the radio and 
television stations broadcasting the commercials. The Court underlined that such situations 
undermine the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic society. Here, however, 
the applicant association, did not constitute a powerful financial group. Rather than seeking to 
abuse a competitive advantage, the association was intending to participate by means of its 
proposed commercial in an ongoing general debate on animal protection. Secondly: although a 
prohibition on political advertising can be compatible with the requirements of Article 10 of the 
Convention, the Court was of the opinion that Section 18 Paragraph 5 of the Swiss Federal Radio 
and Television Act was in casu not applied in accordance with Article 10 of the European 
Convention. According to the Strasbourg Court, the Swiss authorities had not demonstrated in a 
"relevant and sufficient" manner why the grounds generally advanced in support of the 
prohibition on political advertising also served to justify the interference in the particular 
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circumstances of the case. Furthermore, the Court underlined that the domestic authorities did 
not adduce the disturbing nature of any particular sequence, or of any particular words of the 
commercial as a ground for refusing to broadcast it. Finally, it was also taken into consideration 
that the Commercial Television Company was the sole entity responsible for the broadcasting of 
commercials during programmes programmes broadcast nationally, which meant that there were 
few other possibilities to reach the entire Swiss public with the proposed advertisement. 
 
In light of all these elements, the Court held unanimously that the refusal to broadcast VGT's 
commercial could not be considered as necessary in a democratic society and that consequently 
there had been a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention. 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 of the Convention. 
Within 3 months any party in the case may request a rehearing by the Grand Chamber of the 
Court. 
 
• VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, no. 24699/94, ECHR 2001-VI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Ekin Association v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 17 July 2001, the European Court of Human Rights analysed Section 14 of the 
French Act on Freedom of the Press, 1881, from the perspective of Articles 10 and 14 of the 
European Convention. This provision of the French Act empowers the Minister of the Interior to 
impose a ban on the circulation or distribution of foreign publications. The Court noted that 
Section 14 of the 1881 Act does not state the circumstances in which the power can be used. In 
particular, there is no definition of the concept of "foreign origin" and no indication of the grounds 
on which a publication could be banned. With regard to the banning in 1987 of the book "Euskadi 
at war", published by the Basque cultural organisation Ekin, the Court was of the opinion that the 
applicant had not been given the possibility to rely on an effective judicial review to prevent the 
abuse of Section 14 of the French Freedom of the Press Act. According to the Court, this provision 
also appeared to be in direct conflict with the actual wording of Article 10 § 1 of the European 
Convention, which provides that the rights recognised in that Article subsist "regardless of 
frontiers". The Court ruled that a system of control on publications merely based on their foreign 
origin is indeed to be considered as a kind of discrimination. Finally, the Court held that the 
content of the book did not justify so serious an interference with the applicant's freedom of 
expression as that constituted by the ban imposed by the French Minister of the Interior. Besides 
the violation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court also noted that the total length of the 
proceedings, more than nine years, could not be considered "reasonable", although the issue of 
the litigation was of particular importance. Consequently, there was also a violation of Article 6 
§ 1 of the Convention. 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 of the Convention. Any 
party to the case may request a rehearing by the Grand Chamber of the Court within three months. 
 
• Association Ekin v. France, no. 39288/98, ECHR 2001-VIII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Feldek v. Slovakia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 12 July 2001, the European Court of Human Rights decided, by five votes to two, 
that there had been a violation of Article 10 because of the conviction of a publicist who had 
sharply criticised the Slovak Minister of Culture and Education. This is the second time in only a 
short period that the Strasbourg Court has found a breach of the right to freedom of expression 
in Slovakia (See also: Judgment by the European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), Case 
of Marônek v. Slovakia, Application no. 32686/96 of 19 April 2001. 
 
After the publication in 1995 of a statement in several newspapers referring to the "fascist past" 
of the Minister of Culture and Education of the Slovak Republic, the author of this statement, Mr 
Feldek, was convicted by the Supreme Court. The Court applied Articles 11 and 13 of the Slovak 
Civil Code, which offer protection against the unjustified infringement of one's personal rights, 
civil and human dignity. The statement was indeed considered as having a defamatory character 
and Feldek was ordered to ensure the publication of the final judgment in five newspapers. 
 
The judgment of the European Court of Human Rights recalls that there is little scope under 
Article 10 § 2 of the Convention for restrictions on political speech or on debate on questions of 
public interest and that the limits of acceptable criticism are wider as regards a politician as such 
than as regards a private individual. Emphasising the promotion of free political debate as a very 
important feature in a democratic society, the Court underlined that allowing broad restrictions 
on political speech in individual cases would undoubtedly affect respect for freedom of 
expression in general in the state concerned. In the Feldek case, the Court was satisfied that the 
value judgment referring to the "fascist past" of the Slovak Minister of Culture was based on 
information which was already known to the wider public. The Strasbourg Court refused to 
subscribe to a restrictive definition of the term "fascist past", as such an interpretation could also 
mean that a person participated in a fascist organisation, as a member, even if this was not 
coupled with specific activities propagating fascist ideals. The Court of Human Rights reached 
the conclusion that the Slovak Court of Cassation had not convincingly established any pressing 
social need for putting the protection of the personal right of a public figure above the applicant's 
right to freedom of expression and the general interest of promoting this freedom when issues 
of public interest are concerned. As the interference complained of by Feldek was not necessary 
in a democratic society, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 of the Convention. Any 
party to the case may request a rehearing by the Grand Chamber of the Court within three months. 
 
• Feldek v. Slovakia, no. 29032/95, ECHR 2001-VIII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Perna v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In its judgment of 25 July 2001, the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that there 
had been a violation of Article 10 on account of the applicant's conviction for alleging, by means 
of symbolic expression, that a senior Italian judicial officer had sworn an oath of obedience to 
the former Italian Communist Party. 
 
The applicant, Giancarlo Perna, who is a journalist, published an article in the Italian daily 
newspaper Il Giornale sharply criticising the communist militancy of a judicial officer, Mr G. 
Caselli, who was at that time the public prosecutor in Palermo. The article raised in substance 
two separate issues. Firstly, Perna questioned Caselli's independence and impartiality because of 
his political militancy as a member of the Communist Party. Secondly, Caselli was accused of an 
alleged strategy of gaining control of the public prosecutors' offices in a number of cities and the 
use of the pentito (i.e. criminalturned-informer) T. Buscetta against Mr Andreotti, a former Prime 
Minister of Italy. After a complaint by Caselli, Perna was convicted for defamation pursuant to 
Articles 595 and 61 § 10 of the Criminal Code and Section 13 of the Italian Press Act. Throughout 
the defamation proceedings before the domestic courts, the journalist was not allowed to admit 
the evidence he sought to adduce. In 1999 Perna alleged a violation of Article 6 and Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The refusal by the Italian Courts was not considered by the Strasbourg Court as a breach of Article 
6 § 1 and 3(d) of the Convention, which guarantee everyone charged with a criminal offence the 
right to examine witnesses or to have witnesses examined on their behalf. The Court was of the 
opinion that the applicant had not explained how evidence from the witnesses he wished to call 
could have contributed any new information whatsoever to the proceedings. 
 
After repeating the general principles of its case law on Article 10 of the Convention, the Court 
emphasised the distinction that is to be made between facts and value judgments in order to 
decide if there has been a breach of Article 10. The existence of facts can be demonstrated, 
whereas the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof. The Court noted that the 
criticism directed at the complainant had a factual basis that was not disputed, namely Caselli's 
political militancy as a member of the Communist Party. By such conduct, a judicial officer 
inevitably exposes himself to criticism in the press, which may rightly see the independence and 
impartiality of the State legal service as a major concern of public interest. The Court agreed that 
the terms chosen by Perna and the use of the symbolic image of the "oath of obedience" to the 
Communist Party was hard-hitting, but it also emphasised that journalistic freedom covers 
possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation. According to the Court, the 
conviction of Perna was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention as the punishment of a 
journalist for such kinds of criticism of a member of the judiciary is not necessary in a democratic 
society. 
 
With regard, however, to Perna's assertions about the alleged strategy of gaining control over 
the public prosecutors' offices in a number of cities and especially the use of the pentito Buscetta 
in order to prosecute Mr Andreotti, the Court came to the conclusion that the conviction of Perna 
was not in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. In contrast to the general criticism in the 
impugned newspaper article, these allegations obviously amounted to the attribution of specific 
acts to the complainant. As this part of the article did not mention any evidence or cite any source 
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of information, the Court considered that these allegations were not covered by the protection 
of Article 10. Referring to the extremely serious character of such allegations against a judicial 
officer, with a lack of factual basis, the Court came to conclusion that this part of Perna's article 
indeed overstepped the limits of acceptable criticism. 
 
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 of the Convention. Any 
party to the case may request a rehearing by the Grand Chamber of the Court within three months. 
 
• Perna v. Italy, no. 48898/99, 25 July 2001.  
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 6 
May 2003. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case Thoma v. Luxembourg 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 29 March 2001, the European Court of Human Rights once again recognised the 
importance of journalistic freedom in reporting on matters of public interest. Marc Thoma, a radio 
journalist working for RTL, alleged that his civil conviction for making a defamatory statement 
in a radio programme violated his right to freedom of expression. In that radio programme, he 
reported on alleged fraudulent practices in the field of reafforestation work. These allegations 
were based on an article published in the newspaper Tageblatt. Following legal action by 63 
Forestry Commission officials, the journalist was convicted of defamation by the Luxembourg 
courts. 
 
The European Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. The Court recalled its general principles, emphasising 
the important role of the press in a democratic society. Although the European Court recognised 
that some of the applicant's remarks were very serious and that the officials of the Water and 
Forestry Commission were indirectly identifiable, it noted at the same time that the issue raised 
in the radio programme had been widely debated in the Luxembourg media and concerned a 
problem of public interest. 
 
In particular, the fact that Thoma had based his defamatory remarks on an article published by a 
fellow journalist was a decisive element in this case. The European Court reiterated that 
punishing a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another person 
would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to the discussion of matters of public 
interest and should not be envisaged unless there were particularly strong reasons for doing so. 
The Luxembourg courts had decided that a journalist who merely quoted from an article that had 
already been published would only escape liability if he formally distanced himself from that 
article. The European Court, however, is of the opinion that such a requirement for journalists to 
distance themselves systematically and formally from the content of a quotation that might 
defame or harm a third party was not reconcilable with the role of the press in providing 
information on current events, opinions and ideas. The Court noted that the applicant had taken 
the precaution of mentioning that he was quoting from a press article and that he had underlined 
that this article contained some "strongly worded" allegations. The Court also took into 
consideration the fact that the journalist had interviewed a third party, a woodlands owner, about 
whether he thought that the allegations of fraud in the reafforestation sector were true. Under 
these circumstances, the Court was not sufficiently convinced that the conviction of the applicant 
was necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the reputation and rights of others. 
 
• Thoma v. Luxembourg, no. 38432/97, ECHR 2001-III.  
 
IRIS 2001-9/1 
Back to overview of case-law 
104 
European Court of Human Rights: Case Marônek v. Slovakia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 19 April 2001, the Court also held that there had been a violation of Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, this time in the case of Marônek v. Slovakia. In 
1992, the daily newspaper Smena published an article on the problems experienced by Vladimir 
Marônek with the allocation of a flat that was the property of a State-owned company. The article 
stated that the flat allocated to Marônek had been unlawfully occupied by A., a public prosecutor. 
It also criticised the fact that Marônek had no possibility of using the flat. A few weeks later, the 
newspaper published an open letter written by Marônek, criticising the fact that the flat which 
was at his disposal was occupied by A., emphasising again that A. was a public prosecutor and 
adding: "[S]hould our newly-born democracy have such representatives of law, it will not outlive 
its childhood and we can bury it right away". Marônek and the newspaper were sued and 
convicted of defamation. Marônek alleged before the European Court that his right to freedom 
of expression had been violated. 
 
The European Court noted that the purpose of Marônek's open letter was not only to resolve his 
individual problem, but also to urge others with a similar problem to take action. According to 
the Court, he expressed the view, apparently in good faith, that the resolution of the issue was 
important for strengthening the rule of law in a newly-born democracy. The open letter also 
raised issues of public interest, capable of affecting housing policy at a period when State-owned 
apartments were about to be denationalised. Taken as a whole, the statements of Marônek did 
not appear to be excessive and most of the events on which he had relied had earlier been made 
public in the Smena article. Futhermore, and most importantly, the European Court reached the 
conclusion that the domestic courts lacked sufficient reasons to justify the relatively high amount 
of compensation awarded to the claimants. According to the Court, there was no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the measures applied and the legitimate aim pursued 
(the protection of the rights and reputation of others). Accordingly, the Court held unanimously 
that there had been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Marônek v. Slovakia, no. 32686/96, ECHR 2001-III.  
 
IRIS 2001-9/2 
Back to overview of case-law 
105 
European Court of Human Rights: Case Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
On 19 December 2001, the European Court of Human Rights announced its decision on 
admissibility in the case of Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other Contracting States. The 
application was brought by six citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and concerned 
the bombing by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of the building of Radio Televizije 
Srbije (Radio-Television Serbia, RTS) during the Kosovo crisis in April 1999. The building was 
destroyed; 16 people were killed and 16 others were seriously injured. The applicants, all family 
members of the deceased or themselves injured in the bombing, complained that the 
bombardment of the RTS building violated not only Article 2 (right to life), but also Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of expression). 
 
The Court, however, unanimously declared the application inadmissible as the impugned act is 
to be considered as falling outside the jurisdiction of the respondent States. The Court came to 
the conclusion that there was no jurisdictional link between the persons who were victims of the 
act complained of and the respondent States. Accordingly, it was not satisfied that the applicants 
and their deceased relatives were capable of coming withinthe jurisdiction of the respondent 
States on account of the extra-territorial act in question. As to whether the exclusion of the 
applicants from the respondent States' jurisdiction would defeat the ordre public mission of the 
Convention and leave a regrettable vacuum in the Convention system of human rights protection, 
the Court's obligation was to have regard to the special character of the Convention as a 
constitutional instrument of European public order for the protection of individual human beings 
and its role was to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting 
States within their legal space. The FRY clearly did not fall within this legal space and the 
Convention is not considered to be designed for application throughout the world, even in 
respect of the conduct of the Contracting States. 
 
The Court concluded that the impugned action of the respondent States does not engage their 
Convention responsibility and that the application could therefore be declared inadmissible. 
 
• Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (dec.) [GC], no. 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of E.K. v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1994, E.K., the secretary of the Istanbul section of the Human Rights Association, was convicted 
in two separate judgments by the State Security Court, which found that she had expressed 
support for the activities of the PKK and that she had undermined the territorial integrity and 
unity of the Turkish Nation. The first conviction related to an article by E.K., published in the 
Istanbul daily newspaper, Özgür Gündem, and entitled, "The world owes a debt to the Kurdish 
people". The article contained the text of a lecture by E.K. at a conference held in the Belgian 
Parliament. The article criticised the repressive approach of Turkish policy in Kurdistan and the 
violation of human rights by the Turkish army. The second case concerned an article in a book 
that was edited by E.K. The article described the situation in Turkish prisons. The State Security 
Court sentenced E.K. to terms of two years' and of six months' imprisonment and imposed 
substantial fines on her, pursuant to the Anti-terrorism Act. 
 
The applicant complained that her conviction in relation to the publication of the book 
constituted a violation of Article 7 (no punishment without law) and that both convictions 
infringed Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 6 (fair trial) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
 
The Court unanimously declared the conviction in relation to the publication of the book to be 
an infringement of Article 7 of the Convention, as according to Turkish law, prison sentences 
could only be imposed on the editors of periodicals, newspapers and magazines - and not books. 
The Court also unanimously declared that both convictions were in breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention. The conviction in relation to the publication of the book applied a law which was no 
longer applicable at the time of the conviction by the State Security Court. Hence this 
interference by the Turkish public authorities was considered not to be prescribed by law. In more 
general and principled terms, the Court also found a breach of Article 10, as the Court emphasised 
once more the importance of freedom of expression, the role of the press in a genuine democracy 
and the right of the public to be properly informed. According to the Court, the impugned article 
published in Özgür Gündem did indeed sharply criticise the Turkish authorities, but it did not 
contain any incitement to violence, hostility or hatred between citizens. Nor was the conviction 
of the applicant as editor of the book to be considered "necessary in a democratic society". The 
Court emphasised that the impugned article was rather to be seen as a strong protest referring 
to a difficult political situation, and not as incitement to an armed struggle. Finally, with regard 
to the alleged violation of Article 6, the Strasbourg Court attached great importance to the fact 
that a civilian (lawyer, editor and human rights activist) had to appear before a court composed, 
even if only in part, of members of the armed forces. Hence the applicant could legitimately fear 
that because one of the judges of the State Security Court was a military judge, it might allow 
itself to be unduly influenced by considerations which had nothing to do with the nature of the 
case. In other words, E.K. had a legitimate cause and there were objective reasons to doubt the 
independence and impartiality of the State Security Court, which led to the finding of a violation 
of Article 6 of the Convention. 
 
• E.K. v. Turkey, no. 28496/95, 7 February 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Three Violations of Article 10 by Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In three judgments of 26 February 2002, all against Austria, the European Court of Human Rights 
found a breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The first case (Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria) concerned the publication 
in the periodical TATblatt of a leaflet referring to "racist agitation" by the Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (Austrian Freedom Party, FPÖ). The text criticised the racist policy proposals of the 
FPÖ and was followed by a list of addresses and telephone numbers of FPÖ members and offices, 
with an invitation to the readers of TATblatt to call the FPÖ politicians and tell them what they 
thought of them and their policy. The Austrian courts, following civil proceedings initiated by the 
FPÖ leader, Jörg Haider, were of the opinion that the statement concerning racial agitation was 
to be considered as an insult and went beyond the limits of acceptable criticism by reproaching 
the plaintiff with a criminal offence. An injunction not to repeat the statement was granted 
against the publisher of the magazine. The European Court, however, in its judgment of 26 
February 2002, was of the opinion that the statement was to be situated in the context of a 
political debate and that it contributed to a discussion on subject matters of general interest, 
such as immigration and the legal status of aliens in Austria. The Court did not accept the 
qualification of the statement on "racist agitation" as an untrue statement of fact and considered 
the comment to be a value judgment, the truth of which is not susceptible of proof. In sum, the 
Court unanimously concluded that it could not find sufficient reasons to prevent the publisher 
from repeating the critical statement in question. For these reasons, the Court held that there 
had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In a second case (Dichand and others v. Austria), the Austrian courts had issued an order to retract 
and not to repeat some critical statements published in the Neue Kronen Zeitung. These 
statements firmly criticised the strategies and interests of a politician-lawyer, Mr. Graff, who was 
the defence lawyer of another media group. The European Court again disagreed with the 
Austrian courts: according to the European Court, the impugned statements were value 
judgments which had an adequate factual basis and represented a fair comment on issues of 
general public interest. The Court accepted the criticism of Mr. Graff as a politician who was in a 
situation where his business and political activities overlapped. It was recognised by the Court 
that the statement contained harsh criticism in strong, polemical language. However, the Court 
recalled its standard jurisprudence that Article 10 also protects information and ideas that offend, 
shock or disturb. The Court unanimously came to the conclusion that the interference by the 
Austrian authorities had violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In the third case (Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria), the European Court of Human Rights 
found that the Austrian courts had failed to take into account the essential function fulfilled by 
the press in a democratic society and its duty to impart information and ideas on matters of public 
interest. The case concerned the publication of an article, accompanied by photographs of a 
politician who had allegedly received unlawful salaries. A permanent injunction was granted by 
an Austrian court prohibiting the applicant company from publishing the politician's picture in 
connection with the article in question or similar articles. According to the Strasbourg Court, 
there was no valid reason why the newspaper should have been prevented from publishing the 
picture, especially as the photographs did not disclose any details of the private life of the 
politician concerned. The Court also referred to the fact that the picture of the politician as a 
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member of the Austrian Parliament was included on the Austrian Parliament's Internet site. The 
interference with the newspaper's right to freedom of expression was therefore not necessary in 
a democratic society. Accordingly, the Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v. Austria, no. 28525/95, ECHR 2002-I.  
• Dichand and Others v. Austria, no. 29271/95, 26 February 2002.  
• Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria, no. 34315/96, 26 February 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of De Diego Nafría v. Spain 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1997, Mariano de Diego Nafría, a former civil servant with the rank of inspector at the Bank of 
Spain, was dismissed after he had written a letter to the Bank's inspectorate accusing the 
Governor and other senior officials of the Bank of different kinds of irregularities. After the 
Spanish Courts had confirmed the legitimate character of the dismissal of de Diego Nafría 
because of the defamatory character of the letter, de Diego Nafría alleged a violation of Article 
10 of the European Convention (freedom of expression) before the European Court of Human 
Rights, submitting that the content of the letter reflected the truth and that the terms held to be 
offensive were taken out of context. 
 
The European Court, by five votes to two, held that there had been no violation of Article 10, 
observing that the Spanish courts had pertinently and correctly weighed the conflicting interests 
against each other before concluding that the applicant had overstepped the acceptable limits 
of the right to criticise. The European Court was of the opinion that the judgment in which the 
Madrid High Court had ruled that it was insulting to make serious and totally unsubstantiated 
accusations against a number of directors of the Bank of Spain could not be considered 
unreasonable or arbitrary. 
 
In the dissenting opinion it was emphasised that this case is very similar to the case of Fuentes 
Bobo v. Spain (see IRIS 2000-4: 2). In a judgment of 29 February 2000, the Court came to the 
conclusion in that case that the dismissal of the applicant because of his criticism of the 
management of the Spanish public broadcasting organisation, TVE, was to be considered a breach 
of Article 10 of the Convention. According to the dissenting judges, the Court should have taken 
the same approach in the instant case of de Diego Nafría. The dissenting judges referred in 
particular to the fact that the letter was not made public, nor distributed to the media, but was 
exclusively and directly addressed to the Bank's inspectorate. These observations and arguments 
could not, however, dissuade the majority of the European Court from reaching the conclusion 
that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention, as the national courts had not 
exceeded their margin of appreciation in penalising the applicant. 
 
• De Diego Nafría v. Spain, no. 46833/99, 14 March 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Gaweda v. Poland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1993 and 1994, the Polish authorities refused to register two of Mr. Gaweda's periodicals. The 
title of the first periodical was The Social and Political Monthly - A European Moral Tribunal, 
while the second request concerned the registration of a periodical under the title Germany - a 
Thousand year-old Enemy of Poland. Both requests for registration were dismissed by the Polish 
courts, which considered that the name of a periodical should be relevant to its content, in 
accordance with the 1984 Press Act and the Ordinance of the Minister of Justice on the 
registration of periodicals. With regard to the first periodical, the Polish courts were of the 
opinion that the proposed name implied that a European institution was supporting or publishing 
the magazine, which was untrue and misleading. With regard to the second title, the courts 
considered that the title was also in conflict with reality, in that it unduly concentrated on 
negative aspects of Polish-German relations, thus giving an unbalanced picture of the facts. 
 
In a judgment of 14 March 2002, the European Court of Human Rights reached the conclusion 
that both refusals to register the title of a periodical magazine violated the applicant's freedom 
of expression, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court 
did not consider the obligation to register a title of a newspaper or a magazine as such to be a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. However, as the refusal of registration amounted to an 
interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression, this refusal must be in 
accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the Convention, which means in the first place that the 
interference with the freedom of expression of the applicant must be "prescribed by law". 
Referring to Article 20 of the Press Act and Article 5 of the Ordinance on the registration of 
periodicals, the Court was of the opinion that the applicable law was not formulated with 
sufficient precision, as the terms used in the Law and in the Ordinance are ambiguous and lack 
the clarity that one would expect in a legal provision of this nature. According to the Court, the 
legal provisions suggest rather that registration could be refused where the request for 
registration did not conform to the technical details specified in Article 20 of the Press Act. The 
refusal to allow registration because of the allegedly misleading title is to be considered as 
"inappropriate from the standpoint of freedom of the press". 
 
The European Court also observed that in the present case, the domestic courts had imposed a 
kind of prior restraint on "a printed media" in a manner which entailed a ban on publication of 
entire periodicals on the basis of their titles. Such an interference would at least require a 
legislative provision which clearly authorised the courts to do so. According to the European 
Court, the interpretation given by the Polish courts to Article 5 of the Ordinance introduced new 
criteria, which were not foreseeable on the basis of the text specifying situations in which the 
registration of a title can be refused. Therefore, the Court was of the opinion that the nature of 
the interference with the applicant's exercise of his freedom of expression was not "prescribed 
by law" within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court 
unanimously concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Gawęda v. Poland, no. 26229/95, ECHR 2002-II.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Nikula v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1996, Anne Nikula, a lawyer living in Helsinki, lodged an application against Finland with the 
European Court of Human Rights, alleging that her freedom of expression had been violated by 
her conviction for defamation for having criticised the public prosecutor in her own capacity as 
defence counsel. In a memorial which the applicant read out before the court, the public 
prosecutor, Mr. T., was criticised for "role manipulation and unlawful presentation of evidence". 
After a private prosecution was initiated by Mr. T., Nikula was convicted in 1994 of public 
defamation committed without better knowledge. The Supreme Court upheld the criminal 
conviction in 1996, but restricted the sanction to the payment of damages and costs only. 
 
In its judgment of 21 March 2002, the European Court of Human Rights reiterated that the special 
status of Sciences lawyers gives them a central position in the administration of justice as 
intermediaries between the public and the courts. Given the key role of lawyers in this field, it is 
legitimate to expect them to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. 
However, the Court referred as well to the possibility that an interference with the counsel's 
freedom of expression in the course of a trial could raise an issue under Article 6 of the 
Convention with regard to the right of an accused client to receive a fair trial. According to the 
Court, the "equality of arms" principle and more generally, the principle of a fair trial, militate in 
favour of free and even forceful argumentation between the parties, although this should not 
lead to unlimited freedom of expression for a defence counsel. 
 
In evaluating the legitimacy of the applicant's conviction, the Court - referring to the Interights 
Amicus Curiae report - reiterated the distinction between the role of the prosecutor as the 
opponent of the accused, and that of the judge. This should provide increased protection for 
statements whereby an accused person criticises a prosecutor, as opposed to verbally attacking 
the judge or the court as a whole. The Court also noted that the applicant's submissions were 
confined to the courtroom, as opposed to criticism of a judge or prosecutor voiced in the media. 
More substantially, the Court underlined that the threat of an ex post facto review of a counsel's 
criticism of the public prosecutor is difficult to reconcile with defence counsels' duty to defend 
their clients' interests zealously. The assessment of a defence argument should not be influenced 
by the potential chilling effect of a criminal sanction or an obligation to pay compensation for 
harm suffered or costs incurred. According to the Court, it is only in exceptional cases that a 
restrictioneven by way of a lenient criminal sanction - of a defence counsel's freedom of 
expression can be accepted as necessary in a democratic society. In the Court's view, such reasons 
were not shown to exist in the Nikula case. Therefore, the restriction on Ms. Nikula's freedom of 
expression failed to answer any pressing social need. The Court held, by five votes to two, that 
there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Nikula v. Finland, no. 31611/96, ECHR 2002-II.  
• Amicus Curiae brief submitted to the European Court of Human Rights by Interights, the 
International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights, pursuant to Rule 61 of the 
Rules of the Court, 26 March 2002. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of McVicar v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 7 May 2002, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in a case in which the 
defamation of a well-known sports figure was the central issue. In September 1995, an article 
was published in the magazine, Spiked, in which the journalist John McVicar suggested that the 
athlete Linford Christie used banned performance-enhancing drugs. Mr. Christie brought an 
action in the High Court for defamation against McVicar. For the greater part of the proceedings, 
McVicar represented himself as he could not afford to pay legal fees because of the non-
availability of legal aid for defamation actions. His defence was that the allegations made in the 
article were true in substance and in fact. The trial judge, however, refused to admit the evidence 
of two witnesses upon which McVicar wished to rely. The judge found that to allow both 
witnesses to give evidence would have been unfair to Mr. Christie as he would not have had time 
to call counter-evidence and further, he would only have been made aware of the details about 
his alleged drugtaking when the witnesses would have taken the stand. In 1998, the jury found 
that the article contained defamatory allegations and found that McVicar had not proved that the 
article was substantially true. McVicar was ordered to pay costs and was made the subject of an 
injunction preventing him from repeating the allegations. 
 
McVicar lodged an application with the European Court alleging that the inability of a defendant 
in a libel action to claim legal aid constituted a violation of Articles 6 para. 1 (fair trial) and 10 
(freedom of expression and information) of the European Convention on Human Rights. He also 
submitted that the exclusion of witness evidence at a trial, as well as the burden of proof which 
he faced in pleading a defence of justification, the order for costs and the injunction restricting 
future publication further violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The European Court was of the opinion that McVicar was not prevented from presenting his 
defence to the defamation action effectively in the High Court, nor that the proceedings were 
unfair by reason of his ineligibility for legal aid. The Court noted, inter alia, that the applicant 
was a well-educated and experienced journalist who would have been capable of formulating a 
cogent argument before the Court. Therefore, there had been no violation of Article 6 or of Article 
10 of the Convention. 
 
As for the exclusion of evidence, the order to pay the costs arising from the defamation 
proceedings and the injunction measure, the Court held that there had been no violation of 
Article 10 either. The Court considered the potential consequences of the allegations made in 
the article for an individual who had achieved fame and fortune purely as a result of his athletic 
achievements to be very grave. The Court also emphasised that the offending article in itself 
made no mention of any authoritative basis for the drug-taking allegation. For those reasons, the 
Court held unanimously that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention either. 
 
• McVicar v. the United Kingdom, no. 46311/99, ECHR 2002-III.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Colombani (Le Monde) v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 25 June 2002, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation by France 
of the right to freedom of expression. The case concerns the conviction of the publishing director 
and of a journalist of the newspaper, Le Monde. Both had been convicted by the Court of Appeal 
of Paris in 1997 for defamation of the King of Morocco, Hassan II. 
 
In its issue of 3 November 1995, Le Monde published an article about a confidential version of a 
report by the Geopolitical Drugs Observatory (OGD) on drug production and trafficking in 
Morocco. The report had been compiled at the request of the Commission of the European 
Communities. The article, which was sub-headed, "A confidential report casts doubt on King 
Hassan II's entourage", called into question the resolve of the Moroccan authorities, and 
principally the King, in combatting the increase in drug-trafficking on Moroccan territory. At the 
request of the King of Morocco, criminal proceedings were brought against Le Monde. Mr. 
Colombani, the publishing director, and Mr. Incyan, the journalist who wrote the article, were 
convicted by the Paris Court of Appeal under section 36 of the Law of 29 July 1881 for insulting 
a foreign head of state. According to the Court, the journalist had failed to check the allegations 
and the article was considered to have been inspired by malicious intent. 
 
The European Court, however, did not agree with these findings, emphasising in the first place 
that when contributing to a public debate on issues that raised legitimate concerns, the press 
had - in principle - to be able to rely on official reports without being required to carry out its 
own separate investigations. The Strasbourg Court also referred to other French case-law which 
was inclined to recognise that the offence under section 36 of the Law of 29 July 1881 infringed 
freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention. Recent French 
jurisprudence itself appears to accept that this provision and its application were not necessary 
in a democratic society, particularly since heads of state or ordinary citizens who have been the 
target of insulting remarks or whose honour or reputation has been harmed, have an adequate 
criminal remedy in recourse to a prosecution for defamation. The special status for heads of states 
that derogated from the general law could not be reconciled with modern practice and political 
conceptions. In the Court's view, such a privilege went beyond what was necessary in a 
democratic society. The Court therefore found that, owing to the special nature of the protection 
afforded by the relevant provision of the Law on Freedom of the Press of 1881, the offence of 
insulting foreign heads of state was liable to infringe freedom of expression without meeting a 
"pressing social need". For these reasons, the Court held unanimously that there had been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Colombani and Others v. France, no. 51279/99, ECHR 2002-V.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Wilson & the NUJ v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 2 July 2002, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation by the United 
Kingdom of the right to freedom of assembly and association (Article 11 of the European 
Convention). The case concerns the use of financial incentives to induce employees to relinquish 
the right to union representation for collective bargaining. The case is especially interesting for 
the media sector, as it was brought before the Court of Human Rights jointly by David Wilson, a 
journalist working for the Daily Mail and by the National Union of Journalists (NUJ). Other 
applications by members of the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers were 
later joined to this initial application by Wilson and the NUJ. 
 
The case goes back to 1989 when Associated Newspapers Limited gave notice of its intention to 
de-recognise the NUJ and to terminate all aspects of collective bargaining. It also signalled that 
personal contracts were to be introduced with a 4.5% pay increase for journalists who signed and 
accepted the de-recognition. Wilson applied to the domestic courts, contesting the legality of the 
requirement to sign the personal contract and lose union rights, or accept a lower pay rise. After 
the House of Lords held that the collective bargaining over employment terms and conditions 
was not a sine qua non of union membership, Wilson and the NUJ lodged applications in 
Strasbourg, alleging that the law of the United Kingdom, by allowing the employer to de-
recognise trade unions, failed to uphold their right to protect their interests through trade union 
representation and their right to freedom of expression, contrary to Articles 11 and 10 (and also 
in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (non-discrimination)). 
 
With regard to Article 11, the Court is of the opinion that the absence in UK law of an obligation 
on employers to enter into collective bargaining did not give rise, in itself, to a breach of Article 
11 of the Convention. However, the Court took the view that allowing employers to use financial 
incentives to induce employees to relinquish important union rights constituted a violation of 
Article 11. The Court referred to the fact that this feature of domestic law has been criticised by 
the Social Charter's Committee of Independent Experts and the International Labour 
Organisation's Committee on Freedom of Association. According to the Court, it is the State's 
responsibility to ensure that trade union members were not prevented or restrained from using 
their union to represent them in attempts to regulate their relations with their employers. The 
Court concluded that the United Kingdom had failed in its positive obligation to secure the 
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under Article 11 of the Convention. 
 
As the Court considered that no separate issue arose under Article 10 of the Convention that had 
not already been dealt with in the context of Article 11, it held that it was not necessary to 
examine the complaint from the perspective of Article 10. The Court also found that it was 
unnecessary to consider the complaint raised under Article 14 of the Convention. 
 
• Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 30668/96, 
30671/96 and 30678/96, ECHR 2002-V.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Yagmurdereli v. Turkey and Seher Karatas v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In two recent judgments, the European Court of Human Rights again found violations of the right 
to freedom of expression in Turkey. 
 
The case of Esber Yagmurdereli concerns an application arising out of a sentence of ten months' 
imprisonment. The applicant, a lawyer, writer and doctor of philosophy, had given a speech at a 
meeting in 1991, in which he referred to Kurdistan as a part of the National Territory and to the 
terrorists acts carried out by the PKK as "a struggle for democracy and freedom". In 1994, he was 
convicted by the National Security Court for infringement of the anti-terrorist law: the content of 
his speech was considered to amount to separatist propaganda aimed at undermining the 
territorial integrity of the State and national unity. 
 
The case of Seher Karatas concerns the conviction of the applicant, who was the publisher and 
editor of a fortnightly magazine, Gençligin Sesi ("The Voice of Youth"). After the publication of an 
article, which urged young people to unite with the working-class and which criticised the actual 
political system as heading towards instability and crisis, Ms. Karatas was charged with inciting 
the people to hatred and hostility, contrary to Article 312 of the Turkish Criminal Code. The 
National Security Court found Karatas guilty of this offence and imposed a fine and a term of 
imprisonment of one year and eight months, with the prison sentence being converted into a 
fine. 
 
In both cases, the European Court recognised the sensitivity of the security situation in south-
east Turkey and referred to the need for the authorities to fight against terrorism and to be 
vigilant in repressing acts liable to increase violence. That is why the Court held that the 
interferences with the applicants' freedom of expression pursued legitimate aims of protecting 
national security and territorial integrity and preventing disorder and crime. 
 
However, in both cases, the Court found that the applicants' comments had taken the form of a 
political speech, emphasising that the European Convention allowed very few restrictions on 
freedom of expression in the sphere of political speech or questions of general interest. The Court 
also noted that the Turkish authorities had not pointed to any passages containing a vindication 
of acts of terrorism, an incitement to hatred between citizens or a call for violence or bloody 
revenge. Accordingly, the Court concluded in both cases that the measures taken against the 
applicants could not be deemed to be necessary in a democratic society and held that there had 
been a violation of Article 10. The Court also found a violation of Article 6 para. 1, as both 
applicants, as civilians, had not had a fair trial owing to the presence of a military judge on the 
bench of the National Security Court. 
 
• Yağmurdereli v. Turkey, no. 29590/96, 4 June 2002.  
• Seher Karataş v. Turkey, no. 33179/96, 9 July 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Stambuk v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 17 October 2002, the European Court of Human Rights came to the conclusion 
that a disciplinary action imposed on a doctor for disregarding a ban on advertising by medical 
practitioners by giving an interview to the press was to be considered a breach of Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In 1995, a fine was imposed on the applicant, an ophthalmologist, by a district Disciplinary Court 
for Medical Practitioners. An article in a newspaper, including an interview with, and a 
photograph of, Mr. Stambuk was considered as disregarding a ban on advertising by medical 
practitioners. The interview in which Mr. Stambuk explained the successful treatment with a new 
laser technique that he applied was seen as a kind of self-promotion, in breach of the [Baden-
Württemberg] Rules of Professional Conduct of the Medical Practitioners' Council. According to 
section 25(2) of this Code, a medical practitioner should not allow pictures or stories which have 
an advertising character, indicate the name or show a photograph, to be published in respect of 
his/her professional activities. According to section 27, the cooperation of a medical practitioner 
in informative publications in the press is only permissible if these publications are limited to 
objective information, without the practitioner being presented in the form of an advertisement. 
The Disciplinary Appeals Court for Medical Practitioners upheld the sanction, taking into account 
that Mr. Stambuk had not only allowed an article which would go beyond objective information 
on a particular operation technique to be published, but had deliberately acted so as to give 
prominence to his own person. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights recognised that restrictions on advertising by medical 
practitioners in the exercise of their liberal profession have a legitimate aim in protecting the 
rights of others or to protect health. However, the question of whether, in casu, a disciplinary 
action was necessary in a democratic society, was answered in the negative by the European 
Court. The Court recalled that, for the citizen, advertising is a means of discovering the 
characteristics of services and goods offered. The Court recognised that owing to the special 
circumstances of particular business activities and professions, advertising or commercial speech 
may be restricted. The Court also accepted that the general professional obligation on medical 
practitioners to care for the health of each individual and for the community as a whole might 
indeed explain restrictions on their conduct, including rules on their public communications or 
participation in public communications on professional issues. These rules of conduct in relation 
to the press are, however, to be balanced against the legitimate interest of the public in 
information and are limited to preserving the good functioning of the profession as a whole. They 
should not be interpreted as putting an excessive burden on medical practitioners to control the 
content of press publications, while also taking into account the essential function fulfilled by 
the press in a democratic society by imparting information and ideas on all matters of public 
interest. 
 
According to the Court, the article with the interview and a photo of Mr. Stambuk on the whole 
presented a balanced explanation of the specific operation technique, inevitably referring to the 
applicant's own experience. The article may well have had the effect of giving publicity to Mr. 
Stambuk and his practice, but, having regard to the principal content of the article, this effect 
proved to be of a secondary nature. According to the Court, the interference complained of by 
Mr. Stambuk did not achieve a fair balance between the interests at stake, namely the protection 
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of health and the interests of other medical practitioners and Mr. Stambuk's right to freedom of 
expression and the vital role of the press. In sum, there was a breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Stambuk v. Germany, no. 37928/97, 17 October 2002.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Cases of Ayse Öztürk v. Turkey and Karakoç and Others v. 
Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
With the adoption of friendly settlements in the cases of Altan v. Turkey on 14 May 2002 (see 
IRIS 2002-7: 2-3), Ali Erol v. Turkey on 20 June 2002, Özler v. Turkey on 11 July 2002, Sürek (no. 
5) v. Turkey on 16 July 2002 (see IRIS 2002-9: 4) and Mehmet Bayrak v. Turkey on 3 September 
2002 (see IRIS 2002-10: 3), several violations of the right to freedom of expression were 
recognised by the Turkish authorities. In two recent cases, the European Court of Human Rights 
again came to the conclusion that Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights had 
not been respected by the Turkish authorities. 
 
In the case of Ayse Öztürk, the Court was asked to decide on the alleged violations of the right 
to freedom of expression after various seizures in 1994 of the fortnightly review Kizil Bayrak 
("The Red Flag"), of which Ayse Öztürk was the owner and editor-in-chief at that time. The 
applicant was sentenced to imprisonment and fines, with these sentences being suspended for 
three years. The impugned articles published in the review were considered to amount to inciting 
hostility and hatred based on a distinction according to race or ethnic origin, or separatist 
propaganda. The seizures and convictions were based on Article 28 of the Constitution, Articles 
36 para. 1, 86 and 312 of the Criminal Code and Article 8 para. 1 of the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act. 
 
In its judgment of 15 October 2002, the Court, without underestimating the difficulties inherent 
in the fight against terrorism and referring to the security situation in south-east Turkey, came 
to the conclusion that the seizures of the review and the conviction of the applicant could not 
be considered as "necessary in a democratic society". The Court especially emphasised that none 
of the impugned articles constituted an incitement to violence and that the comments in those 
articles took the form of political speech. As regards the fact that the sentences were suspended, 
the Court was of the opinion that such measures were tantamount to a ban on the applicant 
exercising her profession, as it required her to refrain from criticising the government or other 
authorities in a way that could be considered contrary to the interests of the State. This measure 
restricted her ability to express ideas, notably regarding the Kurdish Issue, that were part of a 
public debate and forced her to restrict her freedom of expression - as a journalist - to ideas that 
were generally accepted or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference. According to 
the Court, the measures in question were to be considered a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
In the case of Karakoç and others, the applicants, two trade union leaders and a representative 
of a newspaper, complained of an infringement of their right to freedom of expression after they 
had been convicted for committing the offence of separatist propaganda under Article 8 of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act. The applicants were sentenced to several months' imprisonment in 
1994 because of the publication of a statement in the press criticising the policy of the Turkish 
authorities in southeast Turkey and in which reference was made to "massacres and extrajudicial 
executions". Taking into consideration the essential role of the press and its role of public 
watchdog, the applicants were considered to have alerted public opinion to concrete acts that 
were liable to infringe fundamental rights. The statement of the applicants was therefore 
considered as political speech by representatives of unions and the press, criticising the policy 
of the government, without inciting to violence or terrorism. Consequently, the Court held that 
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there had been a violation of Article 10, as the applicants' sentences were disproportionate to 
the aims pursued and not necessary in a democratic society. The Court also found (once more) a 
breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, as civilians accused of terrorist offences should not 
be tried by a court that includes a military judge: this indeed constituted a legitimate ground for 
fearing bias on the part of the court in the instant case. 
 
• Ayşe Öztürk v. Turkey, no. 24914/94, 15 October 2002.  
• Karakoç and Others v. Turkey, nos. 27692/95, 28138/95 and 28498/95, 15 October 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Demuth v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1997, Mr. Demuth complained to the European Court of Human Rights that the decision of the 
Swiss Bundesrat (Federal Council) refusing to grant Car Tv AG a broadcasting licence for cable 
television ran counter to Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of 
expression). He considered that the refusal was arbitrary and discriminatory. In a decision of 16 
June 1996, the Federal Council had decided that there was no right, either under Swiss law or 
under Article 10 of the European Convention, to obtain a broadcasting licence. With reference to 
the instructions for radio and television listed in Section 3 § 1 and Section 11 § 1 (a) of the 
Bundesgezetz über Radio und Fernsehen (Radio and Television Act - RTA), the Federal Council 
was of the opinion that the orientation of the programme content of Car Tv AG was not able to 
offer the required valuable orientation to comply with the general instructions for radio and 
television, as the programme focused mainly on entertainment and reports about automobiles. 
 
In its judgment of 5 November 2002, the European Court confirmed its earlier case-law that the 
refusal to grant a broadcasting licence is to be considered as an interference with the exercise of 
the right to freedom of expression, namely the right to impart information and ideas under Article 
10 para. 1 of the Convention. The question is whether such an interference is legitimate. 
According to the third sentence of Article 10 para. 1, Member States are permitted to regulate by 
means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised in their territories, 
particularly in its technical aspects. It remains to be determined, however, whether the manner 
in which the licensing system is applied satisfies the relevant conditions of paragraph 2 of Article 
10. 
 
The Court was of the opinion that the relevant provisions of the licensing system of the RTA were 
capable of contributing to the quality and balance of programmes. This was considered a 
sufficient legitimate aim, albeit not directly corresponding to any of the aims set out in Article 
10 para. 2. The Court also referred to the particular political and cultural structures in Switzerland 
that necessitate the application of sensitive political criteria such as cultural and linguistic 
pluralism and a balanced federal policy. The Court saw no reason to doubt the validity of these 
considerations, which are of considerable importance for a federal State. Such factors, which 
encourage in particular pluralism in broadcasting may legitimately be taken into account when 
authorising radio and television broadcasts. The Court came to the conclusion that the Swiss 
Federal Council’s decision, guided by the policy that television programmes shall to a certain 
extent also serve the public interest, did not go beyond the margin of appreciation left to national 
authorities in such matters. The Court also observed that the refusal to grant the requested 
licence was not categorical and did not exclude a broadcasting licence once and for all. Although 
the Court explicitly recognised that opinions may differ as to whether the Federal Council’s 
decision was appropriate and whether the broadcasts should have been authorised in the form 
in which the request was presented, the Court reached the conclusion that the restriction of the 
applicant’s freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic society. The Court took special 
note of the Government’s assurance that a licence would indeed be granted to Car Tv AG if it 
included cultural elements in its programme. The Court considered it unnecessary to examine 
the Government’s further ground of justification for refusing the licence, contested by the 
applicant, namely that there were only a limited number of frequencies available on cable 
television. By 6 votes to 1, the Court reached the conclusion that there had been no violation of 
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Article 10 of the Convention. The dissenting opinion of Judge G. Jörundsson is annexed to the 
judgment. 
 
• Demuth v. Switzerland, no. 38743/97, ECHR 2002-IX.  
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European Court of Human Rights: New Violations of Freedom of Political Expression in Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In two recent judgments, the European Court of Human Rights has come to the conclusion that 
freedom of political expression has been violated in Turkey. 
 
In the case of Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey, the Court was of the opinion that the confiscation of copies 
of a book and the applicant's sentence to one year's imprisonment and a fine of TRL 100 million 
was an illegitimate infringement by the authorities of the right to freedom of expression. Kü ç ük 
was convicted for separatist propaganda as the book he had published contained an interview 
with Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader. The book referred to the Kurdish separatist movement and 
to the programme for Kurdish cultural autonomy. In its judgment of 5 December 2002, the 
European Court of Human Rights recognised the need for the authorities to be alert to acts 
capable of fuelling additional violence in the region of south-east Turkey, but the Court found at 
the same time that the book did not constitute an incitement to violence, armed resistance or an 
uprising. The Court was also of the opinion that by confiscating copies of the book and convicting 
its author, the Turkish judicial authorities had failed to have sufficient regard to the general 
public's right to receive alternative forms of information and to assess the situation in south-east 
Turkey. Taking into account as well the nature and severity of the sentences imposed on the 
applicant, the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression was regarded as a 
breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In the case of Dicle on behalf of the Democratic Party (DEP) v. Turkey, the Court was asked to 
decide on an alleged breach of Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), Article 10 
(freedom of expression) and Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) of the European 
Convention. The applicant alleged that the order of the Turkish Constitutional Court to dissolve 
the DEP, on the ground that its activities were liable to undermine the territorial integrity of the 
State and the unity of the nation, was a breach of several articles of the Convention. In its 
judgment of 10 December 2002, the European Court of Human Rights noted that the written 
declarations and the speeches of the leaders of the DEP that had led to the dissolution of the 
party were indeed fiercely critical of government policy towards citizens of Kurdish origin. 
However, the Court did not find those declarations and speeches to be contrary to fundamental 
principles, nor had the Constitutional Court established in accordance with the requisite standard 
that the DEP was seeking to undermine democracy in Turkey. Although one declaration made by 
the former president of the DEP in Iraq amounted to approval of the use of vio Media Law Section 
of the Communication Sciences Department Ghent University lence as a political tool, the Court 
was of the opinion that a single speech by a former leader of the party that had been made in 
another country, in a language other than Turkish and to an audience that was not directly 
concerned, could not be considered a sufficient reason to dissolve a political party. Consequently, 
the Court held that the dissolution of the DEP could not be regarded as "necessary in a democratic 
society" and therefore there had been a violation of Article 11. The Court considered it 
unnecessary to examine the case from the perspective of Articles 9 and 10, as the complaints 
concerned the same matters as those examined under Article 11. 
 
• Yalçın Küçük v. Turkey, no. 28493/95, 5 December 2002.  
• Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey v. Turkey, no. 25141/94, 10 December 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of A. v. United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Although the case of A. v. United Kingdom is not an Article 10 case, the judgment of the European 
Court of Human Rights of 17 December 2002 can be considered as an important confirmation of 
the principle of freedom of speech and political debate. The case concerns the question of 
whether the statements of a Member of Parliament (MP) in the House of Commons are protected 
by parliamentary privilege under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. During a parliamentary 
debate on housing policy in 1996, an MP made offensive and derogatory remarks about the 
behaviour of A. and her children. The MP called the family of A. "neighbours from hell", a phrase 
which was also quoted in the newspapers. Following the MP's speech and hostile reports in the 
press, A. received hate-mail addressed to her and she was also stopped in the street and subjected 
to offensive language. A. was re-housed by the housing association as a matter of urgency and 
her children were obliged to change schools. A letter of complaint to the relevant MP (which was 
forwarded to the Office of the Parliamentary Speaker) and a letter to the then Prime Minister, Mr. 
John Major, did not result in effective measures being taken against the MP. A. was informed 
about the absolute character of parliamentary privilege. 
 
In Strasbourg, the applicant complained that the absolute nature of the privilege that protected 
statements about her made by the MP in Parliament violated, in particular, her right of access to 
the courts under Article 6 para. 1 of the European Convention. The European Court of Human 
Rights recognised the legitimate aim of protecting free speech in Parliament and maintaining 
the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. The Court emphasised that 
in a democracy, Parliament or such comparable bodies are the essential fora for political debate. 
The Court was of the opinion that the absolute immunity enjoyed by MPs is designed to protect 
the interests of Parliament as a whole, as opposed to those of individual MPs: "in all the 
circumstances of this case, the application of a rule of absolute Parliamentary immunity cannot 
be said to exceed the margin of appreciation allowed to States in limiting an individual's right of 
access to court" (para. 87). The Court emphasised, however, that no immunity attaches to 
statements made outside of Parliament, or to an MP's press releases, even if their content repeats 
statements made during the parliamentary debate itself. 
 
The judgment reads: "[T]he Court agrees with the applicant's submissions to the effect that the 
allegations made about her in the MP's speech were extremely serious and clearly unnecessary 
in the context of a debate about municipal housing policy. The MP's repeated reference to the 
applicant's name and address was particularly regrettable. The Court considers that the 
unfortunate consequences of the MP's comments for the lives of the applicant and her children 
were entirely foreseeable. However, these factors cannot alter the Court's conclusion as to the 
proportionality of the parliamentary immunity at issue [...]. There has, accordingly, been no 
violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention as regards the parliamentary immunity enjoyed 
by the MP" (paras. 88 and 89). The absence of legal aid for defamation proceedings in the United 
Kingdom was not considered to be a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention either. The 
applicant was deemed to have had sufficient possibilities to bring defamation proceedings in 
respect of the non-privileged press releases. 
 
The Court also took into consideration the domestic law of the eight States that have made a 
third-party intervention in the case. Each of these laws makes provision for such an immunity, 
although the precise details of the immunities concerned vary. The Court believed that the rule 
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of parliamentary immunity, which is consistent with - and reflects - generally-recognised rules 
within the signatory States, the Council of Europe and the European Union, cannot in principle 
be regarded as imposing a disproportionate restriction on the right of access to the courts, as 
embodied in Article 6 para. 1. The Court found no violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private 
and family life), Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) or Article 14 (prohibition of 
discrimination). 
 
• A. v. the United Kingdom, no. 35373/97, ECHR 2002-X.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
At the origin of this case lies an article in the Lëtzëbuerger Journal in which Robert Roemen 
reported that a Minister was convicted of tax evasion, commenting that such conduct was all the 
more shameful coming from a public person who should set an example. The article reported 
that the Minister had been ordered to pay a tax fine of LUF 100.000 (nearly EUR 2.500). This 
information was based on an internal document that was leaked from the Land Registry and Land 
Property Office. The Minister lodged a criminal complaint and an investigation was opened in 
order to identify the civil servant(s) who had handled the file under a breach of confidence. Apart 
from carrying out searches at the journalist's home and workplace, the investigative judge also 
ordered a search of the office of the journalist's lawyer. Several applications lodged both by 
Roemen and Schmit because of the alleged violation of the protection of journalistic sources and 
the breach of confidentiality between the lawyer and her client (right of privacy) were dismissed. 
Finally, after the exhaustion of all domestic remedies, Roemen and Schmit lodged an application 
with the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
The Court came to the conclusion that the searching of the journalist's home and office is to be 
considered as a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Confirming 
its case law, the Court considered that "having regard to the importance of the Belgium protection 
of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society and the potentially chilling effect 
an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that freedom, such a measure cannot be 
compatible with Article 10 of the Convention, unless it is justifiable by an overriding requirement 
in the public interest" (see also ECourtHR 27 March 1996, Goodwin v. United Kingdom, par. 39 - 
see IRIS 1996-4: 5). The Court recognised that the searches carried out in the journalist's home 
and place of work were prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining the 
public order and preventing crime. However, because the article had discussed a matter of 
general interest, the search interferences could not be compatible with Article 10 of the 
Convention unless they were justified by an "overriding requirement in the public interest". The 
Court was of the opinion that the Luxembourg authorities had not shown that the balance 
between the interests at stake had been preserved. The Court underlined that the search warrant 
gave the investigative officers very wide powers to burst in on a journalist at his place of work 
and gave them access to all the documents in his possession. The reasons adduced by the 
Luxembourg authorities could not be regarded as sufficient to justify the searches of the 
journalist's home and place of work. Therefore the Court came to the conclusion that the 
investigative measures at issue had been disproportionate and had infringed Roemen's right to 
freedom of expression. 
 
The judgment also confirmed the Court's case law on the point that, in principle, the 
confidentiality of communication between a lawyer and his or her client falls under the 
protection of privacy as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention (see also ECourtHR 16 
December 1992, Niemietz v. Germany). The Court considered that the search carried out by the 
Luxembourg judicial authorities at the lawyer's office and the seizure of a document had 
amounted to an unacceptable interference with her right to respect for her private life, and hence 
amounted to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The Court emphasised that the search 
carried out at Ms Schmit's office clearly amounted to a breach of the journalist's source through 
the intermediary of his lawyer. The Court held that the search had therefore been 
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disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued, particularly in view of the rapidity with which 
the search order had been carried out. 
 
• Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, no. 51772/99, ECHR 2003-IV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Peck v. United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In the case of Peck v. United Kingdom the applicant complained about the disclosure to the media 
of closed circuit television (CCTV) footage, which resulted in images of him being published and 
broadcast widely. The local authority operating the CCTV system, the Brentwood Borough 
Council, had released the images to the media with the aim of promoting the effectiveness of 
the system in the detection and the prevention of crime. Extracts of the footage, inter alia, were 
included in an Anglia Television news programme and in the BBC programme "Crime Beat". The 
masking was considered inadequate by the Independent Television Commission (ITC) and the 
Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC) as neighbours, colleagues, friends and family who saw 
the programmes recognised the applicant. The judicial authorities in the United Kingdom, on the 
other hand, did not consider that the disclosure of the CCTV material was a breach of the 
applicant's right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, is of the opinion that the disclosure of the images 
to the media resulted in a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. The Court emphasises that the 
applicant was in a public street but that he was not there for the purposes of participating in any 
public event, nor was he a public figure. The image of the applicant was shown in the media, 
including the audio-visual media, which are commonly acknowledged as having "often a much 
more immediate and powerful effect than the print media". As a result, the Court considers that 
the unforeseen disclosure by the Council operating the CCTV system of the relevant footage 
constituted a serious interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life. The 
Court also comes to the conclusion that the disclosure was not "necessary in a democratic 
society". Although the Court recognises that the CCTV system plays an important role in detecting 
and preventing crime and that this role is rendered more effective and successful through 
advertising the CCTV system and its benefits, the Council had other options available to achieve 
these objectives. The Council could have taken steps to obtain the applicant's prior consent to 
disclosure, it could have itself masked the images before making them available to the media, or 
it could have taken the utmost care in ensuring that the media to which the disclosure was made 
masked the images. The Court notes that the Council did not explore the first or second options 
and considers that the steps taken in respect of the third option were inadequate. The Court is of 
the opinion that the Council should have demanded written undertakings from the media to mask 
the images, a requirement that would have emphasised the need to maintain confidentiality. As 
such, the disclosure constituted a disproportionate and therefore unjustified interference with 
the private life of the applicant and a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
With regard to the applicant's complaint that he had no effective domestic remedy to have his 
right to privacy protected in the United Kingdom, it is interesting to underline that the European 
Court is of the opinion that the power of the BSC and the ITC is not sufficient to consider the 
procedures before these bodies as an effective remedy, as they cannot make monetary 
compensation available to an aggrieved individual who may have been injured by an 
infringement of the relevant broadcasting regulation. Neither did the Court accept the 
Government's argument that any acknowledgment of the need to have a remedy would 
undermine the important conflicting rights of the press as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
Convention, as the media could have achieved their objectives by properly masking the 
applicant's identity. Accordingly there has also been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention 
(right to effective remedy before a national authority). 
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• Peck v. the United Kingdom, no. 44647/98, ECHR 2003-I.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Cordova no. 1 and Cordova no. 2 v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In two judgments of 30 January 2003, the European Court of Human Rights made a restrictive 
application of defamatory and insulting allegations expressed by two Members of Parliament. In 
the case of Cordova no. 1, the senator and former Italian president, Francesco Cossiga, had 
insulted by way of some sarcastic letters a public prosecutor, Mr. Cordova, while in the case of 
Cordova no. 2, the same public prosecutor had been criticised in very offensive terms by a 
member of the Italian parliament, Mr. Vittorio Sgarbi. In both cases Mr. Cordova lodged a criminal 
complaint because of these insulting and defamatory statements. In the case of Cordova no. 1, 
the Italian Senate considered that the acts of which Mr. Cossiga was accused were covered by 
parliamentary immunity, as his opinions had been expressed in the performance of his 
parliamentary duties. In the case of Cordova no. 2, the Court of Cassation accepted also the 
immunity of Mr. Sgarbi, referring to the decision of the Italian Chamber of Deputies interpreting 
the concept of "parliamentary duties" as encompassing all acts of a political nature, even those 
performed outside Parliament. These findings made it impossible to continue the proceedings 
that were under way and deprived Cordova of the opportunity to seek compensation for the 
damages he alleged he had sustained. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, is of the opinion that the decisions applying 
parliamentary immunity to Mr. Cossiga's and Mr. Sgarbi's acts constituted a violation of Article 6 
of the Convention (right to a fair trial - right of access to a court). The European Court, affirming 
its approach developed in the case of A. v. United Kingdom (ECourtHR 17 December 2002, see 
IRIS 2003-3: 3), accepts that a State affords immunity to Members of its Parliament, as this 
principle constitutes a long-standing practice designed to ensure freedom of expression among 
representatives of the people and to prevent the possibility of politically-motivated prosecutions, 
interfering with the performance of parliamentary duties. Hence, the restriction on the applicant's 
right to a fair trial pursued the legitimate aims of protecting free speech in parliament and 
maintaining the separation of powers between the legislature and the judiciary. In both the 
Cordova no. 1 and Cordova no. 2 cases, the European Court notes, however, that the statements 
by Mr. Cossiga and Mr. Sgarbi were not related to the performance of their parliamentary duties 
in the strict sense, but appeared to have been made in the context of personal disputes. According 
to the Strasbourg Court, a denial of access to a court cannot be justified solely on the ground 
that the dispute might have a political character or might relate to political activity. The Court 
considers that the decisions that Mr. Cossiga and Mr. Sgarbi could not be prosecuted for their 
alleged insulting or defamatory statements with regard to Mr. Cordova, had upset the fair balance 
that should be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of protection of the individual's fundamental rights, such as the right to enjoy a 
good reputation and to have this enforced before an impartial judge. The Court attaches 
importance to the fact that, after the relevant resolutions had been passed by the Senate and the 
Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Cordova had no other reasonable alternative means available for the 
effective protection of his rights under the Convention. The Court accordingly held that there had 
been a violation of Article 6 of the Convention. 
 
• Cordova v. Italy (no. 1), no. 40877/98, ECHR 2003-I.  
• Cordova v. Italy (no. 2), no. 45649/99, ECHR 2003-I (extracts).  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Perna v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 6 May 2003, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights has 
overruled the Court in the case of Perna v. Italy (see IRIS 2001-8: 3). While the Strasbourg Court 
in 2001 had come to the conclusion that the conviction of the Italian journalist Giancarlo Perna 
violated Article 10 of the Convention, the Grand Chamber has now reached the conclusion that 
the conviction of the journalist for defamation was in accordance with the European Convention 
on Human Rights. 
 
The case goes back to an article published in the newspaper Il Giornale in which Perna sharply 
criticised the communist militancy of a judicial officer, Mr. G. Caselli, who was at that time the 
public prosecutor in Palermo. The article raised in substance two separate issues. Firstly, Perna 
questioned Caselli's independence and impartiality because of his political militancy as a 
member of the Communist Party (PCI). Secondly, Caselli was accused of a strategy of gaining 
control of the public prosecutors' offices in a number of cities and of the manipulative use of a 
pentito (criminal-turned-informer) against Mr. Andreotti (a former Italian prime minister). After a 
complaint by Caselli, Perna was convicted for defamation in application of Articles 595 and 61 
paragraph 10 of the Italian Criminal Code and Section 13 of the Italian Press Act. Throughout the 
defamation proceedings before the domestic courts, the journalist was refused admittance of the 
evidence he sought to adduce. In 1999 Perna alleged a violation of Article 6 and Article 10 of the 
European Convention. 
 
The refusal to allow the journalist to prove the truth of his statements before the Italian Courts 
was not considered by the Strasbourg Court to be a breach of Article 6 paragraphs 1 and 3 (d) of 
the Convention, which guarantee everyone charged with a criminal offence the right to examine 
witnesses or to have witnesses examined on their behalf. The Court, in its judgment of 25 July 
2001, was of the opinion that there were no indications that the evidence concerned could have 
contributed any new information whatsoever to the proceedings. The Grand Chamber has now 
confirmed this decision, emphasizing that it was not established that Perna's request to produce 
evidence would have been helpful in proving that the specific conduct imputed to Caselli had 
actually occurred. 
 
With regard to Article 10 of the Convention, the Second Section of the European Court, in its 
judgment of 25 July 2001, argued that the criticism directed at Caselli had a factual basis which 
was not disputed, namely Caselli's political militancy as a member of the Communist Party. The 
Court agreed that the terms chosen by Perna and the use of the symbolic image of the "oath of 
obedience" to the Communist Party was hard-hitting, but it also emphasized that journalistic 
freedom covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation. According to 
the Court, the conviction of Perna was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, as the 
punishment of a journalist for such kinds of criticism of a member of the judiciary was considered 
not to be necessary in a democratic society. With regard, however, to Perna's speculative 
allegations about the alleged strategy of gaining control over the public prosecutors' offices in a 
number of cities and especially the use of the pentito Buscetta in order to prosecute Mr. Andreotti, 
the Court came to the conclusion that the conviction of Perna was not in breach of Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
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The Grand Chamber, in its judgment of 6 May 2003, has now come to the overall decision that 
the conviction of Perna did not violate Article 10 at all. The Court focuses on the article's overall 
content and its very essence, of which the unambiguous message was that Caselli had knowingly 
committed an abuse of authority, notably connected with the indictment of Mr. Andreotti, in 
furtherance of the alleged PCI strategy of gaining control of public prosecutors' offices in Italy. 
The Court is of the opinion that Perna at no time tried to prove that the specific conduct imputed 
to Caselli had actually occurred and that in his defence he argued, on the contrary, that he had 
expressed critical judgments that there were no need to prove. According to the Grand Chamber 
of the Court, the interference in Perna's freedom of expression could therefore be regarded as 
necessary in a democratic society to protect the reputation of others within the meaning of Article 
10 paragraph 2 of the Convention. 
 
• Perna v. Italy [GC], no. 48898/99, ECHR 2003-V.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In Strasbourg, two journalists of Danmarks Radio (Danish national television) complained about 
their conviction for defamation of a Chief Superintendent. The journalists, Pedersen and 
Baadsgaard, had produced two programmes about a murder trial in which they criticised the 
police's handling of the investigation. At the end of one of the programmes, the question was 
raised if it was the Chief Superintendent who had decided that a report should not be included 
in the case or who concealed a witness's statement from the defence, the judges and the jury. 
Both journalists were charged with defamation and convicted. They were sentenced to 20 day-
fines of DKK 400 (EUR 53) and ordered to pay DKK 100.000 (EUR 13.400) compensation. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has now decided that this conviction breached neither 
Article 6 nor Article 10 of the European Convention. In its judgment of 19 June 2003, the Court, 
inter alia, emphasized that "[p]ublic prosecutors and superior police officers are civil servants 
whose task it is to contribute to the proper administration of justice. In this respect they form 
part of the judicial machinery in the broader sense of this term. It is in the general interest that 
they, like judicial officers, should enjoy public confidence. It may therefore be necessary for the 
State to protect them from accusations that are unfounded". 
 
The Court is of the opinion that the television programme left the viewers with the impression 
that the named Chief Superintendent had taken part in the suppression of a report in a murder 
case, and thus committed a serious criminal offence. The Court accepts that journalists divulge 
information on issues of general interest, provided however "that they are acting in good faith 
and on accurate factual basis and provide 'reliable and precise' information in accordance with 
the ethics of journalism". The Court is of the opinion that it is doubtful, having regard to the 
nature and degree of the accusation, that the applicants' research was adequate or sufficient to 
substantiate their concluding allegation that the Chief Superintendent had deliberately 
suppressed a vital fact in a murder case. The Court also takes into consideration that the 
programme was broadcast at peak viewing time on a national TV station devoted to objectivity 
and pluralism, and accordingly, was seen by a wide public. The Court reiterates that the audio-
visual media often have a much more immediate and powerful effect than the print media. The 
Court reaches the conclusion that the interference with the applicants' freedom of expression 
did not violate Article 10 of the Convention, as the conviction was necessary for the protection 
of the reputation and the rights of others. Three of the seven judges of the Court dissented, 
emphasizing the vital role of the press as public watchdog in imparting information of serious 
public concern. 
 
• Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, no. 49017/99, 19 June 2003.  
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 17 
December 2004. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Murphy v. Ireland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 10 July 2003 the European Court of Human Rights unanimously held that the 
applicant's exclusion from broadcasting an advertisement announcing a religious event, was 
considered to be prescribed by law, had a legitimate goal and was necessary in a democratic 
society. The decision by the Irish Radio and Television Commission (IRTC) to stop the broadcast 
of the advertisement was taken in application of Section 10(3) of the Irish Radio and Television 
Act, which stipulates that no advertisement shall be broadcast which is directed towards any 
religious or political end (see IRIS 1998-1: 6, IRIS 1998-7: 9 and IRIS 2003-2: 11). The Court 
accepted that the impugned provision sought to ensure respect for the religious doctrines and 
beliefs of others so that the aims of the prohibition were the protection of public order and safety 
together with the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Recognising that a wide margin 
of appreciation is available to the Member States when regulating freedom of expression in the 
sphere of religion, referring to the fact that religion has been a divisive issue and that religious 
advertising might be considered offensive and open to the interpretation of proselytism in 
Ireland, the Court was of the opinion that the prohibition on broadcasting the advertisement was 
not an irrelevant nor a disproportionate restriction on the applicant's freedom of expression. 
While there is not a clear consensus, nor a uniform conception of the legislative regulation of the 
broadcasting of religious advertising in Europe, reference was made to the existence in other 
countries of similar prohibitions on the broadcasting of religious advertising, as well as to Article 
12 of Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 (Television without Frontiers Directive) according 
to which television advertising shall not prejudice respect for human dignity nor be offensive to 
religious or political beliefs. The Court also emphasized that the prohibition concerned only the 
audio-visual media, which have a more immediate, invasive and powerful impact, including on 
the passive recipient, and also the fact that advertising time is purchased and that this would 
lean in favour of unbalanced usage by religious groups with larger resources and advertising. For 
the Court it is important that the applicant, a pastor attached to the Irish Faith Centre, a bible 
based Christian ministry in Dublin, remained free to advertise in any of the print media or to 
participate as any other citizen in programmes on religious matters and to have services of his 
church broadcast in the audio-visual media. The Court indeed accepts that a total ban on religious 
advertising on radio and television is a proportionate measure: even a limited freedom to 
advertise would benefit a dominant religion more than those religions with significantly less 
adherents and resources. This would jar with the objective of promoting neutrality in 
broadcasting, and in particular, of ensuring a "level playing field" for all religions in the medium 
considered to have the most powerful impact. The Court reached the conclusion that the 
interference with the applicant's freedom of expression did not violate Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Murphy v. Ireland, no. 44179/98, ECHR 2003-IX (extracts).  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Ernst and Others v. Belgium 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Four Belgian journalists applied to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging (among other 
complaints) that searches and seizures by the judicial authorities at their newspaper's offices, 
their homes and the head office of the French speaking public broadcasting organisation RTBF 
constituted a breach of their freedom of expression under Article 10 and a violation of their right 
to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In 1995 searches were performed in connection with the prosecution of members of the police 
and the judiciary for breach of professional confidence following leaks in some highly sensitive 
criminal cases (the murder of the leader of the socialist party; investigations regarding industrial, 
financial and political corruption). The complaint lodged by the journalists against the searches 
and seizures at their places of work and homes was declared inadmissible by the Court of 
Cassation and the journalists were informed that no further action would be taken on their 
complaint. 
 
The European Court, in its judgment of 15 July 2003, has come to the conclusion that the searches 
and seizures violated the protection of journalistic sources guaranteed by the right to freedom 
of expression and the right to privacy. The Court agreed that the interferences by the Belgian 
judicial authorities were prescribed by law and were intended to prevent the disclosure of 
information received in confidence and to maintain the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
The Court considered that the searches and seizures, which were intended to gather information 
that could lead to the identification of police officers or members of the judiciary who were 
leaking confidential information, came within the sphere of the protection of journalistic sources, 
an issue which called for the most careful scrutiny by the Court (see also ECourtHR 27 March 
1996, Goodwin v. United Kingdom - see IRIS 1996-4: 5- and ECourtHR 25 February 2003, Roemen 
and Schmit v. Luxembourg - see IRIS 2003-5: 3). The Court emphasized the wide scale of the 
searches that had been performed, while at no stage had it been alleged that the applicants had 
written articles containing secret information about the cases. The Court also questioned whether 
other means could not have been employed to identify those responsible for the breaches of 
confidence, and in particular took into consideration the fact that the police officers involved in 
the operation of the searches had very wide investigative powers. The Court found that the 
Belgian authorities had not shown that searches and seizures on such a wide scale had been 
reasonably proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued and therefore came to the conclusion 
that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court, for analogous reasons, 
also found a violation of the right to privacy protected by Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
• Ernst and Others v. Belgium, no. 33400/96, 15 July 2003.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Karkin v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The case of Karkin v. Turkey concerns the conviction of the secretary of a union who was 
sentenced by the National Security Court in 1997 to one year's imprisonment for making a speech 
inciting the people to hatred and hostility creating discrimination based on membership of a 
social class and race, a criminal conviction in application of Article 312 of the Turkish Criminal 
Code. Although the European Court of Human Rights clearly tion in south-east Turkey and the 
need for the authorities to be alert to acts capable of fuelling additional violence in the region, 
the Court did not agree that the conviction and punishment of Karkin was to be considered 
necessary in a democratic society. The Court was of the opinion that the applicant's speech was 
"political in nature" and was expressed during a peaceful gathering, far away from the conflict 
zone. As these circumstances significantly limited the potential impact of the comments on 
"national security", "public order" or "territorial integrity" and as the penalties imposed on the 
applicant were severe, the Court unanimously concluded that there was a violation of Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
• Karkın v. Turkey, no. 43928/98, 23 September 2003.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Kizilyaprak v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In the case of Kizilyaprak v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights is of the opinion that 
the Turkish national authorities did not take sufficient account of the public's right to be informed 
from different perspectives on the situation in south-east Turkey. The conviction of Kizilyaprak 
concerned the publication of a book entitled "How we fought against the Kurdish people! A 
soldier's memoirs". In this book, a Turkish soldier described what he experienced during his 
military service in south-east Turkey. As the content of the book was considered as disseminating 
separatist propaganda and incitement to hatred based on ethnic and regional differences (Article 
8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and Article 312 of the Criminal Code), the owner of the 
publishing house, Zeynel Abidin Kizilyaprak, was sentenced to six months imprisonment by the 
National Security Court in 1993. In a crucial consideration the Strasbourg Court is of the opinion 
that, although some passages in the book painted an extremely negative picture of the Turkish 
State and the army and reflected a very hostile tone, the content of the book did not constitute 
an incitement to violence, armed resistance or an uprising. Referring also to the severity of the 
conviction, the Court unanimously concluded that the Turkish authorities had violated Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
• Kızılyaprak v. Turkey, no. 27528/95, 2 October 2003.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Müslüm Gündüz v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In the case of Müslüm Gündüz v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights evaluated the 
necessity of a criminal conviction on the grounds of inciting the people to hatred and hostility. 
The applicant, in his capacity as the leader of an Islamic sect, during a TV-debate broadcast by 
HBB channel, demonstrated a profound dissatisfaction with contemporary democratic and secular 
institutions in Turkey by describing them as "impious". During the programme he also openly 
called for the introduction of the sharia. Because of these statements Müslüm Gündüz was found 
guilty by the state security court of incitement to hatred and hostility on the basis of a distinction 
based on religion. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. 
 
In its judgment of 4 December 2003, the European Court of Human Rights came to the conclusion 
that this interference by the Turkish authorities with the applicant's right to freedom of 
expression violated Article 10 of the Convention. Although the applicant's conviction was 
prescribed by Turkish criminal law and had the protection of morals and the rights of others as 
well as the prevention of disorder or crime as legitimate goals, the Court was not convinced that 
the punishment of Müslüm Gündüz was to be considered as necessary in a democratic society. 
The Court observed that the applicant was invited to participate in the programme to present the 
sect and its nonconformist views, including the notion that democratic values were incompatible 
with its conception of Islam. This topic was the subject of widespread debate in the Turkish media 
and concerned an issue of general interest. The Court once more emphasised that Article 10 of 
the Convention also protects information and ideas that shock, offend and disturb. At the same 
time, however, there can be no doubt that expressions propagating, inciting or justifying hatred 
based on intolerance, including religious intolerance, do not enjoy the protection of Article 10. 
In the Court's view, the comments and statements of Müslüm Gündüz expressed during the lively 
television debate could not be regarded as a call to violence or as "hate speech" based on 
religious intolerance. The Court underlined that merely defending the sharia, without calling for 
the use of violence to establish it, cannot be regarded as "hate speech". Notwithstanding the 
margin of appreciation accorded to the national authorities, the Court was of the opinion that for 
the purposes of Article 10 there were insufficient arguments to justify the interference in the 
applicant's right to freedom of expression. By six votes to one the Court came to the conclusion 
that there had been a violation of Article 10. The Turkish Judge, M. Türmen, dissented with the 
majority of the Court. He was of the opinion that the statements of Müslüm Gündüz comprised 
"hate speech" and were offensive for the majority of the Turkish people who have chosen to live 
in a secular society. 
 
• Gündüz v. Turkey, no. 35071/97, ECHR 2003-XI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Abdullah Aydin v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, in its judgment of 9 March 2004, has come to the 
conclusion that Turkey has violated the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
European Convention. 
 
In the case of Abdullah Aydin v. Turkey, the applicant was convicted for making a speech during 
a meeting of the Ankara Democracy Forum criticising the Government's policy towards citizens 
of Kurdish origin and accusing the authorities of breaching human rights. The Ankara National 
Security Court in 1997 found Abdullah Aydin guilty of incitement to hatred and hostility on social, 
ethnic and regional differences, as he had drawn a distinction between the Turkish people and 
the Kurdish people and had not referred to the damage caused by the PKK (Workers' Party of 
Kurdistan). He was sentenced to one year's imprisonment and a fine. 
 
Although the interference in the applicant's right to freedom of expression was prescribed by law 
(art. 312 paras. 1 and 2 Criminal Code) and pursued the legitimate aims of prevention of disorder 
and crime and the preservation of national security and territorial integrity, the European Court 
could not be convinced that the interference was necessary in a democratic society. The Court 
noted that the applicant indeed sharply criticised the Government's action and policy, but that 
his speech also contained repeated calls for peace, equality and freedom. For the European Court 
it is important that the speech at issue was political, was presented by a player on the Turkish 
political scene, during a meeting of a democratic platform, and especially that it did not 
encourage violence, armed resistance or insurrection. The Court also expressed the opinion that 
the applicant had been convicted not so much for his comments as for not referring to or 
denouncing the PKK's activities in south-east Turkey. Hence, the conviction was based especially 
on what the applicant had not said. The Court considered this an insufficient justification for the 
interference. Taking into account also the nature and severity of the penalties imposed, the Court 
unanimously reached the conclusion that the applicant's conviction had not been necessary in a 
democratic society and that there had been a violation of Article 10. In the same judgment, the 
Court also found a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (right to a fair trial), referring 
to its standard opinion that civilians standing trial for offences under the Criminal Code had 
legitimate reason to fear that a national security court which included a military judge among its 
members might not be independent and impartial. The Court awarded the applicant EUR 10,000 
for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 3,000 for costs and expenses. 
 
• Abdullah Aydın v. Turkey, no. 42435/98, 9 March 2004.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Radio France v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, in its judgment of 30 March 2004, has agreed with the 
French authorities that Radio France, its editorial director and a journalist were to be held liable 
for the offence of public defamation of a civil servant. In a series of news flashes and bulletins in 
1997, Radio France had mentioned an article published in the weekly magazine Le Point, which 
alleged that the deputy prefect of Pithiviers in 1942 and 1943, Mr. Michel Junot, had supervised 
the deportation of a thousand Jews. In 1998, the editorial director and the journalist were 
convicted for public defamation and were ordered to pay a fine and damages of approximately 
EUR 10,000. Radio France was also ordered to broadcast an announcement reporting the 
judgment every two hours for a period of 24 hours. The Paris Court of Appeal decided that Michel 
Junot's honour and dignity had been damaged, in particular because of the fact that in the news 
flashes it was said that the former deputy prefect had supervised the deportation of a thousand 
Jews (while in reality he had not taken the decision regarding the deportation); also, by comparing 
Mr. Junot's situation with that of Maurice Papon (who effectively has been convicted by the 
assizes Court for participation in crimes against humanity) and by suggesting that he had not 
been a member of the Resistance (while there was substantial evidence that Junot had been 
active in the Resistance). 
 
The Strasbourg Court recognized that the disputed broadcasts had taken place against the 
background of a public debate and that they mainly had quoted, with correct reference to their 
source, from a serious weekly magazine. However, some allegations in the news flashes on Radio 
France had not been published in Le Point and in the news flashes some facts were presented in 
a much more affirmative tone than in the magazine article. In view of the seriousness of the facts 
inaccurately attributed to Mr. Michel Junot and because the news flashes had been broadcast 
many times with national coverage (the audiovisual media being powerful instruments to reach 
and influence a large part of the population), the European Court came to the conclusion that the 
French jurisdictional authorities had correctly applied Article 10 of the Convention, as the 
exercise of freedom of expression can be restricted or penalized taking into account the duties 
and responsibilities of media and journalists. According to the Strasbourg Court, the journalists 
and the director of Radio France should have exercised the utmost caution, as they must have 
been aware of the consequences for Mr. Junot of the bulletins that were broadcast to the whole 
of France. The conviction of Radio France, its director and a journalist was considered to be 
prescribed by law (Articles 29, 31 and 41 Press Act 1881), to pursue a legitimate goal (protection 
of the reputation and the rights of others, with reference also to the right of privacy as guaranteed 
by Article 8 of the Convention) and to be necessary in a democratic society. The Court 
unanimously came to the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Court also agreed that it was possible to consider the responsibility of the 
director in the circumstances of the case and that the order to broadcast the convicting judgment 
was to be considered as prescribed by law. Therefore, the Court also was of the opinion that there 
had been no breach of Article 6 para. 2, or of Article 7 para. 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
 
• Radio France and Others v. France, no. 53984/00, ECHR 2004-II.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of von Hannover v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in a judgment of 24 June 2004 has come to the conclusion 
that Germany has not awarded a sufficient level of protection to the right of privacy of Princess 
Caroline von Hannover. On several occasions Caroline von Hannover, the daughter of Prince 
Rainier III of Monaco, applied to the German courts for an injunction to prevent any further 
publication of a series of photographs which had appeared in the German magazines Bunte, 
Freizeit Revue and Neue Post. As Caroline von Hannover was undeniably to be considered as a 
contemporary public figure " par excellence ", the German courts were of the opinion that she had 
to tolerate she appeared with her children or with a friend in a secluded place in a restaurant. 
Other photos however showing Caroline von Hannover on horseback, shopping, cycling or skiing 
were to be considered as falling under the right of the press to inform the public on events and 
public persons in contemporary society, just like a series of photographs showing the Princess in 
the Monte Carlo Beach Club. 
 
In its judgment of 24 June, the Strasbourg Court agreed with Caroline von Hannover that the 
decisions of the German courts infringed her right to respect for her private life as guaranteed by 
Article 8 of the Convention. The Court recognizes that "the protection of private life has to be 
balanced against the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention", 
emphasizing at the same time that "the present case does not concern the dissemination of 
"ideas", but of images containing very personal or even intimate "information" about an 
individual. Furthermore, photos appearing in the tabloid press are often taken in a climate of 
continual harassment which induces in the person concerned a very strong sense of intrusion 
into their private life or even of persecution". In such circumstances, priority has to be given to 
respect for the right to privacy. As a matter of fact "a fundamental distinction needs to be made 
between reporting facts - even controversial ones - capable of contributing to a debate in a 
democratic society relating to politicians in the exercise of their functions, for example, and 
reporting details of the private life of an individual who, moreover, as in this case, does not 
exercise official functions. While in the former case the press exercises its vital role of "watchdog" 
in a democracy by contributing to "imparting information and ideas on matters of public interest", 
it does not do so in the latter case". According to the Court, the sole purpose of the publication 
of the photos was to satisfy the curiosity of a particular readership regarding the details of the 
applicant's private life. In these conditions freedom of expression requires a narrower 
interpretation. The Court also stated that "increased vigilance in protecting private life is 
necessary to contend with new communication technologies which make it possible to store and 
reproduce personal data. This also applies to the systematic taking of specific photos and their 
dissemination to a broad section of the public". In the Court's view, merely classifying the 
applicant as a figure of contemporary society " par excellence ", does not suffice to justify an 
intrusion into her private life. The Court therefore considers that the criteria on which the 
domestic courts based their decisions were not sufficient to ensure the effective protection of 
the applicant's private life and that she should, in the circumstances of the case, have had a 
"legitimate expectation" of protection of her private life. The Court unanimously reached the 
conclusion that the German courts did not strike a fair balance between the competing rights and 
that there was a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
• Von Hannover v. Germany, no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004-VI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Application by Österreichischer Rundfunk Declared 
Inadmissible 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, in a decision of 25 May 2004, has come to the conclusion 
that Austria has not violated Article 10 of the Convention by prohibiting in 1999 the 
Österreichischer Rundfunk (ORF) from publishing pictures of a person (B.) showing him as an 
accused during the well known letter-bomb campaign proceedings of some years before. B. had 
started proceedings in 1998 against the ORF requesting that the broadcasting company be 
prohibited from publishing without his consent pictures showing him as an accused in the 
courtroom, referring to the letter-bomb campaign without mentioning his final acquittal or if the 
impression was created that he was a neo-Nazi, was convicted of offences under the National 
Socialism Prohibition Act without mentioning that the imposed sentence had already been served 
or that he had been released on parole in the meanwhile. The Vienna Commercial Court and the 
Vienna Court of Appeal dismissed B.'s claims, arguing that B's interests were not infringed by the 
neutral disclosure of his picture, that no impression was given that he had been convicted of 
participating in the letter-bomb assassinations, and that he had indeed been convicted of a 
serious crime. Therefore, B. could not enjoy unlimited protection of his identity. On 1 June 1999, 
the Supreme Court however was of the opinion that the publication of B.'s picture by ORF had 
obviously interfered with his interests as it reminded the public of B.'s court appearance three 
years after his trial and his release on parole. The Supreme Court decided that there was no 
longer a public interest in having B.'s picture published and ordered the ORF to refrain from 
publishing or disseminating B.'s pictures without his consent showing him in the courtroom in 
the circumstances mentioned above. 
 
The ORF complained under Article 10 of the Convention that the Supreme Court's judgment 
violated its right to freedom of expression. Without deciding on the Government's interesting 
preliminary objection contesting the ORF's locus standi within the meaning of Article 34 of the 
Convention (the applicant as a public broadcasting organisation being a governmental 
organisation), the Court unanimously reached the conclusion that the imposed measure by the 
Austrian Supreme Court did not violate Article 10 of the Convention and declared the application 
by the ORF inadmissible. The Court emphasizes the difference between the present case and the 
findings in the case of News Verlags GmbH & CoKG v. Austria (ECourtHR 11 January 2000, Appl. 
31457/96, see IRIS 2000-2: 2), as the Austrian courts in that case had issued a total prohibition 
on publication of B.'s picture by News Verlags, whereas in the present case the ORF was only 
prohibited from doing so in a specific context. Furthermore, the report in the News Verlags case 
was published at a time when the pending criminal proceedings against B. were to be considered 
as a matter of great public interest. In the present case there was no public interest involved in 
the publication of the picture of B. and there was no need for another public stigmatisation. The 
Court is of the opinion that the private interest of B. in seeking to reintegrate himself into society 
after having been released on parole outweighed the public interest in the disclosure of his 
picture by the media. The Court also found that the prohibition at issue could not be described 
as amounting to a general prohibition against publishing B.'s picture and therefore found that 
the measure was also proportionate to the aim pursued within the meaning of Article 10 of the 
Convention. The complaint by ORF was considered manifestly ill-founded and hence declared 
inadmissible. 
 
• Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria (dec.), no. 57597/00, 25 May 2004.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Plon v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
This case concerns the prohibition of the distribution of the book written by Dr. Gubler " Le Grand 
Secret ", about the former president Mitterrand and how his cancer had been diagnosed and 
medically treated. The central question is: was the prohibition of the distribution of the book in 
1996 to be considered as necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the deceased 
president's honour, his reputation and the intimacy of his private life? Many items of information 
revealed in the book were indeed legally confidential and were capable of infringing the rights 
of the deceased and his family. But was this a sufficient reason to legitimise a blanket ban of the 
book? 
 
As to whether the interference by the French courts ordering the prohibition of the distribution 
of Dr. Gubler's book at the request of Mitterrand's widow and children met a pressing social need, 
the European Court emphasises in the first place that the publication of the book had taken place 
in the context of a general-interest debate. This debate had already been going on for some time 
in France and was related to the right of the public to be informed about the president's serious 
illnesses and his capacity to hold that office, being aware that he was seriously ill. 
 
The European Court considered that the interim ban on the distribution of " Le Grand Secret " a 
few days after Mitterrand's death and until the relevant courts had ruled on its compatibility with 
medical confidentiality and the rights of others as necessary in a democratic society for the 
protection of the rights of President Mitterrand and his heirs and successors. 
 
The ruling however, more than nine months after Mitterrand's death, to keep the ban on the 
book, is considered as a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. Moreover, at the time when the 
French court ruled on the merits of the case 40,000 copies of the book had already been sold, 
the book had been published on the internet and it had been the subject of much comment in 
the media. Accordingly, preserving medical confidentiality could no longer constitute a major 
imperative. The Strasbourg Court consequently considered that when the French court gave 
judgment there was no longer a pressing social need justifying the continuation in force of the 
ban on distribution of " Le Grand Secret ". While the Court found no violation in regard to the 
injunction prohibiting distribution of the book issued as an interim measure by the urgent 
applications judge (summary proceedings), the European Court comes to the conclusion that 
there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in regard to the order maintaining that 
prohibition in force made by the civil court which ruled on the merits. 
 
• Editions Plon v. France, no. 58148/00, ECHR 2004-IV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Final Judgment in the Case of Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In Strasbourg, two journalists of Danmarks Radio (Danish National television) complained about 
their conviction for defamation of a Chief Superintendent. The journalists, Pedersen and 
Baadsgaard, had produced two programmes about a murder trial in which they had criticised the 
police's handling of the investigation. At the end of the programmes, the question was raised if 
it was the Chief Superintendent who had decided that a report should not be included in the case 
or who concealed a witness's statement from the defence, the judges and the jury. Both 
journalists were charged with defamation and convicted and sentenced to 20 day-fines of DKK 
400, amounting to DKK 8,000 (equivalent to approximately EUR 1,078) and ordered to pay 
compensation to the estate of the deceased Chief Superintendent of DKK 100,000 (equivalent to 
approximately EUR 13,469). The domestic courts came to the conclusion that the journalists 
lacked a sufficient factual basis for the allegation that the named Chief Superintendent had 
deliberately suppressed a vital piece of evidence in the murder case. In a Chamber judgment of 
19 June 2003, the Court held by four votes to three, that there had been no violation of Article 
10 (see IRIS 2003-9: 2). On 3 December 2003, the panel of the Grand Chamber accepted a request 
by the applicants for the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber. The Danish Union of 
Journalists was given leave to submit written comments. The Grand Chamber of the European 
Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 17 December 2004 has now also come to the 
conclusion, by nine votes to eight, that there had been no violation of Article 10. The Court 
emphasised that the accusation against the named Chief Superintendent was an allegation of 
fact susceptible of proof, while the applicants never endeavoured to provide any justification for 
their allegation, and its veracity had never been proven. The applicants also relied on just one 
witness. The allegation of deliberate interference with evidence, made at peak viewing time on 
a national TV station, was very serious for the named Chief Superintendent and would have 
entailed criminal prosecution had it been true. The offence alleged was punishable by up to nine 
years' imprisonment. It inevitably not only undermined public confidence in him, but also 
disregarded his right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. In the Court's 
view, the finding of a procedural failure in the conduct of the investigation in the murder case as 
such could not provide a sufficient factual basis for the applicants' accusation that the Chief 
Superintendent had actively tampered with evidence. The Court reached the conclusion that the 
interference in the applicants' freedom of expression did not violate Article 10 of the Convention, 
as the conviction was necessary for the protection of the reputation and the rights of others. 
Eight of the 17 judges of the Grand Chamber Court dissented, emphasizing the vital role of the 
press as public watchdog in imparting information of serious public concern and the fact that the 
applicants had conducted a large-scale search for witnesses when preparing their programmes 
and that they had a sufficient factual basis to believe that a report did not contain the full 
statement of an important witness. According to the minority of the judges, a chief 
superintendent of police must accept that his acts and omissions in an important case should be 
subject to close and indeed rigorous scrutiny. 
 
• Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, ECHR 2004-XI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Final Judgment in Case Cumpana and Mazare v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Constantin Cumpana and Radu Mazare are both professional journalists who have been convicted 
in Romania of insult and defamation. In April 1994 they published an article in the Telegraf 
newspaper questioning the legality of a contract in which the Constan ta City Council had 
authorised a commercial company, Vinalex, to perform the service of towing away illegally 
parked vehicles. The article, which appeared under the headline "Former Deputy Mayor D.M. and 
serving judge R.M. responsible for series of offences in Vinalex scam", was accompanied by a 
cartoon showing the judge, Mrs R.M., on the former deputy mayor's arm, carrying a bag marked 
"Vinalex" containing banknotes. Mrs R.M., who had signed the contract with Vinalex on behalf of 
the city council while employed by the council as a legal expert, brought proceedings against 
Cumpana and Mazare. She submitted that the cartoon had led readers to believe that she had 
had intimate relations with the former deputy mayor, despite the fact that they were both 
married. In 1995 both journalists were convicted of insult and defamation and sentenced to seven 
months' imprisonment. They were also disqualified from exercising certain civil rights and 
prohibited from working as journalists for one year. In addition, they were ordered to pay Mrs 
R.M. a specified sum for non-pecuniary damage. In November 1996 the applicants were granted 
a presidential pardon releasing them from their custodial sentence. In a Chamber judgment of 
10 June 2003 the Strasbourg Court held by five votes to two that there had been no violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention, emphasizing that the article and the cartoon were indeed damaging 
the authority, reputation and private life of judge R.M., overstepping the bounds of acceptable 
criticism. The Grand Chamber of the European Court in its judgment of 17 December 2004 has 
now unanimously come to the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 10. As the 
allegations and insinuations in the article did not have a sufficient factual basis, the Court is of 
the opinion that the Romanian authorities were entitled to consider it necessary to restrict the 
exercise of the applicants' right to freedom of expression and that their conviction for insult and 
defamation had accordingly met a "pressing social need". However, the Court observes that the 
sanctions imposed on the applicants have been very severe and disproportionate. In regulating 
the exercise of freedom of expression in order to ensure adequate protection by law of 
individuals' reputations, States should avoid taking measures that might deter the media from 
fulfilling their role of alerting the public to apparent or suspected misuse of public power. The 
imposition of a prison sentence for a press offence is compatible with journalists' freedom of 
expression only in exceptional circumstances, notably where other fundamental rights had been 
seriously impaired, as, for example, in the case of hate speech or incitement to violence. In a 
classic case of defamation, such as the present case, imposing a prison sentence inevitably has a 
chilling effect. The order disqualifying the applicants from exercising certain civil rights is also 
to be considered particularly inappropriate and is not justified by the nature of the offences for 
which both journalists have been held criminally liable. The order prohibiting the applicants from 
working as journalists for one year is considered as a preventive measure of general scope 
contravening the principle that the press must be able to perform the role of public watchdog in 
a democratic society. The Court comes to the conclusion that, although the interference with 
both journalists' right to freedom of expression might have been justified as such, the criminal 
sanction and the accompanying prohibitions imposed on them by the Romanian courts have been 
manifestly disproportionate in their nature and severity to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court 
therefore holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
  
• Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, ECHR 2004-XI.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in a judgment of 15 February 2005 has come unanimously 
to the conclusion that the United Kingdom has violated Article 6 (fair trial) and Article 10 
(freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights in a libel case opposing 
the McDonald's Corporation against two United Kingdom nationals, Helen Steel and David Morris, 
who had distributed leaflets as part of an anti-McDonald's campaign. In 1986 a six-page leaflet 
entitled “What's wrong with McDonald's?” was distributed by Steel and Morris and in 1990 
McDonald's issued a writ against them claiming damages for libel. The trial took place before a 
judge sitting alone from June 1994 until December 1996. It was the longest trial in English legal 
history. On appeal the judgment of the trial judge was upheld in substance, the damages awarded 
were reduced by the Court of Appeal from a total of GBP 60,000 to a total of GBP 40,000 and 
leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. Throughout the trial and appeal proceedings 
Steel and Morris were refused legal aid: they represented themselves only with some help from 
volunteer lawyers. Steel and Morris applied to the European Court on 20 September 2000, 
complaining that the proceedings were unfair, principally because they were denied legal aid, 
although they were unwaged and dependant on income support. 
 
The applicants also complained that the outcome of the proceedings constituted a 
disproportionate interference with their freedom of expression. With regard to the first complaint, 
under Article 6 para. 1 the Court is of the opinion that the denial of legal aid to the applicants 
had deprived them of the opportunity to present their case effectively before the Court and 
contributed to an unacceptable inequality of arms with McDonald's, who in this complex case, 
lasting 313 court days and involving 40,000 pages of documentation, had been represented by 
leading and junior counsel, experienced in defamation law and by two solicitors and other 
assistants. With regard to the second complaint, the Court reaches the conclusion that there has 
been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. Although it is not in principle incompatible with 
Article 10 to place on a defendant in libel proceedings the onus of proving to the civil standard 
the truth of defamatory statements, it is considered essential by the Court that when a legal 
remedy is offered to a large multinational company to defend itself against defamatory 
allegations, also the countervailing interest in free expression and open debate must be 
guaranteed by providing procedural fairness and equality of arms to the defendants in such a 
case. The Court also emphasizes the general interest in promoting the free circulation of 
information and ideas about the activities of powerful commercial entities, as well as the 
potential “chilling” effect on others an award of damages for defamation in this context may 
have. Moreover, according to the Strasbourg Court, the award of damages was disproportionate 
to the legitimate aim served in order to protect the right and reputation of McDonalds, as the 
sum of GBP 40,000 was not in a reasonable relation of proportionality to the injury to reputation 
suffered. Given the lack of procedural fairness and the disproportionate award of damages, the 
Court found that there had been a violation of Article 10 in this case, which in the media has 
been labelled as the “McLibel” case. The United Kingdom is ordered to pay EUR 35,000 to the 
applicants in respect of non-pecuniary damages and EUR 47,311 in respect of costs and expenses 
related to the Strasbourg proceedings. 
 
• Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, ECHR 2005-II.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Independent News and Media v. Ireland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 16 June 2005, the European Court of Human Rights is of the opinion that a 
conviction to pay an award of damages of EUR 381.000 because of defamatory statements in a 
press article criticizing a politician is not to be considered as a violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. 
 
In 1997 a High Court jury in Ireland found an article published in the Sunday Independent 
robustly criticizing a national politician, Mr. de Rossa, to be defamatory and awarded Mr. de Rossa 
IEP 300.000 (EUR 381.000) in damages. The award, which was upheld by the Supreme Court, was 
three times the highest libel award previously approved in Ireland. The litigious article referred 
to some activities of a criminal nature of Mr. de Rossa's political party and criticised his former 
privileged relations with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
According to the article, Mr. de Rossa's political friends in the Soviet Union “were no better than 
gangsters (..). They were anti-Semitic”. In upholding the award of damages, the Supreme Court 
took into account a number of factors, including the gravity of the libel, the effect on Mr. de Rossa 
as leader of a political party and on his negotiations to form a government at the time of 
publication, the extent of the publication, the conduct of the first applicant newspaper and the 
consequent necessity for Mr. de Rossa to endure three long and difficult trials. Having assessed 
these factors, it concluded that the jury would have been justified in going to the top of the 
bracket and awarding as damages the largest sum that could fairly be regarded as compensation. 
While IEP 300,000 was a substantial sum, it noted that the libel was serious and grave, involving 
an imputation that Mr. de Rossa was involved in or tolerated serious crime and personally 
supported anti-Semitism and violent Communist oppression. “Bearing in mind that a fundamental 
principle of the law of compensatory damages is that the award must always be reasonable and 
fair and bear a due correspondence with the injury suffered and not be disproportionate thereto”, 
the Supreme Court was not satisfied that “that the award made by the jury in this case went 
beyond what a reasonable jury applying the law to all the relevant considerations could 
reasonably have awarded and is not disproportionate to the injury suffered by the Respondent”. 
The press groups publishing the Sunday Independent lodged an application before the 
Strasbourg Court, complaining that the exceptional damages award and the absence of adequate 
safeguards against disproportionate awards violated their rights under Article 10 of the 
Convention (freedom of expression). The application was also supported by some other Irish 
media groups and by the National Union of Journalists (NUJ). 
 
Taking its judgment of 13 July 1995 in the case of Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. U.K. as a point of 
reference, the Court is of the opinion that the present jury award was sufficiently unusual as to 
require a review by the Court of the adequacy and effectiveness of the domestic safeguards 
against disproportionate awards. According to the Court, unpredictably large damages awards in 
libel cases are considered capable of having a chilling effect on the press and therefore require 
the most careful scrutiny. The Strasbourg Court however, referring to the judgment of the Irish 
Supreme Court upholding and legitimising the award of damages, comes to the conclusion, by 6 
votes to 1, that there has been no violation of the right of freedom of expression in this case: 
“Having regard to the particular circumstances of the present case, notably the measure of 
appellate control, and the margin of appreciation accorded to a State in this context, the Court 
does not find that it has been demonstrated that there were ineffective or inadequate safeguards 
against a disproportionate award of the jury in the present case”. In his dissenting opinion judge 
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Cabral Barreto of Portugal argues that the amount of damages which the publishing group of the 
Sunday Independent was ordered to pay was so high “that the reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the interference and the legitimate aim pursued was not observed”. The 
6 judges of the majority however came to the conclusion that there has not been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Independent News and Media and Independent Newspapers Ireland Limited v. Ireland, no. 
55120/00, ECHR 2005-V (extracts). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Grinberg v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 21 July 2005, the European Court of Human Rights has come to the conclusion 
that the Russian authorities overstepped the margin of appreciation afforded to member states 
by convicting a Russian citizen because of a defamatory statement in a press article criticizing a 
politician. It is the first judgment in which the European Court finds a violation of freedom of 
expression by the Russian authorities since the Russian Federation became a member of the 
Council of Europe and subscribed to the European Convention on Human Rights in 1996. The 
Strasbourg Court emphasizes the distinction that is to be made between statements of fact and 
value judgments and considers it unacceptable that the Russian law on defamation, as it stood 
at the material time, made no distinction between these notions, referring uniformly to 
statements and assuming that any statement was amenable of proof in civil proceedings. The 
case goes back to an article in the Guberniya newspaper written by Isaak Pavlovich Grinberg in 
2002. The article criticised the elected Governor of the Ulyanovsk Region, the former General 
V.A. Shamanov for “waging war” against the independent press and journalists. The article also 
referred to the support by Mr. Shamanov for a colonel who had killed an 18-year-old Chechen 
girl, considering that Mr. Shamanov had “no shame and no scruples”. On 14 November 2002, the 
Leninskiy District Court of Ulyanovsk found that the assertion that Mr. Shamanov had no shame 
and no scruples impaired his honour, dignity and professional reputation and that Mr. Grinberg 
had not proved the truthfulness of this statement. The judgment was later confirmed by the 
Regional Court, while the Supreme Court, on 22 August 2003, dismissed Mr. Grinberg's 
application for the institution of supervisory-review proceedings. 
 
Grinberg's complaint, under Article 10 of the Convention, that his right to impart information and 
ideas had been violated, turned out to be successful before the European Court in Strasbourg. 
The Court refers to its well-established case law considering freedom of expression as one of the 
essential foundations of a democratic society, emphasizing the essential function of the press to 
play its vital role of “public watchdog”, the fact that there is little scope under Article 10 para. 2 
for restrictions on political speech and especially the distinction that is to be made in defamation 
cases between statements of fact and value judgments. While the existence of facts can be 
demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is not susceptible of proof. The Court considers that 
the contested comment was a clear example of a value judgment that represented Mr. Grinberg's 
subjective appraisal of the moral dimension of Mr. Shamanov's behaviour who, in his eyes, only 
kept one promise after being elected as Governor, that of waging war against the independent 
press and journalists. The Court takes into account that the contested press article concerned an 
issue of public interest relating to the freedom of the media in the Ulyanovsk region and that it 
criticised an elected, professional politician in respect of whom the limits of acceptable criticism 
are wider than in the case of a private individual. The facts which gave rise to the criticism were 
not contested and Mr. Grinberg had after all expressed his views in an inoffensive manner. Nor 
did Mr. Grinberg's statements affect Mr. Shamanov's political career or his professional life. For 
these reasons the Strasbourg Court unanimously came to the conclusion that the domestic courts 
did not convincingly establish any pressing social need for putting the protection of the 
politician's personality rights above the applicant's right to freedom of expression and the 
general interest in promoting this freedom where issues of public interest are concerned. 
Accordingly, the Court came to the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of I.A. v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in a judgment of 13 September 2005 has come to the 
conclusion that the Turkish authorities did not violate freedom of expression by convicting a 
book publisher for publishing insults against “God, the Religion, the Prophet and the Holy Book”. 
The managing director of the Berfin publishing house in France was sentenced to two years' 
imprisonment, which was later commuted to a fine. 
 
The European Court in Strasbourg is of the opinion that this interference in the applicant's right 
to freedom of expression had been prescribed by law (art. 175 §§ 3 and 4 of the Turkish Criminal 
Code) and had pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting morals and the 
rights of others. The issue for the Court was to determine whether the conviction of the publisher 
had been necessary in a democratic society. This involved the balancing of the applicant's right 
to impart his ideas on religious theory to the public, on the one hand, and the right of others to 
respect for their freedom of thought, conscience and religion, on the other hand. The Court 
reiterates that religious people have to tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious 
beliefs and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. A distinction is to 
be made however between “provocative” opinions and abusive attacks on one's religion. 
According to the Court, one part of the book indeed contained an abusive attack on the Prophet 
of Islam, whereas it is asserted that some of the statements and words of the Prophet were 
“inspired in a surge of exultation, in Aisha's arms… God's messenger broke his fast trough sexual 
intercourse, after dinner and before prayer”. In the book it is stated that “Mohammed did not 
forbid sexual intercourse with a dead person or a living animal”. The Court accepts that believers 
could legitimately feel that these passages of the book constituted an unwarranted and offensive 
attack on them. Hence, the conviction of the publisher was a measure that was intended to 
provide protection against offensive attacks on matters regarded as sacred by Muslims. As the 
book was not seized and the publisher had only to pay an insignificant fine, the Court comes, by 
four votes to three, to the conclusion that the Turkish authorities did not violate the right to 
freedom of expression. According to the three dissenting opinions (of the French, Portuguese and 
Czech judges) the majority of the Court followed its traditional case law on blasphemy leaving a 
wide margin of appreciation to the Member States. According to the three dissenters, the Court 
should reconsider its jurisprudence in the case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria and Wingrove 
v. United Kingdom, as this approach gave too much support to conformist speech and to the 
“ pensée unique ”, implying a cold and frightening approach to freedom of expression. The 
majority of the Court however (the Turkish, Georgian, Hungarian and San Marino judges) argued 
that the conviction of the book publisher met a pressing social need ie protecting the rights of 
others. Accordingly there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• İ.A. v. Turkey, no. 42571/98, ECHR 2005-VIII.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH v. 
Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In a judgment of 27 October 2005, the European Court of Human Rights has come to the 
conclusion that the Austrian authorities violated freedom of expression by convicting 
Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH, a limited liability company based in Vienna which 
owns and publishes the weekly magazine Profil. In November 1998, Profil published a review of 
a book written by a Member of the European Parliament and member of the Austrian Freedom 
Party. Profil's article criticised the author of the book for his treatment of Jörg Haider, the former 
leader of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), in that he pardoned “his belittlement of the 
concentration camps as `punishment camps'” (“ Dessen Verharmlosung der Konzentrationslager als 
'Straflager' ”). Mr Haider successfully filed a compensation claim against Profil as the Wiener 
Neustadt Regional Court ordered the applicant company to pay EUR 3,633 in compensation to 
Mr Haider. It also ordered the forfeiture of that particular issue of the magazine and instructed 
the company to publish its judgment. In its reasoning, the court said that Mr Haider's words had 
been taken out of context and that the article gave the impression that he had played down the 
extent of crimes committed in concentration camps when using the term punishment camps, and 
that he had thereby infringed the National Socialism Prohibition Act. 
 
In its judgment of 27 October 2005, the European Court reiterates that the limits of acceptable 
criticism are wider as regards a politician than as regards a private individual. The Court is of the 
opinion that Haider is a leading politician who has been known for years for his ambiguous 
statements about the National Socialist Regime and the Second World War and has, thus, 
exposed himself to fierce criticism inside Austria, but also at the European level. In the Court's 
view, Haider must therefore display a particularly high degree of tolerance in this context. In 
essence, the Strasbourg Court is not convinced by the domestic court's argument that the 
statement of belittling the concentration camps implied a reproach that Mr Haider had played 
down the extent of the Nazi crimes and therefore came close to a reproach of criminal behaviour 
under the Prohibition Act. The Court finds this conclusion somewhat far-fetched, as the standards 
for assessing someone's political opinions are quite different from the standards for assessing an 
accused person's responsibility under criminal law. According to the Court, the use of the term 
“punishment camp”, which implies that persons are detained there for having committed 
punishable offences, may reasonably be criticised as a belittlement of the concentration camps 
all the more so if that term was applied by someone whose ambiguity towards the Nazi era is 
well-known. The undisputed fact that Mr Haider had used the term punishment camp instead of 
concentration camp was a sufficient factual basis for the applicant's statement, which was 
therefore not excessive in the circumstances. In conclusion, the Court finds that the reasons 
adduced by the domestic courts were not relevant and sufficient to justify the interference. 
Moreover, the Court notes that the applicant was not only ordered to pay compensation to Mr 
Haider and to publish the judgment finding it guilty of defamation, but that the courts also 
ordered the forfeiture of the issue of Profil which is a severe and intrusive measure. Thus, the 
interference was not proportionate either. Therefore, the Court unanimously came to the 
conclusion that the interference complained of was not “necessary in a democratic society” within 
the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. Accordingly there has been a violation of Article 
10 of the Convention. 
 
• Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH v. Austria, no. 58547/00, 27 October 2005.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Tourancheau and July v. France (affaire Libération) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In 1996, the French newspaper Libération published an article focusing on a murder case in which 
adolescents were involved. The criminal investigation was still pending when the article was 
published and two suspects, a young man, B. and his girlfriend, A., had been under investigation. 
The article in Libération, written by Patricia Tourancheau, reproduced extracts from statements 
made by A. to the police and the investigating judge, and comments from B. contained in the 
case file. On the basis of section 38 of the Freedom of Press Act of 29 July 1881, criminal 
proceedings were brought against Tourancheau and against the editor of Libération, Serge July. 
Section 38 of the 1881 Press Act prohibits the publication of any document of the criminal 
proceedings until the day of the court hearing. Both the journalist and the editor were found 
guilty and were each ordered to pay a fine of FRF 10,000 (approximately EUR 1,525). Their 
conviction was upheld on appeal and by the French Supreme Court, although payment of the fine 
was suspended. In the meantime, A. had been sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for murder 
and B. had received a five-year prison sentence for failure to assist a person in danger. 
 
In its judgment of 24 November 2005, the Strasbourg Court has come to the conclusion that the 
conviction of Tourancheau and July was not to be considered as a violation of Art. 10 of the 
Convention. The Court noted that section 38 of the 1881 Press Act defined the scope of the legal 
prohibition clearly and precisely, in terms of both content and duration, as it was designed to 
prohibit publication of any document relating to proceedings concerning serious crimes or other 
major offences until the day of the hearing. The fact that proceedings were not brought 
systematically on the basis of section 38 of the 1881 Act, the matter being left to the discretion 
of the public prosecutor's office, did not entitle the applicants to assume that they were in no 
danger of being prosecuted, since being professional journalists they were familiar with the law. 
They had therefore been in a reasonable position to foresee that the publication of extracts from 
the case file in the article might subject them to prosecution. In the Court's view, the reasons 
given by the French courts to justify the interference with the applicants' right to freedom of 
expression had been “relevant and sufficient” for the purposes of Article 10 para. 2 of the 
Convention. The courts had stressed the damaging consequences of publication of the article for 
the protection of the reputation and rights of A. and B., for their right to be presumed innocent 
and for the authority and impartiality of the judiciary, referring to the possible impact of the 
article on the members of the jury. The Court took the view that the applicants' interest in 
imparting information concerning the progress of criminal proceedings and the interest of the 
public in receiving such information, were not sufficient to prevail over the considerations 
referred to by the French courts. The European Court further considered that the penalties 
imposed on the applicants were not disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued by the 
authorities. In those circumstances, the Court held that the applicants' conviction had amounted 
to an interference with their right to freedom of expression which had been “necessary in a 
democratic society” in order to protect the reputation and rights of others and to maintain the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary. It therefore held that there had been no violation of 
Article 10. The Cypriot, Bulgarian, Croatian and Greek judge formed the smallest possible majority 
(4/3 decision). 
 
The judges Costa, Tulkens and Lorenzen (France, Belgium and Denmark) expressed a joint 
dissenting opinion, in which they argued why the conviction of the applicants is to be considered 
a clear violation of the freedom of expression. Neither the breach of the presumption of 
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innocence, nor the possible impact on the members of the jury are considered pertinent 
arguments in this case in order to legitimise the interference in the applicants' freedom of 
expression. According to the joint dissenting opinion, journalists must be able to freely report 
and comment on the functioning of the criminal justice system, as a basic principle enshrined in 
the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers 2003 (13) on the provision of information 
through the media in relation to criminal proceedings. Referring to the concrete elements 
reported in the newspaper's article and its context, the dissenting judges conclude that there is 
no reasonable and proportional relation between the imposed restrictions and the legitimate aim 
pursued. According to the dissenting judges Article 10 of the Convention has been violated. 
 
• Tourancheau and July v. France, no. 53886/00, 24 November 2005.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. Denmark 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In August 2002, by a judgment of the Højesteret (Danish Supreme Court), the applicant company, 
Nordisk Film, was compelled to hand over limited specified unedited footage and notes of a 
broadcast television programme investigating paedophilia in Denmark. In order to make the 
programme, a journalist went undercover. He participated in meetings of “The Paedophile 
Association” and, with a hidden camera, interviewed two members of the association who made 
incriminating statements regarding the realities of paedophilia in both Denmark and India, 
including advice on how to induce a child to chat over the internet and how easy it was to procure 
children in India. In the documentary, broadcast on national television, false names were used 
and all persons' faces and voices were blurred. The day after the programme was broadcast, one 
of the interviewed persons, called “Mogens”, was arrested and charged with sexual offences. For 
further investigation, the Copenhagen Police requested that the unshown portions of the 
recordings made by the journalist be disclosed. The journalist and the editor of the applicant 
company's documentary unit refused to comply with the request. The Copenhagen City Court and 
the High Court also refused to grant the requested court order having regard to the need of the 
media to be able to protect their sources. The Supreme Court, however, found against the 
applicant company, the latter was therefore compelled to hand over some parts of the unedited 
footage which solely related to “Mogens”. The court order explicitly exempted the recordings and 
notes that would entail a risk of revealing the identity of some persons (a victim, a police officer 
and the mother of a hotel manager), who where interviewed with the promise by the journalist 
that they could participate without the possibility of being identified. In November 2002, Nordisk 
Film complained in Strasbourg that the Supreme Court's judgment breached its rights under 
Article 10 of the Convention, referring to the European Court's case law affording a high level of 
protection to journalistic sources. 
 
In its decision of 8 December 2005, the Strasbourg Court has come to the conclusion that the 
judgment of the Danish Supreme Court did not violate Article 10 of the Convention. The 
Strasbourg Court is of the opinion that the applicant company was not ordered to disclose its 
journalistic sources of information, rather, it was ordered to hand over part of its own research 
material. The Court is not convinced that the degree of protection applied in this case can reach 
the same level as that afforded to journalists when it concerns their right to keep their sources 
confidential under Article 10 of the Convention. The Court is also of the opinion that it is the 
State's duty to take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by 
private individuals. These measures should provide effective protection, in particular, of children 
and other vulnerable persons and include reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment or sexual 
abuse of which the authorities had or ought to have knowledge. The European Court supports 
the opinion of the Danish Supreme Court that the non-edited recordings and the notes made by 
the journalist could assist the investigation and production of evidence in the case against 
“Mogens” and that it concerned the investigation of alleged serious criminal offences. 
 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court's judgment explicitly guaranteed that material 
which entailed the risk of revealing the identity of the journalist's sources was exempted from 
the court order and that the order only concerned the handover of a limited part of the unedited 
footage as opposed to more drastic measures such as, for example, a search of the journalist's 
home and workplace. In these circumstances, the Strasbourg Court is satisfied that the order was 
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not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and that the reasons given by the Danish 
Supreme Court in justification of those measures were relevant and sufficient. Hence, Article 10 
of the Convention has not been violated. The application is manifestly ill-founded and is declared 
inadmissible. 
 
The decision of the European Court makes it clear that the Danish Supreme Court's order to 
compel the applicant to hand over the unedited footage is to be considered as an interference in 
the applicant's freedom of expression within the meaning of Article 10 § 1 of the Convention. In 
casu, the interference however meets all the conditions of Article 10 § 2, including the 
justification as being “necessary in a democratic society”. The Strasbourg Court is also of the 
opinion that the Danish Supreme Court and legislation (Art. 172 and 804-805 of the 
Administration of Justice Act) clearly acknowledge that an interference with the protection of 
journalistic sources cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified 
by an overriding requirement of public interest. It thereby reflects the approach developed in the 
Strasbourg Court's jurisprudence in the cases of Goodwin v. UK (1996), Roemen and Schmit v. 
Luxembourg (2003) and Ernst and others v. Belgium (2003). 
 
• Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), no. 40485/02, ECHR 2005-XIII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Giniewski v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1994, the newspaper Le quotidien de Paris published an article with the headline “The obscurity 
of error”, concerning the encyclical “The splendour of truth” ( Veritatis Splendor ) issued by Pope 
John Paul II. The article was written by Paul Giniewski, a journalist, sociologist and historian and 
contained a critical analysis of the particular doctrine developed by the Catholic Church and its 
possible links with the origins of the Holocaust. A criminal complaint was lodged against the 
applicant, the newspaper and its publishing director, alleging that they had published racially 
defamatory statements against the Christian community. The defendants were found guilty of 
defamation at first instance but were acquitted on appeal. Ruling exclusively on the civil claim 
lodged by the Alliance générale contre le racisme et pour le respect de l'identité française et 
chrétienne (General Alliance against Racism and for Respect for the French and Christian Identity 
- AGRIF), the Orléans Court of Appeal ruled that Giniewski was to pay damages to the AGRIF and 
that its decision was to be published at his expense in a national newspaper. The Orléans Court 
of Appeal considered the article defamatory toward a group of persons because of their religious 
beliefs. The applicant unsuccessfully contested the decision before the French Supreme Court. 
 
In a judgment of 31 January 2006, the European Court of Human Rights holds that the article in 
question had contributed to a debate on the various possible reasons behind the extermination 
of Jews in Europe: a question of indisputable public interest in a democratic society. In such 
matters, restrictions on freedom of expression are to be strictly interpreted. Although the issue 
raised in the present case concerned a doctrine endorsed by the Catholic Church, therefore a 
religious matter, an analysis of the article in question showed that it did not contain attacks on 
religious beliefs as such, but a view which the applicant had wished to express as a journalist 
and historian. The Court considered it essential that a debate on the causes of acts of particular 
gravity, resulting in crimes against humanity, take place freely in a democratic society. The article 
in question had, moreover, not been “gratuitously offensive” or insulting and had not incited 
disrespect or hatred. Nor had it cast doubt in any way on clearly established historical facts. 
 
From this perspective, the facts were different from those in I.A. v. Turkey regarding an offensive 
attack on the Prophet of Islam (see IRIS 2005-10: 3) and those in R. Garaudy v. France. The Court 
considered that the reasons given by the French courts could not be regarded as sufficient to 
justify the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression. Specifically with 
regard to the order to publish a notice of the ruling in a national newspaper at the applicant's 
expense, the Court considers that while the publication of such a notice did not in principle 
appear to constitute an excessive restriction on freedom of expression, the fact that it mentioned 
the criminal offence of defamation undoubtedly had a deterrent effect. The sanction thus 
imposed appeared disproportionate with regard to the importance and interest of the debate in 
which the applicant had legitimately sought to take part. The Court therefore held that there has 
been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Giniewski v. France, no. 64016/00, ECHR 2006-I.  
• Garaudy v. France (dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX (extracts). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Özgür Radyo v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1998 and 1999 the Istanbul radio station Özgür Radyo was given three warnings and its licence 
was twice suspended by Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu (Turkish broadcasting regulatory authority - 
RTÜK). The first suspension was for a period of 90 days, the second suspension period lasted 365 
days. Some of Özgür Radyo’s programmes had touched on various themes such as corruption, the 
methods used by the security forces to tackle terrorism and possible links between the State and 
the Mafia. The radio station was sanctioned by RTÜK because one programme was considered 
defamatory and other programmes had allegedly incited people to engage in violence, terrorism 
or ethnic discrimination and stirred up hatred or offended the independence, the national unity 
or the territorial integrity of the Turkish State. The radio station turned to the administrative 
courts for an order setting aside each of the penalties, but its applications were dismissed. 
 
In its complaint to the European Court of Human Rights, Özgür Radyo argued primarily that the 
penalties that had been imposed by the RTÜK entailed a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention (freedom of expression). There was no discussion as to the fact that the sanctions 
(both the warnings and the suspension of the licence) were prescribed by law (Art. 4 and 33 of 
the Turkish Broadcasting Act n° 3984 of 12 April 1991) and pursued a legitimate aim as listed in 
Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention. Thus, the decisive issue before the Court was whether the 
interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had been “necessary in a 
democratic society”. In assessing the situation, the Court said it would have particular regard to 
the words that had been used in the programmes and to the context in which they were 
broadcast, including the background to the case and in particular the problems linked to the 
prevention of terrorism. 
 
The Court emphasizes that the programmes covered very serious issues of general interest that 
had been widely debated in the media and that the dissemination of information on those themes 
was entirely consistent with the media’s role as a “watchdog” in a democratic society. The Court 
also notes that the information concerned had already been made available to the public. Some 
of the programmes had only reproduced orally, without further comment, newspaper articles that 
had already been published and for which no one had been prosecuted. Moreover, Özgür Radyo 
had been diligent in explaining that it was citing newspaper articles and in identifying the 
sources. The Court also observes that although certain particularly acerbic parts of the 
programmes had made them to some degree hostile in tone, they had not encouraged the use of 
violence, armed resistance or insurrection and did not constitute hate speech. The Court strongly 
underlines that this is an essential factor to be taken into consideration. Finally the Court refers 
to the severity of the penalties that had been imposed on the applicant, especially in terms of 
the suspension of the licence, first for a period of 90 days and in a second decision for a period 
of one year. The latter being the maximum penalty prescribed in Art. 33 of the Turkish 
Broadcasting Act n° 3984. Taking into account all these elements of the case, the Strasbourg 
Court considers the penalties disproportionate to the aims pursued and, therefore, not “necessary 
in a democratic society”. Consequently, the Court unanimously holds that there has been a 
violation of Article 10. 
 
• Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın Yapım Ve Tanıtım A.Ş. v. Turkey (no. 1), nos. 64178/00, 
64179/00, 64181/00, 64183/00 and 64184/00, 30 March 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Stoll v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In December 1996, the Swiss ambassador to the United States drew up a “strategic document”, 
classified as “confidential”, concerning the possible strategies regarding the compensation due 
to Holocaust victims for unclaimed assets deposited in Swiss banks. The document was sent to 
the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in Berne and to a limited list of other persons. Martin 
Stoll, a journalist working for Sonntags-Zeitung, also obtained a copy of this document, probably 
as a result of a breach of professional confidence by one of the initial recipients of such a copy. 
Soon afterwards, the Sonntags-Zeitung published two articles by Martin Stoll, featuring extracts 
from the document. Other newspapers soon followed suit. In 1999, Stoll was sentenced to a fine 
of CHF 800 (EUR 520) for publishing “official confidential deliberations” within the meaning of 
Article 293 of the Criminal Code. This provision not only targets the person who is responsible 
for the breach of confidence of official secrets, but also those who were accomplices in giving 
publicity to such secrets. The Swiss Press Council, to which the case also had been referred in 
the meantime, found that Stoll had irresponsibly made some extracts appear sensational and 
shocking by shortening the analysis and failing to sufficiently place the report in context. 
 
In a judgment of 25 April 2006, the European Court of Human Rights held, by four votes to three, 
that the conviction of Stoll is to be considered as a breach of the journalist’s freedom of 
expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Human Rights’ Convention. For the Court, it is 
crucial that the information contained in the report manifestly raised matters of public interest, 
that the role of the media as critic and public watchdog also applies to matters of foreign and 
financial policy and that the protection of confidentiality of diplomatic relations, although 
justified, could not be secured at any price. The publication of the report did not undermine the 
very foundations of Switzerland. The Court therefore believes that the interests deriving from 
freedom of expression in a democratic society could legitimise the public discussion brought 
about by the document, initially classified as confidential. Fining Stoll for revealing the content 
of the document had amounted to a kind of censorship which would be likely to discourage him 
from expressing criticism of that kind again in the future. The Strasbourg Court considers the 
conviction of Stoll by the Swiss judiciary as liable to hamper the press in performing its task as 
purveyor of information and public watchdog. Furthermore, as Stoll had only been convicted for 
publishing parts of the document in the newspaper, the European Court believes the finding by 
the Swiss Press Council that he had neglected his professional ethics by presenting some extracts 
in a sensationalist way, should not be taken into account to determine whether or not publishing 
the document was legitimate. The Court once more underlines that press freedom also covers 
possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation. The dissenting opinion from 
Judges Wildhaber, Borrego Borrego and Šikuta emphasises the importance of respecting official 
secrets and Stoll’s lack of professionalism in ignoring some fundamental rules of journalistic 
ethics. The dissenting judges also consider it as an important element that the articles at hand 
had not contributed in a useful way to the public debate on the issue of the unclaimed assets 
deposited in Swiss Banks. The majority of the Court however held that there has been a violation 
of Article 10 of the Convention, as Stoll’s conviction was not necessary in a democratic society, 
having regard to the interest of a democratic society in ensuring and maintaining the freedom of 
the press. 
 
• Stoll v. Switzerland, no. 69698/01, 25 April 2006.  
Back to overview of case-law 
164 
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 10 
December 2007. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Dammann v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 25 April 2006, the Court unanimously held that the Swiss authorities violated 
Article 10 of the Convention by convicting a journalist, Viktor Dammann, for inciting an 
administrative assistant of the public prosecutor’s office to disclose confidential data. The 
assistant had forwarded data relating to criminal records of suspects in a spectacular robbery. By 
punishing the journalist in this case, a step had been taken prior to publication and such a 
sentence would be likely to deter journalists from contributing to public discussion of issues 
affecting the life of the community. It was thus likely to hamper the press in its role as provider 
of information and public watchdog. Furthermore, no damage had been done to the rights of the 
persons concerned, as the journalist had himself decided not to publish the data in question. In 
these circumstances, the Court considered that Dammann’s conviction had not been reasonably 
proportionate to the pursuit of the legitimate aim in question, having regard to the interest of a 
democratic society in ensuring and maintaining the freedom of the press. 
 
• Dammann v. Switzerland, no. 77551/01, 25 April 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Tatlav v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1992, Erdoğan Aydin Tatlav, a journalist living in Istanbul, published a five volume book under 
the title Islamiyet Gerçeği (The Reality of Islam). In the first volume of the book he criticised Islam 
as a religion legitimising social injustice by portraying it as “God’s will”. Following a complaint 
on the occasion of the fifth edition of the book in 1996, the journalist was prosecuted for 
publishing a work intended to defile one of the religions (Art. 175 of the Criminal Code). He was 
sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, which was reduced to a fine. 
 
Tatlav complained before the European Court of Human Rights that this conviction was in breach 
of Article 10 of the Convention, referring to the right of freedom of expression “without 
interference by public authority”. Essentially, the Court assessed whether the interference in the 
applicant’s right in view of protecting the morals and the rights of others could be legitimised as 
“necessary in a democratic society”. The Court is of the opinion that certain passages of the book 
contained strong criticism of religion in a socio-political context, but that these passages had no 
insulting tone and did not contain an abusive attack on Muslims or on sacred symbols of Muslim 
religion (see [I.A. v. Turkey] IRIS 2005-10: 3). The Court did not exclude that Muslims could 
nonetheless feel offended by the caustic commentary on their religion, but this was not 
considered to be a sufficient reason to justify the criminal conviction of the author of the book. 
The Court also took account of the fact that although the book had first been published in 1992, 
no proceedings had been instituted until 1996, when the fifth edition was published. It was only 
following a complaint by an individual that proceedings had been brought against the journalist. 
With regard the punishment imposed on Tatlav, the Court is of the opinion that a criminal 
conviction involving, moreover, the risk of a custodial sentence, could have the effect of 
discouraging authors and editors from publishing opinions about religion that are non-conformist 
and could impede the protection of pluralism, which is indispensable for the healthy 
development of a democratic society. Taking into consideration all these elements of the case, 
the Strasbourg Court considers the interference by the Turkish authorities disproportionate to 
the aims pursued. Consequently, the Court holds unanimously that there has been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention (see IRIS 2006-4: 2). 
 
• Aydın Tatlav v. Turkey, no. 50692/99, 2 May 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Erbakan v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights held by six votes to one that the criminal proceedings 
instituted in 1998 against the leader of a political party - because of a public speech during an 
election campaign in 1994 - and the ensuing sentence of imprisonment delivered by the State 
Security Court, had been a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
In its judgment, the Court especially considered the interest of a democratic society in ensuring 
and maintaining freedom of political debate. The Court also found there was a breach of Article 
6 § 1 of the Convention, as civilians standing trial for offences under the Criminal Code had 
legitimate reason to fear that a State Security Court which included a military judge among its 
members might not be independent and impartial. 
 
The case concerns the application of Necmettin Erbakan, who was Prime Minister of Turkey from 
June 1996 to June 1997. In 1997 and 1998, he was the chairman of Refah Partisi (the Welfare 
Party), a political party which was dissolved in 1998 for engaging in activities contrary to the 
principles of secularism (see also ECHR, 13 February 2003). In February 1994, the applicant gave 
a public speech in Bingöl, a city in south-east Turkey. More than four years later criminal 
proceedings were brought against Erbakan for incitement to hatred or hostility through 
comments made in his 1994 speech about distinctions between religions, races and regions 
(Article 312 § 2 of the Criminal Code). The applicant contested the accusations against him, in 
particular disputing the authenticity and reliability of a video cassette, produced by the public 
prosecutor’s office, containing a recording of the speech. In March 2000, the State Security Court 
convicted Erbakan and sentenced him to one year’s imprisonment and a fine. In reaching its 
judgment, the State Security Court took into account the situation at the material time in the city 
of Bingöl, where the inhabitants had been victims of terrorist acts perpetrated by an extremist 
organisation. It concluded that the applicant, in particular by making a distinction between 
“believers” and “non-believers”, had overstepped the acceptable limits of freedom of political 
debate. A few months later, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of 
law and upheld the conviction. In January 2001, pursuant to Laws no. 4454 and 4616, the State 
Security Court stayed the execution of the sentence, a decision which was confirmed by the Court 
of Diyarbakir in April 2005. 
 
Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, the applicant complained before the European Court of 
Human Rights that his conviction had infringed his right to freedom of expression. 
 
In its judgment of 6 July 2006, the Court held that by using religious terminology in his 
speech,Erbakan had indeed reduced diversity - a factor inherent in any society - to a simple 
division between “believers” and “non-believers” and had called for a political line to be formed 
on the basis of religious affiliation. The Court also pointed out that combating all forms of 
intolerance and hate speech was an integral part of human rights protection and that it was 
crucially important that politicians avoid making comments in their speeches likely to foster such 
intolerance. However, in view of the fundamental nature of freedom of political debate in a 
democratic society, a severe penalty in relation to political speech can only be justified by 
compelling reasons. The Court noted in this perspective that the Turkish authorities had not 
sought to establish the content of the speech in question until five years after the rally, and had 
done so purely on the basis of a video recording the authenticity of which was disputed. The 
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Court concluded that it was particularly difficult to hold the applicant responsible for all the 
comments cited in the indictment. Furthermore, it had not been established that the speech had 
given rise to, or been likely to give rise to, a “present risk” and an “imminent danger”. Also taking 
into account the severity of the one year’s imprisonment sentence, the Court found that the 
interference in the applicant’s freedom of expression had not been necessary in a democratic 
society. The Court accordingly held that there had been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Erbakan v. Turkey, no. 59405/00, 6 July 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Sdružení Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has, on several occasions, recognised “the right of the 
public to be properly informed” and “the right to receive information”, but until recently the Court 
was very reluctant to derive from Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights a right 
to have access to public or administrative documents. In the cases of Leander v. Sweden (1987), 
Gaskin v. United Kingdom (1989) and Sîrbu v. Moldova (2004)), the Strasbourg Court has indeed 
recognised “that the public has a right to receive information as a corollary of the specific 
function of journalists, which is to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest”. 
However, the Court was of the opinion that the freedom to receive information basically prohibits 
a government from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or may be 
willing to impart to that person. It was decided in these cases that the freedom to receive 
information as guaranteed by Article 10 could not be construed as imposing on a State a positive 
obligation to disseminate information or to disclose information to the public. 
 
In a recent decision (10 July 2006) on an application’s admissibility, the European Court of Human 
Rights has, for the first time, applied Article 10 of the Convention in a case where a request for 
access to administrative documents was refused by the authorities. The case concerns a refusal 
to grant an ecological NGO access to documents and plans regarding a nuclear power station in 
Temelin, Czech Republic. Although the Court is of the opinion that there has not been a breach 
of Article 10, it explicitly recognised that the refusal by the Czech authorities is to be considered 
as an interference with the right to receive information as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
Convention. Hence, the refusal must meet the conditions set out in Article 10 para. 2. In the case 
of Sdružení Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic, the Court refers to its traditional case law, 
emphasising that the freedom to receive information “aims largely at forbidding a State to 
prevent a person from receiving information which others would like to have or can consent to 
provide”. The Court is also of the opinion that it is difficult to derive from Article 10 a general 
right to have access to administrative documents, The Court, however, recognises that the refusal 
to grant access to administrative documents, in casu relating to a nuclear power station, is to be 
considered as an interference in the applicant’s right to receive information. Because the Czech 
authorities have reasoned in a pertinent and sufficient manner the refusal to grant access to the 
requested documents, the Court is of the opinion that there has been no breach of Article 10 
para. 2 of the Convention in this case. The refusal was justified in the interest of protecting the 
rights of others (industrial secrets), national security (risk of terrorist attacks) and public health. 
The Court also emphasised that the request to have access to essentially technical information 
about the nuclear power station did not reflect a matter of public interest. For these reasons, it 
was obvious that there had not been an infringement of Article 10 of the Convention, thus, the 
Court declared the application inadmissible. 
 
The ruling in the case of Sdružení Jihočeské Matky is nonetheless important as it contains an 
explicit and undeniable recognition of the application of Article 10 in cases of a rejection of a 
request for access to public or administrative documents. The right to access administrative 
documents is not an absolute one and can indeed be restricted under the conditions of Article 
10 para. 2, which implies that such a rejection must be prescribed by law, have a legitimate aim 
and must be necessary in a democratic society. The Court’s decision of 10 July 2006 gives 
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additional support and opens new perspectives for citizens, journalists and NGOs for accessing 
administrative documents in matters of public interest. 
 
• Sdružení Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic (dec.), no. 19101/03, 10 July 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Monnat v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 21 September 2006, the European Court of Human Rights has come to the 
conclusion that the Swiss authorities have violated the freedom of expression of a journalist by 
placing a programme broadcast by the Swiss Public Broadcasting Corporation SSR under a legal 
embargo. In 1997, the SSR broadcast a critical documentary on the position of Switzerland during 
the Second World War. The documentary was part of a news programme, entitled Temps présent 
(“Present time”), for which the applicant, Daniel Monnat, was then responsible. The programme 
described the attitude of Switzerland and of its leaders, emphasising their alleged affinity with 
the far right and their penchant for a rapprochement with Germany. It also contained an analysis 
of the question of anti-Semitism in Switzerland and of its economic relations with Germany, 
focusing on the laundering of Nazi money by Switzerland and on the role of Swiss banks and 
insurance companies in the matter of unclaimed Jewish assets. The programme elicited reactions 
from members of the public. Viewers’ complaints, within the meaning of section 4 of the Federal 
Broadcasting Act, were filed with the Autorité indépendante d’examen des plaintes en matière de 
radiotélévision (Independent Broadcasting Complaints Commission). The Complaints Commission 
was of the opinion that the programme had breached the duty to report objectively in such a way 
as to reflect the plurality and diversity of opinion. The Complaints Commission found against the 
SSR and requested the broadcasting company to take appropriate measures. The Commission 
particularly found that the method used, namely politically engaged journalism, had not been 
identified as such. The News Editors’ Conference of SSR informed the Complaints Commission 
that it had taken note of its decisions and would take them into account when dealing with 
sensitive issues. Being satisfied with the measures, the Commission declared the proceedings 
closed. In the meantime, the registry of the court of Geneva decided to place the programme 
under a legal embargo, which led to the suspension of the sale of videotapes of the programme. 
 
Mr. Monnat alleged before the European Court of Human Rights that the programme scrutiny 
introduced by Swiss law and the decision of the Complaints Commission, upheld by the Federal 
Court, had hampered him in the exercise of his freedom of expression, as provided for by Article 
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint 
as to the inappropriateness of the programme scrutiny introduced by the Federal Broadcasting 
Act, because he was challenging general legal arrangements in abstract terms. However, in his 
capacity as a programme-maker he could claim to be the victim of a violation of the Convention 
because of the legal embargo. 
 
The Strasbourg Court noted that the impugned programme had undoubtedly raised a question of 
major public interest, at a time when Switzerland’s role in the Second World War was a popular 
subject in the Swiss media and divided public opinion in that country. As regards the journalist’s 
duties and responsibilities, the Court was not convinced that the grounds given by the Federal 
Court had been “relevant and sufficient” to justify the admission of the complaints, even in the 
case of information imparted in a televised documentary on a state-owned television channel. 
As to the sanctions imposed in this case, the Court noted that whilst they had not prevented the 
applicant from expressing himself, the admission of the complaints had nonetheless amounted 
to a kind of censorship, which would be likely to discourage him from making criticisms of that 
kind again in future. In the context of debate on a subject of major public interest, such a sanction 
would be likely to deter journalists from contributing to public discussion of issues affecting the 
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life of the community. By the same token, it was liable to hamper the media in performing their 
task as purveyor of information and public watchdog. Moreover, the censorship had subsequently 
taken on the form of a legal embargo on the documentary, formally prohibiting the sale of the 
product in question. For these reasons, the Court considered that there had been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Monnat v. Switzerland, no. 73604/01, ECHR 2006-X.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of White v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1996, the two main evening newspapers in Sweden, Expressen and Aftonbladet , published a 
series of articles in which various criminal offences were ascribed to Anthony White, a British 
citizen residing in Mozambique. The articles also included an assertion that he had murdered 
Olof Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister, in 1986. Mr White was a well-known figure whose 
alleged illegal activities had already been at the centre of media attention. The newspapers also 
reported statements of individuals who rejected the allegations made against Mr White. In an 
interview published in Expressen , Mr White denied any involvement in the alleged offences. 
 
Mr White brought a private prosecution against the editors of the newspapers for defamation 
under the Freedom of Press Act and the Swedish Criminal Code. The District Court of Stockholm 
acquitted the editors and found that it was justifiable to publish the statements and pictures, 
given that there was considerable public interest in the allegations. It further considered that the 
newspapers had a reasonable basis for the assertions and that they had performed the checks 
that were called for in the given circumstances, taking into regard the constraints of a fast news 
service. The Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s decision. 
 
Mr White complained before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg that the Swedish 
courts had failed to provide due protection for his name and reputation. He relied on Article 8 
(right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention. The European Court found that a 
fair balance must be struck between the competing interests, namely freedom of expression 
(Article 10) and the right to respect for privacy (Article 8), also taking into account that under 
Article 6 § 2 of the Convention individuals have a right to be presumed innocent of any criminal 
offence until proven guilty in accordance with the law. The Court first noted that as such the 
information published in both newspapers was defamatory. The statements clearly tarnished his 
reputation and disregarded his right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty as it appeared 
that Mr. White had not been convicted of any of the offences ascribed to him. However in the 
series of articles, the newspapers had endeavoured to present an account of the various 
allegations made which was as balanced as possible and the journalists had acted in good faith. 
Moreover, the unsolved murder of the former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and the ongoing 
criminal investigations were matters of serious public interest and concern. The Strasbourg Court 
considered that the domestic courts made a thorough examination of the case and balanced the 
opposing interests involved in conformity with Convention standards. The European Court found 
that the Swedish courts were justified in finding that the public interest in publishing the 
information in question outweighed Mr White’s right to the protection of his reputation. 
Consequently, there had been no failure on the part of the Swedish State to afford adequate 
protection of the applicant’s rights. For these reasons, the Court considered that there had been 
no violation of Article 8. 
 
• White v. Sweden, no. 42435/02, 19 September 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Klein v. Slovakia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In March 1997, the weekly magazine Domino Efekt published an article written by Martin Klein, a 
journalist and film critic. In this article, Klein criticised Archbishop Ján Sokol’s televised proposal 
to halt the distribution of the film “The People v. Larry Flint” and to withdraw the poster 
advertising it. The article contained slang terms and innuendos with oblique vulgar and sexual 
connotations, allusions to the Archbishop’s alleged cooperation with the secret police of the 
former communist regime and an invitation to the members of the Catholic Church to leave their 
church. 
 
On complaints filed by two associations, criminal proceedings were brought against Klein. The 
journalist was convicted of public defamation of a group of inhabitants of the Republic for their 
belief. For this criminal offence, he was sentenced to a fine of EUR 375, in application of Article 
198 of the Slovakian Criminal Code. The Regional Court of Košice considered the article in 
question as vulgar, ridiculing and offending, hence not eligible for protection under Article 10 of 
the European Convention. It concluded that the content of Klein’s article had violated the rights, 
guaranteed by the Constitution, of a group of adherents to the Christian faith. 
 
Contrary to the domestic courts’ findings, the European Court of Human Rights was not persuaded 
that the applicant had discredited and disparaged a section of the population on account of their 
Catholic faith. The applicant’s strongly-worded pejorative opinion related exclusively to the 
Archbishop, a senior representative of the Catholic Church in Slovakia. The fact that some 
members of the Catholic Church could have been offended by the applicant’s criticism of the 
Archbishop and by the statement that he did not understand why decent Catholics did not leave 
that Church could not affect that position. The Court accepts the applicant’s argument that the 
article neither unduly interfered with the right of believers to express and exercise their religion, 
nor denigrated the content of their religious faith. Given that the article exclusively criticised the 
person of the Archbishop, convicting the applicant of defamation of others’ beliefs was in itself 
inappropriate in the particular circumstances of the case. 
 
For those reasons, and despite the vulgar tone of the article, the Court found that it could not be 
concluded that by publishing the article the applicant had interfered with the right to freedom 
of religion of others in a manner justifying the sanction imposed on him. The interference with 
his right to freedom of expression therefore neither corresponded to a pressing social need, nor 
was it proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Court held unanimously that the 
interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was not “necessary in a 
democratic society” and that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention. 
 
• Klein v. Slovakia, no. 72208/01, 31 October 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Leempoel & S.A. Ed. Ciné Revue v. Belgium 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 9 November 2006, the European Court of Human Rights found no violation of 
freedom of expression in a case concerning the withdrawal from sale and ban on distribution of 
an issue of the Belgian weekly magazine Ciné Télé Revue. On 30 January 1997, the magazine 
published an article containing extracts from the preparatory file and personal notes that an 
investigating judge, D., had handed to a parliamentary commission of inquiry. The article was 
advertised on the front cover of the magazine via the headline, which was superimposed on a 
photograph of the judge. The disclosures received substantial press coverage, as the issue was 
related to the “Dutroux case” and the manner in which the police and the judiciary had handled 
the investigations into the disappearance, kidnapping, sexual abuse and murder of several 
children. 
 
Following a special judicial procedure for urgent applications before a judge in Brussels, 
investigating judge D. obtained an injunction for the magazine editor and its publisher to take 
all necessary steps to remove every copy of the magazine from sales outlets and the prohibition 
of the subsequent distribution of any copy featuring the same cover and the same article. The 
court order was based on the grounds that the published documents were subject to the rules on 
confidentiality of parliamentary inquiries and that their publication appeared to have breached 
the right to due process and also the judge’s right to respect for her private life. 
 
In an application before the European Court of Human Rights, the applicants complained that 
the ruling against them infringed Article 10 of the Convention and they maintained that Article 
25 of the Belgian Constitution, which forbids censorship of the press, afforded a greater degree 
of protection than Article 10 of the Convention and that its application should accordingly have 
been safeguarded by Article 53 of the Convention (the Convention’s rights and freedoms being 
“minimum rules”). 
 
The Court noted that although the offending article was related to a subject of public interest, 
its content could not be considered as serving the public interest. Moreover, the parliamentary 
commission’s hearings had already received significant media exposure, including via live 
broadcasts on television. The Court found that the article in question contained criticism that 
was especially directed against the judge’s character and that it contained in particular a copy of 
strictly confidential correspondence which could not be regarded as contributing in any way to a 
debate of general interest to society. The use of the file handed over to the commission of inquiry 
and the comments made in the article had revealed the very essence of the “system of defence” 
that the judge had allegedly adopted or could have adopted before the commission. The Court is 
of the opinion that the adoption of such a “system of defence” belonged to the “inner circle” of a 
person’s private life and that the confidentiality of such personal information had to be 
guaranteed and protected against any intrusion. As the Court found that the article in question 
and its distribution could not be regarded as having contributed to any debate of general interest 
to society it considered that the grounds given by the Belgian courts to justify the ban on the 
distribution of the litigious issue of the magazine were relevant and sufficient and that the 
interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression was proportionate to the aim 
pursued. The Court considered that such interference could be seen as “necessary in a democratic 
society” and did not amount to a violation of Article 10. 
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With regard to the alleged negligence to apply Article 53, the Court referred back to its finding 
that the interference in question had been “prescribed by law” and further observed that the 
decision to withdraw the magazine from circulation did not constitute a pre-publication measure 
but, having been taken under the special procedure for urgent applications, sought to limit the 
extent of damage already caused. As such interference was not considered by the Belgian Court 
of Cassation as a form of censorship, the European Court did not consider it necessary to examine 
separately the complaint under Article 53 based on an alleged breach of Article 25 of the Belgian 
Constitution. 
 
• Leempoel & S.A. ED. Ciné Revue v. Belgium, no. 64772/01, 9 November 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Radio Twist v. Slovakia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 19 December 2006, the European Court of Human Rights considered the 
sanctioning of a radio station to be a violation of freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 
10 of the Convention. The applicant, Radio Twist is a radio broadcasting company that was 
convicted for broadcasting the recording of a telephone conversation between the State 
Secretary at the Ministry of Justice and the Deputy Prime Minister in a news programme. The 
recording was accompanied by a commentary, clarifying that the recorded dialogue related to a 
politically influenced power struggle in June 1996 between two groups which had an interest in 
the privatisation of a major national insurance provider. Mr. D., the Secretary at the Ministry of 
Justice subsequently filed a civil action against Radio Twist for protection of his personal 
integrity. He argued that Radio Twist had broadcast the telephone conversation despite the fact 
that it had been obtained in an illegal manner. Radio Twist was ordered by the Slovakian courts 
to offer Mr. D. a written apology and to broadcast that apology within 15 days. The broadcasting 
company was also ordered to pay compensation for damage of a non-pecuniary nature, as the 
Slovakian courts considered that the dignity and reputation of Mr. D. had been tarnished. This 
was, in particular, related to the broadcasting of the illegally tapped conversation, which was 
considered an unjustified interference in the personal rights of Mr. D., as the protection of privacy 
also extends to telephone conversations of public officials. 
 
The Strasbourg Court however disagreed with these findings of the Slovakian Courts. Referring 
to the general principles that the European Court of Human Rights has developed in its case law 
regarding freedom of expression in political matters, regarding the essential function of the press 
in a democratic society, and regarding the limits of acceptable criticism of politicians, the Court 
emphasised that the context and content of the recorded conversation was clearly political and 
that the recording and commentary contained no aspects relevant to the concerned politician’s 
private life. Furthermore, the Court referred to the fact that the news reporting by Radio Twist 
did not contain untrue or distorted information and that the reputation of Mr. D. seemed not to 
have been tarnished by the impugned broadcast, as he was shortly afterwards elected as a judge 
of the Constitutional Court. The Court points out that Radio Twist was sanctioned mainly due to 
the mere fact of having broadcast information that had been illegally obtained by someone else 
who had forwarded this to the radio station. The Court was, however, not convinced that the 
mere fact that the recording had been obtained by a third person contrary to the law could 
deprive the broadcasting company of the protection afforded by Article 10 of the Convention. 
The Court also noted that it was, at no stage, alleged that the broadcasting company or its 
employees or agents were in any way liable for the recording or that its journalists transgressed 
criminal law while obtaining or broadcasting it. The Court observed that there was no indication 
that the journalists of Radio Twist acted in bad faith or that they pursued any objective other 
than reporting on matters which they felt obliged to make available to the public. For these 
reasons, the Court concluded that by broadcasting the telephone conversation in question, Radio 
Twist did not interfere with the reputation and rights of Mr. D. in a manner that could justify the 
sanction imposed upon it. Hence the interference with its rights to impart information did not 
correspond to a pressing social need. The interference was not necessary in a democratic society, 
thus it amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Radio Twist a.s. v. Slovakia, no. 62202/00, ECHR 2006-XV.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Mamère v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 11 October 2000, the Paris Criminal Court found Mr. Noël Mamère, a leading member of the 
ecologist party Les Verts and Member of Parliament, guilty of having publicly defamed Mr. 
Pellerin, the director of the Central Service for Protection against Ionising Radiation (SCPRI). Mr. 
Mamère was ordered to pay a fine of FRF 10,000 (app. EUR 1,525). The Paris Court of Appeal 
upheld the conviction considering that Mr. Mamère’s comments during a television programme 
were defamatory as they had compromised Mr. Pellerin’s “honour and reputation” by accusing 
him of repeatedly having “knowingly provided, in his capacity as a specialist on radioactivity 
issues, erroneous or simply untrue information about such a serious problem as the Chernobyl 
disaster, which could potentially have had an impact on the health of the French population”. 
The Court found that Mr. Mamère had not acted in good faith, as he had not adopted a moderate 
tone in insisting forcefully and peremptorily that Mr. Pellerin had repeatedly sought to lie and to 
distort the truth about the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident (the latter occurred 
in the spring of 1986). Mr. Mamère had also attributed “pejorative characteristics” to Mr. Pellerin 
by using the adjective “sinister” and by saying that he suffered from “the Asterix complex”. In 
May 2006, following a complaint by certain individuals suffering from thyroid cancer, the 
Commission for Research and Independent Information on Radioactivity (CRIIRAD) and the 
French Association of Thyroid Disease Sufferers (AFMT) recognised that the official services at 
the time had lied and had underestimated the contamination of soil, air and foodstuffs following 
the Chernobyl disaster. 
 
In its judgment of 7 November 2006, the Strasbourg Court observed that the conviction of Mr. 
Mamère for aiding and abetting public defamation of a civil servant had constituted an 
interference with his right to freedom of expression as guaranteed in the Freedom of the Press 
Act of 29 July 1881. It also considered that it had pursued one of the legitimate aims listed in 
Article 10 § 2, namely the protection of the reputation of others (in this case the reputation of Mr 
Pellerin). The Court, however, considered the interference as not necessary in a democratic 
society, as the case obviously was one in which Article 10 required a high level of protection of 
the right to freedom of expression. The Court underlined that the applicant’s comments 
concerned topics of general concern, namely the protection of the environment and of public 
health. Mr. Mamère had also been speaking in his capacity as an elected representative 
committed to ecological issues, so that his comments were to be regarded as being a political or 
“militant” expression. The Court reiterated that those who have been prosecuted on account of 
their comments on a matter of general concern should have the opportunity to absolve 
themselves of liability by establishing that they have acted in good faith and, in the case of 
factual allegations, by proving that they were true. In the applicant’s case, the comments made 
were value judgments as well as factual allegations, so the applicant should have been offered 
both those opportunities. As regards the factual allegations, since the acts criticised by the 
applicant had occurred more than ten years earlier, the 1881 Freedom of the Press Act barred 
him from proving that his comments were true. While in general the Court could see the logic of 
such a prescription, it considered that where historical or scientific events were concerned, it 
might on the contrary be expected that over the course of time the debate would be enriched by 
new information that could improve people’s understanding of reality. Furthermore, the Court 
was not persuaded by the reasoning of the French Court as to Mr. Mamère’s lack of good faith 
and the insulting character of some of his statements. According to the Strasbourg Court, Mr. 
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Mamère’s comments could be considered sarcastic but they remained within the limits of 
acceptable exaggeration or provocation. Furthermore, the question of Mr. Pellerin’s personal and 
“institutional” liability was an integral part of the debate on a matter of general concern: as 
director of the SCPRI he had had access to the measures being taken and had on several occasions 
made use of the media to inform the public of the level of contamination, or rather, one might 
say, the lack of it, within the territory of France. In those circumstances, and considering the 
extreme importance of the public debate in which the comments had been made, Mr. Mamère’s 
conviction for defamation could not be said to have been proportionate and hence “necessary in 
a democratic society”. The Court therefore held that there had been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Mamère v. France, no. 12697/03, ECHR 2006-XIII.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 7 December 2006, the European Court of Human Rights found that the Austrian 
authorities had acted in violation of the right to freedom of expression. The case concerned a 
reaction to a news item on the Austrian public television channel Österreichischer Rundfunk 
(ORF). In a news programme broadcast by ORF in 1999, a picture was shown of a person, Mr. S, 
who had been released on parole a few weeks earlier. Mr. S. was convicted to eight years 
imprisonment in 1995 because he had been found to be a leading member of a neo-Nazi 
organisation. At the request of Mr. S., the Austrian courts prohibited ORF from showing his picture 
in connection with any report stating that he had been convicted under the Verbotsgesetz 
(National Socialist Prohibition Act) either once the sentence had been executed or once he had 
been released on parole. The courts found that the publication of Mr. S.’s picture in that context 
had violated his legitimate interests within the meaning of both Section 78 of the Copyright Act 
and Section 7a of the Media Act (“right to one’s image”). 
 
The ORF complained in Strasbourg that the Austrian courts’ decisions violated its right to freedom 
of expression as provided in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Despite its 
being a public broadcasting organisation, the European Court of Human Rights was of the opinion 
that ORF does not qualify as a governmental organisation and hence may claim to be a “victim” 
of an interference by the Austrian authorities in its right to freedom of expression, within the 
meaning of articles 34 and 35 of the Convention (see IRIS 2004-5: 3). Referring inter alia to the 
guarantee of the ORF’ s editorial and journalistic independence and its institutional autonomy as 
a provider of a public service, the Court was of the opinion that the ORF does not fall under 
government control. As to the question of the prohibition to show Mr. S.’s picture in the context 
of his conviction under the Prohibition Act, the Court took into account several elements: the 
Court referred to the position of the ORF as a public broadcaster with an obligation to cover any 
major news item in the field of politics, to Mr. S.’s position as a well-known member of the neo-
Nazi scene in Austria and to the nature and subject-matter of the news report, the latter being of 
relevance to the public interest. The Court furthermore underlined the fact that the injunction 
granted by the domestic courts was phrased in very broad terms and that the news item on ORF 
referred to persons recently released on parole after having been convicted of crimes with a clear 
political relevance. Taking into account all these elements the Strasbourg Court found that the 
reasons adduced by the Austrian courts to justify the injunction were not relevant and sufficient 
to warrant the interference in ORF’ s right to freedom of expression. Thus, there had been a 
violation of Article 10. 
 
• Österreichischer Rundfunk v. Austria, no. 35841/02, 7 December 2006.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 22 February 2007, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) considered the 
convictions of both a journalist and a publishing company as being violations of the right to 
freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. The case concerned an 
article in the magazine Profil about a road accident in which the well-known Austrian skiing 
champion, Hermann Maier, injured his leg. The article, written by the journalist Rainer Nikowitz, 
suggested that one of Mr. Maier’s competitors, the Austrian skiing champion Stephan Eberharter, 
was pleased with the accident because he would finally be able to win something, and that he 
even hoped his competitor would break his other leg too. The article was satirical and was written 
in response to public hysteria following the accident. It was accompanied by a portrait of Mr. 
Maier together with the caption: “Hero Hermann’s leg is causing millions of Austrians pain”. 
 
Subsequently, Mr. Eberharter brought a private prosecution for defamation against Mr. Nikowitz 
and a compensation claim under the Mediengesetz (Media Act) against the publishing company. 
In 2001, the Vienna Landesgericht (Regional Criminal Court) found Mr. Nikowitz and the 
publishing company guilty of defamation. Apart from the order to pay a suspended fine, costs 
and compensation for damages, the Court also ordered Verlagsgruppe News to publish extracts 
of the judgment. Mr. Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News appealed unsuccessfully to the Vienna 
Court of Appeal, which found that the satirical meaning of the article would be lost on the 
average reader, and that the personal interests of Mr. Eberharter outweighed the right to freedom 
of artistic expression. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, approached the case from another perspective, 
emphasising that the article in question dealt with an incident that had already attracted the 
attention of the Austrian media, and that it was written in an ironic and satirical style and 
intended as a humorous commentary. The article also sought to make a critical contribution to 
an issue of general interest, namely the attitude of society towards a sports star. It could, at most, 
be understood as the author’s value judgment of Mr. Eberharter’s character, expressed in the form 
of a joke. According to the ECHR, the article remained within the limits of acceptable satirical 
comment in a democratic society. The Court was also of the opinion that the Austrian courts 
showed no moderation in interfering with the applicant’s rights by convicting the journalist of 
defamation and ordering him to pay a fine, and by ordering the publishing company to pay 
compensation and to publish the judgment. It followed that the interference under complaint 
was not “necessary in a democratic society” and therefore there had been a violation of Article 
10. 
 
• Nikowitz and Verlagsgruppe News GmbH v. Austria, no. 5266/03, 22 February 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Tønsberg Blad AS and Marit Haukom v. Norway 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2000, the Norwegian newspaper Tønsberg Blad published an article about a list drafted by the 
Municipal Council of Tjøme. The list identified property owners suspected of breaching 
permanent residence requirements applying to certain properties. The article referred to a well-
known singer and a well-known businessman (Mr. Rygh) stating that they might be “forced to sell 
their properties at Tjøme”. The article included a small photo of Mr. Rygh with the caption: “it 
must be due to a misunderstanding, says Tom Vidar Rygh”. A few weeks later, after being 
informed that the Rygh family’s property had been removed from the list, the newspaper 
published an additional article, which noted that Mr. Vidar Rygh and the singer had “got off” the 
list. The newspaper criticised the fact there were “major loopholes” in the system, in that the 
regulations did not apply to houses that had been built by the owners. In a further article, entitled 
“Tønsberg Blad clarifies”, the paper stated that the properties belonging to the singer and the 
Rygh family had been removed from the list in question, as the regulations did not apply to their 
properties. 
 
Mr. Rygh brought private criminal proceedings against the newspaper and its editor-in-chief, Mrs. 
Haukom. Under Article 253 of the Penal Code (defamation), Lagmannsrett (the High Court) 
declared the impugned statements to be null and void and ordered the publishing firm and the 
editor-in-chief to pay Mr. Rygh NOK 50,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The 
Court was of the opinion that there had not been sufficient evidence for the allegations against 
Mr. Rygh. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and ordered Tønsberg Blad and Haukom to 
pay Mr Rygh NOK 673,879 for costs. 
 
In their case taken before the European Court of Human Rights,Tønsberg Bladand Haukom 
complained, under Article 10 of the Convention, that the Norwegian Courts’ decisions had 
entailed an interference with their right to freedom of expression that could not be regarded as 
necessary in a democratic society. 
 
The ECHR, in the first place, found that the purpose of the article was to illustrate a problem 
about which the public had an interest in being informed. Indeed, a possible failure of a public 
figure to observe laws and regulations aimed at protecting serious public interests, even in the 
private sphere, might in certain circumstances constitute a matter of legitimate public interest. 
The Court recalled that protection of the right of journalists to impart information on issues of 
general interest required that they act in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and provide 
“reliable and precise” information in accordance with the ethics of journalism. Even though the 
news item had been presented in a somewhat sensationalist style, the overall impression given 
by the newspaper report was that, rather than inviting the reader to reach any foregone 
conclusion about any failure on Mr. Rygh’s part, it had raised question marks with respect to both 
whether he had breached the requirements in question, and whether those requirements should 
be maintained, modified or repealed. The ECHR was of the opinion that the overall news coverage 
by Tønsberg Blad on that matter was presented in a balanced way and that the disputed 
allegations were presented with precautionary qualifications. The Court does not find that the 
impugned accusation was capable of causing such injury to personal reputation as could weigh 
heavily in the balancing exercise to be carried out under the necessity test in Article 10 § 2 of 
the Convention. 
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As to the question of whether the applicants had acted in good faith and complied with the 
ordinary journalistic obligation to verify a factual allegation, the European Court found 
substantial evidence to corroborate the newspaper’s contention that the Municipality at the time 
held the view that Mr. Rygh was in breach of the relevant residence requirements.The journalist 
could not in the Court’s opinion be blamed for not having ascertained for himself, whether the 
residence requirements were applicable to Mr. Rygh’s property. On the contrary, in view of the 
relatively minor nature and limited degree of the defamation at issue and the important public 
interests involved, the Court was satisfied that the newspaper had taken sufficient steps to verify 
the truth of the disputed allegation and acted in good faith. 
 
However, the applicants had had to face judicial defamation proceedings pursued at three levels. 
These proceedings had led to their statements being declared null and void and to their being 
ordered to pay the plaintiff NOK 50,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage and to 
reimburse him NOK 673,829 for his legal expenses, in addition to bearing their own costs. In the 
circumstances, the proceedings had resulted in an excessive and disproportionate burden being 
placed on the applicants, which was capable of having a chilling effect on press freedom in the 
relevant State. 
 
The ECHR came to the conclusion that the reasons relied on by the Norwegian authorities, 
although relevant, were not sufficient to show that the interference complained of had been 
“necessary in a democratic society”. The Court considered that there had been no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the restrictions placed by the measures applied by the 
Supreme Court on the applicants' right to freedom of expression and the legitimate aim pursued. 
Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Tønsbergs Blad A.S. and Haukom v. Norway, no. 510/04, 1 March 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Colaço Mestre and SIC v. Portugal 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has once again ruled in favour of freedom of expression, 
this time regarding an interview on television. The Court considered the conviction of a journalist, 
Mr. Colaço Mestre and of the broadcasting company, Sociedade Independente de Comunicação 
(SIC), as a violation of the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. In 
1996, as part of a television programme entitled Os donos da bola (masters of the ball), SCI 
broadcast an interview conducted by Mr. Colaço Mestre with Gerhard Aigner, who at the time was 
General Secretary of UEFA. The interview, in French, focused on allegations concerning the 
bribery of referees in Portugal and the actions of Mr. Pinto da Costa, the then President of the 
Portuguese Professional Football League and Chairman of the football club FC Porto. Mr. Colaço 
Mestre described Mr. Pinto da Costa as “the referees’ boss” and seemed to be eliciting comments 
from his interviewee about the concurrent functions exercised by Mr. Pinto da Costa at the time. 
Mr. Pinto da Costa lodged a criminal complaint against Mestre and SIC accusing them of 
defamation. The Oporto Criminal Court sentenced Mr. Colaço Mestre to a fine or an alternative 
86-day term of imprisonment, and ordered the journalist and the television channel to pay the 
claimant damages of approximately EUR 3,990. In 2002 the Oporto Court of Appeal dismissed an 
appeal lodged by Mestre and SIC and upheld their conviction 
 
The European Court of Human Rights, however, is of the opinion that this sanction was a breach 
of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court noted that Mr. Pinto da Costa played a major role in 
Portuguese public life and that the interview concerned the debate on bribery in football, a 
question of public interest. Moreover, the interview had not addressed the private life, but solely 
the public activities of Mr. Pinto da Costa as Chairman of a leading football club and President of 
the National League. As to the expressions used during the interview, the Court considered that 
there had been no breach of journalistic ethics. In the context of the heated debate at the time 
about bribery of Portuguese referees, the interview had been broadcast in a Portuguese football 
programme intended for an audience with a particular interest in, and knowledge of, the subject-
matter. The Court further considered that the fact that Mr. Colaço Mestre had not been speaking 
in his mother tongue when he conducted the interview with the UEFA-Secretary General, which 
might have had an impact on the wording of his questions. The Court also found that the 
punishment of a journalist by sentencing him to pay a fine, together with an award of damages 
against him and the television channel employing him, might seriously hamper the contribution 
of the press to the discussion of matters of public interest and should not be envisaged unless 
there were particularly strong reasons for doing so. However, that was not the case here. In those 
circumstances the Court considered that, whilst the reasons advanced by the Portuguese courts 
to justify the applicants’ conviction might be regarded as relevant, they were not sufficient and, 
accordingly, did not serve to meet a pressing social need. The Court therefore held that there had 
been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Colaço Mestre and SIC – Sociedade Independente de Comunicação, S.A. v. Portugal, nos. 
11182/03 and 11319/03, 26 April 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Dupuis and Others v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 7 June 2007, the European Court of Human Rights expressed the unanimous 
opinion that the French authorities have violated the freedom of expression of two journalists 
and a publisher (Fayard). Both journalists were convicted for using confidential information 
published in their book Les Oreilles du President (The Ears of the President). The book focused on 
the “Elysée eavesdropping operations”, an illegal system of telephone tapping and record-
keeping, orchestrated by the highest office of the French State and directed against numerous 
figures of civil society, including journalists and lawyers. The French Courts found the two 
journalists, Dupuis and Pontaut, guilty of the offence of using information obtained through a 
breach of the confidentiality of the investigation, or of professional confidentiality. It was also 
argued that the publication could be detrimental to the presumption of innocence of Mr. G.M., 
the deputy director of President Mitterrand’s private office at the time of the events, who was 
placed under formal investigation for breach of privacy under suspicion of being the responsible 
person for the illegal telephone tapping. 
 
The ECHR observed that the subject of the book concerned a debate of considerable public 
interest, a state affair, which was of interest to public opinion. The Court also referred to the 
status of Mr. G.M. as a public person, clearly involved in political life at the highest level of the 
executive wherein the public had a legitimate interest in being informed about the trial, and in 
particular, about the facts dealt with or revealed in the book. The Court found it legitimate that 
special protection should be granted to the confidentiality of the judicial investigation, in view 
of the stakes of criminal proceedings, both for the administration of justice and for the right of 
persons under investigation to be presumed innocent. However, at the time the book was 
published, the case had already been widely covered in the media and it was already well known 
that Mr. G.M. had been placed under investigation in this case. Hence, the protection of the 
information on account of its confidentiality did not constitute an overriding requirement. The 
Court also questioned whether there was still an interest in keeping information confidential 
when it had already been at least partly made public and was likely to be widely known, having 
regard to the media coverage of the case. The Court further considered that it was necessary to 
take the greatest care in assessing the need to punish journalists for using information obtained 
through a breach of the confidentiality of an investigation or of professional confidentiality when 
those journalists are contributing to a public debate of such importance, thereby playing their 
role as “watchdogs” of democracy. According to the Court, the journalists had acted in accordance 
with the standards governing their profession as journalists: the impugned publication was 
relevant, not only to the subject matter, but also to the credibility of the information supplied. 
Lastly, the Court underlined the fact that the interference with freedom of expression might have 
a chilling effect on the exercise of that freedom - an effect that the relatively moderate nature 
of the fine, as in the present case, would not sufficiently negate. As the conviction of the two 
journalists had constituted a disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of 
expression, it was therefore not necessary in a democratic society. Accordingly, there has been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Dupuis and Others v. France, no. 1914/02, 7 June 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Hachette Filipacchi Associés (Paris-Match) v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Shortly after the Prefect of Corsica, Claude Erignac, was murdered in Ajaccio in February 1998, 
an issue of the weekly magazine Paris-Match featured an article entitled “ La République assassinée 
” (The murdered Republic). The article was illustrated by a photograph of the Prefect’s body lying 
on the road, facing the camera. The widow and children of Prefect Erignac sought injunctions 
against several companies, including the publishing company of Paris-Match , Hachette Filipacchi 
Associés. They contended that publication of the photograph of the bloodied and mutilated body 
of their relative was not information, which could possibly be useful to the public, but was 
prompted purely by commercial considerations and constituted a particularly intolerable 
infringement of their right to respect for their privacy. The urgent applications judge issued an 
injunction requiring the Hachette Filipacchi company to publish at its own expense in Paris-Match 
a statement informing readers that Mrs. Erignac and her children had found the photograph 
showing the dead body of Prefect Erignac deeply distressing. A few days, later the Paris Court of 
Appeal upheld the injunction, noting, among other considerations, that publication of the 
photograph, while Prefect Erignac’s family were still mourning his loss, and given the fact that 
they had not given their consent, constituted a gross intrusion in their grief, and accordingly of 
the intimacy of their private life. It ruled that such a photograph infringed human dignity and 
ordered the Hachette Filipacchi company to publish at its own expense in Paris-Match a 
statement informing readers that the photograph had been published without the consent of the 
Erignac family, who considered its publication an intrusion in the intimacy of their private life. 
On 20 December 2000, the Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court) dismissed an appeal on points of 
law by the applicant company. 
 
Relying on Article 10, the publishing house of Paris-Match complained before the European Court 
of Human Rights regarding the injunction requiring it to publish, on pain of a coercive fine, a 
statement informing readers that the photograph had been published without the consent of the 
Erignac family. 
 
The Court considered that the obligation to publish a statement amounted to an interference by 
the authorities in the company’s exercise of its freedom of expression. The Court noted that the 
practice of requiring publication of a statement was sanctioned by a long tradition of settled 
French case-law and was regarded by the French courts as “one of the ways of making good 
damage caused through the press”. It considered that this case-law satisfied the conditions of 
accessibility and foreseeability required for a finding that this form of interference was 
“prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 
 
The Court also considered that the interference complained of had pursued a legitimate aim (the 
protection of the rights of others) and it noted that the rights concerned fell within the scope of 
Article 8 of the Convention, guaranteeing the right to respect for private and family life. The 
crucial question that the Court had to answer was whether the interference had been “necessary 
in a democratic society”, within the framework of duties and responsibilities inherent in the 
exercise of freedom of expression. In this respect, the Court reiterated that the death of a close 
relative and the ensuing mourning, which were a source of intense grief, must sometimes lead 
the authorities to take the necessary measures to ensure respect for the private and family lives 
of the persons concerned. In the present case, the offending photograph had been published only 
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a few days after the murder and after the funeral. The Court considered that the distress of Mr. 
Erignac’s close relatives should have led journalists to exercise prudence and caution, given that 
he had died in violent circumstances which were traumatic for his family, who had expressly 
opposed publication of the photograph. The result of the publication, in a magazine with a very 
high circulation, had been to heighten the trauma felt by the victim’s close relatives in the 
aftermath of the murder, so that they were justified in arguing that there had been an 
infringement of their right to respect for their privacy. 
 
The Court also considered that the wording of the statement Paris-Match had been ordered to 
publish, revealed the care the French courts had taken to respect the editorial freedom of Paris-
Match . That being so, the Court considered that of all the sanctions which French legislation 
permitted, the order to publish the statement was the one which, both in principle and as regards 
its content, was the sanction entailing the least restrictions on the exercise of the applicant 
company’s rights. It noted that the Hachette Filipacchi company had not shown in what way the 
order to publish the statement had actually had a restrictive effect on the way Paris-Match had 
exercised and continued to exercise its right to freedom of expression. 
 
The Court concluded that the order requiring Paris-Match to publish a statement, for which the 
French courts had given reasons which were both “relevant and sufficient”, had been 
proportionate to the legitimate aim it pursued, and therefore “necessary in a democratic society”. 
Accordingly, the Court held by five votes to two that there had been no violation of Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The two dissenting judges expressed their firm 
disagreement with the finding of the majority in two separate dissenting opinions, annexed to 
the judgment. 
 
• Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, no. 71111/01, 14 June 2007.  
 
IRIS 2007-8/105 
Back to overview of case-law 
189 
European Court of Human Rights: Case of Lionarakis v. Greece 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1999 Nikitas Lionarakis, the presenter and coordinator of a radio programme broadcast live by 
the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation ERT, invited the journalist E.V. to debate various aspects 
of Greek foreign policy. During the broadcast, E.V. raised the subject of “the Öcalan case”. He 
referred to the fact that Öcalan, the ex-leader of the PKK who was prosecuted by the Turkish 
authorities for terrorism, had been helped by certain persons in Greece to illegally enter the 
country and to escape to Kenya. E.V. referred to F.K., a lawyer who had stood as a candidate in 
past legislative and European elections and who had been actively involved in the Öcalan case, 
being a contact for Öcalan after he escaped to Kenya. F.K. also had given several interviews in 
the press after Öcalan had been arrested by the Turkish authorities. According to the interviewed 
journalist, F.K. was, along with several others, to be considered as belonging to a “para-state”, 
belonging to a network of “vociferous criminals of the press” and being “neurotic pseudo-
patriots”. In June 1999 F.K. brought an action for damages alleging insult and defamation by 
Lionarakis, ERT and E.V. The domestic courts found against Lionarakis and ordered him to pay 
EUR 161,408 for the damage sustained, an amount that was, after a settlement reached with F.K. 
in the domestic courts, reduced to EUR 41,067.48. 
 
Lionarakis complained under Article 10 of a violation of his right to freedom of expression, 
arguing that he should not be held liable for remarks made by a third party during a radio 
programme of a political nature. The Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention, particularly when taking into account the fact that the insulting or 
defamatory statements were to be considered as value judgments, which had some factual basis. 
According to the Court, the domestic courts had failed to make a distinction between allegations 
of facts and value judgments. The Court also underlined the fact that these value judgments had 
been expressed orally, during a political type programme being broadcast live, while the 
programme also had a format that invited the participants to a free exchange of opinions. The 
Court considered, in particular, that the journalist and coordinator could not be held liable in the 
same way as the person who had made remarks that were possibly controversial, insulting or 
defamatory. It reiterated that requiring that journalists distance themselves systematically and 
formally from the content of a statement that might defame or harm a third party is not 
reconcilable with the press’s role of providing information on current events, opinions and ideas. 
Finally, the Court referred to the fact that F.K. was not a “simple private” person, but a 
contemporary public figure and that the amount of damages the journalist was compelled to pay 
as compensation was rather arbitrary and possibly too high. As the interference in the freedom 
of expression of Lionarakis had not sufficiently and pertinently been justified by the Greek 
authorities, the Court concluded that the inference was not necessary in a democratic society and 
amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court also found a violation of 
Article 6 § 1 in this case (right to a fair hearing), as Lionarakis had been denied the right of access 
to the Court of Cassation. 
 
• Lionarakis v. Greece, no. 1131/05, 5 July 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Elenkov v. Bulgaria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2000 Glas Nadezhda EOOD, managed by Mr. Elenkov, applied to the Bulgarian State 
Telecommunications Commission (STC) for a licence to set up a radio station to broadcast 
Christian programmes in and around Sofia. The STC refused to grant the licence, basing its refusal 
on the decision taken by the National Radio and Television Committee (NRTC) which found that, 
on the basis of the documents submitted by Glas Nadezhda EOOD, the proposed radio station 
would not meet its requirements to make social and business programmes or to target regional 
audiences. The proposal also failed to fully meet the requirements to produce original 
programmes, to ensure audience satisfaction and to provide the professional and technological 
resources required. 
 
Glas Nadezhda EOOD brought proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court for judicial 
review of the decisions of both STC and NRTC, but finally the Court held that the NRTC had total 
discretion in assessing whether an application for a broadcasting licence had met certain criteria 
and that this discretion was not open to judicial scrutiny. In the meantime, Mr. Elenkov attempted 
to obtain a copy of the minutes of the NRTC’s deliberations, which were meant to be available to 
the public under the Access to Public Information Act 2000. Despite his requests and a court 
order, Mr. Elenkov was not given access to those minutes. 
 
Relying on Articles 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and 10 (freedom of 
expression), the applicants complained that they had been refused a broadcasting licence. They 
also complained under Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) about the ensuing judicial review 
proceedings. 
 
The Court is of the opinion that the interference in the freedom of expression of the applicants 
did not meet the requirements of lawfulness as prescribed by Article 10 § 2. The NRTC had not 
held any form of public hearing and its deliberations had been kept secret, despite a court order 
obliging it to provide the applicants with a copy of its minutes. Furthermore, the NRTC had merely 
stated in its decision that Glas Nadezhda EOOD had not, or had only partially, addressed a number 
of its criteria. No reasoning was given to explain why the NRTC came to that conclusion. In 
addition, no redress had been given for that lack of reasoning in the ensuing judicial review 
proceedings because it had been held that the NRTC’s discretion was not subject to review. This, 
together with the NRTC’s vagueness concerning certain criteria for programmes, had denied the 
applicants legal protection against arbitrary interference with their freedom of expression. The 
Court notes that the guidelines adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
in the broadcasting regulation domain call for open and transparent application of the 
regulations governing the licensing procedure and specifically recommend that “[a]ll decisions 
taken ... by the regulatory authorities ... be ... duly reasoned [and] open to review by the competent 
jurisdictions” (Recommendation Rec (2000)23 on the independence and functions of regulatory 
authorities for the broadcasting sector). Consequently, the Court concludes that the interference 
with the applicants’ freedom of expression had not been lawful and held that there had been a 
violation of Article 10. 
 
Having regard to its findings under Article 10, the Court considers that it is not necessary to 
additionally examine whether there has been a violation of Article 9 of the Convention. The Court 
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on the other hand comes to the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 13. The 
Court observes that the Supreme Administrative Court made it clear that it could not scrutinise 
the manner in which that body had assessed the compliance of Glas Nadezhda EOOD's 
programme documents with the relevant criteria, as that assessment was within the NRTC's 
discretionary powers. The Supreme Administrative Court thus refused to interfere with the 
exercise of the NRTC's discretion on substantive grounds and did not examine the issues relevant 
to the merits of the applicants' Article 10 grievance. Referring to its case law in similar cases, the 
Court concludes that the approach taken by the Supreme Administrative Court - refusing to 
interfere with the exercise of the NRTC's discretion on substantive grounds - fell short of the 
requirements of Article 13 of the Convention. 
 
• Glas Nadezhda EOOD and Anatoliy Elenkov v. Bulgaria, no. 14134/02, 11 October 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Filatenko v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In the year 2000, the journalist Aleksandr Grigoryevich Filatenko was convicted of defamation. 
The reason behind the defamation proceedings was a critical question he formulated during a 
broadcast live show he was presenting as a journalist working for Tyva, the regional state 
television and radio broadcasting company in the Tyva Republic of the Russian Federation. The 
controversial question, based on a question raised by a viewer phoning in, referred to an incident 
during which the Tyva Republic flag had been torn off a car, which was campaigning in support 
of the Otechestvo Party candidate. It was a matter of disagreement as to how Filatenko had 
worded that question during the programme. The opinion of the plaintiff was that Filatenko had 
presented the incident as if the Tyva flag had been torn down and stamped on by people from 
the Edinstvo Campaign Headquarters. Filatenko denied having made any such allegation: he only 
admitted to having specified that the incident had taken place near the Edinstvo Campaign 
Headquarters. In the defamation proceedings brought against Filatenko and the broadcasting 
company by members of the Edinstvo Movement, the Kyzyl District Court accepted the plaintiff’s 
version as to how the question had been worded. As the video recording of the show had been 
lost, the district court relied solely on witness testimonies confirming the plaintiff’s version of 
Filatenko’s wording of the question. Filatenko was found guilty of defamation and ordered to pay 
approximately EUR 347 compensation for damages. Tyva was ordered to broadcast a rectification 
in the same time slot as the original show. 
 
In a judgment of 6 December 2007, the European Court of Human Rights was of the opinion that 
this conviction and court order violate Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
The Court reiterated that, as a general rule, any opinions and information aired during an 
electoral campaign should be considered part of a debate on questions of public interest and 
that there is little scope under Article 10 for restrictions on such debate. Similarly, punishing a 
journalist for having worded a question in a certain way, thus seriously hampering the 
contribution of the press to a matter of public interest, should not be envisaged unless there is a 
particularly strong justification. Therefore, the timing (just before elections) and format of the 
show (live and aimed at encouraging lively political debate), required very good reasons for any 
kind of restriction on its participants’ freedom of expression. The European Court found that the 
Russian courts have failed to make an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts and have not 
given sufficient reasons for finding that Filatenko’s wording of the question had been defamatory. 
Furthermore, there was no indication that the assumed allegation contained in Filatenko’s 
question had represented an attack on anyone’s personal reputation. The Court was also of the 
opinion that there could be no serious doubts about Filatenko’s good faith. He had merely 
requested a reaction from the show’s participants on an event of major public concern, without 
making any affirmations. According to the European Court Filatenko could not be criticised for 
having failed to verify facts, given the obvious constraints of a live television show, while a 
representative of the Edinstvo political movement had been present and invited to respond to 
the question. The Court therefore concluded that the interference with Filatenko’s freedom of 
expression had not been sufficiently justified, and hence violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Filatenko v. Russia, no. 73219/01, 6 December 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Grand Chamber Judgment in Case of Stoll v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In December 1996 the Swiss ambassador to the United States drew up a “strategic document”, 
classified as “confidential”, concerning possible strategies with regard the compensations due to 
Holocaust victims for unclaimed assets deposited in Swiss banks. The report was sent to the 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs in Bern and to a limited list of other persons. Martin Stoll, 
a journalist working for the Sonntags-Zeitung, also obtained a copy of this document, probably 
as a result of a breach of professional confidence by one of the persons who had received a copy 
of this strategic paper. Shortly afterwards the Sonntags-Zeitung published two articles by Martin 
Stoll, accompanied by extracts from the document. In the following days other newspapers also 
published extracts from the report. In 1999, Stoll was sentenced to a fine of CHF 800 (EUR 520) 
for publishing “official confidential deliberations” within the meaning of Article 293 of the 
Criminal Code. This provision not only punishes the person who is responsible for the breach of 
confidence of official secrets, but also those who helped, as an accomplice, to publish such 
secrets. The Swiss Press Council, to which the case had also been referred in the meantime, found 
that the way in which Stoll had focused on the confidential report, by shortening the analysis 
and failing to place the report sufficiently into context, had irresponsibly made some extracts 
appear sensational and shocking. In a judgment of 25 April 2006, the Strasbourg Court of Human 
Rights held, by four votes to three, that the conviction of Stoll was to be considered as a breach 
of the journalist’s freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Human Rights 
Convention. For the Court, it was of crucial importance that the information contained in the 
report manifestly raised matters of public interest, that the role of the media as critic and 
watchdog also applies to matters of foreign and financial policy and that the protection of 
confidentiality of diplomatic relations, although a justified principle, could not be protected at 
any price. Furthermore, as Stoll had only been convicted because he published parts of the 
document in the newspaper, the European Court was of the opinion that the finding by the Swiss 
Press Council that he had neglected his professional ethics by focusing on some extracts in a 
sensationalist way, should not be taken into account to determine whether or not the publishing 
of the document was legitimate. 
 
In a judgment of 10 December 2007, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
has now, with twelve votes to five, overruled this finding of a violation of Article 10. Although 
the Grand Chamber recognises that the information contained in the ambassador’s paper 
concerned matters of public interest and that the articles from Stoll were published in the context 
of an important public, impassioned debate in Switzerland with an international dimension, it is 
of the opinion that the disclosure of the ambassador’s report was capable of undermining the 
climate of discretion necessary to the successful conduct of diplomatic relations, and of having 
negative repercussions on the negotiations being conducted by Switzerland. The judgment 
underlines that the fact that Stoll did not himself act illegally by obtaining the leaked document 
is not necessarily a determining factor in assessing whether or not he complied with his duties 
and responsibilities: as a journalist he could not claim in good faith to be unaware that disclosure 
of the document in question was punishable under Article 293 of the Swiss Criminal Code. Finally 
the Court emphasised that the impugned articles were written and presented in a sensationalist 
style, that they suggested inappropriately that the ambassador’s remarks were anti-Semitic, that 
they were of a trivial nature and were also inaccurate and likely to mislead the reader. Similar to 
the Swiss Press Council, the Court observes a number of shortcomings in the form of the 
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published articles. The Court comes to the conclusion that the “truncated and reductive form of 
the articles in question, which was liable to mislead the reader as to the ambassador’s personality 
and abilities, considerably detracted from the importance of their contribution to the public 
debate” and that there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The five dissenting 
judges expressed the opinion that the majority decision is a “dangerous and unjustified departure 
from the Court’s well-established case-law concerning the nature and vital importance of 
freedom of expression in democratic societies”. The judgment of the Grand Chamber also 
contrasts remarkably with the principle enshrined in the 19 December 2006 Joint Declaration by 
the UN, OSCE, OAS and ACHPR according to which “journalists should not be held liable for 
publishing classified or confidential information where they have not themselves committed a 
wrong in obtaining it” [see IRIS 2007-2: Extra]. 
 
• Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no. 69698/01, ECHR 2007-V.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Cases of Nur Radyo and Özgür Radyo v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In two judgments the European Court of Human Rights considered the suspension of 
broadcasting licences by the Radio ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu (Turkish Radio and Television 
Supreme Council – RTÜK) as a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In the case of Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayıncılığı A.Ş. the applicant company complained about 
the temporary broadcasting ban imposed on it by the RTÜK. In 1999 RTÜK censured Nur Radyo 
for broadcasting certain comments by a representative of the Mihr religious community, who had 
described an earthquake in which thousands of people had died in the Izmit region of Turkey 
(August 1999) as a “warning from Allah” against the “enemies of Allah”, who had decided on their 
“death”. The RTÜK found that such comments breached the rule laid down in section 4 (c) of Law 
no. 3984 prohibiting broadcasting that was contrary to the principles forming part of the general 
principles laid down in the Constitution, to democratic rules and to human rights. As the applicant 
company had already received a warning for breaching the same rule, the RTÜK decided to 
suspend its radio broadcasting licence for 180 days. Nur Radyo challenged this measure in the 
Turkish courts, but to no avail. Finally it applied before the European Court of Human Rights, 
alleging a violation of its right to freedom of expression. Nur Radyo argued, in particular, that it 
had put forward a religious explanation for the earthquake, which all listeners were free to 
support or oppose. The European Court acknowledged the seriousness of the offending 
comments and the particularly tragic context in which they were made. It also notes that they 
were of a proselytising nature in that they accorded religious significance to a natural disaster. 
However, although the comments might have been shocking and offensive, they did not in any 
way incite to violence and were not liable to stir up hatred against people. The Court reiterated 
that the nature and severity of the penalty imposed were also factors to be taken into account 
when assessing the proportionality of an interference. It therefore considered that the 
broadcasting ban imposed on the applicant company had been disproportionate to the aims 
pursued, which constitutes a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In the other case, the applicant company was Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın Yapım 
Ve Tanıtım A.Ş. The case concerned the 365-day suspension of the company’s operating licence 
on account of a song that it had broadcast. The RTÜK took the view that the words of the 
offending song infringed the principle set forth in section 4(g) of Law no. 3984, prohibiting the 
broadcasting of material likely to incite the population to violence, terrorism or ethnic 
discrimination, and of a nature to arouse feelings of hatred. After exhausting all national 
remedies, Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon lodged a complaint in Strasbourg under Article 10 
of the Convention that the Turkish authorities had interfered with its right to freedom of 
expression in a manner that could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society. In its 
judgment, the European Court considered that the song reflected a political content and criticised 
the military. The song however referred to events that took place more than 30 years ago. Over 
and above, the lyrics of the song were very well known in Turkey and the song had been 
distributed over many years, with the authorisation of the Ministry of Culture. According to the 
Court the song did present a risk of inciting to hatred or hostility amongst the population. There 
was no pressing social need for the interference and the sanction suspending the broadcaster’s 
licence for such a long period was not proportionate to the legitimate aim of the protection of 
public order. The Court found that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
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• Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayıncılığı A.Ş. v. Turkey, no. 6587/03, 27 November 2007.   
• Özgür Radyo-Ses Radyo Televizyon Yayın Yapım Ve Tanıtım A.Ş. v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 11369/03, 
4 December 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Cases of Voskuil v. the Netherlands and Tillack v. Belgium 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In two recent judgments, the European Court of Human Rights has given substantial protection 
to journalists’ right of non-disclosure of their sources under Article 10 of the Convention. The 
case of Voskuil v. the Netherlands concerns Mr Voskuil’s allegations that he was denied the right 
not to disclose his source for two articles he had written for the newspaper Sp!ts and that he was 
detained for more than two weeks in an attempt to compel him to do so. Voskuil had been 
summoned to appear as a witness for the defence in the appeal proceedings concerning three 
individuals accused of arms trafficking. The court ordered the journalist to reveal the identity of 
a source, in the interests of those accused and the integrity of the police and judicial authorities. 
Voskuil invoked his right to remain silent ( zwijgrecht ) and, subsequently, the court ordered his 
immediate detention. Only two weeks later, the Court of Appeal decided to lift the order for the 
applicant’s detention. It considered that the report published by the applicant was implausible 
and that the statement of Voskuil was no longer of any interest in the proceedings concerning 
the arms trafficking. In Strasbourg, Voskuil complained of a violation of his right to freedom of 
expression and press freedom, under Article 10 of the Convention. The European Court recalled 
that the protection of a journalist’s sources is one of the basic conditions for freedom of the press, 
as reflected in various international instruments, including the Council of Europe’s Committee of 
Ministers Recommendation No. R (2000) 7. Without such protection, sources might be deterred 
from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest and, as a result, the 
vital public-watchdog role of the press might be undermined. The order to disclose a source can 
only be justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest. In essence, the Court was 
struck by the lengths to which the Netherlands authorities had been prepared to go to learn the 
source’s identity. Such far-reaching measures cannot but discourage those who have true and 
accurate information relating to an instance of wrongdoing from coming forward in the future 
and sharing their knowledge with the press. The Court found that the Government’s interest in 
knowing the identity of the journalist’s source had not been sufficient to override the journalist’s 
interest in concealing it. There had, therefore, been a violation of Article 10. 
 
The other case concerns the journalist H.M. Tillack, who complained of a violation, by the Belgian 
authorities, of his right to protection of sources. Tillack, a journalist working in Brussels for the 
weekly magazine Stern, was suspected of having bribed a civil servant, by paying him EUR 8,000, 
in exchange for confidential information concerning investigations in progress in the European 
institutions. The European Anti-Fraud Office OLAF opened an investigation in order to identify 
Tillack’s informant. After the investigation by OLAF failed to unmask the official at the source of 
the leaks, the Belgian judicial authorities where requested to open an investigation into an 
alleged breach of professional confidence and bribery involving a civil servant. On 19 March 
2004, Tillack’s home and workplace were searched and almost all his working papers and tools 
were seized and placed under seal (16 crates of papers, two boxes of files, two computers, four 
mobile phones and a metal cabinet). Tillack lodged an application with the European Court of 
Human Rights, after the Belgian Supreme Court rejected his complaint under Article 10 of the 
Convention. The European Court emphasised that a journalist’s right not to reveal her or his 
sources could not be considered a mere privilege, to be granted or taken away depending on the 
lawfulness or unlawfulness of their sources, but was part and parcel of the right to information 
and should be treated with the utmost caution ( even more so in the applicant’s case, since he 
had been under suspicion because of vague, uncorroborated rumours, as subsequently confirmed 
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by the fact that no charges were placed. The Court also took into account the amount of property 
seized and considered that although the reasons given by the Belgian courts were “relevant”, 
they could not be considered “sufficient” to justify the impugned searches. The European Court 
accordingly found that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Voskuil v. the Netherlands, no. 64752/01, November 2007.  
• Tillack v. Belgium, no. 20477/05, 27 November 2007.  
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European Court of Human Rights: case of Guja v. Moldova 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights recently delivered a judgement on a very particular and 
interesting case, concerning the position of a “whistle-blower” who leaked two letters to the 
press and was subsequently dismissed. The Court held that the divulgence of the internal 
documents to the press was in casu protected by Article 10 of the Convention, which guarantees 
the right to freedom of expression, including the right to receive and impart information and 
ideas. The applicant, Mr. Guja, was Head of the Press Department of the Moldovan Prosecutor 
General’s Office, before he was dismissed, on the grounds that he had handed over two secret 
letters to a newspaper and that, before doing so, he had failed to consult the heads of other 
departments of the Prosecutor General’s Office, a behaviour which constituted a breach of the 
press department’s internal regulations. Guja was of the opinion that the letters were not 
confidential and that, as they revealed that the Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Vadim Mişin, had 
exercised undue pressure on the Public Prosecutor’s Office, he had acted in line with the 
President’s anti-corruption drive and with the intention of creating a positive image of the Office. 
Guja brought a civil action against the Prosecutor General’s Office seeking reinstatement, but this 
action was not successful. Relying on Article 10 of the Convention, he complained to the 
European Court of Human Rights about his dismissal. 
 
The European Court held that, given the particular circumstances of the case, external reporting, 
even to a newspaper, could be justified, as the case concerned the pressure exerted by a high-
ranking politician on pending criminal cases. At the same time, the Public Prosecutor had given 
the impression that he had succumbed to political pressure. The Court also referred to the reports 
of international non-governmental organisations (the International Commission of Jurists, 
Freedom House, and the Open Justice Initiative), which had expressed concern about the 
breakdown of the separation of powers and the lack of judicial independence in Moldova. There 
is no doubt that these are very important matters in a democratic society, about which the public 
has a legitimate interest in being informed and which fall within the scope of political debate. 
The Court considered that the public interest in the provision of information on undue pressure 
and wrongdoing within the Prosecutor's Office is so important in a democratic society, that it 
outweighs the interest in maintaining public confidence in the Prosecutor General's Office. The 
open discussion of topics of public concern is essential to democracy and it is of great importance 
if members of the public are discouraged from voicing their opinions on such matters. The Court, 
being of the opinion that Guja had acted in good faith, finally noted that it was the heaviest 
sanction possible (dismissal) that had been imposed on the applicant. The sanction not only had 
negative repercussions on the applicant's career, but could also have a serious chilling effect on 
other employees from the Prosecutor's Office and discourage them from reporting any 
misconduct. Moreover, in view of the media coverage of the applicant's case, the sanction could 
also have a chilling effect on other civil servants and employees. 
 
Being mindful of the importance of the right to freedom of expression on matters of general 
interest, of the right of civil servants and other employees to report illegal conduct and 
wrongdoing at their place of work, the duties and responsibilities of employees towards their 
employers and the right of employers to manage their staff, and having weighed up the other 
different interests involved in the applicant’s case, the Court came to the conclusion that the 
interference with the applicant's right to freedom of expression, in particular his right to impart 
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information, was not “necessary in a democratic society”. Accordingly, there has been a violation 
of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Guja v. Moldova [GC], no. 14277/04, ECHR 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Yalçin Küçük (nr. 3) v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 22 April 2008, the European Court of Human Rights found a breach of freedom of expression 
in the case of Yalçin Küçük (nr. 3) v. Turkey. Küçük, a university professor and a writer, who was 
prosecuted on account of various speeches he gave and articles he wrote concerning the Kurdish 
question. In 1999, the Ankara State Security Court found him guilty of inciting hatred and 
hostility, of emitting separatist propaganda and of belonging to an armed group (art. 312 § 2 and 
art. 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and art. 8 of the Antiterrorism Act nr. 3713). He was also 
convicted of assisting an armed group (art. 169 Criminal Code) on the basis of an interview for 
Med-TV in which Küçük had welcomed the PKK-leader Abdullah Öcalan as “Mister President” and 
had invited him to make a statement about the Kurdish question. 
 
Küçük had to undergo a prison sentence of six years and six months and was ordered to pay a 
fine of EUR 1,300. Relying on Article 6 § 1 and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, he complained that the proceedings had been unfair and that his right to freedom of 
expression had been breached. 
 
The European Court in its judgment of 22 April 2008 considered that the grounds adopted by the 
Turkish courts could not be regarded in themselves as sufficient to justify interference with 
Külçük’s right to freedom of expression. While certain comments in the offending articles and 
speeches sought to justify separatism, which thus made them hostile in tone, taken as a whole 
they did not, however, advocate the use of violence, armed resistance or an uprising and did not 
constitute hate speech, which, in the Court’s view, was the essential factor to be taken into 
consideration. One speech by Külçük, however, contained a sentence considered as incitement 
to violence and therefore could not invoke the protection guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
The European Court, referring to the nature and the severity of the sanctions, found that Külçük’s 
conviction as a whole had been disproportionate to the aims pursued and, accordingly, was not 
“necessary in a democratic society”. The Court in particular referred to the severity of the sentence 
of imprisonment for six years and six months. The Court held, unanimously, that there had been 
a violation of Article 10 and that it did not need to examine the complaints submitted under 
Article 6 of the Convention. It awarded Küçük EUR 3,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 
 
• Yalçın Küçük v. Turkey (no. 3), no. 71353/01, 22 April 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Meltex Ltd. and Mesrop Movsesyan v. Armenia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 17 June 2008 the European Court of Human Rights held unanimously that the 
refusal by the Armenian authorities, on several occasions, to grant the Meltex television company 
requests for broadcasting licences amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Court firstly recognized that the independent broadcasting 
company Meltex was to be considered as a “victim” of an interference with its freedom of 
expression by the Armenian public authorities: by not recognising the applicant company as the 
winner in the calls for tenders it competed in, the NTRC (National Radio and Television 
Commission) effectively refused the applicant company's bids for a broadcasting licence and such 
refusals do indeed constitute interferences with the applicant company's freedom to impart 
information and ideas. The Court also made clear that States, however, are permitted to regulate 
by means of a licensing system the way in which broadcasting is organised in their territories, 
particularly in its technical aspects, and that the grant of a licence may also be made conditional 
on matters such as the nature and objectives of a proposed station, its potential audience at 
national, regional or local level, the rights and needs of a specific audience and the obligations 
deriving from international legal instruments. The compatibility of such interferences must be 
assessed in light of the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention, which means 
inter alia that the interference must be prescribed by law in a way that guarantees protection 
against arbitrary interferences by public authorities. Indeed, the manner in which the licensing 
criteria are applied in the licensing process must provide sufficient guarantees against 
arbitrariness, including the proper reasoning by the licensing authority of its decisions denying a 
broadcasting licence (see IRIS 2008-1: 3, ECtHR 11 October 2007, Glas Nadezhda EOOD and 
Elenkov v. Bulgaria). 
 
The Court noted that the NTRC’s decisions had been based on the Broadcasting Act (2000) and 
other complementary legal acts defining precise criteria for the NTRC to make its choice, such as 
the applicant company’s finances and technical resources, its staff’s experience and whether it 
produced predominately in-house Armenian programmes. However, the Broadcasting Act had not 
explicitly required at that time that the licensing body give reasons when applying those criteria. 
Therefore, the NTRC had simply announced the winning company without providing any 
explanation as to why that company, and not Meltex, had met the requisite criteria. There was 
no way of knowing on what basis the NTRC had exercised its discretion to refuse a licence. On 
this point, the Court noted that the guidelines adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe in the broadcasting regulation domain call for open and transparent 
application of the regulations governing the licensing procedure and specifically recommend 
that “all decisions taken ... by the regulatory authorities ... be ... duly reasoned” (Rec. (2000)23 - 
See also Declaration of the Committee of Ministers of 26 March 2008 on the independence and 
functions of regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector). The Court further took note of 
the relevant conclusions reached by the PACE in its Resolution of 27 January 2004 concerning 
Armenia, where it stated that “the vagueness of the law in force had resulted in the NTRC being 
given outright discretionary powers”. The Court considered that a licensing procedure whereby 
the licensing authority gives no reasons for its decisions does not provide adequate protection 
against arbitrary interferences by a public authority with the fundamental right to freedom of 
expression. The Court therefore concluded that the interference with Meltex’s freedom to impart 
information and ideas, namely the seven denials of a broadcasting licence, had not met the 
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requirement of lawfulness under the European Convention and hence violated Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan v. Armenia, no. 32283/04, 17 June 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: case of Flux nr. 6 v. Moldova on Journalistic Ethics 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
After several successful complaints before the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights related to the 
freedom of critical journalistic reporting, this time the European Court, by four votes to three, 
came to the conclusion that the conviction of the Moldovan newspaper Flux was not to be 
considered a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The approach taken by the majority of the 
Court regarding the (lack of) journalistic ethical quality of the litigious articles published by Flux 
is strikingly different to that of the dissenting judges. 
 
In 2003 Flux published an article about a High School in Chisinau, sharply criticising its principal. 
The article merely quoted an anonymous letter Flux had received from a group of students' 
parents. The letter alleged inter alia that the school's principal used the school's funds for 
inappropriate purposes and that he had received bribes of up to USD 500 for enrolling children 
in the school. Flux refused a short time later to publish a reply from the school’s principal. The 
text of the reply was then published in another newspaper, the Jurnal de Chisinău . The reply 
stated that Flux had published an anonymous letter without even visiting the school or 
conducting any form of investigation, which showed that its aim was purely sensationalism . It 
was said that Flux had acted contrary to journalistic ethics. Flux reacted to this reply by 
publishing a new article, repeating some of the criticism published in the first article and arguing 
that Fluxwould certainly find persons willing to testify in front of a court about the bribes. The 
principal then brought civil proceedings for defamation against Flux and the district court found 
the allegations of bribery to be untrue and defamatory. The court stated that it had no reason to 
believe the three witnesses who had testified in court that bribes were taken for the enrolment 
of children in the school. The district court expressed the opinion that “to be able to declare 
publicly that someone is accepting bribes, there is a need for a criminal-court decision finding 
that person guilty of bribery”. Since there was no such finding against the principal, he should 
not have been accused of bribery, according to the Moldovan district court. The judgment of the 
district court was confirmed by the Court of Appeal of Chisinau and the appeal with the Supreme 
Court of Justice was dismissed. The newspaper was ordered to issue an apology and to pay the 
principal MDL 1,350, the equivalent of EUR 88 at the time. 
 
Flux complained to Strasbourg under Article 10 of the Convention that the Moldovan courts' 
decisions constituted an interference with its right to freedom of expression that could not be 
regarded as necessary in a democratic society. The European Court, in its judgment of 29 July 
2008, attached major importance to the fact that, despite the seriousness of the accusations of 
bribery, the journalist ofFlux who wrote the article made no attempt to contact the principal to 
ask his opinion on the matter nor conducted any form of investigation into the matters mentioned 
in the anonymous letter. Furthermore, a right of reply was refused by Flux to the principal, 
although the language used in this reply was not offensive. Flux’s reaction to the reply published 
in Jurnal de Chisinău was regarded by the Court as a form of reprisal for questioning the 
newspaper's professionalism. The Court underlined however that it does not accept the reasoning 
of the district court, namely that the allegations of serious misconduct levelled against the 
principal of the school should have first been proved in criminal proceedings. But the Court also 
made clear that the right to freedom of expression cannot be taken to confer on newspapers an 
absolute right to act in an irresponsible manner by charging individuals with criminal acts in the 
absence of a basis in fact at the material time and without offering them the possibility to counter 
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the accusations. As there are limits to the right to impart information to the public, a balance 
must be struck between that right and the rights of those injured, including the right to be 
presumed innocent of any criminal offence until proven guilty. The Court also referred to the 
unprofessional behaviour of the newspaper and the relatively modest award of damages which 
it was required to pay in the context of a civil action and finds that the solution of the domestic 
courts struck a fair balance between the competing interests involved. The Court came to the 
conclusion that the newspaper acted in flagrant disregard of the duties of responsible journalism 
and thus undermined the Convention rights of others, while the interference with the exercise of 
its right to freedom of expression was justified. On these grounds, the Court held by four votes 
to three that there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The three dissenting judges in their joint opinion made clear however that they voted without 
hesitation in favour of a finding of a violation of Article 10. They argued that in this case the 
Court attached more value to professional behaviour on behalf of journalists than to the unveiling 
of corruption. According to the dissenters, the facts show that the newspaper made enquiries 
about persistent rumours, found three witnesses whose integrity has not been questioned and 
who supported the allegations of corruption on oath. The dissenters underlined that the Court 
has penalised the newspaper not for publishing untruths, but for so-called “unprofessional 
behaviour”. The dissenting opinions expressed the fear that this judgment of the Court has 
thrown the protection of freedom of expression as far back as it possibly could, stating that “Even 
if alarming facts are sufficiently borne out by evidence, in the balancing exercise to establish 
proportionality, disregard for professional norms is deemed by Strasbourg to be more serious 
than the suppression of democratic debate on public corruption. To put it differently, in the 
Court's view the social need to fight poor journalism is more pressing than that of fighting rich 
corruption. The 'chilling effect' of sanctions against press freedom dreaded by the Court's old 
case-law has materialised through the Court's new one. (..) The serious inference of this judgment 
is that freedom of expression also ceases to exist when it is punished for pushing forward for 
public debate allegations of public criminality made by witnesses certified as credible but in a 
manner considered unprofessional. When subservience to professional good practice becomes 
more overriding than the search for truth itself it is a sad day for freedom of expression”. 
 
• Flux v. Moldova (no. 6), no. 22824/04, 29 July 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Petrina v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 1997, during a television programme that focused on the problems with access to 
administrative documents stored in the archives of the former Romanian State security services, 
C.I., a journalist with the satirical weekly ‘Caţavencu’, alleged that a politician, Liviu Petrina, had 
been active in the secret police Securitate. A few weeks later, the same journalist published an 
article reiterating his allegations. Similar allegations of collaboration by Petrina with the 
Securitate under the regime of Ceauşescu were also published by another journalist, M.D. Petrina 
lodged two sets of criminal proceedings against the journalists, C.I. and M.D., for insult and 
defamation, but both journalists were acquitted. The Romanian Courts referred to the European 
Court’s case law regarding Article 10 of the Convention, guaranteeing the right of journalists to 
report on matters of public interest and to criticise politicians, esp. as the allegations expressed 
by the journalists had been general and indeterminate. A few years later, however, a certificate 
was issued by the national research council for the archives of the State Security Department 
Securitate, stating that Petrina was not among the people listed as having collaborated with the 
Securitate. 
 
Following the acquittal of the two journalists by the Romanian Courts, Petrina complained in 
Strasbourg that his right to respect for his honour and his good name and reputation had been 
violated, relying on Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and family life). The 
Court accepted that the acquittal of the journalists could raise an issue under the positive 
obligations of the Romanian authorities to help with ensuring respect of Petrina’s privacy, 
including his good name and reputation. 
 
The European Court recognised that the discussion on the collaboration of politicians with the 
Securitate was a highly sensitive social and moral issue in the Romanian historical context. 
However, the Court found that, in spite of the satirical character of Caţavencu and in spite of the 
mediatisation of the debate, the articles in question were intended to offend Petrina, as there 
was no evidence at all that Petrina had ever belonged to the Securitate. It also found that the 
allegations were very concrete and direct, not “general and undetermined”, and were devoid of 
irony or humour. The Court did not believe that C.I. and M.D. could invoke, in this case, the right 
of journalists to exaggerate or provoke, as there was no factual basis at all for the allegations. 
The journalists’ allegations overstepped the bounds of acceptability , accusing Petrina of having 
belonged to a group that used repression and terror to serve the regime of Nikolai Ceauşescu. 
 
Accordingly, the European Court was not convinced that the reasons given by the domestic courts 
for protecting the journalists’ freedom of expression (Article 10) were sufficient to take 
precedence over Petrina’s reputation, as protected under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court 
found unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. Petrina was 
awarded 5,000 EUR in non-pecuniary, moral damages. 
 
• Petrina v. Romania, no. 78060/01, 14 October 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: case of Leroy v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2002, the French cartoonist Denis Leroy (pseudonym Guezmer) was convicted for complicity 
in condoning terrorism because of a cartoon published in a Basque weekly newspaper Ekaitza. 
On 11 September 2001, the cartoonist submitted to the magazine’s editorial team a drawing 
representing the attack on the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, with a caption which 
parodied the advertising slogan of a famous brand: “We have all dreamt of it... Hamas did it” (Cfr. 
“Sony did it”). The drawing was published in the magazine on 13 September 2001. In its next 
issue, the magazine published extracts from letters and emails received in reaction to the 
drawing. It also published a reaction of the cartoonist himself, in which he explained that when 
he made the cartoon he was not taking into account the human suffering (“la douleur humaine”) 
caused by the attacks on WTC. He emphasized that his aim was to illustrate the decline of the 
US-symbols and he also underlined that cartoonists illustrating actual events do not have much 
time for distanced reflection: “Quant un dessinateur réagit sur l’actualité, il n’a pas toujours le 
bénéfice du recul”. He also explained that his real intention was governed by political and activist 
expression, namely that of communicating his anti-Americanism through a satirical image and 
illustrating the decline of American imperialism. 
 
The public prosecutor, on request of the regional governor, brought proceedings against the 
cartoonist and the newspaper’s publishing director in application of Article 24, section 6 of the 
French Press Act of 1881, which penalizes, apart from incitement to terrorism, also condoning 
(glorifying) terrorism: “l’apologie du terrorisme”. The publishing director was convicted for 
condoning terrorism, while Mr. Leroy was convicted for complicity in condoning terrorism. Both 
were ordered to pay a fine of EUR 1,500 each, to publish the judgment at their own expense in 
Ekaitza and in two other newspapers and to pay the costs of the proceedings. The Pau Court of 
Appeal held that “by making a direct allusion to the massive attacks on Manhattan, by attributing 
these attacks to a well-known terrorist organisation and by idealising this lethal project through 
the use of the verb ‘to dream’, [thus] unequivocally praising an act of death, the cartoonist 
justifies the use of terrorism, identifies himself through his use of the first person plural (“We”) 
with this method of destruction, which is presented as the culmination of a dream and, finally, 
indirectly encourages the potential reader to evaluate positively the successful commission of a 
criminal act.” 
 
The cartoonist lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, relying on Article 
10 of the Convention guaranteeing freedom of expression. Mr. Leroy complained that the French 
courts had denied his real intention, which was governed by political and activist expression, 
namely that of communicating his anti-Americanism through a satirical image. Such an 
expression of an opinion, he argued, should be protected under Article 10 of the Convention. The 
Court considered that Mr. Leroy’s conviction amounted indeed to an interference with the 
exercise of his right to freedom of expression. It refused to apply Article 17 of the Convention 
(prohibition of abuse of rights) in this case, although the French government invoked this article 
arguing that the cartoon, by glorifying terrorism, should be considered as an act aimed at the 
destruction of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention for the protection 
of Human Rights and that, therefore, the cartoonist could not rely at all on the freedom of 
expression guaranteed by the Convention. The Court underlined that the message of the cartoon 
- the destruction of US imperialism - did not amount to a denial of the fundamental values of the 
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Convention, in contrast e.g. with incitement to racism, anti-Semitism, Holocaust negationism and 
Islamophobia. Hence, in principle the cartoon was entitled to Article 10 protection. As the 
conviction of Mr. Leroy was prescribed by French law and pursued several legitimate aims, having 
regard to the sensitive nature of the fight against terrorism, namely the maintenance of public 
safely and the prevention of disorder and crime, it especially remained to be determined whether 
the interference by the French authorities was “necessary in a democratic society”, according to 
Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. 
 
The Court noted at the outset that the tragic events of 11 September 2001, which were at the 
origin of the impugned expression, had given rise to global chaos, and that the issues raised on 
that occasion were subject to discussion as a matter of public interest. The Court however 
considered that the drawing was not limited to criticism of American imperialism, but supported 
and glorified the latter’s violent destruction. It based its finding on the caption which 
accompanied the drawing and noted that the applicant had expressed his moral support for those 
whom he presumed to be the perpetrators of the attacks of 11 September 2001. Through his 
choice of language, the applicant commented approvingly on the violence perpetrated against 
thousands of civilians and diminished the dignity of the victims, as he submitted his drawing on 
the day of the attacks and it was published on 13 September, with no precautions on his part as 
to the language used. In the Court’s opinion, this factor - the date of publication - was such as to 
increase the cartoonist’s responsibility in his account of, and even support for, a tragic event, 
whether considered from an artistic or a journalistic perspective. Also the impact of such a 
message in a politically sensitive region, namely the Basque Country, was not to be overlooked. 
According to the Court, the cartoon had provoked a certain public reaction, capable of stirring up 
violence and demonstrating a plausible impact on public order in the region. All in all, the Court 
considered that the grounds put forward by the domestic courts in convicting Mr. Leroy had been 
“relevant and sufficient”. Having regard to the modest nature of the fine and the context in which 
the impugned drawing had been published, the Court found that the measure imposed on the 
cartoonist was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Accordingly, there has not 
been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Leroy v. France, no. 36109/03, 2 October 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of TV Vest SA and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v Norway 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 11 December 2008, the European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment regarding a 
ban on political advertising on television. The crucial question the Court had to decide was 
whether a blanket ban on political advertisements on TV, as it was applied in Norway, was to be 
considered “necessary in a democratic society'” within the meaning of Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. In principle, there is little scope under Article 10 of the Convention 
for restrictions on political speech or on debate on questions of public interest. However, a ban 
on paid political advertisements on TV exists in many countries in Europe, such as the UK, 
Sweden, Denmark, France, Belgium and Norway. According to Art. 3, 1 (3) of the Norwegian 
Broadcasting Act 1992, broadcasters “cannot transmit advertisements for life philosophy or 
political opinions through television”. The Court has now decided unanimously that an 
application of this ban was in breach of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The case goes back to the application by TV Vest AS Ltd., a television company in Stavanger, on 
the west coast of Norway, and the regional branch of a Norwegian political party, Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti (the Rogaland Pensioners Party). A fine was imposed on TV Vest for broadcasting 
adverts for the Pensioners Party, in breach of the Broadcasting Act. This fine had been imposed 
by the Statens medieforvaltning (State Media Administration) and had been confirmed by the 
Høyesterett (Supreme Court), which found, inter alia , that allowing political parties and interest 
groups to advertise on television would give richer parties and groups more scope for marketing 
their opinions than their poorer counterparts. The Supreme Court also maintained that the 
Pensioners Party had many other means available to put across its message to the public. The 
Pensioners Party had argued that it was a small political party, representing only 1.3 % of the 
electorate, without powerful financial means or support from strong financial groups, that it 
seldom got any focus in editorial television broadcasting and, thus, had a real need to establish 
direct communication between itself and the electorate. The Party was never identified either in 
national or local opinion polls. 
 
The European Court said that to accept that the lack of consensus in Europe regarding the 
necessity to ban political advertisements on TV spoke in favour of granting States greater 
discretion than would normally be allowed in decisions with regard to restrictions on political 
debate. The Court however came to the conclusion that the arguments in support of the 
prohibition in Norway, such as the safeguarding of the quality of political debate, guaranteeing 
pluralism, maintaining the independence of broadcasters from political parties and preventing 
powerful financial groups from taking advantage through commercial political advertisements 
on TV were relevant, but not sufficient, reasons to justify the total prohibition of this form of 
political advertising. The Court especially noted that the Pensioners Party did not come within 
the category of parties or groups that had been the primary targets of the prohibition. In contrast 
to the major political parties, which were given a large amount of attention in the edited 
television coverage, the Pensioners Party was hardly ever mentioned on Norwegian television. 
Therefore, paid advertising on television had become the only way for the Party to get its 
message across to the public through that type of medium. 
 
The Court was not persuaded that the ban had the desired effect and it explicitly rejected the 
view expounded by the Norwegian Government that there was no viable alternative to a blanket 
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ban. In the Court's view, there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
legitimate aim pursued by the prohibition on political advertising and the means employed to 
achieve that aim. The restriction that the prohibition and the imposition of the fine entailed on 
the applicants' exercise of their freedom of expression could not therefore be regarded as having 
been necessary in a democratic society. Accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
 
• TV Vest AS and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, no. 21132/05, ECHR 2008 (extracts).  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicants, Adnan Khurshid Mustafa and his wife, Weldan Tarzibachi, are Swedish nationals 
of Iraqi origin. Relying on Article 10 (freedom to receive information) and Article 8 (right to 
respect for private and family life), they complained that they and their three children had been 
forced to move from their rented flat in Rinkeby (a suburb of Stockholm) in June 2006. The reason 
for their eviction was their refusal to remove a satellite dish in their flat after the landlord had 
initiated proceedings against them, because he considered the installation of a satellite antenna 
as a breach of the tenancy agreement that stipulated that “outdoor antennae” were not allowed 
to be set up on the house. The proceedings continued even after Mr. Khursid Mustafa and Mrs. 
Tarzibachi had dismantled the outdoor antenna and replaced it with an antenna installation in 
the kitchen on an iron stand from which an arm, on which the satellite dish was mounted, 
extended through a small open window. Eventually, the Swedish Court of Appeal found that the 
tenants had disregarded the tenancy agreement and that they should dismantle the antenna, if 
the tenancy agreement were not cancelled. The Swedish Court was of the opinion that the 
tenants were fully aware of the importance the landlord attached to the prohibition of the 
installation of satellite antennae and that, although the installation in the kitchen did not pose 
a real safety threat, their interests in keeping the antenna installation, based on their right to 
receive television programmes of their choice, could not be permitted to override the weighty 
and reasonable interest of the landlord that order and good custom be upheld. 
 
The fact that the case involved a dispute between two private parties was not seen as sufficient 
reason for the European Court to declare the application inadmissible. Indeed, the Court found 
that the applicants’ eviction was the result of a domestic court’s ruling, making the Swedish State 
responsible, within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention, for any resultant breach of Article 
10 of the Convention. The European Court observed that the satellite dish enabled the applicants 
to receive television programmes in Arabic and Farsi from their country of origin (Iraq). That 
information included political and social news and was of particular interest to them as an 
immigrant family who wished to maintain contact with the culture and language of their country 
of origin. At the time, there were no other means for the applicants to gain access to such 
programmes and the dish could not be placed anywhere else. Nor could news obtained from 
foreign newspapers and radio programmes in any way be equated with information available via 
television broadcasts. It was not shown that the landlord had installed broadband or internet 
access or other alternative means which might have given the tenants in the building the 
possibility of receiving these television programmes. Furthermore, the landlord’s concerns about 
safety had been examined by the domestic courts, who had found that the installation had been 
safe. And there were certainly no aesthetic reasons to justify the removal of the antenna, as the 
flat was located in one of Stockholm’s suburbs, in a tenement house with no particular aesthetic 
aspirations. Moreover, the applicants’ eviction, with their three children, from their home, a flat 
in which they had lived for more than six years, was disproportionate to the aim pursued, namely 
the landlord’s interest in upholding order and good custom. The Court therefore concluded that 
the interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of information had not been “necessary in 
a democratic society”: Sweden had failed in its positive obligation to protect the right of the 
applicants to receive information. The European Court held unanimously that there had been a 
violation of Article 10, while it further held unanimously that there was no need to examine the 
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complaint under Article 8. The applicants were awarded EUR 6,500 in respect of pecuniary 
damage, EUR 5,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 10,000 for costs and expenses. 
 
• Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, no. 23883/06, 16 December 2008.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Times Newspapers Ltd. (nos. 1 and 2) v. UK 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has held unanimously that there had been no violation of 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the case of Times Newspapers v. the 
UK, because the British courts’ finding that the Times Newspapers Ltd had libelled G.L. by the 
continued publication on its Internet site of two articles did not represent a disproportionate 
restriction on the newspaper’s freedom of expression. 
 
The applicant in this case, Times Newspapers Ltd, is the owner and publisher of The Times 
newspaper, registered in England. It published two articles, in September and October 1999 
respectively, reporting on a massive money-laundering scheme carried out by an alleged Russian 
mafia boss, G.L., whose name was set out in full in the original article. Both articles were uploaded 
onto The Times website on the same day as they were published in the paper version of the 
newspaper. In December 1999, G.L. brought proceedings for libel against the Times Newspapers 
Ltd, its editor and the two journalists who signed the two articles printed in the newspaper. The 
defendants did not dispute that the articles were potentially defamatory, but contended that the 
allegations were of such a kind and seriousness that they had a duty to publish the information 
and the public had a corresponding right to know. While the first libel action was underway, the 
articles remained on The Times website, where they were accessible to Internet users as part of 
the newspaper’s archive of past issues. In December 2000, G.L. brought a second action for libel 
in relation to the continuing Internet publication of the articles. Following this, the defendants 
added a notice to both articles in the Internet archive announcing that they were subject to libel 
litigation and were not to be reproduced or relied on without reference to the Times Newspapers 
Legal Department. 
 
Times Newspapers subsequently argued that only the first publication of an article posted on the 
Internet should give rise to a cause of action in defamation and not any subsequent downloads 
by Internet readers. Accordingly, Times Newspapers submitted, the second action had been 
commenced after the limitation period for bringing libel proceedings had expired. The British 
courts disagreed, holding that, in the context of the Internet, the common law rule according to 
which each publication of a defamatory statement gives rise to a separate cause of action meant 
that a new cause of action accrued every time the defamatory material was accessed (“the 
Internet publication rule”). 
 
Relying on Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention, the Times Newspapers Ltd 
complained before the Strasbourg Court that the Internet publication rule breached its freedom 
of expression by exposing them to ceaseless liability for libel. The European Court noted that 
while Internet archives were an important source for education and historical research, the press 
had a duty to act in accordance with the principles of responsible journalism, including by 
ensuring the accuracy of historical information. Further, the Court observed that limitation 
periods in libel proceedings were intended to ensure that those defending actions were able to 
defend themselves effectively and that it was, in principle, for contracting States to set 
appropriate limitation periods. The Court considered it significant that, although libel 
proceedings had been commenced in respect of the two articles in question in December 1999, 
no qualification was added to the archived copies of the articles on the Internet until December 
2000. The Court noted that the archive was managed by the applicant itself and that the domestic 
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courts had not suggested that the articles be removed from the archive altogether. Accordingly, 
the Court did not consider that the requirement to publish an appropriate qualification to the 
Internet version of the articles constituted a disproportionate interference with the right to 
freedom of expression. There was accordingly no violation of Article 10. 
 
Having regard to this conclusion, the Court did not consider it necessary to consider the broader 
chilling effect allegedly created by the Internet publication rule. It nonetheless observed that, in 
the present case, the two libel actions related to the same articles and both had been commenced 
within 15 months of the initial publication of the articles. The Times Newspaper’s ability to 
defend itself effectively was therefore not hindered by the passage of time. Accordingly, the 
problems linked to ceaseless liability did not arise. However, the Court emphasised that, while 
individuals who are defamed must have a real opportunity to defend their reputations, libel 
proceedings brought against a newspaper after too long a period might well give rise to a 
disproportionate interference with the freedom of the press under Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Times Newspapers Ltd v. the United Kingdom (nos. 1 and 2), nos. 3002/03 and 23676/03, ECHR 
2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Faccio v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has declared inadmissible the application in a case 
concerning the sealing by the authorities of a television set because a person had not paid his 
licence fee. 
 
In 1999, the applicant, Mr. Faccio, filed a request with the Radiotelevisione italiana (RAI) 
subscriptions bureau to terminate his subscription to the public television service. On 29 August 
2003, the tax police sealed his television set in a nylon bag so that it could no longer be used. 
Relying on Article 10 (freedom of expression) and Article 8 (right to respect for private and family 
life) of the European Convention on Human Rights, Mr. Faccio complained before the Court of a 
violation of his right to receive information and of his right to respect for his private and family 
life. He alleged that the act of making his television set unusable was a disproportionate measure, 
as it also prevented him from watching private channels. He further relied on Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 1 (protection of property) to the Convention. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights noted that it was not in dispute that the sealing of the 
television set had constituted interference with the applicant’s right to receive information and 
with his right to respect for his property and for his private life. It further found that the measure, 
taken under the provisions of Italian law, had pursued a legitimate aim: to dissuade individuals 
from failing to pay a tax or, in other words, to dissuade them from terminating their subscriptions 
to the public television service. The licence fee represents a tax that is used for the financing of 
the public broadcasting service. In the Court’s view, regardless of whether or not Mr. Faccio 
wished to watch programmes on public channels, the mere possession of a television set obliged 
him to pay the tax in question. Moreover, a system whereby viewers would be able to watch only 
private channels without paying the licence fee, assuming that this were technically feasible, 
would amount to depriving the tax of its very nature, since it is a contribution to a community 
service and not the price paid by an individual in return for receiving a particular channel. 
 
In view of the foregoing considerations and the reasonable amount of the tax (which, by way of 
example, amounts to EUR 107.50 for 2009), the Court concluded that the measure consisting of 
sealing the applicant’s television set in a bag was proportionate to the aim pursued by the Italian 
authorities. It thus declared the application manifestly ill-founded. 
 
• Bruno Antonio Faccio v. Italy (dec.), no. 33/04, 31 March 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of A. v. Norway 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court in a recent judgment clarified the relation of the freedom of the press (Art. 
10) vis à vis the right of privacy (Art. 8) and the presumption of innocence (Art. 6 para. 2) in a case 
of crime-reporting in the media. The applicant, A, is a Norwegian national with a criminal past. 
The case concerns A’s complaint about the unfavourable outcome of a defamation suit he brought 
against the Fœdrelandsvennen newspaper, following its publication of two articles concerning 
the preliminary investigation into a murder case which implicated him. A had been questioned 
as a possible witness about the murder of two young women, but was released after 10 hours. 
The police’s interest in A attracted considerable media attention. Fœdrelandsvennen disclosed 
details of A’s criminal convictions and stated that he had allegedly been seen by witnesses in the 
very same area and at the same time as the girls were killed. A television station, TV2, also 
reported in a news broadcast on the case and presented A as a murderer. 
 
A brought defamation proceedings against the Fœdrelandsvennen newspaper and TV2, as further 
investigation and proceedings made it clear that he had nothing to do with the murder case. The 
Norwegian courts found in his favour and awarded him compensation as regards the TV2 report. 
In respect of the newspaper articles, however, the domestic courts agreed that the publications 
had been defamatory, in as much as they were capable of giving the ordinary reader the 
impression that the applicant was regarded as the most probable perpetrator of the murders, yet 
concluded that, on balance, the newspaper had been right to publish the articles, as it had acted 
in the interest of the general public, which had the right to be informed of the developments in 
the investigation and the pursuit of the perpetrators. Relying on Article 6§2 (presumption of 
innocence) and Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), A complained in Strasbourg 
that the domestic courts’ findings - to the extent that the Fœdrelandsvennen newspaper was 
found to have a right to publish defamatory material about him - had negatively affected his right 
to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise, as well as his private life. 
 
The Court dismissed A’s allegations under Article 6 para. 2, as it found that Article not applicable 
to the matters at hand, given in particular that no public authority had charged A with a criminal 
offence and that the disputed newspaper publications did not amount to an affirmation that he 
was guilty of the crimes in question. The Court, however, was of the opinion that the articles had 
been defamatory in nature, as they had given the impression that the applicant had been a prime 
suspect in the murder case of the two girls. While it is undisputed that the press have the right 
to deliver information to the public and the public have the right to receive such information, 
these considerations did not justify the defamatory allegations against A and the consequent 
harm done to him. Indeed, the applicant had been persecuted by journalists seeking to obtain 
pictures and interviews from him, this being during a period in his life when he had been 
undergoing rehabilitation and reintegration into society. As a result of the journalistic reports, he 
found himself unable to continue his work, had to leave his home and was driven to social 
exclusion. In the Court's view there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between 
the interests relied on by the domestic courts in safeguarding Fædrelandsvennen' freedom of 
expression and those of the applicant in having his honour, reputation and privacy protected. 
The Court was therefore not satisfied that the national courts struck a fair balance between the 
newspaper's freedom of expression under Article 10 and the applicant's right to respect for his 
private life under Article 8, notwithstanding the wide margin of appreciation available to the 
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national authorities. The Court concluded that the publications in question had gravely damaged 
A’s reputation and honour and had been especially harmful to his moral and psychological 
integrity and to his private life, in violation of Article 8. 
 
• A. v. Norway, no. 28070/06, 9 April 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of TASZ v. Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In April 2009, the European Court of Human Rights delivered an important judgment in which it 
recognised the right of access to official documents. The Court made it clear that, when public 
bodies hold information that is needed for public debate, the refusal to provide documents in 
this matter to those who are requesting access, is a violation of the right to freedom of expression 
and information guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention. The case concerns a request by 
the Társaság a Szabadságjogokért (Hungarian Civil Liberties Union - TASZ) to Hungary’s 
Constitutional Court to disclose a parliamentarian's complaint questioning the legality of new 
criminal legislation concerning drug-related offences. The Constitutional Court refused to release 
the information. As the Court found that the applicant was involved in the legitimate gathering 
of information on a matter of public importance and that the Constitutional Court's monopoly of 
information amounted to a form of censorship, it concluded that the interference with the 
applicant's rights was a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The European Court’s judgment refers to the “censorial power of an information monopoly”, when 
public bodies refuse to release information needed by the media or civil society organisations to 
perform their “watchdog” function. The Court refers to its consistent case law, in which it has 
recognised that the public has a right to receive information of general interest and that the most 
careful scrutiny on the part of the Court is called for when the measures taken by the national 
authority are capable of discouraging the participation of the press, one of society's “watchdogs”, 
in the public debate on matters of legitimate public concern, including measures which merely 
make access to information more cumbersome. It is also underlined that the law cannot allow 
arbitrary restrictions, which may become a form of indirect censorship should the authorities 
create obstacles to the gathering of information, this by itself being an essential preparatory step 
in journalism and inherently a protected part of press freedom. The Court emphasised once more 
that the function of the press, including the creation of forums of public debate, is not limited to 
the media or professional journalists. Indeed, in the present case, the preparation of the forum 
of public debate was conducted by a non-governmental organisation. The Court recognises the 
important contribution of civil society to the discussion of public affairs and categorised the 
applicant association, which is involved in human rights litigation, as a social “watchdog”. The 
Court is of the opinion that, in these circumstances, the applicant’s activities warrant similar 
Convention protection to that afforded to the press. Furthermore, given that the applicant's 
intention was to impart to the public the information gathered from the constitutional complaint 
in question, and thereby to contribute to the public debate concerning legislation on drug-related 
offences, its right to impart information was clearly impaired. 
 
It should be emphasised that the European Court’s judgment is obviously a further step in the 
direction of the recognition by the Court of a right of access to public documents under Article 
10 of the Convention, although the Court is still reluctant to affirm this explicitly. The Court 
recalls that “Article 10 does not (..) confer on the individual a right of access to a register 
containing information on his personal position, nor does it embody an obligation on the 
Government to impart such information to the individual” and that “it is difficult to derive from 
the Convention a general right of access to administrative data and documents”. But the 
judgment also states that “the Court has recently advanced towards a broader interpretation of 
the notion of “freedom to receive information” (..) and thereby towards the recognition of a right 
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of access to information”, referring to its decision in the case of Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky v. Czech 
Republic (ECHR 10 July 2006, Appl. No. 19101/03). The Court notes that “the right to freedom to 
receive information basically prohibits a Government from restricting a person from receiving 
information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him”. In this case, the information 
sought by the applicant was ready and available and did not require the collection of any data 
by the Government. Therefore, the Court considers that the State had an obligation not to impede 
the flow of information sought by the applicant. 
 
• Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, no. 37374/05, 14 April 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Kenedi v. Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In May 2009, the Court confirmed once more the applicability of the right to freedom of 
expression and information guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention to matters of access 
to official documents. The case concerns the attempt by a historian, Mr. János Kenedi, to have 
access to certain documents deposited at the Ministry of the Interior regarding the functioning 
of the State Security Services in Hungary in the 1960s. Mr Kenedi, who had previously published 
several books on the functioning of secret services in totalitarian regimes, complained to the 
European Court about the Hungarian authorities’ protracted reluctance to enforce a court order 
granting him unrestricted access to these documents. For several years Kenedi tried to get access 
to the relevant information from the Ministry, but to no avail. After continued refusals, he 
obtained domestic court orders to enforce access. The Ministry, however, continued to obstruct 
him, for example by requiring that Kenedi sign a declaration of confidentiality. Kenedi refused, 
among other reasons because the Court order had not mentioned confidentiality as a 
requirement. At the time of the proceedings in Strasbourg, Kenedi still had not been granted 
access to all the documents he had requested. 
 
The European Court held unanimously that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a 
fair hearing) of the European Convention on Human Rights, on account of the excessive length 
of the proceedings - over ten years - that Mr Kenedi had launched so as to gain and enforce his 
access to documents concerning the Hungarian secret services. Article 10 (freedom of expression 
and information) was also violated in the Court's view. It reiterated that "access to original 
documentary sources for legitimate historical research was an essential element of the exercise 
of the applicant's right to freedom of expression". The Court noted that Mr Kenedi had obtained 
a court judgment granting him access to the documents in question, while the domestic courts 
had repeatedly found in his favour in the ensuing enforcement proceedings. The administrative 
authorities had persistently resisted their obligation to comply with the domestic judgment, thus 
hindering Mr Kenedi’s access to documents he needed to write his study. The Court concluded 
that the authorities had acted arbitrarily and in defiance of domestic law. Their obstructive 
actions had also led to the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Court 
held, therefore, that the authorities had misused their powers by delaying Mr Kenedi in the 
exercise of his right to freedom of expression, in violation of Article 10. 
 
Finally, Article 13 ECHR (effective remedy) had also been violated, since the Hungarian system 
did not provide for an effective way of remedying the violation of Mr Kenedi’s freedom of 
expression in this situation. The Court found that the procedure available in Hungary at the time 
and designed to remedy the violation of Mr Kenedi’s Article 10 rights had proven ineffective. 
There had, therefore, been a violation of Article 13, in conjunction with Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
Again, the Court does not formulate a general right of access to (official) documents. The Court 
is however of the opinion that the granting of access was necessary for the applicant to 
accomplish the publication of a historical study. The Court noted that the intended publication 
fell within the applicant’s freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Kenedi v. Hungary, no. 31475/05, 26 May 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Féret v. Belgium 
 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In an interesting but highly controversial judgment, the European Court focused on the limits of 
freedom of expression in a case of incitement to hatred and discrimination (“hate speech”). The 
Court held by four votes to three that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights in respect of the conviction of the chairman of the Belgian political 
party “Front National”, Mr. Daniel Féret. Mr. Féret was convicted by a Belgian criminal court for 
publicly inciting to racism, hatred and discrimination, following complaints concerning leaflets 
distributed by the Front National during election campaigns. 
 
Between July 1999 and October 2001, the distribution of leaflets and posters by the Front 
National led to complaints by individuals and associations for incitement to hatred, 
discrimination and violence, filed under the law of 30 July 1981, which penalised certain acts and 
expressions inspired by racism or xenophobia. Mr. Féret was the editor in chief of the party’s 
publications and was a member of the Belgian House of Representatives at the time. His 
parliamentary immunity however was waived at the request of the Public Prosecutor and in 
November 2002 criminal proceedings were brought against Féret as author and editor-in-chief 
of the offending leaflets, which were also distributed on the Internet on the website of Féret and 
Front National. 
 
In 2006, the Brussels Court of Appeal found that the offending conduct on the part of Mr. Féret 
had not fallen within his parliamentary activity and that the leaflets contained passages that 
represented a clear and deliberate incitement to discrimination, segregation or hatred, for 
reasons of race, colour or national or ethnic origin. The court sentenced Mr. Féret to 250 hours 
of community service related to the integration of immigrants, commutable to a 10-month prison 
sentence. It declared him ineligible to stand for parliament for ten years and ordered him to pay 
EUR 1 to each of the civil parties. 
 
Relying on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Féret applied to the 
European Court of Human Rights alleging that the conviction for the content of his political 
party’s leaflets represented an excessive restriction on his right to freedom of expression. The 
European Court however disagreed with this assumption, as it considered that the sanction by 
the Belgian authorities was prescribed by law sufficiently precisely and was necessary in a 
democratic society for the protection of public order and for the protection of the reputation and 
the rights of others, thereby meeting the requirements of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. The 
European Court observed that the leaflets presented immigrant communities as criminally-
minded and keen to exploit the benefits they derived from living in Belgium and that they also 
sought to make fun of the immigrants concerned, with the inevitable risk of arousing, particularly 
among less knowledgeable members of the public, feelings of distrust, rejection or even hatred 
towards foreigners. Although the Court recognised that freedom of expression is especially 
important for elected representatives of the people, it reiterated that it was crucial for politicians, 
when expressing themselves in public, to avoid comments that might foster intolerance. The 
impact of racist and xenophobic discourse was magnified by the electoral context, in which 
arguments naturally become more forceful. To recommend solutions to immigration-related 
problems by advocating racial discrimination was likely to cause social tension and undermine 
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trust in democratic institutions. In the present case there had been a compelling social need to 
protect the rights of the immigrant community, as the Belgian courts had done. With regard to 
the penalty imposed on Mr. Féret, the European Court noted that the Belgian authorities had 
preferred a 10-year period of ineligibility to stand for parliament rather than a penal sanction, in 
accordance with the Court’s principle of restraint in criminal proceedings. The Court thus found 
that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court furthermore found 
that Article 17 of the Convention (abuse clause) was not applicable in this case. Three dissenting 
judges disagreed with the findings of the Court on the non-violation of Article 10, arguing that 
the leaflets were in essence part of a sharp political debate during election time. The dissenting 
judges expressed the opinion that the leaflets did not incite to violence nor to any concrete 
discriminatory act and that criminal convictions in the domain of freedom of political debate and 
hate speech should only be considered as necessary in a democratic society in cases of direct 
incitement to violence or discriminatory acts. They argued that the reference to a potential 
impact of the leaflets in terms of incitement to discrimination or hatred does not sufficiently 
justify an interference with freedom of expression. The dissenting judges also emphasised the 
disproportionate character of the sanction of 250 hours of community service or a 10-month 
suspended prison sentence, together with the Belgian Court’s decision declaring Mr. Féret’s 
ineligibility to stand for parliament for a period of ten years. The majority of the European Court 
however could not be persuaded by the dissenting judges’ arguments: the four judges of the 
majority were of the opinion that the Belgian authorities acted within the scope of the justified 
limitations restricting freedom of political expression, as the litigious leaflets contained, in the 
eyes if the Court, incitement to hatred and discrimination based on nationality or ethnic origin. 
 
• Féret v. Belgium, no. 15615/07, 16 July 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In one of its recent judgments the European Court of Human Rights found that the freedom of 
expression of a journalist employed by the Polish public television broadcaster (Telewizja Polska 
Spółka Akcjna, TVP) had been unduly restricted. The journalist, Helena Wojtas-Kaleta, received a 
disciplinary sanction after criticising in public the direction the TVP had taken. This sanction, and 
its confirmation by the Polish courts, was found to constitute a violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention for Human Rights. 
 
In 1999 the national newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza published an article reporting that two classical 
music programmes had been taken off the air by TVP. The article quoted an opinion expressed 
by Ms Wojtas-Kaleta in her capacity as the President of the Polish Public Television Journalists’ 
Union, in which she criticised this decision of the director of TVP. In addition, Ms Wojtas-Kaleta 
signed an open letter in protest at the above measure. The letter was addressed to the Board of 
TVP and stated among other things that, while classical music is the heritage of the nation, its 
continuous dissemination was seriously jeopardised by reducing its time on the air and by instead 
polluting air time with violence and pseudo-musical kitsch. Ms Wojtas-Kaleta was reprimanded 
in writing by her employer for failing to observe the company’s regulations, which required her 
to protect her employer’s good name. Following an unsuccessful objection to the reprimand, she 
brought a claim against TVP before the district court, requesting the withdrawal of the reprimand. 
However, first the district court and subsequently the court of appeal dismissed her claim and 
found that Ms Wojtas-Kaleta had behaved in an unlawful manner and that this was a necessary 
and sufficient prerequisite for the disciplinary measure imposed on her. The courts found that 
she had acted to the detriment of her employer by breaching her obligation of loyalty and, 
consequently, the employer had been entitled to impose the reprimand. 
 
Ms Wojtas-Kaleta complained in Strasbourg that the Polish judicial authorities had violated her 
freedom of expression by taking into account merely her obligations as an employee, while 
disregarding her right as a journalist to comment on matters of public interest. The Court 
considered that, where a State has decided to create a public broadcasting system, the domestic 
law and practice have to guarantee that the system provides a pluralistic audiovisual service. The 
Polish public television company had been entrusted with a special mission including, among 
other things, assisting the development of culture, with emphasis on the national intellectual 
and artistic achievements. In her comments and open letter Ms Wojtas-Kaleta had essentially 
referred to widely-shared concerns of public interest about the declining quality of music 
programmes on public television, while her statements had relied on a sufficient factual basis 
and, at the same time, amounted to value judgments which were not susceptible to proof. The 
Court further noted that Ms Wojtas-Kaleta had to enjoy freedom of expression in all her 
capacities: as an employee of a public television company, as a journalist or as a trade union 
leader. The Court observed that the Polish courts took no note of her argument that she had been 
acting in the public interest. They limited their analysis to a finding that her comments amounted 
to acting to the employer's detriment. As a result, they did not examine whether or how the 
subject matter of Ms Wojtas-Kaleta’s comments and the context in which they had been made 
could have affected the permissible scope of her freedom of expression. Such an approach is not 
compatible with Convention standards. The Court noted that the tone of the impugned 
statements was measured and that she did not make any personal accusations against named 
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members of the management. Finally, the journalist’s good faith had never been challenged 
either by her employer or by the domestic authorities involved in the proceedings. Being mindful 
of the importance of the right to freedom of expression on matters of general interest, Ms Wojtas-
Kaleta’s professional obligations and responsibilities as a journalist, and of the duties and 
responsibilities of employees towards their employers, as well as having weighed up the other 
different interests involved in the present case, the Court came to the conclusion that the 
interference with her right to freedom of expression was not “necessary in a democratic society”. 
Accordingly, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland, no. 20436/02, 16 July 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Manole a.o. v Moldova 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights found that from February 2001 until September 2006 the 
Moldovan authorities violated freedom of expression by not sufficiently guaranteeing the 
independence of Teleradio-Moldova (TRM), the State-owned broadcasting company, which 
became a public broadcasting company in 2002. Nine journalists, editors and producers, who 
were all employed by TRM during that period, complained that the public broadcasting company 
was subjected to political control by the government and the ruling political party, with a lack of 
guarantees of pluralism in its editorial policy and news and information programmes. Relying on 
Article 10 of the European Convention, they complained that as journalists at TRM they were 
subjected to a censorship regime. They also claimed that the political control over news and 
political information worsened after February 2001, when the Communist Party won a large 
majority in Parliament: senior TRM management was replaced by those who were loyal to the 
Government, only a trusted group of journalists were used for reports of a political nature, which 
where then edited to present the ruling party in a favourable light, other journalists were 
reprimanded, interviews were cut and programmes were taken off the air, while opposition 
parties were allowed only very limited opportunities to express their views. After a strike by TRM 
journalists protesting against the government’s media policy and control over TRM, a large 
number of journalists were not retained in their posts during a structural reorganisation of TRM. 
The journalists claimed that they were dismissed for political reasons and appealed the decision 
in court. They were unsuccessful, however. In the meantime, a number of reports by international 
organisations and non-governmental organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and 
the Moldovan Centre for Independent Journalism (IJC), affirmed that domestic law in Moldova did 
not sufficiently guarantee the independence of editorial policy at TRM and that the political 
parties of the opposition were not adequately represented in TRM news and information 
programmes. The nine journalists lodged an application with the European Court in March 2002, 
arguing that their right to freedom of expression had been violated, due to the censorship regime 
imposed on them. They also claimed that the Moldovan State had not discharged its positive 
obligations under Article 10, because it had failed to enact legislation which would offer 
safeguards against abusive interferences by public authorities. 
 
In its judgment, the European Court took as the starting point of its reasoning the fundamental 
truism that there can be no democracy without pluralism. A situation whereby a powerful 
economic or political group in a society is permitted to obtain a position of dominance over the 
audiovisual media and thereby exercise pressure on broadcasters and eventually curtail their 
editorial freedom undermines the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic 
society, as enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention, in particular where it serves to impart 
information and ideas of general interest, which the public is moreover entitled to receive. The 
Court further observed that it is the State itself that must be the ultimate guarantor of pluralism 
and that the State has a duty to ensure that the public has access through television and radio 
to impartial and accurate information and a range of opinions and comments, reflecting the 
diversity of political outlook within the country. Journalists and other professionals working in 
the audiovisual media should not be prevented from imparting this information and commentary. 
Furthermore, it is indispensable for the proper functioning of democracy that a (dominant) public 
broadcaster transmits impartial, independent and balanced news, information and comment and, 
in addition, provides a forum for public discussion in which as broad a spectrum as possible of 
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views and opinions can be expressed. The Court concluded, on the basis of the evidence and 
reports by the Council of Europe, the OSCE and IJC, that there was a significant bias towards 
reporting on the activities of the President and the Government in TRM’s television news and 
other programming and that this policy by TRM had indeed affected the applicants as journalists, 
editors and producers at TRM. The Court also found that domestic law from February 2001 
onwards did not provide any guarantee of political balance in the composition of TRM’s senior 
management and supervisory body nor any safeguard against interference from the ruling 
political party in the bodies’ decision-making and functioning. Also, after 2002, there was no 
safeguard to prevent 14 of the 15 members of the Observers’ Council being appointees loyal to 
the ruling party, despite the fact that this Council was precisely responsible for appointing TRM’s 
senior management and monitoring its programmes for accuracy and objectivity. In the light, in 
particular, of the virtual monopoly enjoyed by TRM over audiovisual broadcasting in Moldova, 
the Court found that the Moldovan State authorities failed to comply with their positive 
obligation. The legislative framework throughout the period in question was flawed: it did not 
provide sufficient safeguards against the control of TRM's senior management, and thus its 
editorial policy, by the political organ of the Government. As Moldovan law did not provide any 
mechanism or effective domestic remedy to challenge at the national level the administrative 
practice of censorship and political control over TRM, the Court also rejected the Moldovan 
Government’s objection that the applicants had not exhausted the remedies available to them 
under national law, as required by Article 35 para. 1 of the Convention. On that basis, the Court 
found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Manole and Others v. Moldova, no. 13936/02, ECHR 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Verein Gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
After two earlier judgments by the European Court of Human Rights, the Grand Chamber of the 
Court again held that there has been a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights on account of the continued prohibition on broadcasting 
on Swiss Television a commercial by an animal rights association. In response to various 
advertisements produced by the meat industry, Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) made a 
television commercial expressing criticism of battery pig-farming, including a scene showing a 
noisy hall with pigs in small pens. The advertisement concluded with the exhortation: “Eat less 
meat, for the sake of your health, the animals and the environment!” Permission to broadcast the 
commercial was refused on 24 January 1994 by the Commercial Television Company and at final 
instance by the Federal Court, which dismissed an administrative law appeal by VgT on 20 August 
1997. The commercial was considered to be political advertising, prohibited under the Swiss 
Broadcasting Act. VgT lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, which in 
a judgment of 28 June 2001 (see IRIS 2001-7: 2) held that the Swiss authorities’ refusal to 
broadcast the commercial in question was a breach of freedom of expression. According to the 
European Court, VgT had simply intended to participate in an ongoing general debate on the 
protection and rearing of animals and the Swiss authorities had not demonstrated in a relevant 
and sufficient manner why the grounds generally advanced in support of the prohibition on 
political advertising could also serve to justify interference in the particular circumstances of the 
case. The Court found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention and awarded VgT CHF 20,000 
(approximately EUR 13,300 at the time) in costs and expenses. 
 
On 1 December 2001, on the basis of the European Court’s judgment, VgT applied to the Swiss 
Federal Court for a review of the final domestic judgment prohibiting the commercial from being 
broadcast. In a judgment of 29 April 2002 the Federal Court however dismissed the application, 
holding among other things that VgT had not demonstrated that there was still any purpose in 
broadcasting the commercial. As the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which is 
responsible for supervising the execution of the European Court’s judgments, had not been 
informed that the Federal Court had dismissed VgT’s application for a review, it adopted a final 
resolution regarding the case in July 2003, referring to the possibility of applying to the Federal 
Court to reopen the proceedings. 
 
In July 2002, VgT lodged an application with the European Court concerning the Federal Court’s 
refusal of its request to reopen the proceedings and the continued prohibition on broadcasting 
its television commercial. In a Chamber judgment of 4 October 2007, the European Court held by 
five votes to two that there had been a violation of Article 10. On 31 March 2008, the panel of 
the Grand Chamber accepted a request by the Swiss Government for the case to be referred to 
the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Convention. The Swiss government argued inter alia 
that the application by VgT was inadmissible, as it concerned a subject - execution of the Court’s 
judgments - which, by virtue of Article 46, fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Committee 
of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Grand Chamber of the European Court reiterated that 
the findings of the European Court of a violation were essentially declaratory and that it was the 
Committee of Ministers’ task to supervise execution. The Committee of Ministers’ role in that 
sphere did not mean, however, that measures taken by a respondent State to remedy a violation 
found by the Court could not raise a new issue and thus form the subject of a new application. In 
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the present case, the Federal Court’s judgment of 29 April 2002 refusing to reopen the 
proceedings had been based on new grounds and therefore constituted new information of which 
the Committee of Ministers had not been informed and which would escape all scrutiny under 
the Convention if the Court were unable to examine it. Accordingly, the Government’s preliminary 
objection on that account was dismissed. 
 
On the merits of the case, the Court firstly noted that the refusal of VgT’s application to reopen 
the proceedings following the Court’s judgment of 28 June 2001 constituted fresh interference 
with the exercise of its rights under Article 10 para. 1. The Court emphasized that freedom of 
expression is one of the preconditions for a functioning democracy and that genuine, effective 
exercise of this freedom does not depend merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but could 
also require positive measures. In the present case, Switzerland had been under an obligation to 
execute the Court’s judgment of 28 June 2001 in good faith, abiding by both its conclusions and 
its spirit. In view of this, the reopening of domestic proceedings had admittedly been a significant 
means of ensuring the full and proper execution of the Court’s judgment, but could certainly not 
be seen as an end in itself, especially since the Federal Court dismissed the application of VgT 
on overly formalistic grounds. Moreover, by deciding that VgT had not sufficiently shown that it 
still had an interest in broadcasting the commercial, the Federal Court did not offer an 
explanation of how the public debate on battery farming had changed or become less topical 
since 1994, when the commercial was initially meant to have been broadcast. Nor did it show 
that after the European Court's judgment of 28 June 2001 the circumstances had changed to such 
an extent as to cast doubt on the validity of the grounds on which the Court had found a violation 
of Article 10. The European Court also rejected the argument that VgT had alternative options 
for broadcasting the commercial in issue, for example via private and regional channels, since 
that would require third parties, or VgT itself, to assume a responsibility that falls to the national 
authorities alone: that of taking appropriate action on a judgment of the European Court. Finally 
the argument that the broadcasting of the commercial might be seen as unpleasant, in particular 
by consumers or meat traders and producers, could not justify its continued prohibition, as 
freedom of expression is also applicable to “information” or “ideas” that offend, shock or disturb. 
Such are indeed the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, without which there 
is no “democratic society”. In the absence of any new grounds that could justify continuing the 
prohibition from the standpoint of Article 10, the Swiss authorities had been under an obligation 
to authorise the broadcasting of the commercial, without taking the place of VgT in judging 
whether the debate in question was still a matter of public interest. The Court therefore held by 
11 votes to six that there had been a violation of Article 10. Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) 
of the Convention the Court awarded VgT EUR 4,000 in costs and expenses. 
 
• Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, ECHR 2009.  
 
IRIS 2009-10/2 
Back to overview of case-law 
230 
European Court of Human Rights: Case of Pasko v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention in the 
highly controversial case of Pasko v. Russia. The case concerns Grigoriy Pasko, a Russian national 
who at the time of the events was a naval officer and worked as a military journalist on the 
Russian Pacific Fleet’s Newspaper “Boyevaya Vakhta”. Mr Pasko had been reporting on problems 
of environmental pollution, accidents with nuclear submarines, transport of military nuclear 
waste and other issues related to the activities of the Russian Pacific Fleet. Mr Pasko had also 
been in contact on a free-lance basis with a Japanese TV station and a newspaper and had 
supplied them with openly available information and video footage. These contacts with 
Japanese journalists and a Japanese TV station and newspaper were pursued by Mr Pasko of his 
own volition and were not reported to his superiors. 
 
In November 1997, Mr Pasko was searched at the Vladivostok airport before flying to Japan. A 
number of his papers were confiscated with the explanation that they contained classified 
information. He was arrested upon his return from Japan and charged with treason through 
espionage for having collected secret information with the intention of transferring it to a foreign 
national. Mr Pasko was sentenced in December 2001 to four years’ imprisonment by the Pacific 
Military Fleet Court, as he was found guilty of treason through espionage for having collected 
secret and classified information containing actual names of highly critical and secure military 
formations and units, with the intention of transferring this information to a foreign national. He 
was released on parole in January 2003. 
 
Relying on Articles 7 (no punishment without law) and 10 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, Mr Pasko complained that the Russian authorities had applied criminal legislation 
retrospectively and had subjected him to an overly broad and politically motivated criminal 
persecution as a reprisal for his critical publications. The Court considered that the essence of 
the case was the alleged violation of Article 10, since Mr Pasko’s complaints under Article 7 
concerned the same facts as those related to Article 10. The Court therefore decided to examine 
the complaints under Article 10 only. 
 
After having accepted that the Russian authorities acted on a proper legal basis, the Court 
observed that, as a serving military officer, the applicant had been bound by an obligation of 
discretion in relation to anything concerned with the performance of his duties. The domestic 
courts had carefully scrutinised each of his arguments. The courts had found that he had collected 
and kept, with the intention of transferring to a foreign national, information of a military nature 
that had been classified as a State secret and which had been capable of causing considerable 
damage to national security. Finally, the applicant had been convicted of treason through 
espionage as a serving military officer and not as a journalist. According to the European Court, 
there was nothing in the materials of the case to support the applicant’s allegations that his 
conviction had been overly broad or politically motivated or that he had been sanctioned for any 
of his publications. The Court found that the domestic courts had struck the right balance of 
proportionality between the aim of protecting national security and the means used to achieve 
that purpose, namely the sentencing of the applicant to a “lenient sentence”, much less severe 
than the minimum stipulated in law. Accordingly, the Court held by six votes to one that there 
had not been a violation of Article 10. 
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• Pasko v. Russia, no. 69519/01, 22 October 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Ürper a.o. v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The Court’s judgment in the case of Ürper a.o. v. Turkey firmly condemns the bans on the future 
publication of four newspapers. At the material time the applicants were the owners, executive 
directors, editors-in-chief, news directors and journalists of four daily newspapers published in 
Turkey: Ülkede Özgür Gündem, Gündem, Güncel and Gerçek Demokrasi. The publication of all 
four newspapers was suspended, pursuant to section 6(5) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law 
no. 3713) by various Chambers of the Istanbul Assize Court, between 16 November 2006 and 25 
October 2007, for periods ranging from 15 days to a month in response to various news reports 
and articles. The impugned publications were deemed to publish propaganda in favour of a 
terrorist organisation, the PKK/KONGRA-GEL, as well as to express approval of crimes committed 
by that organisation and its members. 
 
The applicants alleged, under Article 10 of the Convention, that the suspension of the publication 
and distribution of their newspapers constituted an unjustified interference with their freedom 
of expression. The European Court reiterates that Article 10 of the Convention does not, in its 
terms, prohibit the imposition of prior restraints on publication. However, the dangers inherent 
in prior restraints are such that they call for the most careful scrutiny. This is especially true as 
far as the press is concerned, for news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, 
even for a short period of time, may well deprive it of all its value and interest. As freedom of the 
press was at stake in the present case, the national authorities had only a limited margin of 
appreciation to decide whether there was a “pressing social need” to take the measures in 
question. The Court was of the opinion that, as opposed to earlier cases that have been brought 
before it, the restraints under scrutiny were not imposed on particular types of news reports or 
articles, but on the future publication of entire newspapers, whose content was unknown at the 
time of the national court's decisions. In the Court's view, both the content of section 6(5) of Law 
no. 3713 and the judges' decisions in the instant case stem from the hypothesis that the 
applicants, whose “guilt” was established without trial in proceedings from which they were 
excluded, would re-commit the same kind of offences in the future. The Court found, therefore, 
that the preventive effect of the suspension orders entailed implicit sanctions on the applicants 
to dissuade them from publishing similar articles or news reports in the future and to hinder their 
professional activities. The Court considered that less draconian measures could have been 
envisaged, such as the confiscation of particular issues of the newspapers or restrictions on the 
publication of specific articles. The Court concluded that by suspending the publication and 
distribution of the four newspapers involved, albeit for short periods, the domestic courts largely 
overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them and unjustifiably restricted the 
essential role of the press as a public watchdog in a democratic society. The practice of banning 
the future publication of entire periodicals on the basis of section 6(5) of Law no. 3713 went 
beyond any notion of a “necessary” restraint in a democratic society and, instead, amounted to 
censorship. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Ürper and Others v. Turkey, nos. 14526/07, 14747/07, 15022/07, 15737/07, 36137/07, 
47245/07, 50371/07, 50372/07 and 54637/07, 20 October 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Financial Times a.o. v. UK 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Eight years ago the British courts decided in favour of a disclosure order in the case of Interbrew 
SA v. Financial Times and others. The case concerned an order against four newspapers (FT, The 
Times, The Guardian and The Independent) and the news agency Reuters to deliver up their 
original copies of a leaked and (apparently) partially forged document about a contemplated 
takeover by Interbrew (now: Anheuser Bush InBev NV) of SAB (South African Breweries). In a 
judgment of 15 December 2009, the European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) came to 
the conclusion that this disclosure order constituted a violation of the right of freedom of 
expression and information, which includes press freedom and the right of protection of 
journalistic sources, as protected by Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
 
On the basis of a leaked report by a person X and further investigations by journalists, the British 
media in November and December 2001 reported that Interbrew (now: Anheuser Bush InBev NV) 
had been plotting a bid for SAB. The media coverage had a clear impact on the market on shares 
of Interbrew and SAB, with Interbrew’s share price decreasing, while both the share price and the 
volume of SAB’s shares traded obviously increased. At the request of Interbrew, the High Court 
on 19 December 2001 ordered delivery up of the documents under the so-called Norwich 
Pharmacal principle. This principle implies that if a person through no fault of his own becomes 
involved in the wrongdoing of others so as to facilitate that wrongdoing, he comes under a duty 
to assist the person who has been wronged by giving him full information and disclosing the 
identity of the wrongdoer. The four newspapers and the news agency were ordered not to alter, 
deface, dispose or otherwise deal with the documents received by person X and to deliver up the 
documents to Interbrew’s solicitor within 24 hours. The newspapers and Reuters appealed, but 
the disclosure order was confirmed by the Court of Appeal. In the London Court’s judgment it 
was emphasised that what mattered critically in this case was the source’s purpose: “It was on 
any way a maleficent one, calculated to do harm whether for profit or for spite, and whether to 
the investing public or Interbrew or both.” The public interest in protecting the source of such a 
leak was considered not sufficient to withstand the countervailing public interest in letting 
Interbrew seek justice in the courts against the source. It was also underlined that there is “no 
public interest in the dissemination of falsehood”, as the judge had found that the document, 
leaked by person X to the media, was partially forged. The Court of Appeal said: “While 
newspapers cannot be asked to guarantee the veracity of everything they report, they in turn 
have to accept that the public interest in protecting the identity of the source of what they have 
been told is disinformation may not be great.” Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed the 
appeals. On 9 July 2002, the House of Lords refused the newspapers leave to appeal, following 
which Interbrew required that the newspapers and Reuters comply with the court order for 
delivery up of the documents. The newspapers and Reuters however continued to refuse to 
comply and applied to the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that their rights under 
Article 10 of the Convention had been violated. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights came to the conclusion that the British judicial authorities 
in the Interbrew case did indeed neglect the interests related to the protection of journalistic 
sources, by overemphasising the interests and arguments in favour of source disclosure. The 
Court accepted that the disclosure order in the Interbrew case was prescribed by law (Norwich 
Pharmacal and Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981) and was intended to protect the 
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rights of others and to prevent the disclosure of information received in confidence, both of which 
are legitimate aims. The Court however did not consider the disclosure order to be necessary in 
a democratic society. First, the Court in general terms reiterated that freedom of expression 
constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and that, in that context, the 
safeguards guaranteed to the press are particularly important: “protection of journalistic sources 
is one of the basic conditions for press freedom. Without such protection, sources may be deterred 
from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result, the vital 
“public watchdog” role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide 
accurate and reliable reporting may be adversely affected” (§59). Disclosure orders in relation to 
journalistic sources have a detrimental impact not only on the source in question, whose identity 
may be revealed, but also on the newspaper against which the order is directed, whose reputation 
may be negatively affected in the eyes of future potential sources by the disclosure, and on the 
members of the public, who have an interest in receiving information imparted through 
anonymous sources and who are also potential sources themselves. The Court accepted that it 
may be true that the public perception of the principle of non-disclosure of sources would suffer 
no real damage when overridden in circumstances where it is clear that a source was acting in 
bad faith with a harmful purpose and disclosed intentionally falsified information. The Court 
made clear however that domestic courts should be slow to assume, in the absence of compelling 
evidence, that these factors are present in any particular case. The Court emphasised most 
importantly that “the conduct of the source can never be decisive in determining whether a 
disclosure order ought to be made but will merely operate as one, albeit important, factor to be 
taken into consideration in carrying out the balancing exercise required under Article 10 §2” 
(§63). 
 
Applying these principles to the Interbrew case. the European Court of Human Rights came to 
the conclusion that the British Courts had given too much weight to the alleged bogus character 
of the leaked document and to the assumption that the source had acted mala fide. While the 
Court considered that there may be circumstances in which the source's harmful purpose would 
in itself constitute a relevant and sufficient reason to make a disclosure order, the legal 
proceedings against the four newspapers and Reuters did not allow X's purpose to be ascertained 
with the necessary degree of certainty. The Court therefore did not place significant weight on 
X's alleged purpose in the present case, but did clearly emphasise the public interest in the 
protection of journalistic sources. The Court accordingly found that Interbrew's interests in 
eliminating, by proceedings against X, the threat of damage through future dissemination of 
confidential information and in obtaining damages for past breaches of confidence were, even if 
considered cumulatively, insufficient to outweigh the public interest in the protection of 
journalists' sources. The judicial order to deliver up the report at issue was considered to 
constitute a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The European Court was unanimous in its 
judgment, although it took the Court seven years to come to its conclusion. 
 
• Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 821/03, 15 December 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Laranjeira Marques da Silva v. Portugal 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In one of its first judgments of 2010 the European Court of Human Rights has clarified how court 
and crime reporting can rely on the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Convicting a journalist or a publisher for breach of the secrecy of a criminal investigation or 
because of defamation of a politician can only be justified when it is necessary in a democratic 
society and under very strict conditions. 
 
The applicant in this case, Mr Laranjeira Marques da Silva, was the editor of the regional weekly 
newspaper Notícias de Leiria at the relevant time. In 2000 he wrote two articles about criminal 
proceedings brought against J., a doctor and politician well-known in the region, for the sexual 
assault of a patient. In an editor’s note he called upon readers to supply further testimonies 
relating to other possible incidents of a similar nature involving J. A short time later Mr Laranjeira 
Marques da Silva was charged with a breach of the segredo de justiça, a concept similar to 
confidentiality of judicial investigation, and with the defamation of J. The Leiria District Court 
held in 2004 that Mr Laranjeira Marques da Silva had overstepped his responsibilities as a 
journalist and had aroused widespread suspicion of J. by insinuating, without justification, that 
the latter had committed similar acts involving other victims. He was found guilty of a breach of 
the segredo de justiça and of defamation. He was sentenced to a daily fine payable within 500 
days and ordered to pay EUR 5,000 in damages to J. On appeal, the applicant challenged his 
conviction concerning the segredo de justiça on the ground that he had obtained access to the 
information in question lawfully. On the defamation issue, he argued that he had simply 
exercised his right to freedom of expression and that his articles had been based on fact and, 
moreover, were related to a subject of general interest. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal 
in 2005. A constitutional appeal and later an extraordinary appeal seeking harmonisation of the 
case law with the Supreme Court were also unsuccessful. In Strasbourg, Mr. Laranjeira Marques 
da Silva complained essentially that his conviction had infringed his right to freedom of 
expression. 
 
As to the applicant’s conviction for breach of the segredo de justiça, the European Court was of 
the opinion that the Portuguese authorities’ interference with his freedom of expression had been 
“prescribed by law” and that the interference in question had pursued the legitimate aim of 
protecting the proper administration of justice and the reputation of others. The Court however 
pointed out that neither the concern of safeguarding the investigation nor the concern of 
protecting the reputation of others can prevail over the public’s interest in being informed of 
certain criminal proceedings conducted against politicians. It stressed that in this case there was 
no evidence of any damaging effects on the investigation, which had been concluded by the time 
the first article was published. The publication of the articles did not breach the presumption of 
innocence, as the case of Mr. J. was in hands of professional judges. Furthermore, there was 
nothing to indicate that the conviction of Mr. Laranjeira Marques da Silva had contributed to the 
protection of the reputation of others. The Court held unanimously that the interference with the 
right of freedom of expression of the applicant was disproportionate and that therefore there 
had been a violation of Article 10. 
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As to the conviction for defamation, the Court accepted that the disputed articles dealt with 
matters of general interest, as the public had the right to be informed about investigations 
concerning politicians, including investigations which did not, at first sight, relate to their 
political activities. Furthermore, the issues before the courts could be discussed at any time in 
the press and by the public. As to the nature of the two articles, the Court pointed out that Mr 
Laranjeira Marques da Silva had simply imparted information concerning the criminal 
proceedings in question, despite adopting a critical stance towards the accused. The Court 
observed that it was not its place or that of the national courts to substitute their own views for 
those of the press as to what reporting techniques should be adopted in the journalistic coverage 
of a court case. As to the editor’s note, the Court took the view that, notwithstanding one sentence 
that was more properly to be regarded as a value judgment, it had a sufficient factual basis in 
the broader context of the media coverage of the case. Hence, while the reasons given by the 
national courts for Mr Laranjeira Marques da Silva’s conviction had been relevant, the authorities 
had not given sufficient reasons justifying the necessity of the interference with the applicant’s 
right to freedom of expression. The Court further noted that the penalties imposed on the 
applicant had been excessive and liable to discourage the exercise of media freedom. The Court 
therefore held, by five votes to two, that the conviction for defamation did not correspond to a 
pressing social need and that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Laranjeira Marques da Silva v. Portugal, no. 16983/06, 19 January 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Alfantakis v. Greece 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights recently delivered a judgment on the right to freedom of 
expression of a lawyer convicted for the insult and defamation of a public prosecutor during a 
television interview. In a case that received considerable media coverage, Georgis Alfantakis, a 
lawyer in Athens, was representing a popular Greek singer (A.V.). The singer had accused his wife, 
S.P., of fraud, forgery and use of forged documents causing losses to the State of nearly EUR 
150,000. On the recommendation of the public prosecutor at the Athens Court of Appeal, D.M., it 
was decided not to bring charges against S.P. While appearing live as a guest on Greece’s main 
television news programme ‘Sky’, Mr Alfantakis expressed his views on the criminal proceedings 
in question, commenting in particular that he had “laughed” on reading the public prosecutor’s 
report, which he described as a “literary opinion showing contempt for his client”. The public 
prosecutor sued Mr Alfantakis for damages, arguing that his comments had been insulting and 
defamatory. Mr Alfantakis was ordered by the Athens Court of Appeal to pay damages of about 
EUR 12,000. Alfantakis applied to the European Court of Human Rights, relying on Article 10 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights. He complained about the civil judgment against him 
which he considered an unacceptable interference in his freedom of expression. 
 
According to the European Court it was not disputed that the interference by the Greek authorities 
with Alfantakis’s right to freedom of expression had been ‘prescribed by law’ - by both the Civil 
Code and the Criminal Code - and had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation of 
others. The Court took notice of the fact that the offending comments were directed at a member 
of the national legal service, thus creating the risk of a negative impact both on that individual’s 
professional image and on public confidence in the proper administration of justice. Lawyers are 
entitled to comment in public on the administration of justice, but they are also expected to 
observe certain limits and rules of conduct. However, instead of ascertaining the direct meaning 
of the phrase uttered by the applicant, the Greek courts had relied on their own interpretation of 
what the phrase might have implied. In doing so, the domestic courts relied on particularly 
subjective considerations, potentially ascribing to the applicant intentions he had not in fact had. 
Nor had the Greek courts made a distinction between facts and value judgments, instead simply 
determining the effect produced by the phrases “when I read it, I laughed” and “literary opinion”. 
The Greek courts had also ignored the extensive media coverage of the case, in the context of 
which Mr Alfantakis’s appearance on the television news was more indicative of an intention to 
defend his client’s arguments in public than of a desire to impugn the public prosecutor’s 
character. Lastly, they had not taken account of the fact that the comments had been broadcast 
live and could therefore not be rephrased. The Court came to the conclusion that the civil 
judgment ordering Mr Alfantakis to pay damages was not based on sufficient and pertinent 
arguments and therefore had not met a “pressing social need”. Hence, there had been a violation 
of Article 10. The Court awarded Mr Alfantakis EUR 12,939 in pecuniary damages. 
 
• Alfantakis v. Greece, no. 49330/07, 11 February 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Flinkkilä a.o. and four other connected cases v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in five judgments of 6 April 2010 came to the conclusion 
that Finland had violated the right of freedom of expression by giving too much protection to 
the right of private life under Article 8 of the Convention. In all five cases the Court was of the 
opinion that the criminal conviction of journalists and editors-in-chief and the order to pay 
damages for disclosing the identity of a public person’s partner amounted to an unacceptable 
interference with the freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights. 
 
All applicants in all five cases were journalists, editors-in-chief and publishing companies that 
were involved in the publishing in 1997 of a total of nine articles in a newspaper and in several 
magazines concerning A., the National Conciliator at the time, and B., his female partner. The 
articles focused primarily on the private and professional consequences for A. of an incident in 
1996. This incident, including the revelation of B’.s identity, had earlier been reported upon in 
the Finnish print media and on television. During that incident A. and B. entered A.’s home late 
at night while A.’s wife was there and, as a result of an ensuing fight, B. was fined and A. was 
sentenced to a conditional term in prison. A few weeks later, a newspaper and several magazines 
revisited the incident and the court case, this time with more background information, interviews 
or comments. All articles mentioned B. by name and in addition gave other details about her, 
including her age, name of her workplace, her family relationships and her relationship with A., 
as well as her picture. 
 
A. and B. requested that criminal investigations be conducted in respect of the journalists for 
having written about the incident and the surrounding circumstances. The journalists and media 
companies were ordered by the domestic courts to pay fines and damages for the invasion of B.’s 
private life. The Finnish courts found in particular that, since B. was not a public figure, the fact 
alone that she happened to be the girlfriend of a well-known person in society was not sufficient 
to justify revealing her identity to the public. In addition, the fact that her identity had been 
revealed previously in the media did not justify subsequent invasions of her private life. The 
courts further held that even the mere dissemination of information about a person’s private life 
was sufficient to cause them damage or suffering. Therefore, the absence of intent to hurt B. on 
the part of the applicants was irrelevant. The Finnish courts concluded that the journalists and 
the media had had no right to reveal facts relating to B.’s private life or to publish her picture as 
they did. 
 
The journalists, editors-in-chief and media companies complained under Article 10 of the 
Convention about their convictions and the high amounts they had to pay in damages to B. 
Having examined in earlier case law the domestic Criminal Code provision in question, the 
European Court found its contents quite clear: the spreading of information, an insinuation or an 
image depicting the private life of another person, which was conducive to causing suffering, 
qualified as an invasion of privacy. In addition, even the exception stipulated in that provision - 
concerning persons in a public office or function, in professional life, in a political activity or in 
another comparable activity - was equally clearly worded. Even though there had been no precise 
definition of private life in the law, if the journalists or the media had had any doubts about the 
remit of that term, they should have either sought advice about its content or refrained from 
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disclosing B.’s identity. In addition, the applicants were professional journalists and therefore 
could not claim not to have known the boundaries of the said provision, since the Finnish 
Guidelines for Journalists and the practice of the Council for Mass Media, albeit not binding, 
provided even stricter rules than the Criminal Code. 
 
However, there had been no evidence, or indeed any allegation, of factual misrepresentation or 
bad faith on the part of the applicants. Nor had there been any suggestion that they had obtained 
information about B. by illicit means. While it had been clear that B. was not a public figure, she 
was involved in an incident together with a well-known public figure with whom she had been 
in a close relationship. Therefore, B. could have reasonably been seen as having entered the 
public domain. In addition, the disclosure of B.’s identity was of clear public interest in view of 
A.’s conduct and his ability to continue in his post as a high-level public servant. The incident 
was widely publicised in the media, including in a programme broadcast nationwide on prime-
time television. Thus, the articles in question had not disclosed B.’s identity in this context for 
the first time. Moreover, even if the events were presented in a somewhat colourful manner to 
boost sales of the magazines, this was not in itself sufficient to justify a conviction for breach of 
privacy. Finally, in view of the heavy financial sanctions imposed on the applicants, the European 
Court noted that B. had already been paid a significant sum in damages by the television company 
for having exposed her private life to the general public. Similar damages had been ordered to 
be paid to her also in respect of other articles published in other magazines by the other 
applicants listed above, which all stemmed from the same facts. Accordingly, in view of the 
severe consequences for the applicants in relation to the circumstances of the cases, the 
European Court held that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention in all five 
cases. 
 
Under Article 41 of the Convention (just satisfaction), the Court held that Finland was to pay the 
applicants sums ranging between EUR 12,000 and EUR 39,000 for pecuniary damages, between 
EUR 2,000 and EUR 5,000 for non-pecuniary damages and between EUR 3,000 and EUR 5,000 in 
respect of costs and expenses. 
 
• Flinkkilä and Others v. Finland, no. 25576/04, 6 April 2010.  
• Jokitaipale and Others v. Finland, no. 43349/05, 6 April 2010.  
• Iltalehti and Karhuvaara v. Finland, no. 6372/06, 6 April 2010.  
• Soila v. Finland, no. 6806/06, 6 April 2010.  
• Tuomela and Others v. Finland, no. 25711/04, 6 April 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Renaud v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights recently delivered a judgment regarding defamation and 
insult on the Internet. The Court was of the opinion that the sharp and polemical criticism of the 
public figure in question was part of an ongoing emotional political debate and that the criminal 
conviction for defamation and insult amounted to a violation of the freedom of expression 
guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. 
 
The applicant in the case was Patrice Renaud. He is the founder of a local association (Comité de 
défense du quartier sud de Sens) opposing a big construction project planned in the city of Sens. 
To this end he also initiated a website, sharply criticising the mayor of Sens, who supported and 
promoted the building project. In 2005, and on appeal in 2006, Renaud was convicted in criminal 
proceedings for defamation and for publicly insulting a citizen discharging a public mandate, on 
account of remarks concerning the mayor of Sens. On the website he had inter alia compared the 
urban policy of the mayor to the policy of the former Romanian dictator Ceaucescu. Renaud was 
convicted for defamation because of the specific allegation that the mayor was stimulating and 
encouraging delinquency in the city centre in order to legitimise her policy of security and public 
safety. Also the insinuation that the mayor was illegally putting public money in her own pockets 
was considered defamatory, while the article on the association’s website in which Renaud had 
written that the mayor was cynical, schizophrenic and a liar was considered to be a public insult. 
Renaud was ordered to pay a fine of EUR 500 and civil damages to the mayor of EUR 1,000. 
 
Relying on Article 10 (freedom of expression), Renaud complained of his conviction before the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
 
The European Court recognised that the applicant, being the chairman of the local association of 
residents opposing the construction project and the webmaster of the Internet site of the 
association, was participating in a public debate when criticising public officials and politicians. 
The Court admitted that some of the phraseology used by Renaud was very polemic and virulent, 
but stated that on the other hand a mayor must tolerate such kind of criticism as part of public 
debate which is essential in a democracy. The Court was of the opinion that when a debate relates 
to an emotive subject, such as the daily life of the local residents and their housing facilities, 
politicians must show a special tolerance towards criticism and that they have to accept “les 
débordements verbaux ou écrits” (free translation: “oral or written outbursts”). The Court 
considered the allegations of Renaud to be value judgments with a sufficient factual basis and 
came to the conclusion that the French judicial authorities had neglected the interests and 
importance of freedom of expression in the matter at issue. The conviction of Renaud was thus 
an interference with his right to freedom of expression which did not meet any pressing social 
need, while at the same time such a conviction risks engendering a chilling effect on participation 
in public debates of this kind. Therefore, the European Court found a violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
 
• Renaud v. France, no. 13290/07, 25 February 2010.  
 
IRIS 2010-6/1 
Back to overview of case-law 
241 
European Court of Human Rights: Jean-Marie Le Pen v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
A few years ago, Le Pen, the president of the French National Front party, was fined EUR 10,000 
for incitement to discrimination, hatred and violence towards a group of people because of their 
origin or their membership or non-membership of a specific ethnic group, nation, race or religion, 
on account of statements he had made about Muslims in France in an interview with the Le 
Monde daily newspaper. In the interview, Le Pen asserted, among other things, that “the day 
there are no longer 5 million but 25 million Muslims in France, they will be in charge”.  
 
He was subsequently sentenced to another fine after he commented on the initial fine, in the 
following terms, in a weekly magazine: “When I tell people that when we have 25 million Muslims 
in France we French will have to watch our step, they often reply: ‘But Mr Le Pen, that is already 
the case now!’ - and they are right.” The French courts held that Le Pen’s freedom of expression 
was no justification for statements that were an incitement to discrimination, hatred or violence 
towards a group of people. The Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal lodged by Le Pen in which 
he argued that his statements were not an explicit call for hatred or discrimination and did not 
single out Muslims because of their religion and that the reference to Islam was aimed at a 
political doctrine and not a religious faith. 
 
In a decision of 20 April 2010 the European Court declared the application of Le Pen, which relied 
on Article 10 ECHR (freedom of expression), manifestly ill-founded and hence inadmissible. 
The Court was of the opinion that the French authorities’ interference with Le Pen’s freedom of 
expression, in the form of a criminal conviction, was prescribed by law (Arts. 23-24 of the French 
Press Freedom Act - Loi sur la Liberté de la Presse) and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting 
the reputation or rights of others. Again it was crucial to decide whether or not the conviction of 
Le Pen was to be considered necessary in a democratic society, taking into account the 
importance of freedom of expression in the context of political debate in a democratic society. 
The Court reiterated that freedom of expression applies not only to “information” or “ideas” that 
were favourably received, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Furthermore, anyone 
who engages in a debate on a matter of public interest can resort to a degree of exaggeration, 
or even provocation, provided that they respect the reputation and rights of others. When the 
person concerned is an elected representative, like Le Pen, who represents his voters, takes up 
their concerns and defends their interests, the Court has to exercise the strictest supervision of 
this kind of interference with freedom of expression. Le Pen’s statements had indeed been made 
in the context of a general debate on the problems linked to the settlement and integration of 
immigrants in their host countries. Moreover, the varying importance of the problems concerned, 
which could conceivably generate misunderstanding and incomprehension, required that 
considerable latitude be left to the State in assessing the need for interference with a person’s 
freedom of expression. 
 
In this case, however, Le Pen’s comments had certainly presented the Muslim community as a 
whole in a disturbing light likely to give rise to feelings of rejection and hostility. He had set the 
French as a group against a community whose religious convictions were explicitly mentioned 
and whose rapid growth was presented as an already latent threat to the dignity and security of 
the French people. The reasons given by the domestic courts for convicting Le Pen had thus been 
relevant and sufficient. In addition, the penalty imposed had not been disproportionate. The 
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Court recognised that the fine imposed on Le Pen was significant, but underlined the fact that Le 
Pen under French law had risked a sentence of imprisonment. Therefore, the Court did not 
consider the sanction to be disproportionate. On these grounds the Court found that the 
interference with Le Pen’s enjoyment of his right to freedom of expression had been “necessary 
in a democratic society”. LePen’s complaint was accordingly rejected. 
 
Le Pen is confronted with a boomerang effect of the Court’s case law, as in an earlier case the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court had found that defamatory and insulting statements about 
Le Pen published in a book were not protected by Article 10 of the Convention, as these 
statements were to be considered as a form of hate speech. The Grand Chamber in Lindon, 
Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France had regard “to the nature of the remarks made, in particular 
to the underlying intention to stigmatise the other side, and to the fact that their content is such 
as to stir up violence and hatred, thus going beyond what is tolerable in political debate, even in 
respect of a figure who occupies an extremist position in the political spectrum” (Lindon, 
Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, 22 October 2007, §57). It is precisely this argument, that 
hate speech is beyond what is tolerable in political debate, which has now turned against Le Pen. 
 
• Jean-Marie Le Pen v. France (dec.), no. 18788/09, 20 April 2010.  
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The applicant in this case, Rahmi Akdaş is a publisher, residing in Bandirma, Turkey. In 1999 he 
published the Turkish translation of the erotic novel “Les onze mille verges” by the French writer 
Guillaume Apollinaire (“The Eleven Thousand Rods”, “On Bir Bin Kırbaç” in Turkish). The novel 
contains graphic descriptions of scenes of sexual intercourse, including various practices such as 
sadomasochism, vampirism and paedophilia. Akdaş was convicted under the Criminal Code for 
publishing obscene or immoral material liable to arouse and exploit sexual desire among the 
population. The publisher argued that the book was a work of fiction, using literary techniques 
such as exaggeration or metaphor and that the post face to the edition in question was written 
by specialists in literary analysis. He added that the book did not contain any violent overtones 
and that the humorous and exaggerated nature of the text was more likely to extinguish sexual 
desire. 
 
The criminal court of Istanbul ((Istanbul Asliye Ceza Mahkemesi) ordered the seizure and 
destruction of all copies of the book and Akdaş was given a “severe” fine of EUR 1,100, a fine that 
may be converted into days of imprisonment. In a final judgment of 11 March 2004, the Court of 
Cassation quashed the part of the judgment concerning the order to destroy copies of the book 
in view of a 2003 legislative amendment. It upheld the remainder of the judgment. Akdaş paid 
the fine in full in November 2004. 
 
Relying on Article 10, Akdaş complained about this conviction and about the seizure of the book. 
Before the European Court it was not disputed that there had been an interference with Akdaş’ 
freedom of expression, that the interference had been prescribed by law and that it had pursued 
a legitimate aim, namely the protection of morals. The Court however found the interference not 
necessary in a democratic society. The Court reiterated that those who promoted artistic works 
also had “duties and responsibilities”, the scope of which depended on the situation and the 
means used. As the requirements of morals vary from time to time and from place to place, even 
within the same State, the national authorities are supposed to be in a better position than the 
international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of those requirements, as well as on 
the “necessity” of a “restriction” intended to satisfy them. 
 
Nevertheless, the Court had regard in the present case to the fact that more then a century had 
elapsed since the book had first been published in France (in 1907), to its publication in various 
languages in a large number of countries and to the recognition it had gained through publication 
in the prestigious “La Pléiade” series. Acknowledgment of the cultural, historical and religious 
particularities of the Council of Europe’s member states could not go so far as to prevent public 
access in a particular language, in this instance Turkish, to a work belonging to the European 
literary heritage. Accordingly, the application of the legislation in force at the time of the events 
had not been intended to satisfy a pressing social need. In addition, the heavy fine imposed and 
the seizure of copies of the book had not been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and 
had thus not been necessary in a democratic society, within the meaning of Article 10. For that 
reason, the Court found a violation of Akdaş’ right to freedom of expression. 
 
• Akdaş v. Turkey, no. 41056/04, 16 February 2010.  
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Having been convicted of defamation and threat of terrorism and while serving a prison sentence, 
the founder and chief editor of the newspapers Gündəlik Azərbaycan and Realny Azerbaijan, Mr. 
Fatullayev, applied successfully before the European Court of Human Rights against a violation 
of his freedom of expression and right to a fair trial. The European Court ordered the Azerbaijani 
authorities to release Fatullayev immediately. 
 
In 2007 two sets of criminal proceedings were brought against Fatullayev in connection with two 
articles published by him in Realny Azerbaijan. The first set of criminal proceedings related to an 
article and to separate Internet postings. The statements made in the article and the postings 
differed from the commonly accepted version of the events that took place at the town of Khojaly 
during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh, according to which hundreds of Azerbaijani civilians had 
been killed by the Armenian armed forces with the reported assistance of the Russian army. Four 
Khojaly survivors and two former soldiers involved in the Khojaly battle brought a criminal 
complaint against Fatullayev for defamation and for falsely accusing Azerbaijani soldiers of 
having committed an especially grave crime. The courts upheld the claims, convicted Fatullayev 
of defamation and sentenced him to imprisonment for a term of two years and six months. 
Fatullayev was arrested in the courtroom and taken to a detention centre. In addition, in civil 
proceedings brought against Fatullayev before the above-mentioned first set of criminal 
proceedings, he was ordered to publish a retraction of his statements, an apology to the refugees 
from Khojaly and the newspaper’s readers and to pay approximately EUR 8,500 personally, as 
well as another EUR 8,500 on behalf of his newspaper, in respect of non-pecuniary damages. 
 
The second set of criminal proceedings related to an article entitled “The Aliyevs Go to War”. In 
it Fatullayev expressed the view that, in order for President Ilham Aliyev to remain in power in 
Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani government had sought the support of the United States in exchange 
for Azerbaijan’s support for US “aggression” against Iran. He speculated about a possible US-
Iranian war in which Azerbaijan could also become involved and provided a long and detailed 
list of strategic facilities in Azerbaijan that would be attacked by Iran if such a scenario developed. 
He concluded that the Azerbaijani government should have maintained neutrality in its relations 
with both the US and Iran and that it had not realised all the dangerous consequences of the 
geopolitical game it was playing, like for example the possible deaths of Azeris in both Azerbaijan 
and Iran. Before Fatullayev was formally charged with the offence of threat of terrorism, the 
Prosecutor General made a statement to the press, noting that Fatullayev’s article constituted a 
threat of terrorism. A short time later, Fatullayev was indeed found guilty as charged and 
convicted of threat of terrorism. The total sentence imposed on him was imprisonment for eight 
years and six months. In his defence speech at the trial and in his appeals to the higher courts, 
Fatullayev complained that his presumption of innocence was breached as a result of the 
Prosecutor General’s statement to the press and that his right to freedom of expression as a 
journalist was violated. His complaints were summarily rejected. 
 
Apart from finding breaches of Art. 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial, no impartial tribunal) and Art. 6 § 2 
(breach of presumption of innocence) of the European Convention of Human Rights, the Court 
found that the conviction of Fatullayev in both criminal cases amounted to a manifest violation 
of Article 10 of the Convention. 
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With regard to the first criminal conviction, the Court acknowledged the very sensitive nature of 
the issues discussed in Fatullayev’s article and that the consequences of the events in Khojaly 
were a source of deep national grief. Thus, it was understandable that the statements made by 
Fatullayev may have been considered shocking or disturbing by the public. However, the Court 
recalled that freedom of information applies not only to information or ideas that were favourably 
received, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. In addition, it is an integral part of 
freedom of expression to seek historical truth. Various matters related to the Khojaly events still 
appear to be open to ongoing debate among historians and as such should have been a matter 
of general interest in modern Azerbaijani society. It is essential in a democratic society that a 
debate on the causes of acts of particular gravity which might amount to war crimes or crimes 
against humanity should be able to take place freely. Further, the press plays the vital role of a 
“public watchdog” in a democratic society. Although it ought not to overstep certain bounds, in 
particular in respect of the reputation and rights of others, the duty of the press is to impart 
information and ideas on political issues and on other matters of general interest. The Court 
considered that the article had been written in a generally descriptive style with the aim of 
informing Azerbaijani readers of the realities of day-to-day life in the area in question. The public 
was entitled to receive information about what was happening in the territories over which their 
country had lost control in the aftermath of the war. Fatullayev had attempted to convey, in a 
seemingly unbiased manner, various ideas and views of both sides in the conflict and the article 
had not contained any statements directly accusing the Azerbaijani military or specific individuals 
of committing the massacre and deliberately killing their own civilians. 
 
As regards the Internet postings, the Court accepted that, by making those statements without 
relying on any relevant factual basis, the applicant might have failed to comply with the 
journalistic duty to provide accurate and reliable information. Nevertheless, taking note of the 
fact that he had been convicted of defamation, the Court found that those postings had not 
undermined the dignity of the Khojaly victims and survivors in general and, more specifically, the 
four private prosecutors who were Khojaly refugees. It therefore held that the domestic courts 
had not given “relevant and sufficient” reasons for Fatullayev’s conviction of defamation. In 
addition, the Court held that the imposition of a prison sentence for a press offence would be 
compatible with journalists’ freedom of expression only in exceptional circumstances, notably 
where other fundamental rights have been seriously impaired, as, for example, in cases of hate 
speech or incitement to violence. As this had not been the case, there had been no justification 
for the imposition of a prison sentence on Fatullayev. There had accordingly been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention in respect of his first criminal conviction. 
 
With regard to the second criminal conviction, the Court reached a similar conclusion. The article 
“The Aliyevs Go to War” had focused on Azerbaijan’s specific role in the dynamics of international 
politics relating to US-Iranian relations. As such, the publication had been part of a political 
debate on a matter of general and public concern. The applicant had criticised the Azerbaijani 
Government’s foreign and domestic political moves. At the same time, a number of other media 
sources had also suggested during that period that, in the event of a war, Azerbaijan was likely 
to be involved and speculated about possible specific Azerbaijani targets for Iranian attacks. The 
fact that the applicant had published a list of specific possible targets in itself had neither 
increased nor decreased the chances of a hypothetical Iranian attack. The applicant, as a 
journalist and a private individual, had not been in a position to influence or exercise any degree 
of control over any of the hypothetical events discussed in the article. Neither had Fatullayev 
voiced any approval of any such possible attacks or argued in favour of them. It had been his 
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task, as a journalist, to impart information and ideas on the relevant political issues and express 
opinions about possible future consequences of specific decisions taken by the Government. 
Thus, the domestic courts’ finding that Fatullayev had threatened the State with terrorist acts 
had been arbitrary. The Court considered that Fatullayev’s second criminal conviction and the 
severity of the penalty imposed on him had constituted a grossly disproportionate restriction of 
his freedom of expression. Further, the circumstances of the case had not justified the imposition 
of a prison sentence on him. There had accordingly been a violation of Article 10 in respect of 
Fatullayev’s second criminal conviction as well. 
 
In application of Article 46 of the Convention (execution of the judgment), the Court noted that 
Fatullayev was currently serving the sentence for the press offences in respect of which it had 
found Azerbaijan in violation of the Convention. Having considered it unacceptable that the 
applicant still remained imprisoned and the urgent need to put an end to the violations of Article 
10, the Court held, by six votes to one, that Azerbaijan had to release the applicant immediately. 
Under Article 41 (just satisfaction) of the Convention, the Court held that Azerbaijan is to pay 
Fatullayev EUR 25,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damages and EUR 2,822 in respect of costs 
and expenses. 
 
• Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan, no. 40984/07, 22 April 2010.  
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The applicant, Gabriel Andreescu, is a well-known human rights activist in Romania. He was 
among those who campaigned for the introduction of Law No. 187, which gives all Romanian 
citizens the right to inspect the personal files held on them by the Securitate (the former 
Romanian intelligence service and secret police). The law also allows access to information of 
public interest relating to persons in public office who may have been Securitate agents or 
collaborators. A public agency, the Consiliul Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securităţii 
(National Council for the Study of the Archives of the Securitate - CNSAS) is responsible for the 
application of Law No. 187. In 2000, Andreescu submitted two requests to the CNSAS: one to be 
allowed access to the intelligence file on him personally and the other seeking to ascertain 
whether or not the members of the Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church had collaborated 
with the Securitate. He received no reply and organised a press conference at which he criticised 
A.P., a member of the CNSAS, making reference to some of A.P.’s past activities. Andreescu’s 
remarks on A.P.’s past received widespread media coverage. 
 
A.P. made a criminal complaint against Andreescu accusing him of insult and defamation. After 
being acquitted in first instance, Andreescu was ordered by the Bucharest County Court to pay a 
criminal fine together with a high amount in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The 
appeal Court ruled that he had not succeeded in demonstrating the truth of his assertion that 
A.P. had collaborated with the Securitate. Furthermore, a certificate issued by the CNSAS had 
meanwhile stated that A.P. had not collaborated. 
 
Relying on the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Andreescu 
lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights concerning his conviction for 
defamation. Although the interference by the Romanian authorities with Andreescu’s freedom of 
expression had been prescribed by law and had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting A.P.’s 
reputation, the European Court considered that the sanction was a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Court held that Andreescu’s speech had been made in the specific context of a 
nationwide debate on a particularly sensitive topic of general interest, namely the application of 
the law concerning citizens’ access to the personal files kept on them by the Securitate, enacted 
with the aim of unmasking that organisation’s nature as a political police force, and on the subject 
of the ineffectiveness of the CNSAS’s activities. In that context, it had been legitimate to discuss 
whether the members of that organisation satisfied the criteria required by law for holding such 
a position. Andreescu’s remarks had been a mix of value judgments and factual elements and he 
had especially alerted public opinion to the fact that he was voicing suspicions rather than 
certainties. The Court noted that those suspicions had been supported by references to A.P.’s 
conduct and to undisputed facts, such as his membership with the transcendental meditation 
movement and the modus operandi of Securitate agents. According to the Court, Andreescu had 
acted in good faith in an attempt to inform the public. As his remarks had been made orally at a 
press conference, he had no opportunity of rephrasing, refining or withdrawing them. The 
European Court was also of the opinion that the Romanian court, by convicting Andreescu, had 
paid no attention to the context in which the remarks at the press conference had been made. It 
had certainly not given “relevant and sufficient” reasons for convicting Andreescu. The Court 
noted furthermore that the high level of damages - representing more than 15 times the average 
salary in Romania at the relevant time - could be considered as a measure apt to deter the media 
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and opinion leaders from fulfilling their role of informing the public on matters of general 
interest. As the interference with Andreescu’s freedom of expression had not been justified by 
relevant and sufficient reasons, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 10. It 
also found a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (right to fair trial) due to Andreescu’s 
conviction without evidence being taken from him in person, especially after he had been 
acquitted at first instance. The Court held that Romania was to pay Andreescu EUR 3,500 in 
respect of pecuniary damage, EUR 5,000 for non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1,180 for costs and 
expenses. 
 
• Andreescu v. Romania, no. 19452/02, 8 June 2010.  
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In 2000 the Turkish Ministry of Culture published a book entitled “The Gypsies of Turkey”, written 
by an associate professor. A few months later Mr. Mustafa Aksu, who is of Roma/Gypsy origin, 
filed a petition with the Ministry of Culture on behalf of the Turkish Gypsy associations. In his 
petition, he stated that in twenty-four pages of the book Gypsies were presented as being 
engaged in illegitimate activities, living as “thieves, pickpockets, swindlers, robbers, usurers, 
beggars, drug dealers, prostitutes and brothel keepers” and being polygamist and aggressive. 
Gypsy women were presented as being unfaithful to their husbands and several other expressions 
were humiliating and debasing to Gypsies. Claiming that the expressions constituted criminal 
offences, Mr. Aksu requested that the sale of the book be stopped and all copies seized. During 
the same period Mr. Aksu also took an action in regard to a dictionary entitled “Turkish Dictionary 
for Pupils” which was financed by the Ministry of Culture. According to Mr. Aksu, certain entries 
in the dictionary were insulting to, and discriminatory against, Gypsies. The Ministry of Culture 
and later the judicial authorities in Ankara however rejected these complaints and Mr. Aksu 
lodged two applications with the European Court of Human Rights. He submitted that the 
remarks in the book and the expressions in the dictionary reflected clear anti-Roma sentiment, 
that he had been discriminated against on account of his ethnic identity and that his dignity had 
been harmed because of the numerous passages in the book which used discriminatory and 
insulting language. He argued that that the refusal of the domestic courts to award compensation 
demonstrated an obvious bias against the Roma and he therefore invoked Articles 6 (fair trial) 
and 14 (non-discrimination) of the Convention. The Court considered, however, that it was more 
appropriate to deal with the complaints under Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with 
Article 8 (right of privacy) of the Convention. 
 
In its judgment of 27 July 2010 the Court began by referring to the vulnerable position of 
Roma/Gypsies, the special needs of minorities and the obligation of the European states to 
protect their security, identity and lifestyle, not only for the purpose of safeguarding the interests 
of the minorities themselves, but also to preserve a cultural diversity of value to the whole 
community. The Court also emphasised that racial discrimination requires that the authorities 
exert special vigilance and a vigorous reaction. It is for this reason that the authorities must use 
all available means to combat racism, thereby reinforcing democracy's vision of a society in which 
diversity is not perceived as a threat. Regarding the book, the Court accepted that the passages 
and remarks cited by Mr. Aksu, when read on their own, appear to be discriminatory or insulting. 
However, when the book is examined as a whole it is not possible to conclude that the author 
acted with bad faith or had any intention of insulting the Roma community. The conclusion to 
the book also clarified that it was an academic study that had conducted a comparative analysis 
and focused on the history and socio-economic living conditions of the Roma people in Turkey. 
The passages referred to by Mr. Aksu were not the author's own comments, but examples of the 
perception of Roma people in Turkish society, while the author sought to correct such prejudices 
and make it clear that the Roma people should be respected. Bearing these considerations in 
mind and stressing its subsidiary role, which leaves a broad margin of appreciation to the national 
authorities, the Court was not persuaded that the author of the book had insulted the applicant's 
integrity or that the domestic authorities had failed to protect the applicant's rights. Regarding 
the dictionary, the Court observed that the definitions provided therein were prefaced with the 
comment that the terms were of a metaphorical nature. Therefore it found no reason to depart 
Back to overview of case-law 
251 
from the domestic courts' findings that Mr. Aksu’s integrity was not harmed and that he had not 
been subjected to discriminatory treatment because of the expressions described in the 
dictionary. The Court concluded that in the present cases it cannot be said that Mr. Aksu was 
discriminated against on account of his ethnic identity as a Roma or that there was a failure on 
the part of the authorities to take the necessary measures to secure respect for the applicant's 
private life. 
 
Three dissenting judges, including the president of the second section of the Court, expressed 
their concern about the approach of the majority, as various passages of the book convey a series 
of highly discriminatory prejudices and stereotypes that should have given rise to serious 
explanation by the author and are more forceful in tone than the work's concluding comments. 
The dissenting judges also found that the dictionary contained seriously discriminatory 
descriptions and that in a publication financed by the Ministry of Culture and intended for pupils, 
the Turkish authorities had an obligation to take all measures to ensure respect for Roma identity 
and to avoid any stigmatisation. They also referred to data and reports collected by the European 
Union's Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) showing that more vigilance is needed towards Roma. 
These arguments and references however could not persuade the (slim) majority of the Court, 
which accepted that the publication of the book and the dictionary were not to be considered as 
violating the rights of Mr. Aksu under Articles 14 and 8 of the Convention. 
 
• Aksu v. Turkey, nos. 4149/04 and 41029/04, 27 July 2010.  
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 15 
March 2012. 
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On 31 March 2009 the Chamber of the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) delivered a highly controversial judgment in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the 
Netherlands. In a 4/3 decision, the Court was of the opinion that the order to hand over a CD-
ROM with photographs in the possession of the editor-in-chief of a weekly magazine claiming 
protection of journalistic sources did not amount to a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. The finding and motivation of the majority of the Chamber was not 
only strongly disapproved of in the world of media and journalism, but was also firmly criticised 
by the dissenting judges. Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. requested a referral to the Grand Chamber, this 
request being supported by a large portion of the media, NGOs advocating media freedom and 
professional organisations of journalists. On 14 September 2009, the panel of five Judges decided 
to refer the case to the Grand Chamber in application of Article 43 of the Convention. By referring 
the case to the Grand Chamber the panel accepted that the case raised a serious question 
affecting the interpretation or application of Article 10 of the Convention and/or concerned a 
serious issue of general importance. 
 
On 14 September 2010, the 17 judges of the Grand Chamber unanimously reached the conclusion 
that the order to hand over the CD-ROM to the public prosecutor was a violation of the journalists’ 
rights to protect their sources. It noted that orders to disclose sources potentially had a 
detrimental impact, not only on the source, whose identity might be revealed, but also on the 
newspaper or publication against which the order was directed, whose reputation might be 
negatively affected in the eyes of future potential sources by the disclosure, and on members of 
the public, who had an interest in receiving information imparted through anonymous sources. 
Protection of journalists’ sources is indeed to be considered “a cornerstone of freedom of the 
press, without which sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on 
matters of public interest. As a result the vital public-watchdog role of the press may be 
undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information to the public 
may be adversely affected”. In essence, the Grand Chamber was of the opinion that the right to 
protect journalistic sources should be safeguarded by sufficient procedural guarantees, including 
the guarantee of prior review by a judge or an independent and impartial decision-making body, 
before the police or the public prosecutor have access to information capable of revealing such 
sources. Although the public prosecutor, like any other public official, is bound by the 
requirements of basic integrity, in terms of procedure he or she is a “party” defending interests 
potentially incompatible with journalistic source protection and can hardly be seen as being 
objective and impartial so as to make the necessary assessment of the various competing 
interests. Since in the case of Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands an ex ante guarantee of 
a review by a judge or independent and impartial body was not in existence, the Grand Chamber 
was of the opinion that “the quality of the law was deficient in that there was no procedure 
attended by adequate legal safeguards for the applicant company in order to enable an 
independent assessment as to whether the interest of the criminal investigation overrode the 
public interest in the protection of journalistic sources”. Emphasizing the importance of the 
protection of journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society, the Grand Chamber 
of the European Court found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The judgment implies 
that member states of the Convention should build procedural safeguards into their national law 
in terms of judicial review or other impartial assessment by an independent body based on clear 
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criteria of subsidiarity and proportionality and prior to any disclosure of information capable of 
revealing the identity or the origin of journalists’ sources. 
 
• Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 38224/03, 14 September 2010.   
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The European Court of Human Rights has delivered a judgment in an interesting case with a 
peculiar mix of issues related to freedom of expression, academic research, medical data, privacy 
protection and access to official documents. The defendant state is Sweden, a country very 
familiar with the principle and practice of access to official documents. The right of access to 
official documents has a history of more than two hundred years in Sweden and is considered 
one of the cornerstones of Swedish democracy. The case shows how access to official documents, 
including research documents containing sensitive personal data, can be granted to researchers, 
albeit under strict conditions. It furthermore demonstrates that Sweden applies effective 
procedures to implement orders granting access to official documents: those who refuse to grant 
access to official documents after a court decision has so ordered can be convicted on the basis 
of criminal law. The case reflects the idea that progress in scientific knowledge would be 
hindered unduly if the research methodology of a study or scientific data analysis and the 
conclusions build on the data were not open to scrutiny, discussion and debate, albeit under strict 
conditions of privacy protection regarding medical data. 
 
In this case, a Swedish professor at the University of Gothenburg, Mr. Gillberg, has been 
responsible for a long-term research project on hyperactivity of children and attention-deficit 
disorders. Certain assurances were made to the children's parents and later to the young people 
themselves concerning the confidentiality of the collected data. According to Mr. Gillberg, the 
university's ethics committee had made it a precondition for the project that sensitive 
information about the participants would be accessible only to himself and his staff and he had 
therefore promised absolute confidentiality to the patients and their parents. The research 
papers, called the Gothenburg study, were voluminous and consisted of a large number of 
records, test results, interview replies, questionnaires and video and audio tapes. They contained 
a very large amount of privacy-sensitive data about the children and their relatives. 
Some years later, two other researchers not connected to the University of Gothenburg requested 
access to the research material. One had no interest in the personal data as such but in the 
method used and the evidence the researchers had for their conclusions, the other wanted access 
to the material to keep up with current research. Both requests were refused by the University of 
Gothenburg, but the two researchers appealed against the decisions. The Administrative Court of 
Appeal found that the researchers should be granted access to the material, as they had shown 
a legitimate interest and could be assumed to be well acquainted with the appropriate ways of 
handling confidential data. It was also considered to be important to the neuropsychiatric debate 
that the material in question be exposed to independent and critical examination. A list of 
conditions was set for each of the two researchers, which included restrictions on the use of the 
material and the prohibition of removing copies from the university premises. Notified by the 
university's vice-chancellor that the two researchers were entitled to access by virtue of the 
judgments, first Mr. Gillberg and later the university refused to give access to the researchers. 
The university decisions were annulled however by two judgments of the Administrative Court 
of Appeal. A few days later, the research material was destroyed by a few colleagues of Mr. 
Gillberg. 
 
The Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman brought criminal proceedings against Mr. Gillberg, who 
a short time later was convicted of misuse of office. Mr. Gillberg was given a suspended sentence 
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and a fine of the equivalent of EUR 4,000. The university's vice president and the officials who 
had destroyed the research material were also convicted. Mr. Gillberg's conviction was upheld by 
the Court of Appeal and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused. A short time later, 
Mr. Gillberg lodged an application with the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights. He complained in 
particular that his criminal conviction breached his rights under Articles 8 (right of privacy, 
including personal reputation) and 10 (freedom of expression) of the Convention. Mr. Gillberg 
also complained under Articles 6 (fair trial) and 13 (effective remedy) of the Convention that in 
the civil proceedings concerning access to the research material he did not have a standing 
before the Administrative Courts. Several times Mr. Gillberg’s requests for relief for substantive 
defects to the Supreme Administrative Court were refused because he could not be considered a 
party to the case. As Mr. Gillberg lodged his application before the Court more than six months 
after these judgments, this part of the application had been submitted too late and was rejected 
pursuant to Article 35 §§1 and 4 of the Convention. While on the face of it the case raised 
important ethical issues involving the interests of the children participating in the research, 
medical research in general and public access to information, the Court considered itself to only 
be in a position to examine whether Mr. Gillberg's criminal conviction for refusing to execute a 
court order granting access to official documents was compatible with the Convention. The Court 
found that the conviction of Mr. Gillberg did not as such concern the university's or the applicant's 
interest in protecting professional secrecy with clients or the participants in the research. That 
part was settled by the Administrative Court of Appeal's judgments. For reasons of inadmissibility 
of the application regarding the judgments of the Administrative Courts, the European Court was 
prevented from examining any alleged violation of the Convention by these judgments. 
 
Regarding the remaining and hence crucial complaints under Article 8 and 10, Mr. Gillberg 
emphasised that there had been a promise of confidentiality to the participants in the research, 
as a precondition for carrying out his research and that the order to grant access to the research 
material and his conviction for refusing to do so amounted to a violation of his right to private 
life and his right to negative freedom of expression (the right to refuse to communicate). 
 
The European Court left the question whether there had been an interference with Mr. Gillberg's 
right to respect for his private life for the purpose of Article 8 open, because even assuming that 
there had been such an interference, it found that there had been no violation of that provision. 
According to the Court, Convention States have to ensure in their domestic legal systems that a 
final binding judicial decision did not remain inoperative to the detriment of one party; the 
execution of a judgment is an integral part of a trial. The Swedish State therefore had to react to 
Mr. Gillberg's refusal to execute the judgments granting the two external researchers access to 
the material. The Court noted Mr. Gillberg's argument that the conviction and sentence were 
disproportionate to the aim of ensuring the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, 
because the university's ethics committee had required an absolute promise of confidentiality as 
a precondition for carrying out his research. However, the two permits by the committee he had 
submitted to the Court did not constitute evidence of such a requirement. The Swedish courts 
had moreover found that the assurances of confidentiality given to the participants in the study 
went further than permitted by the Secrecy Act. As regards Mr. Gillberg's argument that the 
Swedish courts should have taken into account as a mitigating circumstance the fact that he had 
attempted to protect the privacy and integrity of the participants in the research, the European 
Court agreed with the Swedish criminal courts that the question of whether the documents were 
to be released had been settled in the proceedings before the administrative courts. Whether or 
not the university considered that they were based on erroneous or insufficient grounds had no 
significance for the validity of the administrative courts’ judgments. It had thus been incumbent 
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on the university administration to release the documents and Mr. Gillberg had intentionally 
failed to comply with his obligations as a public official arising from the judgments. The Court 
therefore did not find that his conviction or sentence was arbitrary or disproportionate to the 
legitimate aims pursued. It concluded, by five votes to two, that there had been no violation of 
Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
With regard to the alleged violation of the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the 
Convention, Mr. Gillberg invoked his "negative right" to remain silent. The Court accepted that 
some professional groups indeed might have a legitimate interest in protecting professional 
secrecy as regards clients or sources and it even observed that doctors, psychiatrists and 
researchers may have a similar interest to that of journalists in protecting their sources. However, 
Mr. Gillberg had been convicted for misuse of office for refusing to make documents available in 
accordance with the instructions he received from the university administration after a Court 
decision; he was thus part of the university that had to comply with the judgments of the 
administrative courts. Moreover, his conviction did not as such concern his own or the university's 
interest in protecting professional secrecy with clients or the participants in the research. The 
Court unanimously concluded that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The judgment of the European Court is certainly an eye-opener for many actors in countries of 
the Council of Europe working in the domain of access to official or administrative documents, 
academic research, the processing of sensitive personal data and data protection authorities. The 
jurisprudence of the Swedish courts and of the European Court of Human Rights demonstrates 
that confidentiality of data used for scientific research and protection of sensitive personal data 
is to be balanced against the interests and guarantees related to transparency and access to 
documents of interest for the research society or society as a whole. The concurring opinion of 
Judge Ann Power, which is annexed to the judgment in the case of Gillberg v. Sweden, elaborates 
the importance of this approach by emphasising that “the public has an obvious interest in the 
findings and implications of research. Progress in scientific knowledge would be hampered 
unduly if the methods and evidence used in research were not open to scrutiny, discussion and 
debate. Thus, the requests for access, in my view, represented important matters of public 
interest”, without however disregarding the principles and values of protection of personal data. 
 
• Gillberg v. Sweden, no. 41723/06, 2 November 2010.  
 
Editor’s Note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 3 
April 2012. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayıncıliğı A.Ş. v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2002 the Turkish Broadcasting Authority (Radio ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu - the “RTÜK”) revoked 
the broadcasting licence of Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayıncıliğı A.Ş. (Nur Radyo), a broadcasting 
company established in Istanbul at that time. In its motivation the RTÜK mainly referred to the 
fact that, despite six temporary broadcasting bans for programmes that had breached the 
constitutional principle of secularism or had incited hatred, Nur Radyo had continued to 
broadcast religious programmes. The RTÜK referred in particular to a programme “along the 
editorial line of Nur Radyo” that was broadcast on 19 November 2001 - during one of the bans - 
from Bursa. That concerned a pirate broadcast, transmitted via satellite and terrestrial links. RTÜK 
held Nur Radyo responsible for it and considered this new violation of the Turkish law as 
justifying the revocation of its broadcasting licence. In addition, criminal proceedings were 
initiated against the managers of Nur Radyo, in their personal capacity, on account of the pirate 
broadcast of 19 November 2001. The managers were acquitted, as the criminal court found that 
there was insufficient evidence of their presumed responsibility for the broadcasting of the 
pirated programme. Nur Radyo subsequently sought the review and immediate suspension of the 
RTÜK’s decision to revoke its broadcasting licence, but was unsuccessful. 
 
Nur Radyo then lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights, arguing in 
particular that the revocation of its broadcasting licence had constituted an unjustified 
interference with its right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The European Court noted that, in essence, the revocation of the licence was a reaction to a 
pirate broadcast, via satellite and terrestrial links, using a frequency that had not been allocated 
to the company and that came from Bursa, whereas Nur Radyo’s broadcasting centre was in 
Istanbul. It further noted that the main reason why the RTÜK had found Nur Radyo to be 
responsible for that programme was because it reflected its editorial line. However, the criminal 
court had acquitted the managers of the company for lack of evidence of any responsibility for 
the pirate broadcast in question. The European Court thus took the view that it had been arbitrary 
to include the seventh programme in the aggregate assessment of the offences that led to the 
revocation. It concluded that the additional penalty imposed on Nur Radyo on the basis of 
offences for which other sanctions had already been imposed was not compatible with the 
principle of the rule of law. The European Court accordingly found that the breach of the freedom 
of expression of Nur Radyo had not been necessary in a democratic society and that there had 
been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon Yayıncılığı A.Ş. v. Turkey (no. 2), no. 42284/05, 12 October 2010.  
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European Court of Human Rights: MGN Limited v. United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Ten years ago, in 2001, the newspaper Daily Mirror published an article on its front page under 
the title: “Naomi: I am a drug addict”. Another longer article inside the newspaper elaborated on 
top model Naomi Campbell’s addiction treatment, illustrated by photos taken secretly near the 
Narcotics Anonymous centre she was attending at the time. As the newspaper continued to 
publish more articles and new pictures related to her attendance at Narcotics Anonymous, Ms. 
Campbell sued the Daily Mirror for breach of her privacy. At a final stage of the domestic 
proceedings, the House of Lords found that the publication of the articles could have been 
justified as a matter of public interest, as Ms Campbell had previously publicly denied drug use. 
The publication of the pictures however, in combination with the articles, had breached her right 
to the respect for her private life. Apart from a modest award of damages of 3500 GBP, the Daily 
Mirror’s publishing group, MGN, was ordered to pay Ms. Campbell’s legal costs, including the 
“success fees” agreed between Ms Campbell and her lawyers. The total amount of the legal costs 
was more than 1 million GBP. 
 
Relying on Article 10 of the European Convention MGN lodged an application with the European 
Court of Human Rights, complaining that the finding by the British courts that it had breached 
Ms Campbell’s privacy disregarded the right to freedom of expression. MGN also argued that the 
requirement to pay disproportionately high success fees amounted to a violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention. This part of the application was supported by third parties, such as the Open 
Society Justice Initiative, the Media Legal Defence Initiative, Index on Censorship and Human 
Rights Watch, all referring to the chilling effect of high costs in defamation proceedings in the 
United Kingdom on NGOs and small media organisations. 
 
Regarding the breach of privacy, the European Court recalled that a balance had to be struck 
between the public interest in the publication of the articles and the photographs of Ms Campbell 
and the need to protect her private life. By six votes to one the Court held that there was no 
breach of Article 10. The Court agreed with the reasoning of the House of Lords that the public 
interest had already been satisfied by the publication of the articles, while adding that the 
photographs was a disproportionate breach of her right to respect for her private life. Therefore, 
the interference in the right to freedom of expression of the Daily Mirror was considered 
necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the rights of Ms Campbell. 
 
However, the order to pay the success fees of up to more than 365.000 GBP was considered by 
the European Court as a disproportionate interference in the right to freedom of expression, 
having regard to the legitimate aims sought to be achieved. The Court took into consideration 
that the system of recoverable success fees may have a chilling effect on media reporting and 
hence on freedom of expression. The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom, no. 39401/04, 18 January 2011.  
 
IRIS 2011-3/1
Back to overview of case-law 
259 
European Court of Human Rights: Yleisradio Oy a.o. v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2004 Yleisradio Oy broadcast a current affairs programme focusing on some legal aspects of 
incest cases in the context of child custody disputes. Genuine cases were used as examples. In 
one case, A. appeared undisguised and using his own first name. He was introduced as a 55-year 
old driver from Helsinki and it was further announced that A. had been convicted and sentenced 
to imprisonment for sexual abuse of his two children, X. and Y., their gender and current age 
being mentioned. The judgment concerning A.’s conviction for sexual offences had been declared 
confidential by the Court of Appeal and the case file had also been declared confidential. 
However, some information included in that file was revealed during the programme and some 
details about the court proceedings and the conduct of the children’s mother were mentioned. 
Z., the children’s mother, filed a criminal complaint and the public prosecutor charged A., the 
editor and the editor-in-chief on grounds of dissemination of information violating personal 
privacy and aggravated defamation. 
 
The Supreme Court concluded that it was probable that several persons could have connected A. 
with X. and Y. on the basis of the information given in the programme and that information had 
been disseminated violating the personal privacy of X., Y. and Z., although the disclosure of this 
confidential information had not been based on the need to inform the public. On the contrary, 
it had been necessary to conceal that information. A. and the two journalists were fined and 
ordered to pay damages and costs. The broadcasting company and its two journalists complained 
under Article 10 of the European Convention that the Supreme Court’s judgment violated their 
right to freedom of expression. 
 
Although the European Court was of the opinion that the programme clearly involved an element 
of general importance and that in such situations any restrictions on freedom of expression 
should be imposed with particular caution, it noted that the two under-age victims of sexual 
offences and their mother were private persons and that sensitive information about their lives 
was revealed on air nationwide. The European Court did not find arbitrary the Finnish Supreme 
Court’s finding that the relevant criminal provision did not, in general, require that the victims 
be recognised de facto and that, in this particular case, it was probable that several people, even 
if a very limited group, could have connected the victims to the person interviewed. The Court 
was satisfied that the reasons relied on by the Supreme Court were relevant and sufficient to 
show that the interference complained of was “necessary in a democratic society” and that a fair 
balance between the competing interests was struck. Unanimously, the Court rejected the 
application by Yleisradio Yo and its editor and editor-in-chief as being manifestly ill-founded. For 
these reasons the Court unanimously declared the application inadmissible. Hence Article 10 of 
the Convention was not found to be violated in this case. 
 
• Yleisradio Oy a.o. v. Finland (dec.), no. 30881/09, 12 June 2009.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Otegi Mondragon v. Spain 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 15 March the European Court of Human Rights decided that an elected 
representative’s conviction for causing serious insult to the King of Spain was contrary to his 
freedom of expression. The case concerns the criminal conviction of a politician of a Basque 
separatist political party, Mr. Arnaldo Otegi Mondragon, following comments made to the press 
during an official visit by the King to the province of Biscay. During a press conference Otegi 
Mondragon, as spokesperson for his parliamentary group, Sozialista Abertzaleak, stated in reply 
to a journalist’s question that the visit of the King to Biscay was a “genuine political disgrace”. 
He said that the King, as “supreme head of the Guardia Civil (police) and of the Spanish armed 
forces” was the person in command of those who had tortured those detained in a recent police 
operation against a local newspaper, amongst them the main editors of the newspaper. Otegi 
Mondragon called the King “he who protects torture and imposes his monarchical regime on our 
people through torture and violence”. Otegi Mondragon was convicted for insult of the King on 
the basis of Article 490 §3 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment and 
suspension of his right to vote during that period. The Spanish courts categorised the impugned 
comments as value judgments and not statements of fact, affecting the inner core of the King’s 
dignity, independently of the context in which they had been made. The European Court of 
Human Rights, however, considers this criminal conviction a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention, as Otegi Mondragon’s remarks had not been a gratuitous personal attack against the 
King nor did they concern his private life or his personal honour. While the Court acknowledged 
that Otegi Mondragon’s language could be considered provocative, it reiterated that it was 
permitted, in the context of a public debate of general interest, to have recourse to a degree of 
exaggeration, or even provocation. The King being the symbol of the State cannot be shielded 
from legitimate criticism, as this would amount to an over-protection of Heads of State in a 
monarchical system. The phrases used by Otegi Mondragon, addressed to journalists during a 
press conference, concerned solely the King’s institutional responsibility as Head of State and a 
symbol of the State apparatus and of the forces which, according to Otegi Mondragon, had 
tortured the editors of a local newspaper. The comments in issue had been made in a public and 
political context that was outside the “essential core of individual dignity” of the King. The 
European Court further emphasised the particular severity of the sentence. While the 
determination of sentences was in principle a matter for the national courts, a prison sentence 
imposed for an offence committed in the area of political discussion was compatible with 
freedom of expression only in extreme cases, such as hate speech or incitement to violence. 
Nothing in Otegi Mondragon’s case justified such a sentence, which inevitably had a dissuasive 
effect. Thus, even supposing that the reasons relied upon by the Spanish courts could be accepted 
as relevant, they were not sufficient to demonstrate that the interference complained of had been 
“necessary in a democratic society”. The applicant’s conviction and sentence were thus 
disproportionate to the aim pursued, in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Otegi Mondragon v. Spain, no. 2034/07, ECHR 2011.  
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European Court of Human Rights: RTBF v Belgium 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 29 March 2011 the European Court found a violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights in the case Radio-télévision belge de la communauté 
française (RTBF) v Belgium. The case concerned an interim injunction ordered by an urgent-
applications judge against the RTBF, preventing the broadcasting of a programme on medical 
errors and patients’ rights. The injunction prohibited the broadcasting of the programme until a 
final court decision in a dispute between a doctor named in the programme and the RTBF. As the 
injunction constituted an interference by the Belgian judicial authorities with the RTBF’s freedom 
of expression, the European Court in the first place had to ascertain whether that interference 
had a legal basis. Whilst Article 10 does not prohibit prior restraints on broadcasting, such 
restraints require a particularly strict legal framework, ensuring both tight control over the scope 
of bans and effective judicial review to prevent any abuse. As news is a perishable commodity, 
delaying its publication, even for a short period, might deprive it of all its interest. In ascertaining 
whether the interference at issue had a legal basis, the Court observed that the Belgian 
Constitution authorised the punishment of offences committed in the exercise of freedom of 
expression only once they had been committed and not before. Although some provisions of the 
Belgian Judicial Code permitted in general terms the intervention of the urgent-applications 
judge, there was a discrepancy in the case law as to the possibility of preventive intervention in 
freedom of expression cases by that judge. The Belgian law was thus not clear and there was no 
constant jurisprudence that could have enabled the RTBF to foresee, to a reasonable degree, the 
possible consequences of the broadcasting of the programme in question. The European Court 
observed that, without precise and specific regulation of preventive restrictions on freedom of 
expression, many individuals fearing attacks on them in television programmes - announced in 
advance - might apply to the urgent-applications judge, who would choose different solutions to 
their cases and that this would not be conducive to preserving the essence of the freedom of 
imparting information. Although the European Court considers a different treatment between 
audiovisual and print media not unacceptable as such, e.g., regarding the licensing of radio and 
television, it did not agree with the Belgian Court of Cassation decision to refuse to apply the 
essential constitutional safeguard against censorship of broadcasting. According to the European 
Court, this differentiation appeared artificial, while there was no clear legal framework to allow 
prior restraint as a form of censorship on broadcasting. The Court was of the opinion that the 
legislative framework, together with the case-law of the Belgian courts, did not fulfil the 
condition of forseeability required by the Convention. As the interference complained of could 
not be considered to be prescribed by law, there had thus been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. The judgment contains an important message to all member states of the European 
Convention on Human Rights: prior restraints require a particularly strict, precise and specific 
legal framework, ensuring both tight control over the scope of bans both in print media and in 
audiovisual media services, combined with an effective judicial review to prevent any abuse by 
the domestic authorities. 
 
• RTBF v. Belgium, no. 50084/06, ECHR 2011.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Mosley v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In the case Mosley v. the United Kingdom the European Court of Human Rights decided that the 
right of privacy guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not 
require the media to give prior notice of intended publications to those who feature in them. The 
applicant in this case is Max Rufus Mosley, the former president of the International Automobile 
Federation. In 2008, the Sunday newspaper News of the World published on its front page an 
article entitled “F1 Boss Has Sick Nazi Orgy with 5 Hookers”, while several pages inside the 
newspaper were also devoted to the story and included still photographs taken from video 
footage secretly recorded by one of the participants in the sexual activities. An edited extract of 
the video, in addition to still images, were also published on the newspaper’s website and 
reproduced elsewhere on the Internet. Mr Mosley brought legal proceedings against the 
newspaper claiming damages for breach of confidence and invasion of privacy. In addition, he 
sought an injunction to restrain the News of the World from making available on its website the 
edited video footage. The High Court refused to grant the injunction because the material was 
no longer private, as it had been published extensively in print and on the Internet. In subsequent 
privacy proceedings the High Court found that there was no public interest and thus no 
justification for publishing the litigious article and accompanying images, which had breached 
Mr. Mosley’s right to privacy. The court ruled that News of the World had to pay to Mr. Mosley 
60,000 GBP in damages. 
 
Relying on Article 8 (right to private life) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the 
European Convention, Mr. Mosley complained that, despite the monetary compensation awarded 
to him by the courts, he remained a victim of a breach of his privacy as a result of the absence of 
a legal duty on the part of the News of the World to notify him in advance of their intention to 
publish material concerning him, thus giving him the opportunity to ask a court for an interim 
injunction and prevent the material’s publication. The European Court found indeed that the 
publications in question had resulted in a flagrant and unjustified invasion of Mr. Mosley’s private 
life. The question which remained to be answered was whether a legally binding pre-notification 
rule was required. The Court recalled that states enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in respect 
of the measures they put in place to protect people’s right to private life. In the United Kingdom, 
the right to private life is protected with a number of measures: there is a system of self-
regulation of the press; people can claim damages in civil court proceedings; and, if individuals 
become aware of an intended publication touching upon their private life, they can seek an 
interim injunction preventing publication of the material. As a pre-notification requirement 
would inevitably also affect political reporting and serious journalism, the Court stressed that 
such a measure would require careful scrutiny. In addition, a parliamentary inquiry on privacy 
issues had been recently held in the UK and the ensuing report had rejected the need for a pre-
notification requirement. The Court further noted that Mr. Mosley had not referred to a single 
jurisdiction in which a pre-notification requirement as such existed nor had he indicated any 
international legal texts requiring states to adopt such a requirement. Furthermore, as any pre-
notification obligation would have to allow for an exception if the public interest were at stake, 
a newspaper would have to be able to opt not to notify an individual if it believed that it could 
subsequently defend its decision on the basis of the public interest in the information published. 
The Court observed in that regard that a narrowly defined public interest exception would 
increase the chilling effect of any pre-notification duty. Anyway, a newspaper could choose, under 
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a system in which a pre-notification requirement was applied, to run the risk of declining to 
notify, preferring instead to pay a subsequent fine. The Court emphasised that any pre-
notification requirement would only be as strong as the sanctions imposed for failing to observe 
it. But at the same time the Court emphasised that particular care had to be taken when 
examining constraints which might operate as a form of censorship prior to publication. Although 
punitive fines and criminal sanctions could be effective in encouraging pre-notification, they 
would have a chilling effect on journalism, including political and investigative reporting, both 
of which attract a high level of protection under the Convention. Such as scheme would therefore 
run the risk of being incompatible with the Convention’s requirements of freedom of expression, 
guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. Having regard to the chilling effect to which a pre-
notification requirement risked giving rise, to the doubts about its effectiveness and to the wide 
margin of appreciation afforded to the UK in this area, the Court concluded that Article 8 did not 
require a legally binding pre-notification requirement. 
 
• Mosley v. the United Kingdom, no. 48009/08, 10 May 2011.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Sigma Radio Television Ltd. v. Cyprus 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
This case concerns a complaint by a broadcasting company regarding a number of decisions by 
the Cyprus Radio and Television Authority (CRTA) imposing fines on the company for violations 
of legislation concerning radio and television programmes in its broadcasts and the alleged 
unfairness of the related domestic proceedings. The breaches found by the CRTA concerned 
advertisements for children’s toys; the duration of advertising breaks; the placement of sponsors’ 
names during news programmes; product placement in a comedy series; news programmes that 
lacked objectivity or contained material unsuitable for minors or were disrespectful of crime 
victims and their relatives; films, series and trailers that contained offensive remarks and 
inappropriate language or included scenes of violence unsuitable for children; and, in one 
particular case, racist and discriminatory remarks in an entertainment series. 
 
Sigma RTV alleged substantially that it had been denied a fair hearing before an independent 
and impartial tribunal, invoking Article 6 of the Convention. In this connection it complained 
about the proceedings before the CRTA and the judicial review proceedings before the Supreme 
Court. Sigma RTV’s grievance as to the proceedings before the CRTA concentrated on the 
multiplicity of its functions in prosecuting, investigating, trying and deciding cases and imposing 
sanctions. In addition, Sigma RTV complained that the members and staff of the CRTA had a 
direct and personal interest in imposing fines, as the amounts thus collected were deposited in 
the CRTA’s Fund, from which their salaries and/or remuneration were paid. 
 
The European Court notes that a number of uncontested procedural guarantees were available 
to Sigma RTV in the proceedings before the CRTA: the company was given details of the probable 
violation or the complaint made against it and the reasoned decisions were arrived at after a 
hearing had been held, while Sigma RTV was able to make written submissions and/or oral 
submissions during the hearing. Furthermore, it was open to Sigma RTV to make a wide range of 
complaints in the context of the judicial review proceedings before the CRTA. Despite the 
existence of these safeguards, the combination of the different functions of the CRTA and, in 
particular, the fact that all fines are deposited in its own fund for its own use, gives rise, in the 
Court’s view, to legitimate concerns that the CRTA lacks the necessary structural impartiality to 
comply with the requirements of Article 6. Nonetheless, the Court reiterates that even where an 
adjudicatory body, including an administrative one as in the present case, which determines 
disputes over “civil rights and obligations” does not comply with Article 6 §1 in some respect, no 
violation of the Convention can be found if the proceedings before that body are “subject to 
subsequent control by a judicial body that has ‘full’ jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees 
of Article 6 §1”. Although the Supreme Court could not substitute its own decision for that of the 
CRTA and its jurisdiction over the facts was limited, it could have annulled the decisions on a 
number of grounds, including if the decision had been reached on the basis of a misconception 
of fact or law, if there had been no proper enquiry or a lack of due reasoning, or on procedural 
grounds. The European Court notes that indeed the Supreme Court examined all the above issues, 
point by point, without refusing to deal with any of them and that the Supreme Court gave clear 
reasons for the dismissal of the Sigma RTV’s points. The Court came to the conclusion that Sigma 
RTV’s allegations as to shortcomings in the proceedings before the CRTA, including those 
concerning objective partiality and the breach of the principles of natural justice, were subject 
to review by the Supreme Court and that the scope of the review of the Supreme Court in the 
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judicial review proceedings in the present case was sufficient to comply with Article 6 of the 
Convention. 
 
The Court also dismissed Sigma RTV’s complaints regarding the alleged violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention as all decisions by the CRTA were in accordance with Art. 10 §2, the sanctions 
and fines being prescribed by law, being proportionate and being pertinently justified on the 
basis of legitimate aims. These aims, in general, included the protection of consumers and 
children from unethical advertising practices, the protection of children from broadcasts 
containing violence or any other material likely to impair their physical, mental or moral 
development, the importance of ensuring that viewers were informed of the true content of the 
broadcasts by the use of appropriate acoustic and visual warnings, the protection of pluralism of 
information, the need for a fair and accurate presentation of facts and events and the protection 
of the reputation, honour, good name and privacy of persons involved in or affected by the 
broadcast. The Court found therefore, that the interference with Sigma RTV’s exercise of their 
right to freedom of expression in these cases can reasonably be regarded as having been 
necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of others. The Court accordingly 
declared inadmissible, as manifestly ill-founded, Sigma RTV’s complaints under Article 10 in 
respect of the CRTA’s decisions. One complaint however received a more thorough analysis on 
the merits: the complaint regarding the racist and discriminatory content of a fictional series. The 
Court emphasises that it is particularly conscious of the vital importance of combating racial and 
gender discrimination in all its forms and manifestations and that the CRTA could not be said in 
the circumstances to have overstepped its margin of appreciation in view of the profound analysis 
at the national level, even though the remarks had been made in the context of a fictional 
entertainment series. Lastly, as to the proportionality of the impugned measure, the Court found, 
bearing in mind the amount of the fine and the fact that the CRTA, when imposing the fine, took 
into account the repeated violations by the applicant in other episodes of the same series, that 
the fine imposed (approximately EUR 3,500) was proportionate to the aim pursued. Accordingly, 
there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
Finally the Court also dismissed the complaint regarding the alleged discrimination against 
Sigma RTV, operating as a private broadcaster under stricter rules, restrictions and monitoring 
than the national public broadcasting company in Cyprus, CyBC. The European Court was of the 
opinion that, given the differences in the legal status and the applicable legal frameworks and 
the different objectives of private stations and the CyBC in the Cypriot broadcasting system, it 
cannot be said that they are in a comparable position for the purposes of Article 14 of the 
Convention. The Court found, therefore, that the present case does not indicate discrimination 
contrary to Article 14 of the Convention. 
 
• Sigma Radio Television Ltd v. Cyprus, nos. 32181/04 and 35122/05, 21 July 2011.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Sipoş v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a remarkable judgment the European Court of Human Rights has come to the conclusion that 
Romania breached the right of privacy of a journalist when the Romanian courts acquitted the 
director and the coordinator of the press office of the Romanian Television Company (SRTV) in 
criminal defamation and insult proceedings. 
 
At the heart of the case lies a press release published by the management of the Romanian State 
TV channel, after removing the applicant, Ms. Maria Sipoş, from a programme that she produced 
and presented on the National State channel România 1. Following her replacement as a 
presenter, Ms. Sipoş made a number of statements to the press alleging that SRTV was engaged 
in censorship. The broadcaster responded in turn by issuing a press release, explaining that Ms. 
Sipoş had been replaced due to audience numbers. The press release, quoted by six national 
newspapers, also made reference to Ms. Sipoş’ emotional state due to family problems, it 
questioned her discernment, referred to allegedly antagonistic relations between her and her 
colleagues and suggested she was a victim of political manipulation. Ms. Sipoş claimed that 
SRTV’s press release had infringed her right to her reputation, and she brought criminal 
proceedings before the Bucharest District Court against the channel’s director and the 
coordinator of the SRTV’s press office, accusing both of insults and defamation. The Bucharest 
County Court acknowledged that the press release contained defamatory assertions about Ms. 
Sipoş, but having regard to the fact that the defendants had not intended to insult or defame her 
and in view of their good faith, it dismissed Ms. Sipoş’ claims. 
 
Before the European Court of Human Rights Ms. Sipoş complained that the Romanian authorities 
had failed in their obligation, under Article 8 of the Convention, to protect her right to respect 
for her reputation and private life against the assertions contained in the press release issued by 
the SRTV. Referring to the positive obligations a State has in securing respect for private life, 
even in the sphere of relations between private individuals, the European Court clarified that it 
had to determine whether Romania had struck a fair balance between, on the one hand, the 
protection of Ms. Sipoş’ right to her reputation and to respect for her private life, and on the 
other, the freedom of expression (Article 10) of those who had issued the impugned press release. 
For that purpose the Court examined the content of the press release and found, in particular, 
that the assertions presenting Ms. Sipoş as a victim of political manipulation were devoid of any 
proven factual basis, since there was no indication that she had acted under the influence of any 
particular vested interest. As regards the remarks about her emotional state, the Court noted that 
they were based on elements of her private life whose disclosure did not appear necessary. As to 
the assessment about Ms. Sipoş’ discernment, it could not be regarded as providing an 
indispensable contribution to the position of the SRTV, as expressed through the press release, 
since it was based on elements of the applicant’s private life known to the SRTV’s management. 
The Court noted that, given the chilling effect of criminal sanctions, a civil action would have 
been more appropriate, but it concluded nonetheless that the statements had crossed the 
acceptable limits and that the Romanian courts had failed to strike a fair balance between 
protecting the right to reputation and freedom of expression. Thus, there had been a violation of 
Article 8, and Ms. Sipoş was awarded EUR 3,000 in damages. 
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One dissenting judge, Judge Myer, drew attention to a particular issue in this case. Although the 
Third Chamber of the Court recognized that criminal sanctions have a chilling effect on speech 
and that it would have been more appropriate to initiate the civil proceedings available to the 
applicant, nevertheless the majority of the European Court found that the criminal sanction of 
the director and press officer of the SRTV was necessary in a democratic society in order to protect 
Ms. Sipoş’ right to her reputation and private life, an approach that contrasts with Resolution 
1577(2007) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe urging the decriminalization 
of defamation and insult. 
 
• Sipoş v. Romania, no. 26125/04, 3 May 2011.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Karttunen v Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has delivered a decision regarding the criminalization of 
the possession, reproduction and public display of child pornography, freely downloaded from 
the Internet, and its compatibility with freedom of (artistic) expression. The issue before the 
European Court was whether the conviction of an artist for including child pornography in a work 
exhibited at an art exhibition violated the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. 
 
Ms. Ulla Annikki Karttunen is a Finnish artist who exhibited her work “the Virgin-Whore Church” 
in an art gallery in Helsinki in 2008. The work included hundreds of photographs of teenage girls 
or otherwise very young women in sexual poses and acts. The pictures had been downloaded 
from free Internet pages. One day after the opening of the exhibition, the police seized the 
pictures and the exhibition was closed down. The police also seized Karttunen’s computer and 
the public prosecutor pressed charges against the artist. The domestic courts convicted the artist 
of possessing and distributing sexually obscene pictures depicting children under the age of 18, 
also referring to the finding that some of the pictures were of an extremely violent or degrading 
nature. Even though the artist’s intention had not been to commit a criminal act but, on the 
contrary, to criticise easy Internet access to child pornography, the possession and distribution 
of sexually obscene pictures depicting children were still to be considered criminal acts according 
to Chapter 17, sections 18/19 of the Finnish Penal Code. Taking into account that Karttunen had 
intended to provoke general discussion about child pornography and that the crimes were minor 
and excusable, the Finnish court did not impose any sanctions on the artist. Instead, all the 
pictures were ordered to be confiscated. 
 
Karttunen complained in Strasbourg under Article 10 of the Convention that her right as an artist 
to freedom of expression had been violated. She argued that she had incorporated the 
pornographic pictures into her work in an attempt to encourage discussion and raise awareness 
of how widespread and easily accessible child pornography was. The European Court noted that 
the artist’s conviction, even if no sanction was imposed on her, constituted an interference with 
her right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 Â§ 1 of the Convention. As the 
interference was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting morals as well 
as the reputation or rights of others, within the meaning of Article 10 Â§ 2, it still was to be 
determined whether the interference in the artist’s freedom of artistic expression was necessary 
in a democratic society. The European Court considered that the domestic courts had adequately 
balanced the artist’s freedom of expression with the countervailing interests. The Court referred 
to the finding by the Finnish courts that the possession and public display of child pornography 
was still subject to criminal liability, the criminalization of child pornography and the artist’s 
conviction being mainly based on the need to protect children against sexual abuse, as well as 
violation of their privacy and on moral considerations. The Court also noted that the domestic 
courts had acknowledged the artist’s good intentions, by not imposing any sanctions. Having 
regard as well to the aspect of “morals” involved and to the margin of appreciation afforded to 
the state in this area, the Court considered that the interference was proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. Thus, the Court concluded that “it does not follow from the applicant’s 
claim that her conviction did not, in all the circumstances of the case, respond to a genuine social 
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need”. The Court declared the artist’s application manifestly ill-founded and therefore 
inadmissible. 
 
• Karttunen v Finland (dec.), no. 1685/10, 10 May 2011.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Avram and other v Moldova 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 5 July 2011 the European Court of Human Rights found that five women 
broadcast on national television in a sauna romp with police officers should have received higher 
financial compensation for the breach of their privacy. This judgment became final on 5 October 
2011. 
 
The applicants in this case are five young women, all friends, who complained about the 
broadcasting on Moldovan national television of an intimate video footage showing them in a 
sauna with five men, four of whom were police officers. At the time, three of the applicants were 
journalists, the first two for the investigative newspaper Accente. The women claimed that they 
first had contact with the police officers when the editor in chief of Accente was arrested on 
charges of corruption and that, from that point on, the officers provided them with material for 
their articles. One of the applicants had even become romantically involved with one of the 
officers. The footage was used in a programme on national television about corruption in 
journalism and notably in the newspaper Accente. It showed the applicants, apparently 
intoxicated, in a sauna in their underwear, with two of them kissing and touching one of the men 
and one of them performing an erotic dance. The faces of the men were covered in the video, 
whereas those of the applicants were not. The video was paused from time to time in order to 
allow the women to be recognized more easily. The applicants alleged in particular that the video 
had been secretly filmed by the police officers and used to try to blackmail them into not 
publishing an article on illegalities at the Moldovan Ministry of Internal Affairs. Indeed the video 
was send to the National Television Service only after the first two applicants had had the article 
published in their newspaper. 
 
The five applicants brought civil proceedings both against the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for 
arranging the secret filming and giving documents of a private nature to national television, and 
against National Television, for then broadcasting the images of a private nature. They requested 
compensation for a breach of their right to respect for their private and family life under Article 
8 of the European Convention. In August 2008 the Supreme Court of Justice in Moldova gave a 
final ruling in which it dismissed the complaint against the Ministry of Internal Affairs concerning 
the secret filming on account of lack of evidence. It held, however, that the Ministry was 
responsible for handing documents of a private nature concerning Ms. Avram over to the National 
Television Service and that National Television was then responsible for the broadcasting of the 
sauna scene, in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. The Supreme Court ordered the National 
Television Service to pay each applicant EUR 214 and the Ministry of Internal Affairs a further 
EUR 214 to Ms. Avram, these being the maximum amounts allowed under Article 7/1 of the 
Moldovan old Civil Code by way of compensation for damage to a person’s honour or dignity. 
 
Relying on Article 8 of the Convention (right to respect for private and family life), the applicants 
complained that the domestic authorities had failed to properly investigate the secret filming in 
the sauna and that the compensation awarded to them for the broadcasting was not 
proportionate to the severity of the breach of their right to respect for their private lives. In its 
judgment, the European Court reiterates that the notion of “private life” within the meaning of 
Article 8 of the Convention is a broad concept which includes, inter alia, the right to establish 
and develop relationships with other people. It encompasses elements such as sexual life, the 
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right to live privately and away from publicity and unwanted attention. The Court sees no reason 
to depart from the conclusion of the national courts, which acknowledged that there had been 
interference with the applicants’ right to privacy in respect of both the secret filming and the 
broadcasting of the video on television and the defamation. The Court furthermore made clear 
that a State that awards compensation for a breach of a Convention right cannot content itself 
with the fact that the amount granted represents the maximum under domestic law. The Court 
found that the amounts awarded by the Supreme Court of Justice to the applicants were too low 
to be considered proportionate with the gravity of interference with their right to respect for their 
private lives, taking into account that the broadcasting of the video on national television had 
dramatically affected the private, family and social lives of the applicants. There has, accordingly, 
been a breach of Article 8 of the Convention. In terms of compensation for non-pecuniary damage 
the Court awarded sums between EUR 4,000 and 6,000 to each of the applicants. The Court also 
awarded them jointly with a sum of EUR 1,500 for costs and expenses. 
 
• Avram and Others v. Moldova, no. 41588/05, 5 July 2011.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Standard Verlags GmbH v Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In its first judgment of 2012 related to (journalistic) freedom of expression, the European Court 
of Human Rights dealt with an interesting application of the right of the media to report on 
criminal cases in an early stage of investigation. The judgment also focuses in a peculiar way on 
the notion of a “public figure”. The case concerns an article published by the Austrian newspaper 
Der Standard, reporting on the enormous speculation losses incurred by a regional bank, Hypo 
Alpe-Adria. The article reported on the criminal investigation into embezzlement that had been 
opened by the public prosecutor in respect of the senior management of the bank. It identified 
some of the persons involved, including Mr Rauscher, the head of the bank’s treasury. Mr 
Rauscher brought proceedings against the newspaper’s company for disclosing his identity in 
that article and, as a result, he was awarded EUR 5,000 in compensation. In its judgment the 
Vienna Court of Appeal found that Mr Rauscher’s interest in the protection of his identity and the 
presumption of innocence outweighed the newspaper’s interest in disclosing his name. 
 
The Strasbourg Court however, after being requested to evaluate the interference in Der 
Standard’s freedom of expression under the scope of Article 10 of the Convention, came to 
another conclusion in balancing the newspaper’s right to freedom of expression against Mr 
Rauscher’s right to protection of his identity. The European Court agreed with the finding by the 
Austrian courts that Mr Rauscher, as a senior employee of the bank in issue, was not a “public 
figure” and that the fact that his father had been a politician did not make him a public figure. 
The Strasbourg Court also agreed with the assessment that Mr Rauscher had not entered the 
public arena. However, the Court observed that the question of whether or not a person, whose 
interests have been violated by reporting in the media, is a public figure is only one element 
among others to be taken into account in answering the question whether the newspaper was 
entitled to disclose the name of that person. Another important factor that the Court has 
frequently stressed when it comes to weighing conflicting interests under Article 10 (freedom of 
expression) on the one hand and Article 8 (right to privacy) on the other hand is the contribution 
made by articles or photos in the press to a debate of general interest. The European Court 
emphasised that the article in Der Standard dealt with the fact that politics and banking are 
intertwined and reported on the opening of an investigation by the public prosecutor. In this 
connection the Court reiterated that there is little scope under Article 10 Â§2 of the Convention 
for restrictions on political speech or on debates on questions of public interest. It accepted the 
Vienna Court of Appeal’s finding that the disclosure of a suspect’s identity may be particularly 
problematic at the early stage of criminal proceedings. However, as the article at issue was not 
a typical example of court reporting, but focused mainly on the political dimension of the banking 
scandal at hand, revealing the names of some persons involved, including senior managers of 
the bank, it was legitimate. The Court considered that, apart from reporting the fact that the 
public prosecutor had opened an investigation into the bank’s senior management on suspicion 
of embezzlement, the impugned litigious article did not deal with the conduct or contents of the 
investigation as such. Instead the focus was on the extent to which politics and banking are 
intertwined and on the political and economic responsibility for the bank’s enormous losses. In 
such a context, names, persons and personal relationships are clearly of considerable importance 
and it is difficult to see how the newspaper could have reported on these issues in a meaningful 
manner without mentioning the names of all those involved, including Mr Rauscher. The Court 
therefore considered that the domestic courts had overstepped the narrow margin of 
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appreciation afforded to them with regard to restrictions on debates on subjects of public 
interest. It follows that the interference with the newspaper’s right to freedom of expression was 
not “necessary in a democratic society”. Consequently, the Court concluded that there had been 
a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court awarded Standard Verlags GmbH EUR 7,600 
for pecuniary damages and EUR 4,500 for costs and expenses. 
 
• Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 3), no. 34702/07, 10 January 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Axel Springer AG v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In two judgments of 7 February 2012 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
has balanced the right to freedom of expression by the media (Article 10 of the Convention) with 
celebrities’ personality rights and their right of privacy (Article. 8 of the Convention). The overall 
conclusion is that media coverage including pictures of celebrities is acceptable when the media 
reporting concerns matters of public interest or at least to some degree contributes to a debate 
of general interest. In the case of Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2), the Court held unanimously 
that the publication of a picture of Princess Caroline of Monaco illustrating an article about the 
Principality of Monaco and the refusal by the German Courts to grant an injunction against it, did 
not amount to a violation of the right of privacy of the Princess. The European Court is of the 
opinion that the Princess, irrespective of the question to what extent she assumed official 
functions, is to be regarded as a public person. The article with the picture at issue did not solely 
serve entertainment purposes and there was nothing to indicate that the photo had been taken 
surreptitiously or by equivalent secret means such as to render its publication illegal. 
 
The judgment in the case Axel Springer AG v. Germany concerns the media coverage by the 
newspaper Bild of the arrest and conviction of a famous TV-actor (X), found in possession of 
drugs. X had played the part of Police Superintendent as the hero of a popular television series 
on German TV, reaching between 3,000,000 and 4,700,000 viewers per episode. X brought 
injunction proceedings against the publishing company of Bild because of the publication of two 
articles, one reporting that X was arrested for possession of cocaine and another, a year later, 
that he was convicted of the same offence. The German courts granted X’s request to prohibit 
any further publication of the two articles and the photos illustrating these articles. Although 
these injunctions were prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the 
reputation of X, the Grand Chamber of the European Court is of the opinion that the interference 
by the German judicial authorities cannot be considered necessary in a democratic society. The 
Court noted that the arrest and conviction of X concerned public judicial facts of which the public 
has an interest in being informed. It is also emphasized that there was a close link between the 
popularity of the actor in question and his character as a TV-actor, playing a police 
superintendent, whose mission was law enforcement and crime prevention. This element 
increased the public’s interest in being informed of X’s arrest for a criminal offence. The Court 
also observed that X was arrested in public, in a tent at the beer festival in Munich. According to 
the Court there were no sufficiently strong grounds for believing that Bild should preserve X’s 
anonymity, having regard to the nature of the offence committed by X, the degree to which X 
was well-known to the public, the circumstances of his arrest and the veracity of the information 
in question. Furthermore the articles in Bild did not reveal details about X’s private life, but 
mainly concerned the circumstances of and events following his arrest. They contained no 
disparaging expression or unsubstantiated allegation. The fact that the first article contained 
certain expressions which, to all intents and purposes, were designed to attract the public’s 
attention cannot in itself raise an issue, according to the Court. Finally the Court finds that the 
injunction against the articles in Bild was capable of having a chilling effect on the applicant 
company. In conclusion, the grounds advanced by the German authorities, although relevant, are 
not sufficient to establish that the interference complained of by Springer Verlag AG was 
necessary in a democratic society. Despite the margin of appreciation enjoyed by Contracting 
States, the Court considers that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between, 
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on the one hand, the restrictions imposed by the national courts on Bild’s right to freedom of 
expression and, on the other hand, the legitimate aim pursued. Accordingly, there has been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. Germany is ordered to pay EUR 50,000 in respect of 
pecuniary damages and costs and expenses to Springer Verlag AG. 
 
Five judges dissented with the finding of a violation of Article 10, mainly arguing that the 
European Court should have respected a broader margin of appreciation for the German courts. 
According to the five dissenting judges it is not the task of the Strasbourg Court to act as a “fourth 
instance to repeat anew assessments duly performed by the domestic courts”. The majority of 12 
judges of the Grand Chamber however found that the interference in Bild’s reporting by the 
German authorities amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention, especially 
taking into account 6 criteria of the media content: the contribution to a debate of general 
interest, the fact that the reporting concerned a public figure, the subject of the report, the prior 
conduct of the person concerned, the method of obtaining the information and its veracity, the 
content, form and consequences of the media content and the severity of the sanction imposed. 
In essence the European Court found that the injunctions against Bild were capable of having a 
chilling effect on the applicant’s freedom of expression. 
 
• Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, 7 February 2012.  
• Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, ECHR 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Tuşalp v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 21 February 2012, the European Court of Human Rights has once again found an unjustified 
interference with the right to freedom of expression and press freedom by the Turkish authorities. 
The peculiarity this time is that the Prime Minister, Mr Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, himself lies at the 
centre of the violation of the European Convention by the Strasbourg Court. In the case Tuşalp v. 
Turkey the European Court was asked to consider whether two defamation actions taken by the 
Prime Minister of Turkey against a journalist for protection of his personality rights were 
compatible with Article 10 of the European Convention. The applicant was Erbil Tuşalp, a 
journalist and author of several books. He criticised in two articles, published in the newspaper 
Birgün, the alleged illegal conduct and corruption of high-ranking politicians, also including the 
Prime Minister in his commentary. The Prime Minister brought civil actions for compensation 
against the journalist and the publishing company before the Turkish courts on the ground that 
certain remarks in the articles constituted an attack on his personality rights. The Turkish courts 
considered that the remarks made in the articles indeed went beyond the limits of acceptable 
criticism and belittled the Prime Minister in the public and the political arena. According to the 
domestic courts, Tuşalp had published allegations of a kind that one cannot make about a Prime 
Minister, including the second article that had alleged that the Prime Minister had psychological 
problems and that he had a hostile attitude suggesting he was mentally ill. The journalist and 
publishing company were ordered to pay TRY 10,000 (EUR 4,300) in compensation. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights however disagreed with the findings of the Turkish courts. 
The Court considered that the articles concerned comments and views on current events. Both 
articles focused on very important matters in a democratic society which the public had an 
interest in being informed about and fell within the scope of political debate. The Court also 
considered the balance between Tuşalp’s interest in conveying his views, and the Prime Minister’s 
interests in having his reputation protected and being protected against personal insult. The 
European Court considers that, even assuming that the language and expressions used in the two 
articles in question were provocative and inelegant and certain expressions could legitimately 
be classed as offensive, they were, however, mostly value judgments. These value judgments 
were based on particular facts, events or incidents which were already known to the general 
public, as some of the quotations compiled by Tuşalp for the purposes of the domestic 
proceedings demonstrate. They therefore had sufficient factual basis. As to the form of the 
expressions, the Court observes that the author chose to convey his strong criticisms, coloured 
by his own political opinions and perceptions, by using a satirical style. According to the Court 
offensive language may fall outside the protection of freedom of expression if it amounts to 
wanton denigration, for example where the sole intent of the offensive statement is to insult. 
But the use of vulgar phrases in itself is not decisive in the assessment of an offensive expression 
as it may well serve merely stylistic purposes. Style constitutes part of communication as a form 
of expression and is as such protected together with the content of the expression. However, in 
the instant case, the domestic courts, in their examination of the case, omitted to set the 
impugned remarks within the context and the form in which they were expressed. 
 
The European Court is of the opinion that various strong remarks contained in the articles in 
question and particularly those highlighted by the domestic courts could not be construed as a 
gratuitous personal attack against the Prime Minister. In addition, the Court observes that there 
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is nothing in the case file to indicate that the applicant’s articles have affected the Prime 
Minister’s political career or his professional and private life. The Court comes to the conclusion 
that the domestic courts failed to establish convincingly any pressing social need for putting the 
Prime Minister’s personality rights above the journalist’s rights and the general interest in 
promoting the freedom of the press where issues of public interest are concerned. The Court 
therefore considers that in making their decisions the Turkish courts overstepped their margin of 
appreciation and that they have interfered with the journalist’s freedom of expression in a 
disproportionate way. The amount of compensation which Tuşalp was ordered to pay, together 
with the publishing company, was significant and such sums could deter others from criticising 
public officials and limit the free flow of information and ideas. The Court concluded that the 
Turkish courts had failed to establish any “pressing social need” for putting the Prime Minister’s 
personality rights above the right to freedom of expression and the general interest in promoting 
press freedom. There had thus been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Tuşalp v. Turkey, nos. 32131/08 and 41617/08, 21 February 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Aksu v. Turkey (Grand Chamber) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
For the facts of this case we refer to IRIS 2010-10/1 in which the Court’s Chamber judgment of 
27 July 2010 was reported. In essence Mr. Mustafa Aksu, who is of Roma/Gypsy origin, complained 
in Strasbourg that two publications financed or supported by the Ministry of Culture in Turkey, 
had offended him in his Roma identity, under Article 14 (the anti-discrimination provision) in 
conjunction with Article 8 (right to privacy). The action of Mr. Aksu was directed against a book 
entitled “The Gypsies of Turkey” and a dictionary entitled “Turkish Dictionary for Pupils”, both 
containing insulting, denigrating or stereotyping statements about Roma. In its judgment of 27 
July 2010 the European Court was not persuaded that the author of the book insulted Mr. Aksu's 
integrity or that the domestic authorities had failed to protect his rights. Regarding the dictionary, 
the Court observed that the definitions provided therein were prefaced with the comment that 
the terms were of a metaphorical nature. The European Court found no reason to depart from the 
domestic courts' findings that Mr. Aksu’s integrity was not harmed and that he had not been 
subjected to discriminatory treatment because of the expressions described in the dictionary. The 
Court, with the smallest majority, concluded that it could not be said that Mr. Aksu was 
discriminated against on account of his ethnic identity as a Roma or that there was a failure on 
the part of the Turkish authorities to take the necessary measures to secure respect for Mr. Aksu’ 
s private life (see also IRIS 2010-10/1). 
 
The Grand Chamber has now confirmed that Mr. Aksu’ s rights under the Convention have not 
been violated. The Grand Chamber decided not to examine the complaint under the anti-
discrimination provision. According to the Court “the case does not concern a difference in 
treatment, and in particular ethnic discrimination, as the applicant has not succeeded in 
producing prima facie evidence that the impugned publications had a discriminatory intent or 
effect. The case is therefore not comparable to other applications previously lodged by members 
of the Roma community”. The main issue in the present case is whether the impugned 
publications, which allegedly contained racial insults, constituted interference with Mr. Aksu’ s 
right to respect for his private life and, if so, whether this interference was compatible with the 
said right. The Court therefore examined the case under Article 8 of the Convention only, 
clarifying that the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle and that it can embrace 
multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity. The Court accepts that an 
individual’s ethnic identity must be regarded as another such element and that in particular, any 
negative stereotyping of a group, when it reaches a certain level, is capable of impacting on the 
group’s sense of identity and the feelings of self-worth and self-confidence of members of the 
group. It is in this sense that it can be seen as affecting the private life of members of the group. 
However, in applying the protection of privacy under Article 8 of the Convention, the Court 
emphasises that due regard should be given to the requirements of freedom of expression under 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
With regard to the book the Court explains that the Turkish courts attached importance to the 
fact it had been written by an academic and that it was to be considered as an academic work. It 
is therefore consistent with the Court’s case-law to submit to careful scrutiny any restrictions on 
the freedom of academics to carry out research and to publish their findings. The Court explains 
why it is satisfied that in balancing the conflicting fundamental rights under Articles 8 and 10 of 
the Convention, the Turkish courts made an assessment based on the principles resulting from 
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the Court’s well-established case law. Although no violation of Article 8 was found, the Court 
nonetheless reiterated that the vulnerable position of Roma/Gypsies means that special 
consideration should be given to their needs and their different lifestyle, both in the relevant 
regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases. Therefore it is clear that in a 
dictionary aimed at pupils, more diligence is required when giving the definitions of expressions 
which are part of daily language but which might be construed as humiliating or insulting. In the 
Court’s view, it would have been preferable to label such expressions as “pejorative” or 
“insulting”, rather than merely stating that they were metaphorical. According to the Court, States 
should promote critical thinking among pupils and equip them with the necessary skills to 
become aware of and react to stereotypes or intolerant elements contained in the material they 
use. The Court also emphasises that the authorities and Government should pursue their efforts 
to combat negative stereotyping of the Roma. Finally the Court considers that the domestic 
authorities did not overstep their margin of appreciation and did not disregard their positive 
obligation to secure to Mr. Aksu effective respect for his private life. By 16 votes to one the Grand 
Chamber holds that there hasn’t been a violation of Article 8 the Convention. 
 
• Aksu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 4149/04 and 41029/04, ECHR 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Vejdeland and others v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 9 February 2012 the European Court has ruled that Sweden did not violate the 
right to freedom of expression in a case about â€˜hate speech’. The criminal conviction of the 
applicants for distributing leaflets that contained anti-gay offensive statements was considered 
necessary in a democratic society in order to protect the rights of homosexuals. It is the first time 
that the Court applies the principles relating to freedom of expression and â€˜hate speech’ in the 
context of sexual orientation. 
 
In 2004 Mr Vejdeland, together with three other persons, went to an upper secondary school and 
distributed approximately a hundred leaflets by leaving them in or on the pupils’ lockers. The 
episode ended when the school’s principal intervened and made them leave the premises. The 
originator of the leaflets was an organisation called National Youth. Vejdeland and his 
companions were charged with agitation against a national or ethnic group (hets mot folkgrupp) 
because of the offensive and denigrating statements toward homosexuals. Vejdeland disputed 
that the text in the leaflets expressed hatred against homosexuals and he claimed that, in any 
event, he had not intended to express contempt for homosexuals as a group; the purpose had 
been to start a debate about the lack of objectivity in the education dispensed in Swedish schools. 
Vejdeland and his companions were convicted by the District Court, but the Court of Appeal 
rejected the charges on the ground that a conviction would amount to a violation of their right 
to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
Swedish Supreme Court finally overruled this judgment and convicted Vejdeland and the others 
of agitation against a national or ethnic group. According to the Supreme Court the leaflets were 
formulated in a way that was offensive and disparaging for homosexuals as a group and in 
violation of the duty under Article 10 to avoid as far as possible statements that are 
unwarrantably offensive to others thus constituting an assault on their rights, and without 
contributing to any form of public debate which could help to further mutual understanding. The 
purpose of the relevant sections in the leaflets could have been achieved without statements 
that were offensive to homosexuals as a group. Vejdeland and his companions complained that 
the judgment of the Supreme Court constituted a violation of their freedom of expression as 
protected by Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The European Court accepted Vejdeland’s argument that the leaflets had been distributed with 
the aim of starting a debate about the lack of objectivity of education in Swedish schools. But 
the Court also agrees with the Swedish Supreme Court that even if this is an acceptable purpose, 
regard must be paid to the wording of the leaflets. The Strasbourg Court observes that, according 
to the leaflets, homosexuality was “a deviant sexual proclivity” that had “a morally destructive 
effect on the substance of society”. The leaflets also alleged that homosexuality was one of the 
main reasons why HIV and AIDS had gained a foothold and that the “homosexual lobby” tried to 
play down paedophilia. In the Court’s opinion, although these statements did not directly 
recommend individuals to commit hateful acts, they are serious and prejudicial allegations. The 
Court reiterates that inciting to hatred does not necessarily entail a call for an act of violence, or 
other criminal acts. Indeed, attacks on persons committed by insulting, holding up to ridicule or 
slandering specific groups of the population can be sufficient for the authorities to favour 
combating racist speech in the face of freedom of expression exercised in an irresponsible 
manner. In this regard, the Court stresses that discrimination based on sexual orientation is as 
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serious as discrimination based on “race, origin or colour”. Furthermore, the leaflets were left in 
the lockers of young people who were at an impressionable and sensitive age and who had no 
possibility to decline to accept them. The European Court refers to the findings by the Supreme 
Court stressing that along with freedoms and rights people also have obligations and that one 
such obligation is, as far as possible, to avoid statements that are unwarrantably offensive to 
others, constituting an assault on their rights. The statements in the leaflets are considered 
unnecessarily offensive and the applicants had left the leaflets in or on the pupils’ lockers, 
thereby imposing them on the pupils. The European Court also notes that the applicants were 
not sentenced to imprisonment, although the crime of which they were convicted carries a 
penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment. Instead, three of them were given suspended sentences 
combined with fines ranging from approximately EUR 200 to EUR 2,000, and the fourth applicant 
was sentenced to probation. The Court does not find these penalties excessive in the 
circumstances. The conviction of Vejdeland and the other applicants and the sentences imposed 
on them were not considered disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and the reasons 
given by the Swedish Supreme Court in justification of those measures were relevant and 
sufficient. The interference with the applicants’ exercise of their right to freedom of expression 
could therefore reasonably be regarded by the Swedish authorities as necessary in a democratic 
society for the protection of the reputation and rights of others. These considerations were 
sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the application did not reveal a violation of Article 
10 of the Convention. Although the Court unanimously came to this conclusion, the concurring 
opinions of five of the seven judges indicate that there was still some hesitation on the 
argumentation why there was no violation of Article 10 and why the distribution and content of 
the leaflets amounted to a form of â€˜hate speech’ against homosexuals. 
 
• Vejdeland v. Sweden, no. 1813/07, 9 February 2012.  
• Fact sheet produced by the European Court of Human Rights on Hate Speech, February 
2012 [Editor’s note: link to updated version of fact sheet (June 2015)]. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Gillberg v. Sweden (Grand Chamber) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The Grand Chamber of the European Court has, more firmly than in its Chamber judgment of 2 
November 2010 (see IRIS 2011/1-1), confirmed that a Swedish professor, Mr. Gillberg, could not 
rely on his right to privacy under Article 8, nor on his (negative) right to freedom of expression 
and information under Article 10 of the Convention to justify his refusal to give access to a set 
of research materials belonging to Gothenburg University, on request of two other researchers, 
K and E. Mr. Gillberg was convicted of misuse of office. He was given a suspended sentence and 
a fine of the equivalent of EUR 4,000. In Strasbourg Mr. Gillberg complained that his criminal 
conviction breached his rights under Articles 8 and 10. 
 
As to the alleged breach of Article 8 of the Convention, the Court is of the opinion that the 
conviction of Mr. Gillberg did not affect his right to privacy. The Court confirmed that Article 8 
cannot be relied on in order to complain of a loss of reputation that is the foreseeable 
consequence of one’s own actions such as, for example, the commission of a criminal offence. As 
there was no indication that the impugned conviction had any repercussions on Mr. Gillberg’s 
professional activities that went beyond the foreseeable consequences of the criminal offence of 
which he was convicted, his rights under Article 8 had not been affected. 
 
Regarding the alleged breach of Article 10, the Court clarified that in the present case the 
applicant was not prevented from receiving and imparting information or in any other way 
prevented from exercising his “positive” right to freedom of expression. Indeed Mr. Gillberg 
argued that he had a “negative” right to refuse to make the disputed research materials available, 
and that consequently his conviction was in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court 
is of the opinion that the finding that Mr. Gillberg would have a right under Article 10 of the 
Convention to refuse to give access to the research materials in this case would not only run 
counter to the property rights of the University of Gothenburg, but “it would also impinge on K’s 
and E’s rights under Article 10, as granted by the Administrative Court of Appeal, to receive 
information in the form of access to the public documents concerned”. 
 
The Court also rejected the claim by Mr. Gillberg that he could invoke a right similar to that of 
journalists in having their sources protected under Article 10 of the Convention. The Court is of 
the opinion that Mr. Gillberg’s refusal to comply with the judgments of the Administrative Court 
of Appeal, by denying K and E access to the research materials, hindered the free exchange of 
opinions and ideas on the research in question, notably on the evidence and methods used by 
the researchers in reaching their conclusions, which constituted the main subject of K’s and E’s 
interest. In these circumstances the Court found that Mr. Gillberg’s situation could not be 
compared to that of journalists protecting their sources. On these grounds the Grand Chamber 
reached the conclusion that the rights of Mr. Gillberg under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention 
had not been affected and that these rights did not apply in the instant case. 
 
• Gillberg v. Sweden [GC], no. 41723/06, 3 April 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Frăsilă and Ciocîrlan v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The case concerns the ineffectiveness of the enforcement of a court decision giving journalists 
the right of access to the premises of a local radio station where they worked (Radio M Plus). 
Access to their work premises had been obstructed by the representatives of the broadcasting 
company Tele M, situated in the same building. In a decision of 6 December 2002 the 
NeamÅ£ County Court ordered Tele M to grant Frăsilă and Ciocîrlan access to the Radio M Plus 
editorial office and held that the obstruction of their access by representatives of the Tele M 
company constituted an unlawful act that might be detrimental to the activities of the radio 
station of which they were the manager and editor respectively. Several attempts to have the 
court decision enforced failed, including a criminal complaint against the representatives of Tele 
M. Relying on Article 10 Frăsilă and Ms Ciocîrlan complained in Strasbourg that the authorities 
had failed to assist them in securing the enforcement of a final judicial decision ordering third 
parties to grant them access to the editorial office at the radio station where they worked as 
journalists. 
 
The Court emphasized that genuine, effective exercise of freedom of expression is a precondition 
of a functioning democracy. The right to freedom of expression does not depend merely on the 
State’s duty not to interfere but could require positive measures of protection, even in the sphere 
of relations between individuals. In determining whether the State had a positive obligation in 
that regard, the Court reiterated that it took into account the nature of the freedom of expression 
at stake, its capacity to contribute to public debate, the nature and scope of the restrictions 
imposed on freedom of expression, the existence of alternative means of exercising this freedom 
and the weight of the competing rights of others or the general public. 
 
Although in this case the authorities did not bear any direct responsibility for the restriction on 
the applicants’ freedom of expression, it was still necessary to determine whether or not the 
authorities had complied with any positive obligation they might have had to protect freedom of 
expression from interference by others. The Court observed that the case concerned the practice 
of a profession that played a crucial “watchdog” role in a democratic society, and that an essential 
element of freedom of expression, namely the means of exercising it, had therefore been at stake 
for Frăsilă and Ciocîrlan. The Court reiterated that the State was the ultimate guarantor of 
pluralism and that this role became even more crucial where the independence of the media was 
at risk as a result of outside pressure from those holding political and economic power, as it had 
been reported. As to whether the State had complied with its positive obligation, the Court 
observed that Frăsilă and Ciocîrlan had taken sufficient steps on their own initiative and made 
the necessary efforts to secure the enforcement of the court decision, but that the main legal 
means available to them for achieving this had proved inadequate and ineffective. Accordingly, 
the Court found that by refraining from taking the necessary measures to assist Frăsilă and 
Ciocîrlan in the enforcement of the court decision, the national authorities had deprived the 
provisions of Article 10 of the Convention of all useful effect. There had therefore been a violation 
of the right to freedom of expression. 
 
• Frăsilă and Ciocîrlan v. Romania, no. 25329/03, 10 May 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Case Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2009 Centro Europa 7 complained in Strasbourg that for a period of almost ten years the Italian 
Government had not allocated it any frequencies for analogue terrestrial television broadcasting, 
while the company had already obtained a licence for TV broadcasting in 1999. The company 
submitted that the failure to apply the broadcasting law of 1997, the refusal to enforce the 
Constitutional Court’s judgments imposing the effective allocation of frequencies for new private 
TV stations and the duopoly existing in the Italian television market (RAI and Mediaset) were in 
breach of Article 10 of the Convention. In this regard Centro Europa 7 especially referred to the 
private broadcaster Mediaset - owned by the family of Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi - being 
treated preferentially and being the reason for the years-long postponing of making frequencies 
available to other broadcasting companies. 
 
The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights reiterates that a situation whereby 
a powerful economic or political group in society is permitted to obtain a position of dominance 
over the audiovisual media and thereby exercise pressure on broadcasters and eventually curtail 
their editorial freedom undermines the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a 
democratic society as enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention, in particular where it serves to 
impart information and ideas of general interest, which the public is moreover entitled to receive. 
It also clarifies that in such a sensitive sector as the audiovisual media, in addition to its negative 
duty of non-interference the State has a positive obligation to put in place an appropriate 
legislative and administrative framework in order to guarantee effective pluralism. It recognises 
that the failure to allocate frequencies to Centro Europa 7 deprived the licence it obtained in 
1999 of all practical purpose since the activity it authorised was de facto impossible to carry out 
for nearly ten years, until June 2009. This substantial obstacle amounted to an interference with 
Centro Europa 7’s exercise of its right to impart information and ideas. According to the European 
Court this interference was not justified under the scope of Article 10§2 of the Convention as it 
was not ‘prescribed by law’. 
 
The Court indeed finds that the Italian legislative framework until 2009 lacked clarity and 
precision and did not enable Centro Europa 7 to foresee, with sufficient certainty, the point at 
which it might be allocated the frequencies and be able to start performing the activity for which 
it had been granted a licence in 1999, notwithstanding the successive findings of the 
Constitutional Court and the CJEU that the Italian law and practice was in breach of constitutional 
provisions and EU law. Furthermore the laws in question were couched in vague terms which did 
not define with sufficient precision and clarity the scope and duration of the transitional schemes 
for the allocation of frequencies. The Court also notes that the authorities did not observe the 
deadlines set in the licence, as resulting from Law no. 249/1997 and the judgments of the 
Constitutional Court, thereby frustrating Centro Europa 7’s expectations. The Italian Government 
has not shown that the company had effective means at its disposal to compel the authorities to 
abide by the law and the Constitutional Court’s judgments. Accordingly, it was not afforded 
sufficient guarantees against arbitrariness. For these reasons the Court considers that the 
legislative framework in Italy at the time did not satisfy the foreseeability requirement under the 
Convention and deprived the company of the measure of protection against arbitrariness required 
by the rule of law in a democratic society. This shortcoming resulted, among other things, in 
reduced competition in the audiovisual sector. It therefore amounted to a failure by the State to 
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comply with its positive obligation to put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative 
framework to guarantee effective media pluralism. 
These findings were sufficient to conclude that there has been a violation of Centro Europa 7’s 
rights to the freedom to express and impart ideas and information under Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Court reached the same finding in relation to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (right 
of property) being violated, as the interference with the Centro Europa 7 company’s property 
rights did not have a sufficiently foreseeable legal basis either within the meaning of the Courts 
case-law. 
 
Centro Europa 7’s claim of EUR 10,000,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage was also 
awarded. The Court considered it appropriate to award this lump sum in compensation for the 
losses sustained and the loss of earnings resulting from the impossibility of making use of the 
licence by Centro Europa 7. In addition, the Court considered that the violations it had found of 
Article 10 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the instant case must have caused 
Centro Europa 7 “prolonged uncertainty in the conduct of its business and feelings of 
helplessness and frustration”. The Court also took into account that Centro Europa 7 already has 
been awarded compensation at domestic level, referring to the judgment of 20 January 2009 of 
the Consiglio di Stato awarding the company the amount of EUR 1,041,418 in compensation. 
 
• Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, ECHR 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicant association is the Swiss branch of the Raëlien Movement, an international 
association whose members believe life on earth was created by extraterrestrials. The association 
sought to conduct a poster campaign, but the local authorities refused permission on the grounds 
of public order and morals. The domestic courts upheld this decision, arguing that although the 
poster itself was not objectionable, because the Raëlien website address was included, one had 
to have regard to the documents and content published on that website. The courts held that the 
poster campaign could be banned on the basis that: (a) there was a link on the website to a 
company proposing cloning services; (b) the association advocated “geniocracy” i.e. government 
by those with a higher intelligence; and (c) there had been allegations of sexual offences against 
some members of the association. Mouvement raëlien made an application to the European Court 
arguing that the ban on its poster campaign was a violation of its right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10 of the European Convention. In January 2011, the First Section of the Court held 
that there had been no violation of Article 10. In its judgment of 13 July 2012 the Grand Chamber 
has affirmed this finding, with a 9-8 vote. 
 
The Court reasoned that because the main aim of the poster and website was to merely draw 
people to the cause of the Raëlien Movement, the speech at issue was to be categorised as 
somewhere between commercial speech and proselytising speech. The Court takes the view that 
the type of speech in question is not political because the main aim of the website in question is 
to draw people to the cause of the applicant association and not to address matters of political 
debate in Switzerland. The Court clarifies that for this reason the management of public 
billboards in the context of poster campaigns that are not strictly political may vary from one 
State to another, or even from one region to another within the same State. The examination by 
the local authorities of the question whether a poster satisfies certain statutory requirements - 
for the defence of interests as varied as, for example, the protection of morals, road traffic safety 
or the preservation of the landscape - thus falls within the margin of appreciation afforded to 
States, as the authorities have a certain discretion in granting authorisation in this area. 
 
The Court takes the view that the national authorities were reasonably entitled to consider, 
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, that it was indispensable to ban the campaign 
in question in order to protect health and morals, to protect the rights of others and to prevent 
crime. The judgment also comments on the controversial approach of banning the poster mainly 
on account of the content of the association’s website the poster referred to, while the association 
remained free to communicate via that same website, the website indeed itself not being 
prohibited, blocked or prosecuted for illegal content. In the Court’s view, however, such an 
approach is justified: to limit the scope of the impugned restriction to the display of posters in 
public places was a way of ensuring the minimum impairment of the applicant association’s 
rights. The Court reiterates that the authorities are required, when they decide to restrict 
fundamental rights, to choose the means that cause the least possible prejudice to the rights in 
question. In view of the fact that the applicant association is able to continue to disseminate its 
ideas through its website, and through other means at its disposal such as the distribution of 
leaflets in the street or in letter-boxes, the impugned measure cannot be said to be 
disproportionate. The majority of the Grand Chamber concluded that the Swiss authorities did 
not overstep the broad margin of appreciation afforded to them in the present case, and the 
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reasons given to justify their decisions were “relevant and sufficient” and met a “pressing social 
need”. Accordingly, there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], no. 16354/06, ECHR 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v. 
Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicant company, the Swiss Radio and Television Company (SSR) is a radio and television 
broadcaster based in Zurich. In 2004 it requested permission to have access to the Hindelbank 
Prison in order to prepare a television interview with A., a prisoner serving a sentence for murder. 
SSR wished to integrate this interview in the programme “Rundschau”, a weekly programme 
covering political and economic questions, in a feature concerning the trial of another person 
who had been accused of murder in the same case. SSR’s request was refused by the prison 
authorities who referred to the need to maintain peace, order and safety and to ensure equal 
treatment among prisoners. SSR complained about this refusal, on account of which it was unable 
to broadcast the planned interview in its “Rundschau” programme. SSR submitted that an 
interview with A., who had given her consent, was a matter of public interest given that even 
after her conviction, the case had continued to attract a great deal of media interest. But all 
appeals before the Swiss courts failed, as it was argued that the entitlement to film in prisons 
could endanger prisoner rehabilitation and violate the personality rights of prisoners. It was also 
argued that the organisation and supervision measures required for television filming exceeded 
what could reasonably be expected of the prison authorities. It was suggested that instead of 
filming in the prison, an audio recording or a simple interview could suffice, as images of the 
prisoner were not necessary for the purposes of a thematic report. Relying on Article 10, SSR 
complained in Strasbourg that it had not been granted permission to film an interview with a 
prisoner inside a prison. It argued that this refusal amounted to a violation of its right to freedom 
of expression and information. 
 
The European Court observed that in determining an issue of freedom of expression in the 
context of a very serious television broadcast devoted to a subject of particular public interest, 
the Swiss authorities had limited discretion to judge whether or not the ban on filming had met 
a “pressing social need”. While acknowledging that there had, at the outset, been grounds to 
justify the ban on filming - in particular with regard to the presumption of innocence of the 
person who was the subject of the programme and whose trial was imminent and the interests 
of the proper administration of justice - the Court observed that the grounds for the courts’ refusal 
had not been relevant or sufficient, either from the point of view of the other prisoners’ rights 
(privacy and rehabilitation) or from the point of view of maintaining order or security reasons. 
Furthermore, the Swiss courts had not examined the technical aspects submitted by SSR 
regarding the limited impact of the filming. As regards the duty of the authorities to protect A., 
the European Court noted that she had given her full and informed consent to the filming. The 
Court reiterated lastly, with regard to the alternatives to filming proposed by the Swiss 
authorities, that since Article 10 also protected the form by which ideas and information were 
conveyed, it was not for this Court, or for the national courts, to substitute their own views for 
those of the media as to what technique of reporting should be adopted by journalists. The 
telephone interview with A. broadcast by SSR in another programme had not in any way remedied 
the interference caused by the refusal to grant permission to film in prison. While reiterating that 
the national authorities in principle were better placed than the Court to make decisions 
concerning access by third parties to a prison, the Court emphasized that in matters of media 
reporting on issues of public interest, the margin of appreciation of the domestic authorities is 
reduced and any interference in this context must be convincingly justified on pertinent and 
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sufficient grounds. The Court concluded that the absolute ban imposed on SSR’s filming in the 
prison did not respond to this condition and had not met a “pressing social need”. For that reason, 
the majority of the Court, with a 5/2 decision (the German and the Swiss judge dissented), came 
to the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Schweizerische Radio- und Fernsehgesellschaft SRG v. Switzerland, no. 34124/06, 21 June 
2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Ressiot and Others v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Once again the European Court has emphasised the importance of the protection of journalists’ 
sources, this time in a case concerning searches and seizures carried out at the French sporting 
daily L'Equipe, the weekly magazine Le Point and at the homes of some of their journalists. This 
judgment comes only a few months after the judgment of the European Court found a violation 
of Article 10 of the European Convention by the French authorities for disrespecting the 
protection of journalists’ sources (ECtHR 12 April 2012, Martin and Others v. France, Appl. Nr. 
30002/08). 
 
The case Ressiot and Others v. France concerns investigations carried out at the premises of 
L’Equipe and Le Point and at the homes of five journalists accused of breaching the 
confidentiality of a judicial investigation. Both newspapers had published a series of articles 
about an ongoing investigation into alleged doping by the Cofidis cycle racing team in the Tour 
de France, an investigation carried out by the Drugs Squad. The French authorities wanted to 
identify the source of the leaks the journalists were obviously relying upon. Searches, seizures 
and telephone tapping were ordered. The five journalists requested that all the material seized 
and gathered during the searches at the newspapers’ offices and at their homes be declared null 
and void. While some of the investigative measures were considered null and void by the French 
courts, the seizure and placing under seal of certain materials were considered to be legitimate 
interferences, not violating the rights of the journalists. The five journalist lodged an application 
with the European Court of Human Rights, complaining that the investigations into their actions 
had been carried out in violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In its judgment the Court reiterates the importance of the protection of journalistic sources as 
one of the cornerstones of freedom of the press. Without such protection, sources might be 
deterred from assisting the press in informing the public. As a result, the vital public-watchdog 
role of the press might be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable 
information might be adversely affected. The Court accepts that the interference by the French 
authorities out of concern for the confidentiality of the investigation had been aimed at 
preventing the disclosure of confidential information, protecting the reputation of others, 
ensuring the proper conduct of the investigation and therefore protecting the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary. According to the Court journalists cannot, in principle, be released 
from their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law. The Court, however, notes that when the 
searches were carried out and the telephone calls tapped, the sole aim had been to identify the 
source of the information published in the newspaper articles, while the right of journalists not 
to disclose their sources could not be considered a mere privilege to be granted or taken away 
depending on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their sources, but was part and parcel of the 
right to information. In this case there was no overriding social need to justify the interference 
with the journalists’ sources. The means used by the French authorities were not reasonably 
proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued having regard to the interest of a democratic society 
in ensuring and maintaining the freedom of the press. Hence the Court, unanimously, comes to 
the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Ressiot and Others v. France, no. 15054/07 and 15066/07, 28 June 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Szima v. Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicant in this case, Ms Judit Szima, was the chairperson of the Tettrekész Police Trade 
Union. She published a number of writings on the Trade Union’s website, which was effectively 
under her editorial control. In some of these writings she sharply criticized the police 
management, also referring to outstanding remunerations due to police staff, alleged nepotism 
and undue political influence in the force, as well as dubious qualifications of senior police staff. 
In 2010 Szima was convicted for instigation to insubordination. The Military Bench of the 
Budapest Court of Appeal confirmed her sentence as a fine and demotion. It held that the 
publication of the posted articles and statements on Tettrekész’s website had gone beyond 
Szima’s freedom of expression, given the particularities of the armed body to which she belonged. 
According to the Hungarian authorities, the views contained in the website articles constituted 
one-sided criticism whose truthfulness could and should not be proven. 
 
The Strasbourg Court confirms that the accusations by Szima of the senior police management 
of political bias and agenda, transgressions, unprofessionalism and nepotism were indeed 
capable of causing insubordination. The Court also observes that “it is true that Szima was barred 
from submitting evidence in the domestic proceedings - a matter of serious concern - however, 
in her attacks concerning the activities of police leadership, she failed to relate her offensive 
value judgments to facts”. The Court is of the opinion that Szima “has uttered, repeatedly, critical 
views about the manner in which police leaders managed the force, and accused them of 
disrespect of citizens and of serving political interests in general”, and that these views 
“overstepped the mandate of a trade union leader, because they are not at all related to the 
protection of labour-related interests of trade union members” (§ 31). In view of the margin of 
appreciation applicable, in order to maintain discipline by sanctioning accusatory opinions that 
undermine trust in, and the credibility of, the police leadership, the European Court accepts that 
there was a sufficient “pressing social need” to interfere with Szima’s freedom of expression. It 
also found that the relatively mild sanction imposed on the applicant - demotion and a fine - 
could not be regarded as disproportionate in the circumstances. By six votes to one, the Court 
concluded that there has been no violation of Article 10 read in the light of Article 11 of the 
Convention. 
 
The outcome of the case is somewhat surprising, as the Court firmly took as its starting point 
that “the members of a trade union must be able to express to their employer their demands by 
which they seek to improve the situation of workers in their company. A trade union that does 
not have the possibility of expressing its ideas freely in this connection would indeed be deprived 
of an essential means of action. Consequently, for the purpose of guaranteeing the meaningful 
and effective nature of trade union rights, the national authorities must ensure that 
disproportionate penalties do not dissuade trade union representatives from seeking to express 
and defend their members’ interests” (§ 28). 
 
As the sole dissent, the president of the Chamber, Judge Tulkens, vehemently disagreed with the 
reasoning of the Court. Tulkens refers to the finding by the Court’s majority that Szima’s critical 
remarks had overstepped the mandate of a trade union leader, because some of them were “not 
at all related to the protection of labour-related interests of trade union members”. Tulkens 
wonders whether the Court itself has not overstepped its mandate by casting this judgment on 
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the role of a trade union leader and on the “legitimate” scope of trade-union activities. In Tulkens’ 
view, the majority of the Court dismissed artificially the trade-union dimension of this case and, 
also neglected the importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society. 
 
• Szima v. Hungary, no. 29723/11, 9 October 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others 
v. the Netherlands 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
For the third time in a short period, the European Court of Human Rights has found that the 
Netherlands authorities have disrespected the right of journalists to protect their sources. This 
time the Court is of the opinion that the telephone tapping and surveillance of two journalists by 
the Netherlands security and intelligence services (AIVD) lacked a sufficient legal basis as the 
law did not provide safeguards appropriate to the use of powers of surveillance against 
journalists with a view to discovering their sources. Also an order to surrender leaked documents 
belonging to the security and intelligence services is considered as a violation of the journalists’ 
rights as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The case concerns the actions taken by the domestic authorities against two journalists of the 
national daily newspaper De Telegraaf after having published articles about the Netherlands 
secret service AIVD, suggesting that highly secret information had been leaked to the criminal 
circuit, and more precisely to the drugs mafia. The journalists were ordered by the National Police 
International Investigation Department to surrender documents pertaining to the secret services’ 
activities. The two journalists had also been subject to telephone tapping and observation by 
AIVD agents. Their applications in court regarding these measures failed, at the level of the 
Regional Court in The Hague as well as at the level of the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). It was 
emphasized that the AIVD investigation was intended to make an assessment of the leaked AIVD-
files and, within that framework, it was considered necessary and proportionate to use special 
powers against the journalists in possession of the leaked files. Also the phone tapping was 
considered to meet the criteria of necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity. 
 
The European Court however disagrees with this approach by the Netherlands’ authorities. 
Referring to its earlier case law regarding the protection of journalists’ sources, the European 
Court reemphasized the necessity of the “ex ante” character of a review by a judge, a court or 
another independent body, as the police or a public prosecutor cannot be considered to be 
objective and impartial so as to make the necessary assessment of the various competing 
interests. The Court applies this approach also in the present case, as the use of special powers 
of surveillance and telephone tapping against the journalists appeared to have been authorised 
by the Minister of the Interior, or by an official of the AIVD, without prior review by an 
independent body with the power to prevent or terminate it. Therefore, the Court finds that the 
law did not provide safeguards appropriate to the use of powers of surveillance against 
journalists with a view to discovering their sources. Regarding the second issue, the Court agrees 
that the order to surrender the leaked documents to the AIVD was prescribed by law, that the 
lawfulness of that order was assessed by a court and that it also pursued a legitimate aim. The 
Strasbourg Court however estimates the interference with the right of journalists to protect their 
sources in casu not necessary in a democratic society, as none of the reasons invoked by the AIVD 
are considered relevant and sufficient by the European Court. 
 
As a consequence of this judgment, the legal framework and the operational practices of many 
security and intelligence services in Europe will need to be modified, in order to guarantee the 
rights of journalists under Article 10 of the Convention. Without guarantees of an ex ante review 
by a judge or an independent body, surveillance or telephone tapping or other coercive measures 
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against journalists by security and intelligence services are inevitably to be considered as 
breaches of the rights of journalists covered by Article 10. 
 
• Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. and Others v. the Netherlands, no. 39315/06, 
22 November 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Nenkova-Lalova v. Bulgaria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a controversial judgment, with a 4/3 decision, the European Court of Human Rights dismissed 
the claim by a journalist, Ms. Nenkova-Lalova, regarding her dismissal from the Bulgarian public 
broadcaster BNR. The BNR journalist complained that her disciplinary dismissal, ostensibly on 
technical grounds regarding the way she had hosted one of her regular weekly radio shows, had 
in reality been a sanction for the way in which she had exposed corrupt practices during one of 
her radio shows. In that talk show unpleasant facts were revealed about the then ruling political 
party. However, as Nenkova-Lalova essentially had breached employment discipline within the 
meaning of the Bulgarian Labour Code and BNR regulations, the European Court agreed with the 
findings of the Sofia Court of Appeal and the Bulgarian Supreme Court that there had been no 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The European Court accepts that Nenkova-Lalova’s dismissal did amount to an interference with 
her rights under Article 10 of the Convention, but the dismissal was justified as it was prescribed 
by law, it pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others and was “necessary in a 
democratic society”. The European Court is of the opinion that Nenkova-Lalova’s dismissal was 
based on her wilful disregard of an editorial decision concerning an issue of the internal 
organisation of the BNR, related to the presentation of a radio show and the journalists (not) 
participating in it. The Court observes that there had not been any limitations on the topics to be 
discussed during her show, or on the substantive content or manner of presentation of the 
information broadcast during the show. Therefore the Court cannot agree with the applicant that 
her dismissal was intended to prevent the dissemination of information of public interest: her 
capacity as a journalist “did not automatically entitle her to pursue, unchecked, a policy that ran 
counter to that outlined by her employer, to flout legitimate editorial decisions taken by the 
BNR’s management and intended to ensure balanced broadcasting on topics of public interest, 
or to have unlimited access to BNR’s air. There is nothing in the facts of the present case to 
suggest that the decisions of the BNR’s management in relation to the applicant’s show were 
taken under pressure from the outside or that the BNR’s management was subject to outside 
interferences”. The Court also comes to the conclusion that although it is true that a dismissal by 
way of disciplinary sanction is a severe measure, it cannot be overlooked that the facts showed 
that her employer could not trust her to perform her duties in good faith. Insisting that 
employment relations should be based on mutual trust applies even more when it comes to 
journalists employed by a public broadcasting organisation. In sum, the Court does not consider 
that Nenkova-Lalova has established that her dismissal was intended to stifle her freedom to 
express herself rather than enable the public broadcasting organisation by which she was 
employed - the BNR - to ensure the requisite discipline in its broadcasts, in line with its “duties 
and responsibilities” under Article 10 of the Convention. There has therefore been no violation 
of that provision. The three dissenting judges are of the opinion that the functioning of the BNR 
and especially the manner in which decisions relevant to the editorial choices of journalists 
hosting programmes were dealt with, did not offer the necessary safeguards for the rights, 
activities, performance and independence of the journalists in their relationship with the public 
employer. They also consider that the act attributed to Nenkova-Lalova taken within this context 
of a rather unclear division of responsibilities as concerns editorial choices within a given 
programme does not appear to have been so grave or so far-reaching in its effects as to have 
irrevocably breached the mutual trust between employer and employee. The opinion that the 
Back to overview of case-law 
298 
Bulgarian authorities have violated Article 10 of the Convention however is not shared by the 
majority of the Court. Four of the seven judges indeed found that the dismissal of the BNR 
journalist did not amount to a breach of Article 10. 
 
• Nenkova-Lalova v. Bulgaria, no. 35745/05, 11 December 2012.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Ahmet Yildirim v Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has reinforced the right of individuals to access the internet 
in a judgment against wholesale blocking of online content. A Turkish PhD student named Ahmet 
Yildirim claimed before the European Court that he had faced “collateral censorship” when his 
Google-hosted website was shut down by the Turkish authorities as a result of a judgment by a 
criminal court order to block access to Google Sites in Turkey. The court injunction was 
promulgated in order to prevent further access to one particular website hosted by Google, which 
included content deemed offensive to the memory of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the 
Turkish Republic. Due to this order Yildirim’s academically-focused website, which was unrelated 
to the website with the allegedly insulting content regarding the memory of Atatürk, was 
effectively blocked by the Turkish Telecommunications Directorate (TIB). According to TIB, 
blocking access to Google Sites was the only technical means of blocking the offending site, as 
its owner was living outside Turkey. Yildirim’s subsequent attempts to remedy the situation and 
to regain access to his website hosted by the Google Sites service were unsuccessful. 
 
The European Court is unanimously of the opinion that the decision taken and upheld by the 
Turkish authorities to block access to Google Sites amounted to a violation of Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, guaranteeing the freedom 
to express, receive and impart information and ideas 'regardless of frontiers'. The Court is of the 
opinion that the order, in the absence of a strict legal framework, was not prescribed by law. 
Although the order might have had a legitimate aim, as it was aimed at blocking a website 
allegedly insulting the memory of Atatürk, the order was not sufficiently based on a strict legal 
framework regulating the scope of a ban and affording the guarantee of judicial review to prevent 
possible abuses. The Court clarifies that a restriction on access to a source of information is only 
compatible with the Convention if a strict legal framework, containing such guarantees, is in 
place. The judgment further makes clear that the Turkish courts should have had regard to the 
fact that such a measure would render large amounts of information inaccessible, thus directly 
affecting the rights of internet users and having a significant collateral effect. It is also observed 
that the Turkish law had conferred extensive powers to an administrative body, the TIB, in the 
implementation of a blocking order originally issued in relation to a specified website. Moreover, 
there was no evidence that Google Sites had been informed that it was hosting content held to 
be illegal, or that it had refused to comply with an interim measure concerning a site that was 
the subject of pending criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the criminal court had not made any 
attempt to weigh up the various interests at stake, in particular by assessing whether it was 
necessary and proportionate to block all access to Google Sites. The European Court observes 
that the Turkish law obviously did not require the court to examine whether the wholesale 
blocking of Google was justified. Such a measure that renders large amounts of information on 
the internet inaccessible must be considered however to effect directly the rights of Internet 
users, having a significant collateral damage on their right of access to the Internet. As the effects 
of the measure have been arbitrary and the judicial review of the blocking of access to internet 
websites has been insufficient to prevent abuses, the interference with Mr. Yildirim’s rights 
amounts to a violation of Article 10 of the Convention by the Turkish authorities. 
 
With this judgment the European Court of Human Rights has explicitly reinforced the right of 
individuals to access the internet, as in its ruling against the wholesale blocking of online 
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content, it asserted that the internet has now become one of the principal means of exercising 
the right to freedom of expression and information. 
 
• Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey, no. 3111/10, ECHR 2012.  
• Fact sheet of December 2012 on the European Court’s case law on New Technologies  
[Editor’s note: link to updated version of fact sheet]. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Ashby Donald and others v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
For the first time in a judgment on the merits, the European Court has clarified that a conviction 
based on copyright law for illegally reproducing or publicly communicating copyright-protected 
material can be regarded as an interference with the right of freedom of expression and 
information under Article 10 of the European Convention. Such interference must be in 
accordance with the three conditions enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 10 of the 
Convention. Due to the important wide margin of appreciation available to the national 
authorities in this particular case, the impact of Article 10 however is very modest and minimal. 
 
All three applicants in this case are fashion photographers. They were convicted in France for 
copyright infringement following the publication of pictures on the Internet site Viewfinder. The 
photos were taken at fashion shows in Paris in 2003 and published without the permission of the 
fashion houses. The three fashion photographers were ordered by the Court of Appeal of Paris to 
pay fines of between EUR 3,000 and EUR 8,000 and an award of damages to the French design 
clothing Federation and five fashion houses, amounting in total to EUR 255,000. The 
photographers were also ordered to pay for the publication of the judgment of the Paris Court of 
Appeal in three professional newspapers or magazines. In its judgment of 5 February 2008 the 
Supreme Court (Court de Cassation) dismissed the applicants’ argumentation based on Article 10 
of the Convention and on Article 122-9° of the Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle (French 
Copyright Act). The Supreme Court was of the opinion that the Court of Appeal had sufficiently 
justified its decision, as the applicants could not rely on an exception in French copyright law, 
allowing the reproduction, representation or public communication of works exclusively for news 
reporting and information purposes. 
 
In Strasbourg the applicants complained in particular of a breach of their rights under Article 10 
of the European Convention. The Court explicitly recognises the applicability of Article 10 in this 
case, considering the conviction of the applicants and the order to pay damages as an 
interference with their right to freedom of expression, which also includes the publication of 
pictures on the internet. The Court, however, is of the opinion that a wide margin of appreciation 
is to be given to the domestic authorities in this case, as the publication of the pictures of models 
at a fashion show and the fashion clothing shown on the catwalk in Paris was not related to an 
issue of general interest to society and concerned a kind of “commercial speech”. Furthermore, 
the member states are considered to be in a position to balance conflicting rights and interests, 
such as the right of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention with the right of 
property (including intellectual property), as protected by Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention. 
 
The European Court agrees with the French Court’s finding that the applicants reproduced and 
represented the pictures without the authorisation of the copyright holders, hence infringing the 
rights of the intellectual property of others. The European Court refers to the reasoning by the 
Paris Court, emphasizing that it saw no reason to consider “that the national judge had 
overstepped his/her margin of appreciation by giving prevalence to the rights of fashion creators 
over the right to freedom of expression of the applicants”. The European Court does not find the 
fines and the award of damages disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, arguing that the 
applicants gave no evidence that these sanctions had “financially strangled” them and referring 
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to the guarantees of a fair trial not being under dispute in this matter. In these circumstances 
and taking into account the particularly important margin of appreciation of the national 
authorities, the Court concludes unanimously that there is no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Ashby Donald and Others v. France, no. 36769/08, 10 January 2013.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. 
Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Only a few weeks after the Strasbourg Court’s judgment in the case of Ashby Donald and others 
v. France (ECtHR 10 January 2013, see IRIS 2013-3/1), the Court has decided a new case of 
conflicting rights, opposing copyright as intellectual property right under Article 1 of the First 
Protocol and freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. The case 
concerned the complaint by two of the co-founders of The Pirate Bay, that their conviction for 
complicity to commit crimes in violation of copyright law had breached their freedom of 
expression and information. During 2005 and 2006, Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi 
were involved in different aspects of one of the world’s largest file-sharing services on the 
Internet, the website The Pirate Bay (TPB). TPB made it possible for users to come into contact 
with each other through torrent files. The users could then, outside TPB’s computers, exchange 
digital material through file-sharing. In 2008 Nej and Sunde were charged with complicity to 
commit crimes in violation of the Swedish Copyright Act. Several companies in the entertainment 
business brought private claims within the criminal proceedings procedure against the 
defendants and demanded compensation for the illegal use of copyright-protected music, films 
and computer games. In 2010 Neij and Sunde were convicted and sentenced to prison sentences 
of ten and eight months respectively, and ordered to pay damages of approximately EUR 5 
million. Neij and Sunde complained under Article 10 of the Convention that their right to receive 
and impart information had been violated when they were convicted for other persons’ use of 
TPB. They also alleged that they could not be held responsible for other people’s use of TPB, the 
initial purpose of which was merely to facilitate the exchange of data on the Internet. 
 
In its decision of 19 February 2013 the European Court affirmed that the applicants have put in 
place the means for others to impart and receive information within the meaning of Article 10 of 
the Convention and that consequently the convictions of Neij and Sunde interfered with their 
right to freedom of expression. Such interference breaches Article 10 unless it was “prescribed 
by law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in Article 10 § 2 and was 
“necessary in a democratic society” to attain such aim or aims. 
 
That the interference by the Swedish authorities was prescribed by law and pursued the 
legitimate aim of the protection of rights of others and prevention of crime, was not under 
discussion. Again the crucial question was whether this interference corresponded to a pressing 
social need, meeting the test of necessity in a democratic society. The Court argued that the 
Swedish authorities had a particularly wide margin of appreciation to decide on the matter - 
especially since the information at stake was not given the same level of protection as political 
expression and debate - and that their obligation to protect copyright under both the Copyright 
Act and the Convention had constituted weighty reasons for the restriction of the applicants’ 
freedom of expression. Due to the nature of the information at hand and the balancing interest 
of conflicting Convention rights, the wide margin of appreciation the national authorities could 
rely on in this case, was therefore particularly important. The Swedish courts advanced relevant 
and sufficient reasons to consider that the activities of Neij and Sunde within the commercially 
run TPB amounted to criminal conduct requiring appropriate punishment. In reaching this 
conclusion, the European Court had regard to the fact that the domestic courts found that Neij 
and Sunde had not taken any action to remove the torrent files infringing copyright, despite 
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having been urged to do so. Instead they had been indifferent to the fact that copyright-protected 
works had been the subject of file-sharing activities via TPB. Therefore, the Court concluded that 
the interference with the right to freedom of expression of Neij and Sunde had been necessary 
in a democratic society. It rejected the application under Article 10 of the Convention as 
manifestly ill-founded. 
 
• Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden (dec.), no. 40397/12, ECHR 2013.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Eon v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a Chamber judgment of 14 March 2013 the European Court of Human Rights made clear that 
the French president should not be overprotected against insulting statements, especially when 
these statements, with a satirical undertone, have been uttered as part of a public or political 
debate. 
 
The case concerns the criminal conviction of Hervé Eon, a socialist and anti-GM activist living in 
Laval, for insulting the President of France, Mr. Sarkozy. In 2008, during a visit to Laval by the 
President of France, Eon waved a small placard reading “Casse toi pov’con” (“Get lost, you sad 
prick”), an allusion to a much publicised phrase that the President himself had uttered earlier 
that year at the International Agricultural Show in response to a farmer who had refused to shake 
his hand. The phrase had given rise to extensive comment and media coverage and had been 
widely circulated on the Internet and used as a slogan at demonstrations. Eon was immediately 
arrested by police and taken to the police station. He was prosecuted by the public prosecutor 
for insulting the president, an offence punishable under section 26 of the Freedom of the Press 
Act of 29 July 1881. The court of first instance of Laval found, in particular, that by repeating the 
phrase in question, Eon had clearly intended to cause offence to the head of State. Eon was fined 
EUR 30, a penalty that was suspended. The judgment was upheld by the court of appeal of Angers. 
Subsequently, an appeal to the Supreme Court (Court de Cassation) was dismissed. Eon lodged 
an application with the European Court of Human Rights, arguing that his conviction for insulting 
the President of France had infringed his freedom of expression. 
 
While accepting that the phrase in issue, taken literally, was offensive to the French President, 
the European Court considered that the showing of the placard with the slogan should be 
examined within the overall context of the case. The European Court emphasized the importance 
of free discussion of matters of public interest. The Court considered that Eon’s repetition of a 
phrase uttered earlier by the President had not targeted the latter’s private life or honour; nor 
had it simply amounted to a gratuitous personal attack against him. Instead, the Court took the 
view that Eon’s criticisms had been political in nature. There was therefore little scope under 
Article 10 for restrictions on freedom of expression in the political sphere. The Court reiterated 
that politicians inevitably and knowingly laid themselves open to close public scrutiny of their 
words and deeds and consequently had to display a greater degree of tolerance towards criticism 
directed at them. Furthermore, by echoing an abrupt phrase that had been used by the President 
himself and had attracted extensive media coverage and widespread public comment, much of 
it humorous in tone, Eon had chosen to adopt a satirical approach. Since satire was a form of 
expression and comment that naturally aimed to provoke and agitate, any interference with the 
right to such expression had to be examined with particular care. The European Court held that 
criminal penalties for an expression and conduct such as that displayed by Eon were likely to 
have a chilling effect on satirical contributions to discussion of matters of public interest, such 
discussion being fundamental to a democratic society. The criminal penalty imposed on Eon, 
although modest, had thus been disproportionate to the aim pursued and unnecessary in a 
democratic society. The European Court therefore found a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Eon v. France, no. 26118/10, 14 March 2013. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Ten years after the finding by the European Court of a violation of Articles 8 (right to respect for 
private and family life) and 10 (freedom of expression and information) of the European 
Convention of Human Rights in the case Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg (25 February 2003, 
IRIS 2003/5-3), the Luxembourg authorities have again been found in breach of these Articles by 
issuing a search and seizure warrant disrespecting the protection of journalistic sources. 
 
In 2009 a judicial investigation was opened concerning an article in the newspaper Contacto, 
published by Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. The article described the situation of families who had 
lost the custody of their children. A social worker who was mentioned in the article and his 
employer, the central social welfare department, had lodged a complaint with the Attorney 
General, alleging defamation of the social worker in question and also of the judicial and social 
welfare system in Luxembourg in general. An investigating judge issued a search and seizure 
warrant of the offices of the publishing house in order to identify the author of the article at 
issue. A few days later, police officers presented themselves at the premises of the newspaper, 
with the search warrant. The journalist who had written the article (his name was partly 
mentioned under the article), was formally identified and he handed over a copy of the 
newspaper, a notebook and various documents used in preparing the article. During the search 
one of the police officers also introduced a USB-stick in the computer of the journalist, eventually 
copying files from that computer. A short time later the applicant company and the journalist 
applied to the District Court to have the warrant set aside and the search and seizure operation 
declared null and void, but this claim was rejected. Later the Court of Appeal upheld the warrant. 
 
Relying on Article 8, Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. alleged that the search of the newspaper had 
infringed the inviolability of its “home” and had been disproportionate. Relying on Article 10 it 
argued that the measure in question had consisted of an attempt to identify the journalist’s 
sources and had had an intimidating effect. With regard to Article 8 of the Convention, the 
European Court is of the opinion that the investigating judge could have opted for a less intrusive 
measure than a search in order to confirm the identity of the article’s author, as it was rather 
obvious which journalist of Contacto had written the article at issue. As the search and seizure 
operation was not necessary and had not been reasonably proportionate to the legitimate aims 
pursued, the European Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
The Strasbourg Court also considered that the warrant in question had given the police officers 
access to information that the journalist had not intended for publication and that would have 
made it possible to identify his sources. The purpose of the warrant had been to search for “and 
seize any documents or items, irrespective of form or medium, connected with the alleged 
offences”. Being formulated in such broad terms, the warrant had conferred extensive powers on 
the investigating officers. The search and seizure operation had been disproportionate in so far 
as it had enabled the police officers to identify the journalist’s sources and the warrant itself had 
not been sufficiently limited in scope to avoid the possibility of such abuse. Since the sole 
purpose of the search had been to ascertain the identity of the journalist who had written the 
article, a more narrowly-worded warrant would have sufficed. The European Court therefore also 
found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxembourg, no. 26419/10, 18 April 2013.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The Grand Chamber of the European Court held, by nine votes to eight, that the UK’s ban on 
political advertising on television did not violate Article 10 of the Convention. The majority 
opinion in this controversial judgment reflects a somewhat particular approach compared to the 
Court’s previous case law on political advertising, such as in VgT Vereinigung gegen Tierfabriken 
v. Switzerland (see IRIS 2001-7/2 and IRIS 2009-10/2). Essentially the judgment in the case of 
Animal Defenders International v. UK accepts that a total ban on political advertising on 
television, characterized by a broad definition of the term “political”, with no temporal limitations 
and no room for exceptions, is in accordance with the right to freedom of political expression. 
The dissenting opinions attached to the judgment argued for a radically different approach, but 
their arguments could not convince the majority of the Grand Chamber. 
 
The applicant in this case is an NGO (Animal Defenders International, “ADI”) campaigning against 
the use of animals in commerce, science and leisure, seeking to achieve changes in law and 
public policy and to influence public and parliamentary opinion to that end. In 2005, ADI began 
a campaign directed against the keeping and exhibition of primates in zoos and circuses and 
their use in television advertising. As part of the campaign, it wished to screen a TV advertisement 
with images of a girl in chains in an animal cage followed by a chimpanzee in the same position. 
It submitted the advert to the Broadcast Advertising Clearance Centre (“the BACC”), for a review 
of its compliance with relevant laws and codes. The BACC refused to clear the advert, drawing 
attention to the political nature of ADI’s objectives, referring to section 321(2) of the 
Communications Act 2003, which prohibits advertisements “directed towards a political end”. 
The refusal to broadcast the advert was confirmed by the High Court and later reached the House 
of Lords, which held that the ban on political advertising and its application in this case did not 
violate Article 10 of the European Convention. ADI subsequently submitted an application to the 
European Court, arguing that the refusal of their advert breached Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In the first part of its reasoning, the Court emphasizes that both ADI and the UK authorities had 
the same objective of maintaining a free and pluralist debate on matters of public interest, and 
more generally, of contributing to the democratic process as a legitimate aim. The Court weighed 
in the balance, on the one hand, ADI’s right to impart information and ideas of general interest 
which the public is entitled to receive, with, on the other hand, the authorities’ desire to protect 
the democratic debate and process from distortion by powerful financial groups with 
advantageous access to influential media. 
 
The Court had three main considerations in making its assessment: the legislative process by 
which the ban had been adopted and any review by the judicial authorities; the impact of the 
ban and any steps that might have been taken to moderate its effect; and, what happens in other 
countries, particularly those where the Convention applies. As far as the process was concerned, 
account was taken of the fact that the complex regulatory regime governing political 
broadcasting in the United Kingdom had been subjected to exacting and pertinent reviews and 
validated by both parliamentary and judicial bodies. The Court also referred to the influential, 
immediate and powerful impact of the broadcast media, while there is no evidence that the 
development of the internet and social media in recent years in the United Kingdom has shifted 
this influence to the extent that the need for a ban specifically on broadcast media should be 
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undermined, internet and social media not having “the same synchronicity or impact as 
broadcasted information”. The Court also noticed that the ban was relaxed in a controlled fashion 
for political parties - the bodies most centrally part of the democratic process - by providing them 
with free party political, party election and referendum campaign broadcasts. The European Court 
agreed with the UK authorities that allowing a less restrictive prohibition could give rise to abuse 
and arbitrariness, such as wealthy bodies with agendas being fronted by social advocacy groups 
created for that precise purpose or creating a large number of similar interest groups, thereby 
accumulating advertising time. Given the complex regulatory background, this form of control 
could lead to uncertainty, litigation, expense and delay. 
 
As to the impact of the ban, the Court noted that the ban only applied to advertising and that 
ADI had access to alternative media, both radio and television and also non-broadcast, such as 
print media, the internet and social media, demonstrations, posters and flyers. Finally, because 
there is no European consensus on how to regulate paid political advertising in broadcasting, 
this broadens the margin of appreciation to be accorded to the UK authorities in this case. 
Accordingly, the majority of the Court considers the reasons adduced by the authorities, to justify 
the prohibition of ADI’s advertisement to be relevant and sufficient. The prohibition cannot 
therefore be considered to amount to a disproportionate interference with ADI’s right to freedom 
of expression. Hence there is no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 48876/08, ECHR 2013 (extracts). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Meltex Ltd v. Armenia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
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On 17 June 2008, the European Court of Human Rights delivered a judgment in the case of Meltex 
Ltd and Movsesyan v. Armenia (see IRIS 2008-8/1). The Court held that there had been a breach 
of Article 10 of the Convention as the refusal by the Armenian National Radio and Television 
Commission (NTRC) to allocate a broadcasting license to Meltex, amounted to an interference 
with Meltex’ freedom to impart information and ideas that did not meet the Convention 
requirement of lawfulness. The Court noted, in particular, that a procedure that did not require a 
licensing body to justify or motivate its decisions did not provide adequate protection against 
arbitrary interference by a public authority with the fundamental right to freedom of expression. 
In 2009 Meltex complained in Strasbourg that the Armenian authorities had failed to enforce the 
Court’s judgment of 17 June 2008. In particular, relying on the Court’s Grand Chamber judgment 
in the case of Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) (see IRIS 2009-10/2), 
Meltex claimed that the refusal of the Court of Cassation in Armenia to reopen its case constituted 
a fresh violation of its freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
In its decision of 21 May 2013, the European Court of Human Rights reiterates that a judgment 
in which the Court finds a breach of the Convention or its Protocols imposes on the respondent 
State a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just 
satisfaction. The State must also take the appropriate general or individual measures required to 
put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects of that 
violation. Subject to monitoring by the Committee of Ministers, the respondent State however 
remains free to choose the means by which it will discharge its legal obligations under the 
Convention, provided that such means are compatible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s 
judgment. The European Court itself does not have jurisdiction to verify whether a State has 
complied with the obligations imposed on it by one of the Court’s judgments. The situation is 
different however when it concerns a new interference or a new issue. A “new issue” can result 
from the continuation of the violation that formed the basis of the Court’s initial decision, but 
the determination of the existence of a “new issue” very much depends on the specific 
circumstances of a given case. In Meltex Ltd and Movsesyan v. Armenia, the Committee of 
Ministers ended its supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgment of 17 June 2008, after 
the refusal by the Court of Cassation to reopen the proceedings. Although the Committee of 
Ministers had been informed that the Court of Cassation had dismissed the application to reopen 
the proceedings, in its resolution the Committee of Ministers declared itself satisfied with the 
individual and general measures taken by the Republic of Armenia to execute the Court’s 
judgment. That being so, the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to examine Meltex’ complaint 
as it did not contain a new issue and therefore the application is incompatible ratione materiae 
with the provisions of the Convention. The Court rejected the application under Article 10 of the 
Convention as manifestly ill-founded. 
 
• Meltex Ltd. v. Armenia (dec.), no. 45199/09, ECHR 2013.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
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In its judgment of 25 June 2013, the European Court of Human Rights has recognised more 
explicitly than ever before the right of access to documents held by public authorities, based on 
Article 10 of the Convention (right to freedom of expression and information). The judgment also 
emphasised the importance of NGOs acting in the public interest. 
 
The case concerns an NGO, known as Youth Initiative for Human Rights, that is monitoring the 
implementation of transitional laws in Serbia with a view to ensuring respect for human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. The applicant NGO requested the intelligence agency of Serbia 
to provide it with some factual information concerning the use of electronic surveillance 
measures used by that agency in 2005. The agency at first refused the request, relying on the 
statutory provision applicable to secret information. After an order by the Information 
Commissioner that the information at issue should be disclosed under the Serbian Freedom of 
Information Act 2004, the intelligence agency notified the applicant NGO that it did not hold the 
requested information. Youth Initiative for Human Rights complained in Strasbourg about the 
refusal to have access to the requested information held by the intelligence agency, 
notwithstanding a final and binding decision of the Information Commissioner in its favour. 
 
The European Court is of the opinion that as Youth Initiative for Human Rights was obviously 
involved in the legitimate gathering of information of public interest with the intention of 
imparting that information to the public and thereby contributing to the public debate, there has 
been an interference with its right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Court recalls that the notion of “freedom to receive information” embraces a 
right of access to information. Although this freedom may be subject to restrictions that can 
justify certain interferences, the Court emphasises that such restrictions ought to be in 
accordance with domestic law. The Court is of the opinion that the refusal to provide access to 
public documents did not meet the criterion as being prescribed by law. It refers to the fact that 
the intelligence agency indeed informed the applicant NGO that it did not hold the information 
requested, but for the Court it is obvious that this “response is unpersuasive in view of the nature 
of that information (the number of people subjected to electronic surveillance by that agency in 
2005) and the agency’s initial response”. The Court comes to the conclusion that the “obstinate 
reluctance of the intelligence agency of Serbia to comply with the order of the Information 
Commissioner” was in defiance of domestic law and tantamount to arbitrariness, and that 
accordingly there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. It is interesting to note 
that the Court reiterates in robust terms that an NGO can play a role as important as that of the 
press in a democratic society: “when a non-governmental organisation is involved in matters of 
public interest, such as the present applicant, it is exercising a role as a public watchdog of 
similar importance to that of the press”. Finally, as a measure under Article 46 of the Convention, 
the Court ordered the Serbian State to ensure, within three months from the date on which the 
judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the intelligence 
agency of Serbia to provide the applicant NGO with the information requested. 
 
• Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, no. 48135/06, 25 June 2013.   
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Once again the European Court of Human Rights has found a breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention in a case of protection of journalistic sources. The Court is of the opinion that the 
Latvian investigating authorities failed to adequately protect the sources of a journalist of the 
national television broadcaster Latvijas televīzija  (LTV), Ms Nagla. The journalist’s home was 
searched and data storage devices were seized following a broadcast she had aired informing 
the public of an information leak from the State Revenue Service (Valsts ieņēmumu dienests - 
VID) database. Almost three months after the broadcast of the programme on LTV, Ms Nagla’s 
home was searched, and a laptop, an external hard drive, a memory card, and four flash drives 
were seized with the aim of collecting information concerning the data leaks at VID. The search 
warrant was drawn up by the investigator and authorised by a public prosecutor. Relying on 
Article 10 of the European Convention, Ms Nagla complained that the search of her home meant 
that she had been compelled to disclose information that had enabled a journalistic source to be 
identified, violating her right to receive and impart information. 
 
According to the Court the concept of journalistic “source” refers to “any person who provides 
information to a journalist”, while “information identifying a source” includes, as insofar as they 
are likely to lead to the identification of a source, both “the factual circumstances of acquiring 
information from a source by a journalist” and “the unpublished content of the information 
provided by a source to a journalist”. While recognising the importance of securing evidence in 
criminal proceedings, the Court emphasises that a chilling effect will arise wherever journalists 
are seen to assist in the identification of anonymous sources. The Court confirms that a search 
conducted with a view to identifying a journalist’s source is a more drastic measure than an order 
to divulge the source’s identity, and it considers that it is even more so in the circumstances of 
the present case, where the search warrant was drafted in such vague terms as to allow the 
seizure of “any information” pertaining to the crime under investigation allegedly committed by 
the journalist’s source, irrespective of whether or not his identity had already been known to the 
investigating authorities. The Court reiterates that limitations on the confidentiality of 
journalistic sources call for the most careful scrutiny by the Court. It also emphasises that any 
search involving the seizure of data storage devices such as laptops, external hard drives, memory 
cards and flash drives belonging to a journalist raises a question of the journalist’s freedom of 
expression including source protection and that the access to the information contained therein 
must be protected by sufficient and adequate safeguards against abuse. The scarce motivation 
of the domestic authorities as to the perishable nature of evidence linked to cybercrimes in 
general, cannot be considered sufficient in the present case, given the investigating authorities’ 
delay in carrying out the search and the lack of any indication of impending destruction of 
evidence. The Court finds that the investigating judge failed to establish that the interests of the 
investigation in securing evidence were sufficient to override the public interest in the protection 
of the journalist’s freedom of expression, including source protection. Because of the lack of 
relevant and sufficient reasons, the interference with Ms Nagla’s freedom to impart and receive 
information did not correspond to a “pressing social need”, hence there was a violation of Article 
10 of the Convention. 
 
• Nagla v. Latvia, no. 73469/10, 16 July 2013.   
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European Court of Human Rights: Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland 
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The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has recently clarified the application of freedom of 
expression when conflicting with personality rights in the environment of online news media and 
digital archives. The case concerns the complaint by two lawyers that a newspaper article 
damaging to their reputation - which the Polish courts, in previous libel proceedings, had found 
to be based on insufficient information and in breach of their rights - remained accessible to the 
public on the newspaper’s website. They complained that the Polish authorities, by refusing to 
order that the online version of the news article should be removed from the newspaper’s website 
archive, breached their rights to respect for their private life and reputation as protected by 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
In its judgment, the Court emphasises the potential impact of online media, stating that the 
Internet is “an information and communication tool particularly distinct from the printed media, 
especially as regards the capacity to store and transmit information”. The Court stresses the 
substantial contribution made by Internet archives to preserving and making available news and 
information and it reiterates that news archives “constitute an important source for education 
and historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally 
free. While the primary function of the press in a democracy is to act as a ‘public watchdog’, 
archives have a valuable secondary role in maintaining and making available to the public 
archives containing news which has previously been reported”. According to the Court the 
internet “is not and potentially never be subject to the same regulations and control” as the 
traditional media. The Court, however, also recognises that “the risk of harm posed by content 
and communications on the Internet to the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life, is certainly higher than that posed by 
the press”. Therefore it accepts that the policies governing reproduction of material from the 
printed media and the Internet may differ, taking also into consideration technology’s specific 
features in order to secure the protection and promotion of the rights and freedoms at issue. 
 
Turning to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court is of the opinion that the newspaper 
was not obliged to completely remove from its Internet archive the article at issue, as was 
requested by the two lawyers. The Court firmly states “that it is not the role of judicial authorities 
to engage in rewriting history by ordering the removal from the public domain of all traces of 
publications which have in the past been found, by final judicial decisions, to amount to 
unjustified attacks on individual reputations” and it also refers to the legitimate interest of the 
public to have access to the public Internet archives of the press, as being protected under Article 
10 of the Convention. The Court is of the view that the alleged violations of rights protected 
under Article 8 of the Convention should be redressed by more adequate remedies available 
under domestic law and it refers to the observation by the Warsaw Court of Appeal in the present 
case, that it would have been desirable to add a comment to the article on the website informing 
the public of the outcome of the civil proceedings in the earlier libel case regarding the printed 
version of the article. The Court observes that in the proceedings at the domestic level the 
applicants did not submit a specific request for the information to be rectified by means of the 
addition of a reference to the earlier judgments in their favour. It follows from the Court’s 
judgment that a rectification or a reference to the judgment in the libel case about the printed 
version of the article at issue, would have been a pertinent and sufficient interference with the 
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rights of the newspaper in order to secure in its online archives the effective protection of the 
applicants’ rights. Hence, the Court accepts that the Polish authorities complied with their 
obligation to strike a balance between the rights guaranteed by Article 10 and Article 8 of the 
Convention. The requested limitation on freedom of expression for the sake of the applicants’ 
reputation in the circumstances of the present case would have been disproportionate under 
Article 10 of the Convention. Therefore the Court comes to the conclusion that there has been 
no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
• Węgrzynowski and Smolczewski v. Poland, no. 33846/07, 16 July 2013.   
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The European Court of Human Rights has delivered a new judgment regarding a complaint by 
Princess Caroline von Hannover that the German courts had not sufficiently protected her right 
to privacy as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention, by giving too much weight to the right 
of the press as guaranteed by Article 5 of the German Constitution and Article 10 of the European 
Convention (see earlier also Von Hannover no. 1 v. Germany, IRIS 2004-8/2 and Von Hannover 
no. 2 v. Germany, IRIS 2012-3/1). This time the Princess of Monaco lodged an appeal in 
Strasbourg relating to the refusal by the German courts to grant an injunction prohibiting any 
further publication of a photograph of her and her husband. The photograph that was the subject 
of the litigation was published in the magazine 7 Tage in 2002. It was taken without the Princess’ 
knowledge while on holiday and it illustrated an article about the trend among the very wealthy 
towards letting out their holiday homes. With reasoning similar to that of Von Hannover no. 2, 
the European Court could not find a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
The European Court refers to its judgments in Axel Springer AG v. Germany and Von Hannover 
no. 2 v. Germany (see IRIS 2012-3/1) in which it set forth the relevant criteria for balancing the 
right to respect for private life (Article 8) against the right to freedom of expression (Article 10). 
These were: contribution to a debate of general interest; how well-known the person concerned 
was; the subject of the report; the prior conduct of the person concerned; the content, form and 
consequences of the publication; and, in the case of photographs, the circumstances in which 
they were taken. The Court refers to the findings by the German courts that, while the photograph 
in question had not contributed to a debate of general interest, the article with the litigious 
picture, however, reported on the current trend among celebrities towards letting out their 
holiday homes, which constituted an event of general interest. The article did not contain 
particular information concerning the private life of the Princess, as it focused on practical 
aspects relating to the Von Hannover’s villa and its letting. The Court also referred to the fact 
that the Princess and her husband were to be regarded as public figures who could not claim 
protection of their private lives in the same way as individuals unknown to the public. The 
European Court concluded that the German courts had not failed to comply with their positive 
obligations to protect the right of privacy in its confrontation with the freedom of press. Therefore 
there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
 
•    Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 3), no. 8772/10, 19 September 2013.    
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The European Court of Human Rights has delivered a new judgment against Italy for interfering 
with the freedom of expression and public statements related to the “war” between judges, 
prosecutors and the police in the context of combating the Mafia (see also Perna v. Italy (GC), see 
IRIS 2003-8/2). The judgment reflects a tension between the freedom of parliamentary speech 
on the one hand, and the restrictions and obligations on the media reproducing or publishing 
statements by politicians covered by their parliamentary immunity on the other hand (see also 
Cordova no.1 and no.2 v. Italy, see IRIS 2003-7/2). 
 
The applicant in this case is Maurizio Belpietro, who at the relevant time was editor of the 
national daily newspaper Il Giornale. In court in Strasbourg he complained about his conviction 
for defamation after publishing an article by an Italian Senator, R.I. The article by the Senator 
was a robust opinion piece analysing the lack of results in combating the Mafia in Palermo. The 
Senator more particularly criticised the Italian judiciary and especially accused some members 
of the public prosecutors’ office in Palermo of using political strategies in their fight against the 
Mafia. Two prosecutors, Guido Lo Forte and Giancarlo Gaselli considered some of the allegations 
in the Senator’s article as damaging to their professional and personal reputations. They lodged 
a complaint for defamation against Senator R.I. and Belpietro. Regarding the liability of the editor 
of Il Giornale, the prosecutors relied on Article 57 of the Criminal Code, making the editor or 
assistant editor of a newspaper responsible for lack of control when publishing defamatory 
statements without a sufficient factual basis.  
 
Separate proceedings were brought against Senator R.I. which ended in 2007 with a finding that 
there was no case to answer, on the grounds that the Senator had expressed his views in his 
capacity as a member of the Senate, and was thus shielded by his parliamentary immunity based 
on Article 68§1 of the Italian Constitution. The Senate accepted that the statements published 
by Senator R.I. were related to the exercise of his parliamentary functions. Belpietro however was 
sentenced to a suspended term of four months’ imprisonment and he was ordered to pay 
substantial sums to each of the civil parties, adding to a total amount of EUR 110,000. The Court 
of Appeal of Milan considered some of the allegations against the members of the judiciary as 
defamatory of Lo Forte and Caselli. 
 
Belpietro made an application to the Strasbourg Court, alleging that his conviction for 
defamation had amounted to a violation of his freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 
of the Convention. After reiterating extensively the general principles of its relevant case law on 
the issue, including the balance that has to be found between the prosecutors’ right to his 
reputation based on Article 8 and the newspaper editor’s right to freedom of expression based 
on Article 10, the European Court is of the opinion that the Italian authorities did not breach 
Article 10 in finding Belpietro liable for publishing the defamatory article of Senator R.I. Although 
the Court recognises that the article concerned an issue of importance to society that the public 
had the right to be informed about, it emphasises that some of the allegations against Lo Forte 
and Caselli were very serious, without sufficient objective basis. Furthermore, the Court refers to 
the obligation of an editor of a newspaper to control what is published, in order to prevent the 
publication of defamatory articles in particular. This duty does not disappear when it concerns 
an article written by a member of parliament, as otherwise, according to the Court, this would 
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amount to an absolute freedom of the press to publish any statement of members of parliament 
in the exercise of their parliamentary mandate, regardless of its defamatory or insulting 
character. The Court also refers to the fact that Senator R.I. had already been convicted in the 
past for defamation of public officials and to the fact that the newspaper had given a prominent 
place to the Senator’s article in the newspaper. However, as the Court considers the sanction of 
imprisonment and the high award of damages as disproportionate to the aim pursued, it comes 
to the conclusion that solely for that reason the interference by the Italian authorities amounted 
to a breach of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court especially draws attention to the fact that 
a sentence of imprisonment (even if suspended) can have a significant chilling effect and that 
the conviction was essentially because of not having executed sufficient control before 
publishing a defamatory article. Therefore there were no exceptional circumstances justifying 
such a severe sanction. A unanimous Court concludes that Italy has violated Article 10 of the 
Convention, awarding Belpietro just satisfaction in terms of EUR 10,000 non-pecuniary damage 
and EUR 5,000 for costs and expenses. 
 
•   Belpietro v. Italy, no. 43612/10, 24 September 2013. 
 
IRIS 2013-10/1  
Back to overview of case-law 
320 
European Court of Human Rights: Ricci v. Italy 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In its judgment in the case of Ricci v. Italy the European Court of Human Rights found that the 
suspended prison sentence of a TV presenter for disclosing confidential images violated Article 
10 of the Convention. The Court is of the opinion that the nature and severity of the prison 
sentence constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of 
expression. The Court’s judgment confirms that prison sentences for defamation of public persons 
or for making confidential information public, in principle amount to a breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention (see also ECtHR (GC) 17 December 2004, Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, 
IRIS 2005-2/4 and ECtHR 24 September 2013, Belpietro v. Italy, IRIS 2013-10/1). 
 
The case of Ricci v. Italy concerns a broadcast of the satirical television programme Striscia la 
notizia on Canale 5, of which Antonio Ricci is the producer and presenter. The programme 
contained intercepted images of a row between a writer and Gianni Vattimo, a philosopher, 
during the recording of a programme to be broadcast on RAI. Because Vattimo had not signed a 
document allowing it to be broadcast on RAI, the pieces of footage used were considered as 
confidential internal data. However Ricci had obtained access to the footage and he integrated 
them into a programme on Canale 5, meant to illustrate that the nature of television aimed at 
creating entertainment rather than informing the public. The RAI lodged a criminal complaint for 
fraudulent interception and disclosure of confidential communications by Ricci, in breach of 
Article 617 quater of the Criminal Code. Vattimo also joined the proceedings as a civil party. Ricci 
was ordered to pay the RAI and Vattimo damages and he was given a suspended prison sentence 
of four months and five days. However, the Court of Cassation declared the offence time-barred 
and quashed the Court of Appeal’s judgment without remitting it. It upheld the order that Ricci 
was to compensate the civil parties and to pay RAI’s legal costs. The civil courts later ordered 
Ricci to pay EUR 30,000 damages to Vattimo. 
 
Although the European Court agrees with the Italian judicial authorities that Ricci’s programme 
had breached Article 617 quater of the Criminal Code, it clarifies that the protection of the 
confidentiality of communications in a data-transmission system had to be balanced against the 
exercise of freedom of expression. As in many other recent cases, the Court applies a balancing 
test between the right to privacy protected by Article 8 of the Convention (protection of 
confidential communication and reputation rights) and the right to freedom of expression 
guaranteed by Article 10. This balancing test leaves a broad margin of appreciation to national 
authorities, but nevertheless a set of criteria needs to be taken into consideration. The Court 
accepted Ricci’s argument that the broadcast footage concerned a subject of general interest, 
namely the denunciation of the “real nature” of television in modern society. However other 
means were available to Ricci to broadcast this message, without involving any breach of the 
confidentiality of communications. According to the Court the programme was also aimed at 
ridiculing and stigmatising some individuals. Furthermore Ricci, as a media professional, could 
not have been unaware that disclosing the footage amounted to a breach of the confidentiality 
of RAI’s communications. Accordingly, Ricci had not acted in accordance with the ethics of 
journalism. Therefore his conviction had not constituted, in itself, a violation of Article 10. 
Because of the nature and severity of the sanctions imposed on Ricci, however, the Court is of 
the opinion that the interference by the Italian authorities was disproportionate, referring to 
Ricci’s sentence of imprisonment for four months and five days. Even though it had been a 
Back to overview of case-law 
321 
suspended sentence, which was later annulled by the Court of Cassation, that conviction must 
have had a significant chilling effect, while there were no exceptional circumstances justifying 
recourse to such a harsh sanction. Consequently, on account of the nature and quantum of the 
sentence imposed on Ricci, the Court comes to the conclusion that the interference with his right 
to freedom of expression was not proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. The Court for 
that reason finds a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Ricci v. Italy, no. 30210/06, 8 October 2013. 
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On 10 October 2013, the European Court of Human Rights found that one of Estonia’s largest 
news portals on the Internet, Delfi, is not exempt from liability for grossly insulting remarks in 
its readers’ online comments. The news portal was found liable for violating the personality rights 
of the plaintiff (a captain of industry), although it had expeditiously removed the grossly 
offending comments posted on its website as soon as it had been informed of their insulting 
character. The European Court, in a unanimous decision, found no violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
 
The European Court accepted the Estonian authorities’ approach that Delfi’s news portal is to be 
considered as a publisher, rather than as an internet service provider (ISP). The consequence is 
that, as a publisher, Delfi could not rely on the specific provisions of the Directive 2001/31/EC 
on Electronic Commerce (Art. 14-15) and the Estonian Information Society Services Act (Sections 
10-11) exempting internet service providers, including host-providers, from liability in cases 
where they expeditiously remove or disable access to content emanating from third parties, as 
soon as they obtain knowledge or become aware of the illegal nature of the information. The E-
Commerce Directive and the Estonian Act also guarantee that no general obligation to monitor 
should be imposed on the internet service providers, nor a general obligation to seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity. The general principle is indeed that expeditious removal 
upon (notified) knowledge of illegal content exempts the ISP from liability. The reason why Delfi 
could not rely on the ISP liability exemption is that the news portal had integrated the readers’ 
comments into its news portal and that it had invited the users to post comments, having also 
an economic interest in exploiting its news platform with the integrated comment environment. 
Because Delfi was considered a provider of content services, rather than a provider of technical 
services, it should have effectively prevented clearly unlawful comments from being published. 
The European Court did not challenge this finding by the Estonian courts, restricting its 
supervisory role to ascertaining whether the effects of the non-treating of Delfi as an ISP were 
compatible with Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
The Court found that the interference with Delfi’s right to freedom of expression was prescribed 
by law and was necessary in a democratic society to protect the rights of others. This finding was 
based on a set of arguments. The Court considered that Delfi should have anticipated that the 
users’ comments could go beyond the boundaries of acceptable criticism and that therefore it 
should have taken steps in order to avoid being held liable for an infringement of other persons’ 
reputations. Next, the Court is of the opinion that the word-based technical filter that was 
installed to delete vulgarities, threats or obscene expressions, was shown to be insufficient. Also 
the notice-and-take-down facility according to which anyone, by simply clicking on a button 
designed for that purpose, could notify inappropriate comments to the administrators of the 
portal, had not prevented the grossly insulting comments from being published on the platform. 
The Court is of the opinion that Delfi exercised a substantial degree of control over the comments 
published on its portal, although it did not make as much use of this possibility as it could have 
done. As Delfi allowed comments by non-registered users, and as it would appear 
disproportionate to put the onus of identifying authors of the offensive comments on the injured 
person, the Court is of the opinion that Delfi must be considered to have assumed a certain 
degree of responsibility for these comments and that it should have prevented defamatory or 
insulting statements from being made public. The Court refers to the danger that information 
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once made public on the internet will remain and circulate forever. Finally the Court noted that 
Delfi was ordered to pay EUR 320 in non-pecuniary damages, being by no means a 
disproportionate sanction for a professional media platform such as Delfi. Based on these 
elements and “in particular the insulting and threatening nature of the comments” the Court 
came to the conclusion that the Estonian courts’ finding that Delfi was liable for the defamatory 
comments posted by readers on its Internet news portal was a justified and proportionate 
interference with Delfi’s right to freedom of expression. 
 
• Delfi AS v. Estonia, no. 64569/09, 10 October 2013. 
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 16 
June 2015. 
 
IRIS 2014-1/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Ristamäki and Korvola v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In 2008 Juha Arvo Mikael Ristamäki and Ari Jukka Korvola were convicted of defamation. 
Ristamäki is an editor working in the news service of a national Finnish broadcaster, while 
Korvola was his direct superior at the time. The reason for the conviction of the two journalists 
was the broadcast of a current affairs programme criticising the lack of co-operation between the 
authorities concerning a specific investigation into economic crime. It was revealed that the tax 
authorities had refused the request of the National Bureau of Investigation to conduct a tax 
inspection of the functioning of two companies. Reference was made in that connection to K.U., 
a well-known Finnish businessman who, at the time, was standing trial for economic offences. 
The public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against Ristamäki and Korvola. He 
maintained that Ristamäki, by editing the programme, and Korvola by allowing its broadcast, had 
intentionally made false insinuations about K.U. such that their conduct had been conducive to 
causing suffering to the latter, subjecting him to contempt and causing him damage. The Helsinki 
District Court convicted Ristamäki and Korvola of defamation pursuant to Chapter 24, section 9, 
subsection 1, point 1, of the Penal Code. They were sentenced to 30 day-fines each, amounting 
to approximately EUR 2,000 and they were ordered to pay K.U. EUR 1,800 for suffering and EUR 
1,500 in legal costs. The Court of Appeal and later the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals by 
the journalists. 
 
The European Court disagrees with the findings of the Finnish courts. The Court refers to its 
reasoning in Axel Springer AG and Von Hannover no. 2 (see IRIS 2012-3/1) and to the relevant 
criteria to be applied when balancing the protection of one’s reputation (Article 8) with the 
freedom of expression (Article 10). The Court emphasises that the TV programme was clearly 
aimed at disclosing a malfunctioning of the administration in two specific cases that both 
involved influential persons. Both of these persons, including K.U., were mentioned in the 
programme rather as examples, as the major part of the programme focused on the tax 
authorities. The unsuccessful criminal investigation of economic crime, and the unwillingness of 
the tax authorities to contribute to this investigation, was a matter of legitimate public interest. 
The facts set out in the programme at issue were not in dispute and they were presented in an 
objective manner, in a non-provocative style and without exaggeration. There is no evidence, or 
indeed any allegation, of factual misrepresentation or bad faith on the part of the journalists. 
Neither are there any indications that details of the programme or the photograph of K.U. were 
obtained by subterfuge or other illicit means: the programme was based on information given by 
the police authorities and K.U.’s photograph was taken at a public event. From the point of view 
of the general public’s right to receive information about matters of public interest, and thus 
from the standpoint of the media, there were justified grounds for reporting the matter to the 
public. The Court observes that the domestic courts did not, in their analysis, attach any 
importance to the journalists’ right to freedom of expression, nor did they balance it in any 
considered way against K.U.’s right to reputation. It is not clear in the reasoning of the domestic 
courts what pressing social need in the present case justified protecting K.U.’s rights over the 
rights of the journalists. In the Court’s opinion the reasons relied on by the domestic courts, 
although relevant, were not sufficient to show that the interference complained of was 
“necessary in a democratic society”. Having regard to all the factors of the case, and 
notwithstanding the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in this area, the Court considers 
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that the Finnish courts failed to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. 
There has therefore been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Ristamäki and Korvola v. Finland, no. 66456/09, 29 October 2013. 
 
IRIS 2014-1/3 
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European Court of Human Rights: Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und 
Schaffung eines wirtschaftlich gesunden land- und forstwirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes v. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a new judgment on the right of access to public documents, the Strasbourg Court has further 
clarified and expanded the scope of the application of Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant 
in this case is an NGO, the Austrian association for the preservation, strengthening and creation 
of an economically sound agricultural and forestry land ownership (OVESSG). In 2005 the 
association twice requested the Tyrol Real Property Transaction Commission, which is 
responsible for approving agricultural and forest land transactions, to provide OVESSG with the 
decisions the Commission had issued over a certain period of time, eventually in an anonymised 
form. OVESSG indicated that it would reimburse the resulting costs. However, the association’s 
requests were refused on the ground that they did not fall within the scope of the Tyrol Access 
to Information Act. Moreover, even if the request did fall within its scope, pursuant to the Act an 
authority did not have the duty to provide the requested information if doing so would require 
so much resources that its functioning would be affected and would jeopardise the fulfilment of 
the Commission’s other tasks. The association’s complaints to the Administrative Court and the 
Constitutional Court were rejected. OVESSG then complained in Strasbourg that its right to 
receive information, guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention, had been violated. 
 
The Court considers that the refusal to give OVESSG access to the requested documents 
amounted to an interference with its rights under Article 10, as the association was involved in 
the legitimate gathering of information of public interest with the aim of contributing to public 
debate. As it was accepted that the refusal was prescribed by law, based on the Tyrol Access to 
Information Act, and that it pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights of others, 
the Court had next to decide whether the refusal to grant access to the documents was justified, 
which means, in the terms of Article 10§ 2,being necessary in a democratic society. The Court 
refers to the development in its case law regarding Article 10 and access to information. It recalls 
that it has held that the right to receive information cannot be construed as imposing on a State 
positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion. However, the Court 
noted that it had recently advanced towards a broader interpretation of the notion of the freedom 
to receive information and thereby towards the recognition of a right of access to information. 
The Court also refers to its case-law stating that the most careful scrutiny was called for when 
authorities enjoying an information monopoly interfered with the exercise of the function of a 
social watchdog (see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, (IRIS 2009-7/1) and Youth 
Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, (IRIS 2013-8/1)). 
 
The Court finds that the Tyrol Real Property Transaction Commission had not given sufficient 
reasons to justify its refusal to grant OVESSG access to the requested documents. The European 
Court observes that in contrast with similar authorities in other regions in Austria, the Tyrol 
regional authority had chosen not to publish its decisions and thus, by its own choice, held an 
information monopoly. The unconditional refusal by the Tyrol Real Property Transaction 
Commission thus made it impossible for OVESSG to carry out its research in respect of one of the 
nine Austrian Länder, namely Tyrol, and to participate in a meaningful manner in the legislative 
process concerning amendments to real property transaction law in Tyrol. The Court therefore 
concludes that the interference with the applicant association’s right to freedom of expression 
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and information cannot be regarded as having been necessary in a democratic society. In a 6-1 
vote it found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, no. 39534/07, 28 
November 2013. 
 
IRIS 2014-2/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Perinçek v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 17 December 2013, the European Court of Human Rights ruled by five votes to two, that 
Switzerland violated the right to freedom of expression by convicting Doğu Perinçek, chairman 
of the Turkish Workers’ Party, of publicly denying the existence of the genocide against the 
Armenian people. On several occasions, Perinçek had described the Armenian genocide as “an 
international lie”. The Swiss Courts found Perinçek guilty of racial discrimination within the 
meaning of Article 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code. This Article punishes inter alia the denial, 
gross minimisation or attempt at justification of a genocide or crimes against humanity, publicly 
expressed with the aim of lowering or discriminating against a person or a group of persons by 
reference to race, ethnic background or religion in a way that affects the human dignity of the 
person or group of persons concerned. According to the Swiss Courts, the Armenian genocide, 
like the Jewish genocide, was a proven historical fact, recognised by the Swiss Parliament, while 
Perinçek’s motives in denying this historical fact were of a racist tendency and did not contribute 
to the historical debate. Relying on Article 10 of the European Convention, Perinçek complained 
before the Strasbourg Court that the Swiss authorities had breached his right to freedom of 
expression. 
 
First the European Court found that Perinçek had not committed an abuse of his rights within the 
meaning of Article 17 of the Convention. The Court underlined that the free exercise of the right 
to openly discuss questions of a sensitive and controversial nature was one of the fundamental 
aspects of freedom of expression and distinguished a tolerant and pluralistic democratic society 
from a totalitarian or dictatorial regime. The Court emphasized that the limit beyond which 
comments may engage Article 17 lay in the question of whether the aim of the speech was to 
incite hatred or violence, aiming at the destruction of the rights of others. The rejection of the 
legal characterisation as “genocide” of the events of 1915 was not such as to incite hatred against 
the Armenian people. 
 
Next, from the perspective of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court agreed with the Swiss courts 
that Perinçek could not have been unaware that by describing the Armenian genocide as an 
“international lie”, he was exposing himself, being on Swiss territory, to a criminal sanction 
“prescribed by law”. The Court also found that the aim of the application of Article 261bis of the 
Swiss Criminal Code was to protect the rights of others, namely the honour of the relatives of 
victims of the atrocities perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian people from 
1915 onwards. 
 
The crucial question was whether the prosecution and conviction of Perinçek was “necessary in 
a democratic society”. The Court was of the opinion that the discussion about the Armenian 
“genocide” was of great interest to the general public and that Perinçek had engaged in speech 
of a historical, legal and political nature which was part of a heated debate. Accordingly, this 
limited the margin of appreciation of the Swiss authorities in deciding whether the interference 
with Perinçek’s freedom of expression was justified and necessary in a democratic society. 
Essential for the Court is that it is still very difficult to identify a general consensus about the 
qualification of the Armenian “genocide”. Only about 20 States out of the 190 in the world have 
officially recognised the Armenian genocide. Furthermore the notion of “genocide” is a precisely 
defined and narrow legal concept, difficult to substantiate. Historical research is by definition 
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open to discussion and a matter of debate, without necessarily giving rise to final conclusions or 
to the assertion of objective and absolute truths. In this connection, the Court clearly 
distinguished the present case from those concerning the negation of the crimes of the 
Holocaust, committed by the Nazi regime. The Court therefore took the view that Switzerland 
had failed to show how there was a social need in that country to punish an individual for racial 
discrimination on the basis of declarations challenging the legal characterisation as “genocide” 
of acts perpetrated on the territory of the former Ottoman Empire in 1915 and the following 
years. The European Court also referred to the General Comment nr. 34 of the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee on Article 19 ICCPR, opposing “general prohibitions on expression of 
historical views”. According to the UN HRC “laws that penalise the promulgation of specific views 
about past events, so called “memory-laws”, must be reviewed to ensure they violate neither 
freedom of opinion nor expression”. 
 
In conclusion, the Court expressed its doubt that Perinçek’s conviction had been dictated by a 
“pressing social need”. It pointed out that it had to ensure that the sanction did not constitute a 
kind of censorship that would lead people to refrain from expressing criticism as part of a debate 
of general interest, because such a sanction might dissuade persons from contributing to the 
public discussion of questions that are of interest for the life of the community. The Court found 
that the grounds given by the national authorities in order to justify Perinçek’s conviction were 
insufficient and that the domestic authorities had overstepped their narrow margin of 
appreciation in this case in respect of a matter of debate of undeniable public interest. The Court 
considered the criminal conviction of Perinçek, for denial that the atrocities perpetrated against 
the Armenian people in 1915 and following years constituted genocide, was unjustified. 
Accordingly there has been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Perinçek v. Switzerland, no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013. 
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber on 2 June 2014, which returned its 
judgment on 15 October 2015. 
 
IRIS 2014-2/1 
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European Court of Human Rights: Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The applicants in this case are Lars Lillo-Stenberg and Andrine Sæther, respectively a well-known 
musician and an actress in Norway, who complained about press invasion of their privacy during 
their wedding on 20 August 2005. The wedding took place outdoors on an islet in the Oslo fjord 
that was accessible to the public. Without the couple’s consent, the weekly magazine Se og Hør 
subsequently published a two-page article about the wedding accompanied by six photographs. 
The pictures were obtained by hiding and using a strong telephoto lens from a distance of 
approximately 250 metres. The pictures showed the bride, her father and bridesmaids arriving at 
the islet in a small rowing boat, the bride being brought to the groom by her father and the bride 
and groom returning to the mainland on foot by crossing the lake on stepping stones. The couple 
brought compensation proceedings against the magazine and won at the first two instances, but 
finally the Supreme Court found against the couple, by three votes to two. It considered that they 
had married in a place that was accessible to the public, easily visible and at a popular holiday 
location. Furthermore the article was neither offensive nor negative. Relying on Article 8 (right 
to respect for private and family life), Lars Lillo-Stenberg and Andrine Sæther complained that 
their right to respect for private life had been breached by the Supreme Court’s judgment. 
 
The European Court starts from the premise that the present case requires an examination of the 
fair balance that has to be struck between the applicants’ right to the protection of their private 
life under Article 8 of the Convention and the publisher’s right to freedom of expression as 
guaranteed by Article 10. The Court confirms “that a person’s image constitutes one of the chief 
attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals the person’s unique characteristics and 
distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The right to the protection of one’s image is thus 
one of the essential components of personal development. It mainly presupposes the individual’s 
right to control the use of that image, including the right to refuse publication thereof” and that 
“even where a person is known to the general public, he or she may rely on a “legitimate 
expectation” of protection of and respect for his or her private life”. The Court again applies a 
number of criteria it considers relevant where the right of freedom of expression is being 
balanced against the right to respect for private life. The relevant criteria are: (i) contribution to 
a debate of general interest; (ii) how well known is the person concerned and what is the subject 
of the report?; (iii) prior conduct of the person concerned; (iv) method of obtaining the 
information and its veracity/circumstances in which the photographs were taken; and (v) content, 
form and consequences of the publication. In the opinion of the European Court, both the 
majority and the minority of the Norwegian Supreme Court had carefully balanced the right of 
freedom of expression with the right to respect for private life, and had explicitly taken into 
account the criteria set out in the Court’s case law that existed at the relevant time (notably Von 
Hannover (no. 2) and Axel Springer AG, see IRIS 2012-3/1). The Court considered that there was 
an element of general interest in the article about the applicants’ wedding and that the article 
did not contain any elements that could damage their reputations. Since the wedding took place 
in an area that was accessible to the public, easily visible, and a popular holiday location, it was 
likely to attract the attention of third parties. Being well-known public figures in Norway, these 
circumstances certainly lowered their legitimate expectation of privacy, while on the other hand 
no pictures were published of the private marriage ceremony itself. Although the Court considers 
that “opinions may differ on the outcome of a judgment”, it sees no sufficient, strong reasons to 
substitute its view for that of the majority of the Norwegian Supreme Court. Having regard to the 
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margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national courts when balancing competing interests, the 
Court concludes that the Supreme Court did not fail to comply with its obligations under Article 
8 of the Convention. The interference with the right of privacy of the applicants was sufficiently 
justified by the right to freedom of expression of the magazine Se og Hør. 
 
• Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther v. Norway, no. 13258/09, 16 January 2014. 
 
IRIS 2014-3/1 
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Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
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Tierbefreier E.V. is an association based in Germany that militates in favour animal rights. A court 
decision prevented the association from disseminating film footage, which was secretly taken by 
a journalist on the premises of a company performing experiments on animals for the 
pharmaceutical industry (C. company). The journalist used his footage to produce documentary 
films of different lengths, critically commenting on the way in which laboratory animals were 
treated. His films, or extracts from them, were shown on different TV channels. Largely based on 
the journalist’s footage, Tierbefreier produced a film of about 20 minutes, with the title 
“Poisoning for profit” and made it available on its website. The film contained the accusation that 
the legal regulations on the treatment of animals were being disregarded by C. company and 
closed with the statement that medicines were not being made safer by poisoning monkeys. On 
the request of C. company, relying on its personality rights, which encompassed the right not to 
be spied upon by the use of hidden cameras, Tierbefreier was ordered by a court injunction to 
desist from publicly showing the film footage taken by the journalist on the C. company’s 
premises or to make it otherwise available to third persons. According to the German courts 
Tierbefreier could not rely on its right to freedom of expression, as the manner in which it had 
presented the footage did not respect the rules of the intellectual battle of ideas. Relying on 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Tierbefreier lodged an appeal before 
the Strasbourg Court, complaining that the injunction had violated its right to freedom of 
expression. The association further relied on Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) in 
conjunction with Article 10, complaining that it had been discriminated against in comparison 
with the journalist and other animal rights activists who had merely been prohibited from 
disseminating specific films, but had been allowed to continue the publication of the footage in 
other contexts. 
 
The European Court endorses the assessment that the injunction interfered with Tierbefreier’s 
right to freedom of expression. But as it was prescribed by law, pursued the legitimate aim of 
protecting the C. company’s reputation and was considered “necessary in a democratic society”, 
the Court found no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court observed that the 
domestic courts carefully examined whether a decision to grant the injunction in question would 
violate the applicant association’s right to freedom of expression, fully acknowledging the impact 
of the right to freedom of expression in a debate on matters of public interest. The Court points 
out that there was no evidence however that the accusations made in the film “Poisoning for 
profit”, according to which the C. company systematically flouted the law, were correct. 
Furthermore, Tierbefreier had employed unfair means when militating against the C. company’s 
activities and they could be expected to continue to do so if allowed to make further use of the 
footage. The Court also referred to the German courts’ findings that the further dissemination of 
the footage would seriously violate the C. company’s rights, especially since the footage had been 
produced by a former employee of the C. company, who had abused his professional status in 
order to secretly produce film material within that company’s private premises. The Court finally 
notes that the interference at issue did not concern any criminal sanctions, but a civil injunction 
preventing Tierbefreier from disseminating specified footage. It referred to the fact that 
Tierbefreier remained fully entitled to express its criticism on animal experiments in other, even 
one-sided ways. The Court considers that the German courts struck a fair balance between 
Tierbefreier’s right to freedom of expression and the C. company’s interests in protecting its 
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reputation. Hence, there has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention taken separately. 
As the German courts also gave relevant reasons for treating Tierbefreier differently from the 
other animal rights activists and the journalist with regard to the extent of the civil injunction, 
the European Court accordingly also finds that there has been no violation of Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Tierbefreier e.V. v. Germany, no. 45192/09, 16 January 2014. 
 
IRIS 2014-3/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Pentikäinen v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a judgment of 4 February 2014, the European Court found that a Finnish press photographer’s 
conviction for disobeying the police while covering a demonstration did not breach his freedom 
of expression. The applicant, Mr Pentikäinen, is a photographer and journalist for the weekly 
magazine Suomen Kuvalehti. He was sent by his employer to take photographs of a large 
demonstration in Helsinki. At a certain point, the police decided to interrupt the demonstration 
which had turned violent. It was announced over loudspeakers that the demonstration was over 
and that the crowd should leave the scene. After further escalation of violence, the police 
considered that the event had turned into a riot and decided to seal off the demonstration area. 
When leaving, the demonstrators were asked to show ID and their belongings were checked. 
However, a core group of around 20 people remained in the demonstration area, including Mr 
Pentikäinen, who assumed the order to leave the area only applied to the demonstrators and not 
to him, doing his work as a journalist. He also tried to make clear to the police that he was a 
representative of the media, referring to his press badge. A short time later the police arrested 
the demonstrators, including Mr Pentikäinen. He was detained for more than 17 hours and short 
time later the public prosecutor brought charges against him. The Finnish courts found the 
journalist guilty of disobeying the police, but they did not impose any penalty on him, holding 
that his offence was excusable. 
 
In Strasbourg Mr Pentikäinen complained that his rights under Article 10 (freedom of expression) 
had been violated by his arrest and conviction, as he had been prevented from doing his job as a 
journalist. The European Court recognised that Mr Pentikäinen, as a newspaper photographer and 
journalist, had been confronted with an interference in his right to freedom of expression. 
However, as the interference was prescribed by law, pursued several legitimate aims (the 
protection of public safety and the prevention of disorder and crime) and was to be considered 
necessary in a democratic society, there was no violation of his right under Article 10 of the 
Convention. The European Court especially referred to the fact that Mr Pentikäinen had not been 
prevented from taking photos of the demonstration and that no equipment or photos had been 
confiscated. There was no doubt that the demonstration had been a matter of legitimate public 
interest, justifying media reporting on it, and Mr Pentikäinen was not prevented from doing so. 
His arrest was a consequence of his decision to ignore the police orders to leave the area, while 
there was also a separate secure area which had been reserved for the press. It was also doubtful 
whether Mr Pentikäinen had made it sufficiently clear to the police when being arrested that he 
was a journalist. Furthermore, although Mr Pentikäinen was found guilty of disobeying the police, 
no penalty had been imposed on him and no entry of his conviction had been made on his 
criminal record. The Court also considered that the fact that the applicant was a journalist did 
not give him a greater right to stay at the scene than the other people and that the conduct 
sanctioned by the criminal conviction was not his journalistic activity as such, but his refusal to 
comply with a police order at the very end of the demonstration, when the latter was judged by 
the police to have become a riot. The European Court concluded therefore, by five votes to two, 
that the Finnish courts had struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake and 
accordingly came to the conclusion that there had been no violation of Article 10. 
 
According to the separate dissenting opinion of two judges it has not been substantiated why it 
was necessary in a democratic society to equate a professional journalist, operating within 
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recognised professional limits in covering the demonstration, with any of the people taking part 
in the demonstration and to impose drastic criminal restraints on him. The dissenting judges 
criticised sharply the imposition of restrictions on a journalist’s freedom of expression through 
his arrest, detention, prosecution and conviction for a criminal offence simply because he had 
the courage to do his duty in furtherance of the public interest. According to the dissenting 
judges, the case reveals a one-sided attitude on the part of the Finnish authorities, one likely to 
create a “chilling effect” on press freedom. 
 
• Pentikäinen v. Finland, no. 11882/10, 4 February 2014. 
 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber on 2 June 2014, which returned its 
judgment on 20 October 2015. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Bayar (nos. 1-8) v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In eight judgments of 25 March 2014 the European Court of Human Rights has once more found 
gross violations of the right to freedom of expression and information in Turkey. Each of the 
judgments concerns the criminal conviction for publishing declarations from an illegal armed 
organisation. The applicant in all of the eight cases is Hasan Bayar, the editor-in-chief of the 
Ülkede Özgür Gündem, a daily newspaper based in Istanbul. In 2004 the newspaper published a 
series of statements and articles expressing, in various ways, the positions of the PKK (the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party), as well as statements by its leaders. It also published appeals from 
prisoners to the Turkish Government to negotiate with Mr Öcalan, the PKK leader. Other articles 
described events linked to Mr Öcalan’s incarceration. Some of the statements from the PKK or 
Congra-Gel or PJA, a branch of the PKK, concerned the political situation of the Kurds, the role 
of women in society and appeals for democratisation and peace. One article, reproducing 
declarations of the leader of Congra-Gel, protested against the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister 
to Iran. After the publication of each article, the public prosecutor charged Mr Bayar and the 
owner of the newspaper with spreading propaganda via the press, and publishing material from 
an illegal armed organisation. On each occasion Mr Bayar and the owner of the newspaper were 
convicted in application of the anti-terrorism act nr. 3713 and they were ordered to pay a fine. 
Mr Bayar appealed to the Court of Cassation against each of these decisions, arguing that his 
rights as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention had been violated. However, all 
Mr Bayer’s appeals were declared inadmissible. 
 
The Strasbourg Court is of the opinion that Mr Bayer’s right under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) 
was violated, as the Court of Cassation had wrongfully declared his appeals inadmissible. The 
European Court also found that Mr Bayer’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 was 
violated, as the Court saw no pertinent reason to justify Mr Bayer’s conviction. The Court said 
that it was aware of the difficulties the fight against terrorism was confronted with, but it 
emphasised at the same time the importance of the right to freedom of expression, by notifying 
that the impugned articles did not encourage violence, armed resistance or insurrection and did 
not constitute hate speech. According to the Court this was crucial, and it could not find any 
pertinent and sufficient reasons to justify any of the interferences with the editor-in-chief’s right 
to freedom of expression. Unanimously, the Court awarded Mr Bayer - in all the cases taken 
together - the total sum of EUR 6,133 (pecuniary damage), EUR 10,400 (non-pecuniary damage), 
and EUR 4,000 (costs and expenses). 
 
• Bayar v. Turkey (nos. 1-8), nos. 39690/06, 40559/06, 48815/06, 2512/07, 55197/07, 55199/07, 
55201/07, 55202/07, 25 March 2014. 
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The European Court of Human Rights has delivered an interesting judgment on the right to 
freedom of political expression, during pre-election time. The applicant, Mr Ulrich Brosa alleged 
that a court injunction in Germany, prohibiting him from distributing a leaflet that he had drawn 
up on the occasion of mayoral elections, had violated his right to freedom of expression. The 
injunction at issue prohibited Brosa from distributing a leaflet in which he called not to vote for 
a candidate, F.G. for the office of local mayor, who allegedly provided cover for a neo-Nazi 
organisation, Berger-88. The injunction also prevented Brosa from making other assertions of 
fact or allegations that might depict F.G. as a supporter of neo-Nazi organisations. Any 
contravention was punishable by a fine of up to EUR 250,000 or by imprisonment of up to six 
months. The German courts found that to claim that someone was supporting a neo-Nazi 
organisation amounted to an infringement of that individual’s honour and social reputation and 
to his personality rights, while Brosa had failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his 
allegation against F.G. In Strasbourg, Brosa complained that the injunction had breached his right 
to freedom of expression, as provided for in Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
Examining the particular circumstances of the case, the Court refers to the following elements 
to be taken into account: (1) the position of the applicant, (2) the position of the plaintiff in the 
domestic proceedings, (3) the subject-matter of the publication and finally (4) the classification 
of the contested statement by the domestic courts. 
 
As to the position of Brosa, the Court notes that he is a private individual, participating however 
in a public discussion on the political orientation of an association. F.G. was an elected town 
councillor who was running for the office of mayor at the time in question. This status of F.G. as 
a politician made the limits of acceptable criticism wider than as regards a private individual. 
The subject-matter of the publication concerned a leaflet asking citizens not to vote for F.G. as 
mayor, primarily on the basis of his attitude vis-à-vis an association having an extremist right-
wing orientation. Brosa’s leaflet, disseminated in the run-up to the mayoral elections was 
therefore of a political nature on a question of public interest at the material time and location, 
leaving little scope for restrictions on political speech or on debate of questions of public interest. 
As regards the qualification of the impugned statement by the domestic courts, the Court 
considers it to consist of two elements: firstly, the allegation that the association Berger-88 was 
a neo-Nazi organisation that, moreover, was particularly dangerous; and, secondly, the allegation 
that F.G. had “covered” for the organisation. The Court admits that, in substance, the reference to 
the neo-Nazi background and the dangerous character of Berger-88 was not devoid of factual 
basis, while the Court also reminds us of the fact that the association was monitored by the 
German Intelligence Services on suspicion of extremist tendencies. The European Court holds 
the opinion that that the German courts in this case required a disproportionately high degree of 
factual proof to be established. It also considers that the statement that F.G. has covered the neo-
Nazi organisation at issue was part of an ongoing debate. The Court finds that this statement had 
a sufficient factual basis, referring to F.G.’s public statements, emphasizing that the association 
had no extreme right-wing tendencies and calling Brosa’s statements “false allegations”. 
According to the Court, Brosa’s leaflet did not exceed the acceptable limits of criticism. Therefore 
the Court comes to the conclusion that the German courts failed to strike a fair balance between 
the relevant interests and to establish a “pressing social need” for putting the protection of the 
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personality rights of F.G. above Brosa’s right to freedom of expression, even in the context of a 
civil injunction rather than criminal charges or monetary compensation claims. Under these 
circumstances, the Court considers that the domestic courts overstepped the margin of 
appreciation afforded to them and that the interference was disproportionate to the aim pursued 
and not “necessary in a democratic society”. There has been, accordingly, a violation of Article 10 
of the Convention. The Court held that Germany was to pay Mr Brosa EUR 3,000 in respect of 
non-pecuniary damage and 2,683 euros in respect of costs and expenses. 
 
• Brosa v. Germany, no. 5709/09, 17 April 2014. 
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Can a title of a newspaper article that could be interpreted as damaging the reputation of a public 
person justify a criminal conviction of the journalist who wrote the article, while the article itself 
is written in good faith and does not contain any factual errors or defamatory allegations? That 
is the question the European Court needed to answer in a recent case against Finland. The 
applicant in this case is Tiina Johanna Salumäki, a journalist working for the newspaper Ilta-
Sanomat. Ms Salumäki published an article concerning the investigation into a homicide (of P.O.). 
The front page of the newspaper carried a headline asking whether the victim of the homicide 
had connections with K.U., a well-known Finnish businessman. A photograph of K.U. appeared 
on the same page. Next to the article was a separate column mentioning K.U.’s previous 
conviction for economic crimes. The Helsinki District Court convicted the journalist, Salumäki, 
and the newspaper’s editor-in-chief at the time, H.S., of defaming K.U. as the title of their article 
insinuated that K.U. had been involved in the killing, even though it was made clear in the text 
of the article itself that the homicide suspect had no connections with K.U. Along with H.S., 
Salumäki was ordered to pay damages and costs to K.U. This judgment was subsequently upheld 
on appeal and the Supreme Court finally refused leave to appeal. Salumäki complained that her 
conviction had amounted to a violation of Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. She argued that the information presented in the article was 
correct and that the title of the article only connected K.U. to the victim and did not insinuate 
that K.U. had connections with the perpetrator, or that he was involved in the homicide. 
 
The Court explains that it had to verify whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance 
when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention that may come into conflict with each 
other in certain cases, namely, on the one hand, the freedom of expression protected by Article 
10 and, on the other, the right to respect for private life, including the right of reputation, 
enshrined in Article 8. The Court applies the criteria developed by the Grand Chamber in Axel 
Springer Verlag and Von Hannover (no. 2) (IRIS 2012/3-1) in order to find out whether the 
domestic authorities indeed struck a fair balance between the rights protected by Articles 8 and 
10 of the Convention. First the Court emphasises that the criminal investigation into a homicide 
was clearly a matter of legitimate public interest, having regard in particular to the serious nature 
of the crime: “From the point of view of the general public’s right to receive information about 
matters of public interest, and thus from the standpoint of the press, there were justified grounds 
for reporting the matter to the public”. The Court also recognised that “the article was based on 
information given by the authorities and K.U.’s photograph had been taken at a public event”, 
while “the facts set out in the article in issue were not in dispute even before the domestic courts. 
There is no evidence, or indeed any allegation, of factual errors, misrepresentation or bad faith 
on the part of the applicant”. Nevertheless the decisive factor in this case was that, according to 
the domestic courts, the title created a connection between K.U. and the homicide, implying that 
he was involved in it. Even though it was specifically stated in the text of the article that the 
homicide suspect had no connections with K.U., this information only appeared towards the end 
of the article. The Court was of the opinion that Salumäki must have considered it probable that 
her article contained a false insinuation and that this false insinuation was capable of causing 
suffering to K.U. The Court also refers in this context to the principle of presumption of innocence 
under Article 6 §2 of the Convention and emphasises that this principle may be relevant also in 
the context of Article 10, in situations in which nothing is clearly stated but only insinuated. The 
Back to overview of case-law 
340 
Court therefore concluded that what the journalist had written was defamatory, as it implied that 
K.U. was somehow responsible for P.O.’s murder. According to the Court, “it amounted to stating, 
by innuendo, a fact that was highly damaging to the reputation of K.U.” and at no time did 
Salumäki attempt to prove the truth of the insinuated fact, nor did she plead that the insinuation 
was a fair comment based on relevant facts. Having regard to all the foregoing factors, including 
the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in this area, the Court considered that the 
domestic courts struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. There has 
therefore been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Salumäki v. Finland, no. 23605/09, 29 April 2014. 
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The European Court’s judgment in the case of Taranenko v. Russia illustrates how Article 10, in 
conjunction with Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association), also protects collective action, 
expressive conduct and distribution of leaflets as a form of protected speech. The case concerns 
the detention and conviction of Ms Taranenko, a participant in a protest against the politics of 
President Putin in 2004. The protesters had occupied the reception area of the President’s 
Administration building in Moscow and locked themselves in an office. They waved placards with 
“Putin, resign!” («Путин, уйди!») and distributed leaflets with a printed address to the President 
that listed ten ways in which he had failed to uphold the Russian Constitution, and a call for his 
resignation. One of the protesters, Ms Taranenko, complained in Strasbourg about the way the 
Russian authorities have treated, detained, prosecuted and convicted her for participating in this 
protest action, claiming that her right to freedom of expression and her right of peaceful 
assembly had been violated. 
 
The Court reiterated that “the right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic 
society and, like the right to freedom of expression, is one of the foundations of such a society. 
Thus, it should not be interpreted restrictively”. The Court also emphasised that any measures 
interfering with freedom of assembly and expression “other than in cases of incitement to 
violence or rejection of democratic principles do a disservice to democracy and often even 
endanger it”. The Court noted that the issues of freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful 
assembly are closely linked in the present case: “Indeed, the protection of personal opinions, 
secured by Article 10 of the Convention, is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful assembly 
as enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention”. The European Court underlined that the protest, 
although involving some disturbance of public order, had been largely non-violent and had not 
caused any bodily injuries. The participants in the protest action came to the President’s 
Administration building to meet officials, hand over a petition criticising the President’s policies, 
distribute leaflets and talk to journalists. The aim of the protesters in Moscow was indeed to 
obtain media-exposure, in which they effectively succeeded. The disturbance that followed was 
not part of their initial plan but a reaction to the guards’ attempts to stop them from entering the 
building. In this context, the Court had to examine with particular scrutiny the prison sentence 
as a sanction imposed by the national authorities for non-violent conduct. The Court found in 
particular that while a sanction for Ms Taranenko’s actions might have been warranted by the 
demands of public order, her detention pending trial of almost one year and the suspended prison 
sentence of three years imposed on her had to have had a deterring effect on protesters. The 
Court considered the pre-trial detention and the prison sentence as an “unusually severe 
sanction” having a chilling effect on Ms Taranenko and other persons taking part in protest 
actions. The Court referred to the “exceptional seriousness of the sanctions” as being 
disproportionate and therefore concluded that the interference had not been necessary in a 
democratic society for the purposes of Article 10. There had accordingly been a violation of 
Article 10 interpreted in the light of Article 11 of the Convention. 
 
• Taranenko v. Russia, no. 19554/05, 15 May 2014. 
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The European Court of Human Rights has again reiterated that collecting information and 
guaranteeing access to documents held by public authorities is a crucial right for journalists in 
order to be able to report on matters of public interest, helping to implement the right of the 
public to be properly informed on such matters. In the case of Ioan Romeo Roşiianu, a presenter 
of a regional television programme, the Court came to the conclusion that the Romanian 
authorities had violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights by refusing 
access to documents of a public nature, which he had requested at Baia Mare, a city in the north 
of Romania. The Court’s judgment clarifies that efficient enforcement mechanisms are necessary 
in order to make the right of access to public documents under Article 10 practical and effective. 
 
In his capacity as a journalist, Roşiianu had contacted the Baia Mare municipal authorities, 
requesting disclosure of several documents, as part of his investigation into how public funds 
were used by the city administration. His requests were based on the provisions of Law no. 
544/2001 on freedom of public information. As the reply from the mayor did not contain the 
requested information, Roşiianu applied to the administrative court. In three separate decisions, 
the Cluj Court of Appeal ordered the mayor to disclose most of the requested information. The 
Court of Appeal noted that, under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Law no. 544/2001 on freedom of public information, Roşiianu was entitled to obtain the 
information in question, which he intended to use in his professional activity. The letters sent by 
the mayor of Baia Mare did not represent adequate responses to those requests. The Cluj Court 
of Appeal ordered the mayor to pay the applicant EUR 700 in respect of non-pecuniary damages, 
and held that his refusal to disclose the requested information amounted to a denial of the right 
to receive and impart information, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention. Mr 
Roşiianu applied for enforcement of the decisions, but the mayor refused to comply. The 
decisions delivered by the Cluj Court of Appeal remained unenforced. 
 
Roşiianu complained about the failure to execute the judicial decisions, relying on Article 6 §1 
(right to a fair hearing). Relying on Article 10, he alleged that the failure to execute the decisions 
of the Cluj Court of Appeal amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of expression. 
 
With regard to the complaint under Article 6 §1 of the Convention, it is observed that the mayor 
had suggested that Roşiianu should come in person to the town hall to obtain several thousand 
photocopied pages, which would have included having to pay for the reproduction costs, but that 
the domestic courts had concluded that such an invitation could not possibly be considered as 
an execution of a judicial decision ordering the disclosure of information of a public nature. The 
European Court found that the non-enforcement of the final judicial decisions ordering disclosure 
to Mr Roşiianu of public information had deprived Roşiianu of effective access to a court, which 
amounted to a violation of Article 6 §1 of the Convention. 
 
With regard to the complaint under Article 10, the Court noted that Roşiianu was involved in the 
legitimate gathering of information on a matter of public importance, namely the activities of 
the Baia Mare municipal administration. The Court reiterated that in view of the interest 
protected by Article 10, the law cannot allow arbitrary restrictions that may become a form of 
indirect censorship should the authorities create obstacles to the gathering of information. 
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Gathering information is indeed an essential preparatory step in journalism and is an inherent, 
protected part of press freedom. Given that the journalist’s intention had been to communicate 
the information in question to the public and thereby to contribute to the public debate on good 
public governance, his right to impart information had clearly been impaired. The Court found 
that there had not been adequate execution of the judicial decisions in question. It also observed 
that the complexity of the requested information and the considerable work required in order to 
select or compile the requested documents had been referred to solely to explain the 
impossibility of providing that information rapidly, but could not be a sufficient or pertinent 
argument to refuse access to the requested documents. The Court concluded that the Romanian 
authorities had adduced no argument showing that the interference in Roşiianu’s right had been 
prescribed by law, or that it pursued one or several legitimate aims, hence finding a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. The Court held that Romania was to pay the applicant EUR 4,000 
in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 4,748 in respect of costs and expenses. 
 
• Roşiianu v. Romania, no. 27329/06, 24 June 2014. 
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In a judgment of 10 July 2014, the European Court found that the publication by the daily 
newspaper Bild of suspicions concerning the former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, was 
covered by journalistic freedom. In Strasbourg, the publisher of Bild, Axel Springer AG, had lodged 
a complaint arguing that the German courts had interfered with the right to freedom of 
expression and critical press reporting in a way that violated Article 10 of the Convention.  
 
An article in Bild had repeated a series of suspicions and doubts on the part of Mr Thiele – the 
deputy president of the Liberal Democratic Party’s (FDP) parliamentary group – with regard to 
Schröder’s appointment as chairman of the supervisory board of the German-Russian consortium 
Konsortium Nordeuropäische Gaspipeline (NEGP). Thiele had insinuated that Mr Schröder had 
resigned from his political functions because he had been offered a lucrative post in the 
consortium headed by the Russian company Gazprom. In this regard, references were made to an 
agreement on construction of a pipeline that was signed in April 2005, in the presence of Mr 
Schröder and the Russian President Vladimir Putin. Having complained to the German courts, Mr 
Schröder obtained an order banning further publication of the passage, which reported Mr 
Thiele’s comments and insinuations of corruption. 
 
The European Court sharply disagrees with the reasoning and findings of the German courts. The 
Court refers to the relevant criteria it has taken into consideration in earlier cases (see Von 
Hannover v. Germany (No. 2) and Axel Springer AG v. Germany (No. 1), (see IRIS 2012-3/1) when 
dealing with the conflicting rights of freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 and the 
right to protection of one’s reputation under Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to 
private life.  
 
First the Court notes that the article in Bild did not recount details of Mr Schröder’s private life 
with the aim of satisfying public curiosity, but related to Mr Schröder’s conduct in the exercise of 
his term of office as Federal Chancellor and his controversial appointment to a German-Russian 
gas consortium shortly after he ceased to hold office as Chancellor. Furthermore, there were 
sufficient facts, which could justify suspicions with regard to Mr Schröder’s conduct. Such 
suspicions amounted to the expression of a value judgment, without concrete allegations of 
Schröder having committed criminal offences. The Court also observes that Mr Thiele’s questions 
were not the only comments to be reproduced in the Bild article, but supplemented a series of 
statements made by different political figures from various political parties.  
 
As well as this, the Court could not subscribe to the German court’s opinion that the article in 
Bild should have also contained elements in favour of the former Chancellor. The former 
Chancellor had a duty to show a much greater degree of tolerance than a private citizen. In the 
political arena, freedom of expression is of the utmost importance and the press has a vital role 
as public “watchdog”. The punishment of a journalist for assisting in the dissemination of 
statements made by another person would seriously hamper the contribution of the press to 
discussions of matters of public interest. The Court also considers that a newspaper cannot be 
required to systematically verify the merits of every comment made by one politician about 
another, when such comments are made in the context of a current political debate. As to the 
severity of the measure imposed, the Court notes that although only a civil-law ban on further 
Back to overview of case-law 
345 
publication of the impugned passage in the Bild article had been imposed, it nonetheless 
considers that this prohibition could have had a chilling effect on the newspaper’s freedom of 
expression. 
 
The Court concludes unanimously that Bild has not exceeded the limits of journalistic freedom 
in publishing the disputed passage. The German courts have not convincingly established the 
existence of any pressing social need for placing the protection of Mr Schröder’s reputation above 
the newspaper’s right to freedom of expression and the general interest in promoting this 
freedom where issues of public interest were concerned. There had therefore been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Axel Springer AG v. Germany (no. 2), no. 48311/10, 10 July 2014. 
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In an unexpected judgment, the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of the right 
to respect for private life, as it considered that the confiscation of computers containing illegal 
software was not “in accordance with the law”, as required by Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Rumen Trifonov Prezhdarov and Anna Aleksandrovna 
Prezhdarova had started a business in their garage renting computers to clients, without having 
the necessary software licence for reproduction and distribution of the software and games that 
were installed on the computers. After a complaint by a manager of a company that distributed 
computer games, the district prosecutor ordered a police inquiry. Three weeks later the police 
inspected the applicants’ computer club and found that five computers contained computer 
games. Prezhdarov was invited to present documents, such as purchase invoices or any other 
evidence of his title to the games. As he failed to do so, the police seized the computers. Several 
requests to return the computers, due to the fact that they contained personal data, were 
dismissed. During the further criminal proceedings and trial, the computers remained confiscated. 
Prezhdarov was convicted for illegally distributing computer games and for illegally reproducing 
computer programmes and films. He was sentenced to one year and six months’ imprisonment, 
suspended for three years, and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of BGN 4,000.The confiscated 
computers were not returned after sentencing. 
 
Prezhdarov and Prezhdarova, relying on Article 8 ECHR, complained that the search in their 
garage and the seizure of five computers had not been conducted in accordance with the law. 
They argued, in particular, that private documents contained in the seized computers, which were 
unrelated to the criminal proceedings against the first applicant, had been caught up in the 
search-and-seizure operation. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights emphasised that, in the context of search and seizure, the 
domestic law must provide for sufficient safeguards against arbitrary interference with Article 8 
ECHR. The Court accepted that Bulgarian law allowed the police to conduct an immediate search-
and-seizure operation outside the criminal proceedings if that was the only possibility of 
collecting and securing evidence. The Court, however, expressed its doubts of whether the 
circumstances in the present case were really pressing, given that the prosecutor ordered the 
said operation three weeks before it was conducted. Therefore, the authorities had enough time 
to collect more information regarding the alleged criminal conduct, to open criminal proceedings, 
and to submit a prior request to the Court. 
 
Furthermore, the Court considered that the absence of a prior judicial warrant was not 
counterbalanced by the availability of a retrospective and effective judicial review. The Bulgarian 
court that approved the measure did not consider the scope of the operation, and did not make 
a distinction between information that was necessary for the investigation, and information that 
was not relevant. The European Court of Human Rights accepted that, as a matter of principle, 
the retention of the computers for the duration of the criminal proceedings pursued the 
legitimate aim of securing physical evidence in an ongoing criminal investigation. However, it 
was of the opinion that the lack of any consideration of the relevance of the seized information 
for the investigation, and of the applicants’ complaint regarding the personal character of some 
of the information stored on the computers, rendered the judicial review formalistic and deprived 
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the applicants of sufficient safeguards against abuse. Therefore, the Court considered that even 
assuming that there existed a general legal basis in Bulgarian law for the impugned measure, 
the applicants in the present case were not offered sufficient guarantees for their right to respect 
for their private life before or after the search-and-seizure operation. In these circumstances, the 
Court found that the interference with the applicants’ right to respect for their private life was 
not “in accordance with the law” as required by Article 8 § 2 of the Convention and hence violated 
Article 8 of the Convention. Consequently, the Court did not need to examine whether the 
impugned measure had a legitimate aim and was proportionate. 
 
One judge, Faris Vehabović, dissented, arguing that as Prezhdarov was sentenced for illegal use 
of software, it appeared that through his request for return of the confiscated computers 
(together with software installed on them), he was in fact seeking to regain possession of 
intellectual property acquired by committing a criminal act. In any democratic country, according 
to judge Vehabović, it would be unprecedented that property acquired as a result of a criminal 
act be returned to a convicted person, even if that property contained personal data, in order to 
satisfy the requirements of Article 8 under the concepts of “home” or “private life”. But this 
argument could not persuade the majority of the Court that found a violation of Article 8. 
 
• Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria, no. 8429/05, 30 September 2014. 
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In its judgment in the case of Matúz v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights confirmed 
the importance of whistleblower protection, in this case for a journalist who alarmed public 
opinion regarding censorship within the public broadcasting organisation in Hungary. The case 
concerned the dismissal of a television journalist, Gábor Matúz, working for the State television 
company Magyar Televízió Zrt., after having revealed several instances of alleged censorship by 
one of his superiors. 
 
Matúz first contacted the television company’s president and sent a letter to its board, informing 
them that the cultural director’s conduct in modifying and cutting certain programme content 
amounted to censorship. A short time later, an article appeared in the online version of a 
Hungarian daily newspaper, containing similar allegations and inviting the board to end 
censorship in the television company. A few months later, Matúz published a book containing 
detailed documentary evidence of censorship exercised in the State television company. 
Subsequently, Matúz was dismissed with immediate effect. Matúz challenged his dismissal in 
court, but he remained unsuccessful in his legal action in Hungary. After exhausting all national 
remedies, he lodged a complaint in Strasbourg, arguing a violation of his rights under Article 10 
of the Convention. He submitted that he had the right and obligation to inform the public about 
alleged censorship at the national television company. The Hungarian government argued that 
by publishing the impugned book without prior authorisation and by revealing confidential 
information in that book, Matúz had breached his duties, leading to his summary - and justified 
- dismissal. 
 
The European Court accepted that the legitimate aim pursued by the impugned measure was the 
prevention of the disclosure of confidential information, as well as “the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others” within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. Once more, 
the central question was whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. The 
Court referred to its standard case law on freedom of expression and journalistic reporting on 
matters of public interest and also observed that the present case bears a certain resemblance 
to the cases of Fuentes Bobo v. Spain (see IRIS 2000-4/1) and Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland (see 
IRIS 2009-9/1), in which it found violations of Article 10 in respect of journalists who had publicly 
criticised the public television broadcaster’s management. 
 
The relevant criteria regarding the balancing of the right to freedom of expression of a person 
bound by professional confidentiality against the right of employers to manage their staff have 
been laid down in the Court’s case-law since its Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Guja v. 
Moldova (§§74-78) (see IRIS 2008-6/1). These criteria are: (a) public interest involved in the 
disclosed information; (b) authenticity of the information disclosed; (c) the damage, if any, 
suffered by the authority as a result of the disclosure in question; (d) the motive behind the 
actions of the reporting employee; (e) whether, in the light of the duty of discretion owed by an 
employee toward his or her employer, the information was made public as a last resort, following 
disclosure to a superior or other competent body; and (f) the severity of the sanction imposed. 
The Court emphasised that the content of the book essentially concerned a matter of public 
interest and it confirmed that it was not in dispute that the documents published by Matúz were 
authentic and that his comments had a factual basis. The Court also noted that the journalist had 
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included the confidential documents in the book with no other intention than to corroborate his 
arguments on censorship and that there was no appearance of any gratuitous personal attack 
either (par. 46). Furthermore, the decision to make the impugned information and documents 
public was based on the lack of any response following his complaint to the president of the 
television company and letters to the board. Hence the Court was “satisfied that the publication 
of the book took place only after the applicant had felt prevented from remedying the perceived 
interference with his journalistic work within the television company itself - that is, for want of 
any effective alternative channel” (par. 47). The Court also noted that “a rather severe sanction 
was imposed on the applicant”, namely the termination of his employment with immediate effect 
(par. 48). 
 
The Court was of the opinion that the approach by the Hungarian judicial authorities neglected 
to sufficiently apply the right of freedom of expression. The Court concluded that the interference 
with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was not “necessary in a democratic society”. 
Accordingly, the Court unanimously found that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
• Matúz v. Hungary, no. 73571/10, 21 October 2014. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Urechean and Pavlicenco v. Moldova 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a case against Moldova, the European Court of Human Rights has decided that blanket 
immunity in defamation proceedings in order to guarantee the free speech rights of a president, 
violates the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court has examined many cases 
concerning limitations on the right of access to court in defamation cases by operation of 
parliamentary immunity (see e.g. [A. the United Kingdom] IRIS 2003-3/2, [Cordova v. Italy (Nos. 
1 & 2)] IRIS 2003-7/2 and [Belpietro v. Italy] IRIS 2013-10/1), but this was the first occasion on 
which the Court had to address immunity from a civil libel suit which benefits a president and a 
head of State. 
 
The applicants, Mr Urechean and Mrs Pavlicenco, were opposition politicians at the time. In two 
television programmes, the Moldovan president had been interviewed by journalists on various 
topics such as the economy, justice, foreign relations and elections. In the interviews the 
president stated, among other things, that Mr Urechean, as the mayor of Chişinău, had created “a 
very powerful mafia-style system of corruption” and that Mrs Pavlicenco “came straight from the 
KGB”. Both politicians brought libel suits against the president, but the Moldovan courts held 
that the president enjoyed immunity and could not be held liable for opinions which he expressed 
in the exercise of his mandate. Before the European Court of Human Rights, the applicants 
contended that the refusal of the domestic courts to examine the merits of their libel actions 
constituted a violation of their right of access to court under Article 6, paragraph 1, of the 
Convention. 
 
It was undisputed that there was a limitation of the applicants’ right of access to a court as a 
result of the domestic courts’ refusal to examine the merits of their libel actions against the 
president. The parties also agreed that the limitation of that right was prescribed by law and 
pursued a legitimate aim. The question for the Court was whether a fair balance had been struck 
between the competing interests involved, namely between the public’s interest in protecting 
the president’s freedom of speech in the exercise of his functions and the applicants’ interest in 
having access to a court and obtaining a reasoned answer to their complaints. 
 
The Court found that, in the circumstances of the case, such a fair balance had not been struck. 
Although a head of State’s task is not, unlike that of a member of Parliament, to be actively 
involved in public or political debates, the Court considered that it should be acceptable in a 
democratic society for States to afford some functional immunity to their heads of State in order 
to protect their free speech in the exercise of their functions and to maintain the separation of 
powers in the State. Nevertheless, such immunity, being an exception from the general rule of 
civil responsibility, should be regulated and interpreted in a clear and restrictive manner. In 
particular, the Court was of the opinion that the Moldovan courts had not addressed the question 
of whether the then-president of Moldova had made the statements about the applicants in the 
exercise of his mandate. Nor did the relevant constitutional provision define the limits of 
presidential immunity in libel actions. The Court furthermore observed that the immunity 
afforded to the president was perpetual and absolute and could not be lifted. The Court 
considered that conferring such blanket immunity on the head of State in the application of the 
rule of immunity was to be avoided. 
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The lack of alternative means of redress was another issue considered by the Court, as the 
Government submitted that the applicants, being politicians, should have resorted to the media 
to express their points of view on the President’s allegations about them. The Court however 
considered relevant its findings in Manole and Others v. Moldova (see IRIS 2009-10/1), which 
provided that at the material time there were only two television channels with national coverage 
in Moldova, one of which was involved in the present case and refused to offer airtime to one of 
the applicants, the other being State television. In view of that and of the findings in Manole and 
others concerning the administrative practice of censorship on State television, the Court was 
not persuaded that the applicants had at their disposal an effective means of countering the 
accusations made against them by the head of State during the television interviews at issue. 
 
The Court concluded, by four votes to three, that the manner in which the immunity rule was 
applied in the instant case constituted a disproportionate restriction on the applicants’ right of 
access to a court and hence violated Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Convention. According to the 
dissenting judges, the Moldovan courts had sufficiently established that the president’s 
statements fell within the exercise of his mandate. They also contended that the findings in 
Manole and others concerning the practice of censorship on State television were totally 
irrelevant to the instant case. According to the dissenters, the applicants could have relied on 
their right of reply or on other national legislation providing for a number of alternative means 
of redress in cases of defamation of honour, dignity and professional reputation. Furthermore, in 
their capacity as politicians the applicants fell within the category of persons open to close 
scrutiny of their acts, not only by the press, but also - and above all - by bodies representing the 
public interest, the risk of some uncompensated damage to reputation being, as a consequence, 
inevitable. On this basis, the dissenters found no violation of Article 6, paragraph 1. 
 
• Urechean and Pavlicenco v. the Republic of Moldova, nos. 27756/05 and 41219/07, 2 December 
2014. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Uzeyir Jafarov v. Azerbaijan 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a case related to a violent attack on a journalist, the European Court reiterated that the States 
have positive obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to create a favourable 
environment for participation in public debate by all the persons concerned, enabling them to 
express their opinions and ideas without fear. Because of failures to carry out an effective 
investigation, the European Court found that the criminal investigation of a journalist’s claim of 
ill-treatment was ineffective and that accordingly there has been a violation of Article 3 
(prohibition of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment) of the Convention under its procedural 
limb. 
 
In 2007, Uzeyir Jafarov had been the victim of a violent attack by two men, only a few hours after 
publishing an article in a newspaper in which he accused a senior military officer of corruption 
and illegal activities. The journalist was hit several times with a hard blunt object and he was 
also punched by his aggressors. The attack took place just in front of the newspaper’s office. 
Having heard the journalist’s screams, his colleagues came out of the office and the assailants 
left the scene of the incident by car. The journalist however recognised one of his two assailants: 
this person (N.R.) was a police officer from the Yasamal District Police Office. Also, other 
journalists could confirm that they had seen N.R. standing outside the newspaper’s office on the 
day of the attack. Although formally a criminal investigation was started in connection with the 
attack on the journalist, no further steps were taken in order to identify the perpetrators. In a 
newspaper interview the Minister of Internal Affairs was questioned about the attack on Uzeyir 
Jafarov. In that interview the Minister stated that the journalist had staged the attack on himself. 
The same day, the journalist lodged a complaint with the Prosecutor General, complaining of the 
police authorities’ failure to conduct an effective investigation. But this action had no further 
result. 
 
Relying on Article 3 of the European Convention, the journalist complained that State agents had 
been behind the attack on him and that the domestic authorities had failed to carry out an 
effective investigation in respect of his ill-treatment. In particular, the journalist pointed out that 
the investigator had failed to order an official identity parade including the police officer N.R. 
who had been one of his aggressors, to question his colleagues from the newspaper as witnesses 
and to obtain video recordings from security cameras situated in the vicinity of the scene of the 
incident. The European Court found numerous shortcomings in the investigation carried out by 
the domestic authorities. The Court inter alia referred to the fact that the journalist’s complaint 
was examined by the police office where the officer who had allegedly committed the offence 
was based. In the Court’s view, an investigation by the police into an allegation of misconduct by 
one of its own officers could not be independent in these circumstances. The Court also noted 
that, despite explicit requests by the journalist, the domestic authorities failed to take all steps 
reasonably available to them to secure the evidence concerning the attack. The Court further 
considered that the public statement by the Minister of Internal Affairs showed that during the 
investigation the domestic authorities were more concerned with proving the lack of involvement 
of a State agent in the attack on the journalist than with discovering the truth about the 
circumstances of that attack. In particular, it does not appear that adequate steps were taken to 
investigate the possibility that the attack could have been linked to Uzeyir Jafarov’s work as a 
journalist. On the contrary, it appears that the responsible authorities had already discarded that 
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possibility in the early stages of the investigation and with insufficient reason. These elements 
were sufficient to enable the Court to conclude that the investigation of the journalist’s claim of 
ill-treatment was ineffective. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention under its procedural limb. 
 
According to the European Court, it was not possible however to establish that the journalist had 
been subjected to the use of force by a State agent or that a State agent had been behind the 
attack on the journalist with the aim of interfering with his journalistic work. The Court 
considered that the present case should also be distinguished from other cases, where the 
domestic authorities ‒ which were aware of a series of violent actions against a newspaper and 
persons associated with it ‒ did not take any action to protect the newspaper and its journalists. 
In the present case, by contrast, neither the journalist nor the newspaper had been subjected to 
violent actions before. Moreover, the journalist had not lodged any request for protection with 
the domestic authorities before the attack on him. The Court emphasised that its inability to 
reach any conclusions as to whether there has, in substance, been treatment prohibited by Article 
3 of the Convention, derived to a large extent from the failure of the domestic authorities to carry 
out an effective investigation at the relevant time. However, the Court could not establish a 
substantive violation of Article 3 of the Convention in respect of the attack on the journalist. 
 
Finally the Court’s task was also to establish whether or not the journalist’s right to freedom of 
expression had been violated on account of the domestic authorities’ failure to conduct an 
effective investigation into the attack on him. The Court noted that the journalist’s allegations in 
this respect arise out of the same facts as those already examined under Article 3 of the 
Convention and found to be a violation of Article 3. Having regard to those findings, the Court 
considered that the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention did not raise a separate issue 
and that therefore it was not necessary to examine the complaint again under Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan is ordered to pay the journalist a sum 
of EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 4,400 in respect of costs and 
expenses. 
 
• Uzeyir Jafarov v. Azerbaijan, no. 54204/08, 29 January 2015. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Bohlen and Ernst August von Hannover v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In two cases related to humorous cigarette advertisements, the European Court of Human Rights 
found that there had been no reason for the domestic authorities to interfere with the freedom 
of commercial speech in order to protect the right of reputation and the right to their own names 
of two public persons referred to in the advertisements, without their consent. The European 
Court found, in particular, that the German Federal Court of Justice had struck a fair balance 
between freedom of expression (Article 10) and the right to privacy (Article 8). 
 
The first applicant, Dieter Bohlen, is a well-known musician and artistic producer in Germany, 
while the second applicant, Ernst August, is the husband of Princess Caroline of Monaco. In 2000, 
the company British American Tobacco (Germany) used in an advertisement campaign the first 
names and references to events associated with Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Von Hannover, who both 
sought injunctions prohibiting the distribution of the advertisements. The cigarette manufacturer 
immediately stopped the advertisement campaign, but refused to pay the sums the applicants 
claimed in compensation for the use of their first names. The Hamburg Regional Court and the 
Court of Appeal upheld the claims and awarded the applicants EUR 100 000 and EUR 35 000 
respectively. However, the Federal Court of Justice quashed the Court of Appeal judgments and 
held that, despite their commercial nature, the advertisements in question were apt to help shape 
public opinion and had not exploited the applicants’ good name or contained anything degrading. 
On this basis, it dismissed the applicants’ claims seeking financial compensation. Mr. Bohlen and 
Mr. Von Hannover lodged applications with the European Court of Human Rights, complaining 
that the ruling of the Federal Court of Justice had breached their right to privacy and their right 
to their own names, protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The European Court reiterated the relevant criteria laid down in its case-law for assessing the 
manner in which the domestic courts had balanced the right to respect for private life against 
the right to freedom of expression: the contribution to a debate of general interest, the extent to 
which the person in question was in the public eye, the subject of the report, the prior conduct 
of the person concerned and the content, form and impact of the publication. The Court gave the 
opinion that the advertisements were able to contribute to a debate of general interest to some 
degree, as they dealt in a satirical manner with events that had been the subject of public debate. 
It also considered that the applicants were sufficiently well-known to be unable to claim the 
same degree of protection of their private lives as persons who were unknown to the public at 
large or have not been in the public eye before. Furthermore, the image of and references to the 
applicants in the advertisements had not been degrading, while they obviously had a humorous 
character. The Court agreed with the finding by the German Federal Court of Justice that, in this 
case, priority was to be given to the right to freedom of expression of the tobacco company and 
that the dismissal of the applicants’ claim for financial compensation was justified, as they 
already had obtained the suspension of the distribution of the advertisements at issue. Hence a 
fair balance had been struck between freedom of expression and the right to respect for private 
life. The European Court found therefore, by six votes to one, that in both cases there had been 
no violation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
• Bohlen v. Germany, no. 53495/09, 19 February 2015. 
• Ernst August von Hannover v. Germany, no. 53649/09, 19 February 2015. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Haldimann and Others v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
In a case concerning the conviction of four journalists for having recorded and broadcast an 
interview using hidden cameras, the European Court of Human Rights found, by six votes to one, 
that the Swiss authorities had violated the journalists’ rights protected under Article 10 on 
freedom of expression of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court emphasised that 
the use of hidden cameras by the journalists was aimed at providing public information on a 
subject of general interest, whereby the person filmed was targeted not in any personal capacity, 
but as a professional broker. The Court found that the interference with the private life of the 
broker had not been serious enough to override the public interest in information on denouncing 
malpractice in the field of insurance brokerage (on the use of hidden cameras, see also 
Tierbefreier E.V. v. Germany, IRIS 2014-3/2). 
 
In 2003, the Swiss German-language television channel SF DRS prepared a documentary on sales 
of life insurance products, against a background of public discontent with the practices used by 
insurance brokers. One of the SF DRS journalists presented herself as a customer while meeting 
with an insurance broker. Two hidden cameras were placed in the room in which the meeting 
took place. At the end of the meeting the journalist revealed that the conversation had been in 
reality an interview that had been filmed for journalistic purpose. The broker tried to obtain an 
injunction against the programme, but that request was dismissed. A short time later, sequences 
from the recording were broadcast on television, with the broker’s face and voice disguised. After 
a complaint by the broker, a prosecution was started against the journalists involved in the 
making and editing of the programme, on charges of illegal recording of a conversation by others. 
Although acknowledging the major public interest in securing information on practices in the 
field of insurance, the journalists were convicted for recording and communicating a conversation 
by others without authorisation. The journalists complained before the European Court of Human 
Rights that their sentence to a payment of between four to 12 day-fines amounted to a 
disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of expression as protected under Article 
10. 
 
The Court reiterated its case law on attacks on the personal reputations of public figures and the 
six criteria which it has established in its Grand Chamber judgment of 7 February 2012 in the 
case of Axel Springer AG v. Germany (see IRIS 2012-3/1), weighing freedom of expression against 
the right to private life: (1) contributing to a debate of general interest, (2) ascertaining how well-
known the person being reported on is and the subject of the report/documentary, (3) that 
person’s prior conduct, (4) the method of obtaining the information and its veracity, (5) the 
content, form and repercussions of the journalistic output, and (6) the penalty imposed. The Court 
applied those criteria to the present case, while taking into consideration that the broker was not 
a well-known public figure. The Court noted that the documentary in question had not been 
geared towards criticising the broker personally, but rather towards denouncing specific 
commercial practices and the inadequate protection of consumers’ rights in the sector of 
insurance brokers. Hence the report concerned an issue of interesting public debate, while Article 
10 protects journalists in relation to such reporting under the proviso that they are acting in good 
faith and on an accurate factual basis, while providing “reliable and precise” information in 
accordance with the ethics of journalism. The Court noted that the veracity of the facts as 
presented by the journalists had indeed never been contested and that it was not established 
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that the journalists had deliberately acted in breach of the ethics of journalism. The recording on 
the other hand had been broadcast in the form of a report which was particularly negative in so 
far as the broker was concerned, using audiovisual media, which are often considered to have a 
more immediate and powerful effect than the written press. However, a decisive factor was that 
the journalists had disguised the broker’s face and voice and that the interview had not taken 
place on his usual business premises. Therefore the Court held that the interference with the 
private life of the broker had not been serious enough to override the public’s interest in receiving 
information on the alleged malpractice in the field of insurance brokerage. Despite the relative 
leniency of the penalties of 12 day-fines and four day-fines respectively, the criminal sentence 
by the Swiss court had been liable to discourage the media from expressing criticism, even 
though the journalists had not been prevented from broadcasting their documentary. The Court 
therefore concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10. 
 
• Haldimann and Others v. Switzerland, no. 21830/09, ECHR 2015. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Morice v. France (Grand Chamber) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
The Grand Chamber has overruled an earlier finding of non-violation of the right to freedom of 
expression of a lawyer (Chamber, Fifth Section, 11 July 2013). With an extensively elaborated 
reasoning, the Grand Chamber unanimously came to the conclusion that the applicant lawyer’s 
conviction for the defamation of two investigative judges violated Article 10 of the Convention. 
It found that the lawyer, Morice, had expressed value judgments in the newspaper Le Monde 
with a sufficient factual basis and that his remarks concerning a matter of public interest had not 
exceeded the limits of the right to freedom of expression. 
 
The judgment refers to the specific status of lawyers that gives them a central position in the 
administration of justice as intermediaries between the public and the courts. As a result, lawyers 
play a key role in ensuring that the courts, whose mission is fundamental in a State based on the 
rule of law, enjoy public confidence. This, however, does not exclude lawyers from the right to 
freedom of expression, in particular to comment in public on the administration of justice, 
provided that their criticism does not overstep certain bounds. Those bounds lie in the usual 
restrictions on the conduct of members of the Bar, with their particular reference to “dignity”, 
“honour” and “integrity” and to “respect for … the fair administration of justice”. 
 
The judgment analyses more concretely (a) the applicant’s status as a lawyer, (b) the contribution 
to a debate on a matter of public interest, (c) the nature of the impugned remarks, (d) the specific 
circumstances of the case and (e) the sanctions imposed. As regards (a) the applicant’s status as 
a lawyer, the Court reiterated its case-law to the effect that a distinction had to be drawn 
depending on whether the lawyer was speaking inside or outside the courtroom. Remarks made 
in the courtroom remained there and thus warrant a high degree of tolerance to criticism, 
especially since the lawyer’s freedom of expression may raise questions as to his client’s right to 
a fair trial: the principle of fairness thus also militates in favour of a free and even forceful 
exchange of argument between the parties. In the present case however the Court stated that it 
did not see how Morice’s statements could have directly contributed to his task of defending his 
client. The Court also took the view that lawyers cannot be equated with journalists. It stated 
that their respective positions and roles in society are intrinsically different. Regarding (b) the 
contribution to a debate on a matter of public interest, the Court took the view that the impugned 
remarks published in Le Monde concerned a high-profile case that created discussion about the 
functioning of the judiciary. As such, a context of a debate on a matter of public interest calls for 
a high level of protection of freedom of expression, while only a particularly narrow margin of 
appreciation is left to the domestic authorities, leading to a strict scrutiny by the European Court 
as to whether the interference at issue can be justified as being necessary in a democratic society. 
As regard (c) on the nature of the impugned remarks, the Court was of the opinion that they were 
more value judgments than pure statements of fact, reflecting mainly an overall assessment of 
the conduct of the investigating judges in the course of the investigation. Furthermore, the 
remarks had a sufficient factual basis and could not be regarded as misleading or as a gratuitous 
attack on the reputation or the integrity of the two investigative judges. With regard to (d) and 
the specific circumstances of the case, the Grand Chamber reiterated that lawyers cannot be held 
responsible for everything appearing in an interview published by the press or for actions by the 
press. Furthermore, the Grand Chamber stated its opinion that Morice’s statements could not be 
reduced to the mere expression of personal animosity, as their aim was to reveal shortcomings 
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in the justice system. According to the Court, “a lawyer should be able to draw the public’s 
attention to potential shortcomings in the justice system; the judiciary may benefit from 
constructive criticism”. The Grand Chamber also considered that respect for the authority of the 
judiciary cannot justify an unlimited restriction on the right to freedom of expression. Although 
the defence of a client by his lawyer must be conducted not in the media, but in the courts of 
competent jurisdiction, involving the use of any available remedies, the Grand Chamber accepted 
that there might be “very specific circumstances” justifying a lawyer making public statements in 
the media, such as in the case at issue. The Court found that Morice’s statements were not capable 
of undermining the proper conduct of the judicial proceedings and that his conviction could not 
serve to maintain the authority of the judiciary. Finally, with regard to (e) on the imposed 
sanction, the Court referred to its findings on many occasions that interference with freedom of 
expression may have a chilling effect on the exercise of that freedom, especially in cases of 
criminal defamation. In view of the foregoing, the Grand Chamber reached the conclusion, 
unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Morice v. France [GC], no. 29369/10, 23 April 2015. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Erla Hlynsdóttir v. Iceland (no. 3) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
Once again, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has rejected a finding by national courts 
that journalistic reporting about a criminal case had overstepped the limits of freedom of 
expression. The Court emphasised the role of the media in a democratic society in informing the 
general public of serious criminal proceedings and it referred again to the notion of “responsible 
journalism”. The Court found unanimously that the interference with the journalist’s rights had 
violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
The applicant in this case was Ms. Erla Hlynsdóttir. She was a journalist, working for the 
newspaper DV. In 2007, the newspaper DV published an article on the ongoing criminal 
proceedings against Mr. A and his co-accused, Mr. B, before the Reykjavík District Court. A picture 
of Mr. A was published on the front page of the newspaper showing him walking into the 
courtroom. There was a large headline under the photograph which read “Scared cocaine 
smugglers” and underneath it was written that both the accused were afraid of retaliation by 
their accomplices and had therefore refused to identify them. Mr. A´s name also appeared on the 
front page. Both on the front page and in the newspaper’s article written by Erla Hlynsdóttir it 
was mentioned that Mr. A and his co-accused could expect prison sentences. Reference was made 
to the indictment by the Director of Public Prosecutions requesting a punishment of seven to 
eight years´ imprisonment in respect of Mr. A, for importing nearly 3.8 kilograms of cocaine, 
intended for sale, together with an unknown accomplice. A punishment of three to four years 
was requested in respect of Mr. B, who was charged in the case with removing the alleged drugs 
from a vehicle, in cooperation with Mr. A. After being acquitted by the Icelandic courts, Mr. A 
lodged defamation proceedings against Mr. SME, the editor of DV at the time, and the journalist 
who wrote the article, Erla Hlynsdóttir. The Supreme Court declared null and void the words 
“cocaine smugglers” on the front page and the statement referring to the removal of drugs in a 
vehicle. Both Erla Hlynsdóttir and the editor were ordered to pay approximately EUR 575 in 
compensation for non-pecuniary damage and about EUR 290 for the costs of publishing the 
judgment. 
 
The ECtHR first reiterated that the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court is called for 
when, as in the present case, the measures taken or sanctions imposed by the national authority 
are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in debates over matters of legitimate 
public concern. In the Court’s view, a journalist’s good faith should be assessed on the basis of 
the knowledge and information which was available to him or her at the time of writing the 
item(s) in question. Thus, it is not decisive for the purpose of the present case that Mr. A was later 
acquitted of the charges brought against him by the Director of Public Prosecutions. Although 
the ECtHR fully agreed with the Icelandic Supreme Court that it is for the courts and not the 
media to determine whether an accused is guilty of an offence, it also recognised the right of the 
media to report on ongoing court cases on the basis of available and correct information, such 
as an indictment by the public prosecutor and information gathered at the public hearing. The 
Court was of the opinion that the rendering of an indictment in a media coverage after it has 
been read out at a trial hearing is a kind of situation where there may be special grounds for 
dispensing the press from its ordinary obligation to verify factual statements that are defamatory 
of private individuals. With regard the labelling on the front page of the accused as “cocaine 
smugglers”, the ECtHR emphasised that was not the applicant journalist, but to the editor who 
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was deemed to have defamed Mr. A thereby. The journalist cannot be found responsible and 
liable for this statement in the newspaper and therefore the interference with her right to 
freedom of expression in this manner cannot be justified. The European Court came to the 
conclusion that the respondent State failed to sufficiently show that Erla Hlynsdóttir acted in bad 
faith or otherwise inconsistently with the diligence expected of a responsible journalist reporting 
on a matter of public interest. Therefore, there has been a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Court reiterated though that, in assessing the relevance and 
sufficiency of the national courts’ findings, the Court, in accordance with the principle of 
subsidiarity, must take into account the extent to which the domestic courts balanced the 
conflicting rights implicated in the case, in the light of the Court’s established case-law in this 
area. As the European Court found that the reasoning of the national courts demonstrated a lack 
of sufficient engagement with the general principles of the Court under Article 10 of the ECHR, 
it disagreed with the domestic courts’ finding that the interference with the applicant’s rights 
could be justified as being necessary in a democratic society. The judgment shows once again 
how diligent and responsible journalism reporting on issues of public interest receives a very 
high level of protection by the ECtHR and that in such cases, notwithstanding its references to 
the subsidiarity principle, the Court applies a strict scrutiny over the findings and arguments by 
the domestic courts. 
 
• Erla Hlynsdottir v. Iceland (no. 3), no. 54145/10, 2 June 2015. 
 
IRIS 2015-7/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Delfi AS v. Estonia (Grand Chamber) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
On 16 June 2015, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered 
the long-awaited final judgment in the case of Delfi AS v. Estonia, deciding on the liability of an 
online news portal for the offensive comments posted by its readers below one of its online news 
articles. It was the first case in which the European Court has been called upon to examine, from 
the perspective of the right to freedom of expression, a complaint about liability for user-
generated comments on an internet news portal. By a Chamber judgment of 10 October 2013, 
the ECtHR had first unanimously held that there had been no violation of the right to freedom of 
expression as guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (see 
IRIS 2014-1/2). The Court confirmed the findings by the domestic courts that the Delfi news 
platform was to be considered a provider of content services, rather than a provider of technical 
services, and that therefore it should have effectively prevented clearly unlawful comments from 
being published. The fact that Delfi had immediately removed insulting content after having 
received notice of it did not suffice to exempt Delfi from liability. The reason why Delfi could not 
rely on the limited liability regime for internet service providers (ISPs) of Article 12 to 15 of the 
Directive 2001/31/EC on Electronic Commerce (no liability in case of expeditious removal after 
obtaining actual knowledge of illegal content and no duty of pre-monitoring) was, according to 
the Estonian courts, that the news portal had integrated the readers’ comments into its news 
portal, it had some control over the incoming or posted comments and it had invited the users 
to post comments, while it also had an economic interest in exploiting its news platform through 
the integrated comment environment. The European Court did not challenge this finding by the 
Estonian courts, restricting its supervisory role to ascertaining whether the effects of refusing to 
treat Delfi as an ISP were compatible with Article 10 of the Convention. The Chamber’s judgment 
however did not become final as, on 17 February 2014, the panel of five judges, in application of 
Article 43 of the Convention, decided to refer the case to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR (see 
IRIS 2014-4/1). 
 
The Grand Chamber has now confirmed the non-finding of a breach of Article 10 of the 
Convention, on very similar, but not identical grounds as those given in the Chamber’s judgment. 
The Grand Chamber started by considering that the case concerns the “duties and 
responsibilities” of Internet news portals, under Article 10 paragraph 2 of the Convention, when 
they provide for economic purposes a platform for user-generated comments on previously 
published content and some users - whether identified or anonymous - engage in clearly unlawful 
speech, which infringes the personality rights of others and amounts to hate speech and 
incitement to violence against them. The Grand Chamber is of the opinion that the Estonian 
courts’ finding of liability against Delfi was a justified and proportionate restriction on the portal’s 
freedom of expression. The Court agreed that the Information Society Services Act transposing 
the E-Commerce Directive into Estonian law, including the provisions on the limited liability of 
ISPs, did not apply to the present case, since the latter related to activities of a merely technical, 
automatic and passive nature, while Delfi’s activities reflected those of a media publisher running 
an internet news portal. Delfi’s involvement in making public the comments on its news articles 
on its news portal went beyond that of a passive, purely technical service provider. The Grand 
Chamber was of the opinion that the interference by the Estonian authorities in Delfi’s freedom 
of expression was sufficiently foreseeable and sufficiently precisely prescribed by law and was 
justified by the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights of others. While the Court 
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acknowledged that important benefits can be derived from the Internet in the exercise of 
freedom of expression, it was also mindful that liability for defamatory or other types of unlawful 
speech must, in principle, be retained as an effective remedy for violations of personality rights. 
 
The Court emphasised that the case concerned a large professionally managed Internet news 
portal run on a commercial basis, which published news articles of its own and invited its readers 
to comment on them. The Grand Chamber agreed with the Chamber’s finding that Delfi must be 
considered to have exercised a substantial degree of control over the comments published on its 
portal. It noted that Delfi cannot be said to have wholly neglected its duty to avoid causing harm 
to third parties, but that the automatic word-based filter used by Delfi failed to filter out odious 
hate speech and speech inciting violence posted by readers and thus limited its ability to 
expeditiously remove the offending comments. The Court recalled that the majority of the words 
and expressions in question did not include sophisticated metaphors or contain hidden meanings 
or subtle threats: they were manifest expressions of hatred and blatant threats to the physical 
integrity of the insulted person. Thus, even if the automatic word-based filter may have been 
useful in some instances, the facts of the present case demonstrate that it was insufficient for 
detecting comments that can be qualified as “hate speech” and do not constitute protected 
speech under Article 10 of the Convention. The Court noted that, as a consequence of this failure 
of the filtering mechanism, such clearly unlawful comments remained online for six weeks. The 
Court considered that a large news portal’s obligation to take effective measures to limit the 
dissemination of hate speech and speech inciting violence - the issue in the present case - can 
by no means be equated to “private censorship”. The Grand Chamber attached weight to the 
consideration that the ability of a potential victim of hate speech to continuously monitor the 
Internet is more limited than the ability of a large commercial Internet news portal to prevent or 
rapidly remove such comments. By way of conclusion, the Grand Chamber took the view that the 
steps taken by Delfi to remove the offensive comments had been insufficient. Furthermore, the 
compensation of EUR 320 that Delfi had been obliged to pay for non-pecuniary damages was not 
to be considered as an excessive interference with the right to freedom of expression of the 
applicant media company. Therefore, the Grand Chamber found that the domestic courts’ 
imposition of liability on Delfi was based on relevant and sufficient grounds and that this measure 
did not constitute a disproportionate restriction on Delfi’s right to freedom of expression. By 
fifteen votes to two, the Grand Chamber held there has been no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
It is important to draw attention to one of the Grand Chamber’s considerations that the Delfi case 
does not affect “other fora on the Internet” where third-party comments can be disseminated, for 
example Internet discussion fora or bulletin boards where users can freely set out their ideas on 
any topic without the discussion being channelled by any input from the forum’s manager. The 
Grand Chamber’s finding is also not applicable to a social media platform where the platform 
provider does not offer any content and where the content provider may be a private person 
running the website or a blog as a hobby. The Court indeed emphasised very strongly that the 
case concerned a professionally managed Internet news portal, run on a commercial basis. 
 
The Grand Chamber also made clear that the impugned comments in the present case mainly 
constituted hate speech and speech that directly advocated acts of violence. Hence, the 
establishment of their unlawful nature did not require any linguistic or legal analysis by Delfi, 
since the remarks were on their face manifestly unlawful. According to the Grand Chamber its 
judgment is not to be understood as imposing a form of “private censorship”. 
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• Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, 16 June 2015. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
After proceedings at national level over eight years, and after a preliminary ruling by the EU Court 
of Justice on 16 December 2008 (Case C-73/07), the European Court of Human Rights has 
delivered a judgment in a highly interesting case of conflicting rights between the right of privacy 
and the right to freedom of expression, in the domain of protection of personal data and data 
journalism. The Court comes to the conclusion that a prohibition issued by the Finnish Data 
Protection Board that prohibited two media companies (Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy) from publishing personal data in the manner and to the extent Satamedia had 
published these data before, is to be considered as a legitimate interference in the applicants’ 
right to freedom of expression and information. More precisely the Finnish authorities forbade 
Satamedia from collecting, saving and processing to a large extent taxation data, with the result 
that an essential part of the information published in the applicant’s magazine Veropörssi could 
no longer be published and an SMS-service was discontinued. The European Court agrees with 
the Finnish authorities that the applicants could not rely on the exception of journalistic activities 
as the publication of the large amount of taxation data by Satamedia was not justified by a public 
interest. The Court accepts the approach of the Finnish Supreme Administrative Court that it was 
necessary to interpret Satamedia’s freedom of expression strictly in order to protect the right of 
privacy of Finnish citizens. 
 
The European Court recognises however the general subject-matter which was at the heart of 
the publication in question, namely the taxation data about natural persons’ taxable income and 
assets, while such data are a matter of public record in Finland, available to everyone. The Court 
agrees that as such this taxation information was a matter of public interest. The Court also 
emphasises that such data are public in Finland, in accordance with the Act on the Public 
Disclosure and Confidentiality of Tax Information, and that there was no suggestion that 
Satamedia had obtained the taxation data by subterfuge or other illicit means. The Court equally 
observes that the accuracy and reliability of the published information was not in dispute. 
According to the European Court the only problematic issue was the extent of the published 
information by Satamedia, as the Veropörssi magazine had published in 2002 taxation data on 
1.2 million persons. According to the domestic authorities the publishing of taxation information 
to such an extent could not be considered as journalism, but as processing of personal data which 
Satamedia had no right to do. The Court’s judgment also contains a reference to the preliminary 
ruling of the EU Court of Justice of 16 December 2008, which found that the activities of 
Satamedia related to data from documents which were in the public domain under Finnish 
legislation, could be classified as “journalistic activities”, if their object was to disclose to the 
public information, opinions or ideas, irrespective of the medium which was used to transmit it.  
 
Leaving a broad margin of appreciation, the European Court of Human Rights accepts the finding 
by the Finnish authorities that the publication of personal data by Satamedia could not be 
regarded as journalistic activity, in particular because that derogation for journalistic purpose in 
the Personal Data Act (see also Article 9 of Protection of Personal Data Directive 95/46/EC of 24 
October 1995) was to be interpreted strictly. The European Court is of the opinion that the Finnish 
judicial authorities have attached sufficient importance to Satamedia’s right to freedom of 
expression, while also taking into consideration the right to respect for private life of those tax-
payers whose taxation information had been published. The Court finds that the restrictions on 
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the exercise of Satamedia’s freedom of expression were established convincingly by the Supreme 
Administrative Court, in line with the Court’s case-law. In such circumstances the Court would 
require strong reasons to substitute its own view for that of the domestic courts. 
 
The Court finally notes that Satamedia was not prohibited generally from publishing the taxation 
information about private persons, but only to a certain extent. The fact that the prohibition 
issued lead to the discontinuation of Veropörssi magazine and Satamedia’s SMS-service was, 
according to the Court, not a direct consequence of the interference by the Finnish authorities, 
but an economic decision made by Satamedia itself. The Court also takes into account that the 
prohibition laid down by the domestic authorities was not a criminal sanction, but an 
administrative one, and thereby a less severe sanction than a criminal one. Having regard to all 
the foregoing factors, and taking into account the margin of appreciation afforded to the State 
in this area, the Court considers that the domestic courts struck a fair balance between the 
competing interests at stake. Therefore there has been no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention.  Only one judge dissented, emphasising that the majority’s approach does not follow 
the established case-law of the Court finding a violation of Article 10 in cases where national 
authorities have taken measures to protect publicly available and known information on matters 
of public interest from disclosure. The dissenting opinion also states that no negative effect or 
harm was identified as having been inflicted upon any individual, nor had society been otherwise 
imperilled through the publication of the taxation data at issue. It states further that “regrettably, 
the majority agreed with the respondent state that the applicant companies’ activities did not 
fall within the exception for the purposes of journalism in the Personal Data Act” and that this 
can lead to an interpretation “that journalists are so limited in processing data that the entire 
journalistic activity becomes futile (..), particularly in the light of the dynamic and evolving 
character of media”. 
 
Apart from rejecting the applicants’ arguments with regard their right to freedom of expression 
and information under Article 10 of the Convention, the Court also rejected Satamedia’s claim 
that Article 14 of the Convention was violated. Satamedia had argued that they had been 
discriminated against vis-à-vis other newspapers which had been able to continue publishing the 
taxation information in question. According to the European Court, Satamedia could not be 
compared with other newspapers publishing taxation data as the quantity published by them 
was clearly greater than elsewhere. Therefore Satamedia’s situation was not sufficiently similar 
to the situation of other newspapers, and hence there was no discrimination in the terms of 
Article 14. Indeed, in order for an issue to arise under Article 14 there must be a difference in 
treatment in relevantly similar situations, the latter not being the case in this context. The Court 
found this part of the application manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible. 
 
The Court did find however a violation of Article 6 § 1 (fair trial) of the Convention in this case, 
as the length of the proceedings at domestic level (six years and six months) was excessive and 
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement, even taking into account the complexity of the 
case. 
 
• Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, no. 931/13, 21 July 2015.  
• Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) in Case C-73-07 
Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy, 16 December 2008. 
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Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber on 14 December 2015, which 
returned its judgment on 27 June 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Niskasaari and Otavamedia Oy v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media 
 
An interesting judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recently became final, 
in which the Court confirmed the right of journalists to express severe criticism in strong wording 
on matters of public interest. The judgment clarifies that this right is also protected under Article 
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) when the criticism relates to journalistic 
reporting by other media, and focuses in casu on a journalist who produced two TV 
documentaries broadcast by the Finnish public service broadcaster. 
 
In this case, the journalist, Mikko Veli Niskasaari, and the media company Otavamedia Oy, were 
found liable for defamation of a journalist who had been criticised for having manipulated a 
documentary. The criticism had been uttered in Seura magazine, and on two internet discussion 
forums, calling the journalists of the Finnish public service broadcaster who produced two 
documentaries on forest protection “liars”. According to Niskasaari, some figures and data in the 
documentary were fabricated, and one of the journalists who made the documentary was “lying 
cold-bloodedly and intentionally”. Niskasaari was convicted in Finland because there was no 
evidence that the journalist had disseminated wrong or misleading information in the 
documentaries in question. As a consequence, Niskasaari had not had strong reason or probable 
cause to hold his own accusations to be true, and to call the journalist a liar. Niskasaari was 
convicted under criminal law and was ordered to pay a fine (EUR 240) and damages (EUR 2000) 
to the complainant journalist. The media company was ordered, together with Niskasaari, to pay 
EUR 4000 in damages to the complainant, as well as the latter’s costs and expenses of EUR 
25500. The criminal conviction and civil damages were based on Chapter 24, section 9, of the 
Penal Code (defamation) and Chapter 5, section 6, of the Tort Liability Act (dissemination of 
information that violates private life or reputation). 
 
According to the ECtHR, there is no doubt that the measures against Niskasaari and Otavamedia 
Oy were prescribed by law, fulfilling the requirements of precision and clarity, and were pursuing 
the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others. The Court, however, finds 
unanimously that the Finnish authorities have violated the right to freedom of expression of the 
applicant journalist and media company, as the interference with their rights under Article 10 of 
the European Convention is not considered necessary in a democratic society. According to the 
Court’s case law a number of criteria are relevant when examining the necessity of an 
interference with the right to freedom of expression in the interests of the “protection of the 
reputation or rights of others”, namely (i) contribution to a debate of general interest; (ii) how 
well-known the person concerned is and what the subject of the report is; (iii) prior conduct of 
the person concerned; (iv) method of obtaining the information and its veracity; (v) content, form 
and consequences of the publication; and (vi) severity of the sanction imposed. 
 
In the case at issue, the ECtHR is of the opinion that it was not clear from the reasoning in the 
judgments of the domestic courts what “pressing social need” was taken to justify protecting the 
TV-journalist’s right to reputation over the freedom of expression of Niskasaari and Otavamedia 
Oy, particularly as it concerned a debate between two professional journalists discussing the 
limits of critical and investigative journalism. The European Court considers that journalists who 
use strong expressions and pursue so-called investigative journalism in a TV-documentary could 
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be expected to tolerate even severe criticism of their activities. It emphasises that it is relevant 
for the judicial balancing exercise, that the complainant TV-journalist, while entitled to benefit 
from the protection afforded to every individual’s reputation by Article 8, was himself an 
investigative journalist involved in making TV documentaries on controversial issues for a public 
broadcasting company. Hence the journalist was engaged in an activity very much in the public 
domain in a manner and in circumstances “where he could himself expect to be the subject of 
robust scrutiny, comment and criticism regarding his professional conduct”. The Court is of the 
opinion that the Court of Appeal did not pay sufficient attention to this “journalistic” hue of the 
case. The ECtHR also points out that Seura magazine provided the reporters who had made the 
TV-documentaries in question, including the complainant, with an opportunity to reply to the 
first applicant’s criticism. In response to this reply, the magazine subsequently published a page-
long counter-reply by Niskasaari. The Court notes that different statistical information existed as 
far as the conserved forest area in Finland was concerned and that it could not therefore be said 
that the figures given by the complainant TV-journalist were fabricated. However, the domestic 
courts did not, as required by Article 10 of the ECHR, proceed to a sufficient evaluation of the 
actual impact of Niskasaari’s right to freedom of expression on the outcome of the case. In 
particular, the Appeal Court did not balance his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 
of the European Convention, on the basis of the relevant criteria, in any considered way against 
the complainant’s conflicting right to reputation, under Article 8 of the Convention. Nor is it clear 
whether, according to the Appeal Court, the resultant interference with Niskasaari’s freedom of 
expression was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The European Court regards the 
amount of compensation (EUR 4000) as substantial, given that the maximum compensation 
afforded to victims of serious violence varies between EUR 3000 and EUR 5000. Having regard 
to all the foregoing factors, and notwithstanding the margin of appreciation afforded to the State 
in this area, the Court considers that the domestic courts failed to undertake an assessment 
capable of striking a fair balance between the competing interests at stake under Articles 8 and 
10 of the European Convention. Therefore the ECtHR concludes that the reasons relied upon by 
the domestic courts, although relevant, were not sufficient to show that the interference 
complained of was “necessary in a democratic society”. Accordingly, the Finnish authorities were 
found to have violated Article 10 of the ECHR. 
• Niskasaari and Otavamedia Oy v. Finland, no. 32297/10, 23 June 2015. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Perinçek v. Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media (VRM) and of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) 
 
On 17 December 2013 the Second Section of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled by 
five votes to two that Switzerland violated the right to freedom of expression by convicting Doğu 
Perinçek, chairman of the Turkish Workers’ Party, for publicly denying the existence of the 
genocide against the Armenian people (IRIS 2014-2/1 and IRIS 2014-7/2). After referral, on 15 
October 2015 the Grand Chamber confirmed by ten votes to seven the finding of a violation of 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In several public speeches, 
Perinçek had described the Armenian genocide as “an international lie”. The Swiss courts found 
that Perinçek’s denial that the Ottoman Empire had perpetrated the crime of genocide against 
the Armenian people in 1915 and the following years, was in breach with Article 261bis § 4 of 
the Swiss Criminal Code. This article punishes inter alia the denial, gross minimisation or attempt 
of justification of a genocide or crimes against humanity. According to the Swiss courts, the 
Armenian genocide, like the Jewish genocide, is a proven historical fact. Relying on Article 10 
ECHR, Perinçek complained before the European Court that his criminal conviction and 
punishment for having publicly stated that there had not been an Armenian genocide had 
breached his right to freedom of expression. 
 
The Grand Chamber, in a 128-page judgment, is of the opinion that the Swiss authorities only 
had a limited margin of appreciation to interfere with the right to freedom of expression, and it 
takes a set of criteria into consideration when assessing whether Perinçek’s conviction can be 
considered as “necessary in a democratic society”. Therefore the Court looks at the nature of 
Perinçek’s statements; the context in which they were interfered with; the extent to which they 
affected the Armenians’ rights; whether there is a consensus among the High Contracting Parties 
on the need to resort to criminal law sanctions in respect of such statements; the existence of 
any international law rules bearing on this issue; the method employed by the Swiss courts to 
justify the applicant’s conviction; and the severity of the interference. 
 
The European Court considers Perinçek’s statements as a part of a heated debate of public 
concern, touching upon a long standing controversy, not only in Armenia and Turkey, but also in 
the international arena. His statements were certainly virulent, but were not to be perceived as 
a form of incitement to hatred, violence or intolerance. The Grand Chamber emphasises that it is 
“aware of the immense importance attached by the Armenian community to the question whether 
the tragic events of 1915 and the following years are to be regarded as genocide, and of that 
community’s acute sensitivity to any statements bearing on that point. However, it cannot accept 
that the applicant’s statements at issue in this case were so wounding to the dignity of the 
Armenians who suffered and perished in these events and to the dignity and identity of their 
descendants as to require criminal law measures in Switzerland”. 
 
After analysing the relevant criteria and case-specific elements, and after balancing the 
conflicting rights at issue (freedom of expression under Article 10 versus the right of reputation 
and (ethnic) dignity under Article 8), the majority of the Grand Chamber concludes that Perinçek’s 
right to freedom of expression has been violated by the Swiss authorities. The Grand Chamber 
summarises its finding as follows: “Taking into account all the elements analysed above - that 
the applicant’s statements bore on a matter of public interest and did not amount to a call for 
hatred or intolerance, that the context in which they were made was not marked by heightened 
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tensions or special historical overtones in Switzerland, that the statements cannot be regarded 
as affecting the dignity of the members of the Armenian community to the point of requiring a 
criminal law response in Switzerland, that there is no international law obligation for Switzerland 
to criminalise such statements, that the Swiss courts appear to have censured the applicant for 
voicing an opinion that diverged from the established ones in Switzerland, and that the 
interference took the serious form of a criminal conviction - the Court concludes that it was not 
necessary, in a democratic society, to subject the applicant to a criminal penalty in order to 
protect the rights of the Armenian community at stake in the present case”. On these grounds, 
ten of the 17 judges come to the conclusion that the Swiss authorities have breached Article 10 
of the Convention. The Grand Chamber majority also confirms that Article 17 (abuse clause) can 
only be applied on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases, where it is “immediately clear” 
that freedom of expression is employed for ends manifestly contrary to the values of the 
Convention. As the decisive issue whether Perinçek had effectively sought to stir up hatred or 
violence and was aiming at the destruction of the rights under the Convention was not 
“immediately clear” and overlapped with the question whether the interference with his right to 
freedom of expression was necessary in a democratic society, the Grand Chamber decided that 
the question whether Article 17 was applicable had to be joined with the examination of the 
merits of the case under Article 10 of the Convention. As the Court found that there has been a 
breach of Article 10 of the Convention, there were no grounds to apply Article 17 of the 
Convention. 
 
Seven judges however, including the president of the Court, argued that the conviction of 
Perinçek in Switzerland did not amount to a breach of his right to freedom of expression. Four of 
them also argued that Article 17 (abuse clause) should have been applied in this case. The 
dissenting judges emphasise “that the massacres and deportations suffered by the Armenian 
people constituted genocide is self-evident. The Armenian genocide is a clearly established fact. 
To deny it is to deny the obvious”, immediately admitting however that this is not the (relevant) 
question in the case at issue. According to the dissenting judges the real issue at stake is “whether 
it is possible for a State, without overstepping its margin of appreciation, to make it a criminal 
offence to insult the memory of a people that has suffered genocide”. They confirm that, in their 
view, this is indeed possible. 
• Perinçek v. Switzerland [GC], no. 27510/08, ECHR 2015 (extracts). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Pentikäinen v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media (VRM) and of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) 
 
On 20 October 2015 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
confirmed that the interference with a press photographer’s right to freedom of expression and 
newsgathering as a result of disobeying a police order to leave the scene of a demonstration that 
had turned into a riot, can be said to have been “necessary in a democratic society” within the 
meaning of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Grand Chamber 
comes to the same conclusion as the earlier judgment of the Fourth Section finding that the 
arrest, detention, prosecution and conviction of the journalist did not violate Article 10 ECHR 
(see IRIS 2014-4/2 and IRIS 2014-7/2). 
 
The applicant, Markus Pentikäinen, is a photographer and journalist for the weekly magazine 
Suomen Kuvalehti. He was sent by his employer to take photographs of a large demonstration 
against the Asia-Europe meeting in Helsinki, and to conduct an extensive report on the 
demonstration for the paper version of the magazine and also to publish it online immediately, 
once the demonstration had ended. At a certain moment, the police decided to interrupt the 
demonstration, which had turned violent, and to seal off the demonstration area. It was 
announced over loudspeakers that the demonstration was stopped and that the crowd should 
leave the scene. The police continued to order the crowd to disperse, stating that any person who 
did not leave would be apprehended. 
 
Hundreds of people then left voluntarily via several exit routes established by the police. When 
leaving, they were asked to show their identity cards and their belongings were checked. At one 
point, a police officer told Pentikäinen personally that he had one last chance to leave the scene. 
Pentikäinen told the police officer that he was reporting for Suomen Kuvalehti and that he was 
going to follow the event to its end. After the situation inside the cordon had already been 
peaceful for an hour with around only 20 demonstrators left, the police apprehended the 
protesters that had not left the scene yet, including Pentikäinen. He told the apprehending officer 
that he was a journalist and he presented his press card, which the police officer later confirmed. 
In addition, at the police station, the police were aware that Pentikäinen was a member of the 
press. He was detained for about 18 hours and later the public prosecutor brought charges 
against him. The Finnish courts found the journalist guilty of disobeying the police, but they did 
not impose any penalty on him, holding that his offence was excusable. Apart from the 
acceptance that the impugned measures were prescribed by law, the Grand Chamber also 
considers them necessary in a democratic society, as pertinently and sufficiently motivated by 
the Finnish authorities. In general terms the Court is of the opinion that “a journalist cannot claim 
an exclusive immunity from criminal liability for the sole reason that, unlike other individuals 
exercising the right to freedom of expression, the offence in question was committed during the 
performance of his or her journalistic functions”. According to the Grand Chamber “the present 
case does not concern the prohibition of a publication (public disclosure of certain information) 
or any sanctions imposed in respect of a publication. What is at stake in the present case are 
measures taken against a journalist who failed to comply with police orders while taking photos 
in order to report on a demonstration that had turned violent” (§ 93). The Grand Chamber also 
endorses the argument of the Finnish Government, stating that “the fact that the applicant was 
a journalist did not entitle him to preferential or different treatment in comparison to the other 
people left at the scene”. 
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The judgment refers to the obligation of a journalist to behave in a “responsible” way, which 
includes obeying lawful orders by the police: “Against the background of this conflict of interests, 
it has to be emphasised that the concept of responsible journalism requires that whenever a 
journalist - as well as his or her employer - has to make a choice between the two duties and if 
he or she makes this choice to the detriment of the duty to abide by ordinary criminal law, such 
journalist has to be aware that he or she assumes the risk of being subject to legal sanctions, 
including those of a criminal character, by not obeying the lawful orders of, inter alia, the 
police”.The Grand Chamber agrees with the Finnish authorities that the impugned measures 
taken against Pentikäinen were necessary and proportionate for the protection of public safety 
and the prevention of disorder and crime. That includes not only his apprehension, but also the 
near 18-hour detention, the prosecution, and finally the criminal conviction for having disobeyed 
the police. 
 
The majority of the Grand Chamber, by thirteen votes to four, comes to the conclusion that there 
has been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court recalls that it “clearly transpires 
from the case file that the authorities did not deliberately prevent or hinder the media from 
covering the demonstration in an attempt to conceal from the public gaze the actions of the 
police with respect to the demonstration in general or to individual protesters (..). Indeed, the 
applicant was not prevented from carrying out his work as a journalist either during or after the 
demonstration”. It also stresses that “this conclusion must be seen on the basis of the particular 
circumstances of the instant case, due regard being had to the need to avoid any impairment of 
the media’s “watch-dog” role”. The dissenting judges consider the reasoning and finding by the 
majority of the Grand Chamber “a missed opportunity”, neglecting the rights of journalists to 
observe public demonstrations effectively and unimpeded, so long as they do not take a direct 
and active part in hostilities. The four dissenters emphasise “the fundamental role of the press in 
obtaining and disseminating to the public information on all aspects of governmental activity”. 
In a statement of 12 November 2015 published on the Council of Europe’s Platform to promote 
the protection of journalism and the safety of journalists, the EFJ, the IFJ, Index on Censorship 
and Article 19 call on Finland and other Council of Europe member states to adopt a clear legal 
framework for the treatment of journalists during protests, in order to ensure the right balance 
between press freedom and public order during protests and demonstrations. 
 
• Pentikäinen v. Finland [GC], no. 11882/10, ECHR 2015. 
• EFJ, IFJ, Article 19, Index, “Finland: Unclear Legal Framework for Guaranteeing Journalists’ 
Rights Covering Protests” 12 November 2015 [Ed.: via the Council of Europe Platform to 
promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists]. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media (VRM) and of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) 
 
The Grand Chamber’s judgment in Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France elaborates 
on the appropriate standards for privacy and media coverage on issues related to the private life 
of public persons (see also IRIS 2014-3/1). In 2005, the French magazine Paris Match was ordered 
to pay EUR 50,000 in damages and to publish a statement detailing the judgment of the Versailles 
Court of Appeal finding a breach of privacy, because of an article which caused damage to Albert 
II of Monaco. The impugned article in Paris Match contained an interview with the former lover 
of Albert Grimaldi, Ms Coste, who claimed that Albert Grimaldi, who had become the reigning 
prince of Monaco, was the father of her son. In particular, the interview described the 
circumstances in which Ms Coste had met the Prince, their intimate relationship, their feelings, 
and the manner in which the Prince had reacted to the news of Ms Coste’s pregnancy and had 
behaved towards the child at his birth and afterwards. Ms Conte also revealed that she was living 
in the Prince’s Paris apartment and that she received an allowance from him, being the mother 
of his illegitimate child. The article was illustrated by several photographs showing the Prince 
with the child in his arms and with Ms Coste. Considering that the publication of the article in 
Paris Match interfered with his right to private life and to protection of his own image, the Prince 
had brought proceedings against Paris Match, seeking damages from the publishing company 
and an order to publish the court’s ruling. The French Court of Cassation confirmed the finding 
of the invasion of Albert Grimaldi’s privacy, inter alia on the grounds that “every person, whatever 
his rank, birth, fortune or present or future functions, is entitled to respect for his private life”. 
 
The publication director, Ms Couderc, and the publishing company, of the weekly magazine Paris 
Match lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) against France, 
complaining about an unjustified interference with their right to freedom of expression under 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Fifth Section of the ECtHR, 
in a judgment of 12 June 2014, held, by four votes to three, that there had been a violation of 
Article 10 of the Convention. The Chamber judgment, however, did not become final. On request 
of the French Government, the case was referred to the Grand Chamber. In its judgment of 10 
November 2015, the Grand Chamber confirms the finding of a violation of Article 10 ECHR. The 
Court refers to the relevant criteria applied in other cases in which the rights under Article 8 and 
10 needed to be balanced. These criteria are: 1. contribution to a debate of public interest and 
the subject of the news report; 2. the degree of notoriety of the person affected; 3. the prior 
conduct of the person concerned; 4. the content, form and consequences of the publication; 5. 
the circumstances in which the photographs were taken, the way in which the information was 
obtained and its veracity; and 6. the gravity of the penalty imposed on the journalists or 
publishers. 
 
In relation to the first aspect, the Court finds that the birth of the Prince’s illegitimate son could 
not come solely within the private sphere of Albert Grimaldi, as the disclosure of the Prince’s 
fatherhood could be understood as constituting information on a question of public interest, as 
at the material time the child’s birth was not without possible dynastic and financial implications. 
According to the Court, the impugned information also had a political dimension. It further 
emphasises “that the press’s contribution to a debate of public interest cannot be limited merely 
to current events or pre-existing debates. Admittedly, the press is a vector for disseminating 
debates on matters of public interest, but it also has the role of revealing and bringing to the 
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public’s attention information capable of eliciting such interest and of giving rise to such a debate 
within society”. 
 
The Grand Chamber is particularly critical of the domestic courts’ failure to weigh up the Prince’s 
right to privacy with that of his son and the child’s mother. Ms Coste had willingly given the 
interview and revealed certain details of her private affair with the Prince. The resulting disputed 
article had made clear that her son’s right to public recognition by his father was of utmost 
importance to her, and was a key reason for her decision to publicise the issue. Hence, Ms Coste 
“was certainly not bound to silence” and the Prince’s private life was not the sole subject of the 
article. It also concerned the private life of Ms Coste and her son, her pregnancy, her own feelings, 
the birth of her son, a health problem suffered by the child and their life together. The Court 
emphasises “that the combination of elements relating to Ms Coste’s private life and to that of 
the Prince had to be taken into account in assessing the protection due to him”. 
 
The Court also refers to the fairness of the means used to obtain the information and reproduce 
it for the public, and the respect shown for the person who is the subject of the news report: Ms 
Coste herself contacted Paris Match, the veracity of the information is not disputed and the 
pictures which illustrate the interview were handed over voluntarily by Ms Coste to Paris Match. 
In addition, the photographs taken with the Prince were not taken without his knowledge and 
were taken in public places, raising no particular issues. The magazine furthermore cannot be 
criticised for enhancing the article and striving to present it attractively, provided that this does 
not distort or deform the information published and is not such as to mislead the reader. With 
regard to the photographs illustrating the article which show the Prince holding the child, the 
Court reiterates that Article 10 ECHR leaves it for journalists to decide whether or not it is 
necessary to reproduce such documents to ensure credibility. While there is no doubt that these 
photographs fell within the realm of the Prince’s private life and that he had not consented to 
their publication, their link with the impugned article however was not tenuous, artificial or 
arbitrary, and their publication could be justified by the fact that they added credibility to the 
account of events. The pictures were neither defamatory, depreciatory or pejorative for the 
Prince’s image. 
 
The Court finally reiterates that in the context of assessing proportionality, “any undue restriction 
on freedom of expression effectively entails a risk of obstructing or paralysing future media 
coverage of similar questions”, while the order to pay EUR 50,000 in damages and to publish a 
statement detailing the judgment cannot be considered as insignificant penalties. 
 
The Court concluded that the arguments for the protection of the Prince’s private life and his 
right to his own image, although relevant, cannot be regarded as sufficient to justify the 
interference at issue. The French courts did not give due consideration to the principles and 
criteria as laid down by the Court’s case-law for balancing the right to respect for private life and 
the right to freedom of expression. They thus exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded to 
them and failed to strike a reasonable balance of proportionality between the measures 
restricting Paris Match’s right to freedom of expression, and the legitimate aim pursued. The 
Court therefore, unanimously, concludes that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
• Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France [GC], no. 40454/07, ECHR 2015 (extracts). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Cengiz and others v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium) & Copenhagen University (Denmark) & Member of the Flemish 
Regulator for the Media (VRM) and of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF) 
 
On 1 December 2015, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered a judgment dealing 
with a blocking order in Turkey of the popular video-sharing website YouTube. The Court found 
that the blocking of access to YouTube amounted to a violation of the right to receive and impart 
information under Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The Court 
observed that YouTube, as an Internet platform, enabled information on political and social 
matters to be broadcast and citizen journalism to emerge. The Court found that there was no 
provision in the Turkish law allowing domestic courts to impose the blanket blocking order of 
YouTube at issue. 
 
Pursuant to a law regulating Internet publications and combating Internet offences, in May 2008 
the Ankara Criminal Court of First Instance ordered the blocking of access to YouTube on the 
ground that the website contained some ten videos which it was claimed were insulting to the 
memory of Atatürk. Arguing that this restriction interfered with their right to freedom to receive 
or impart information and ideas, Serkan Cengiz, Yaman Akdeniz and Kerem Altıparmak 
challenged the decision and requested, in their capacity as users, that the measure be lifted. They 
also alleged that the measure had an impact on their professional academic activities, as all three 
occupied academic positions in different universities, where they teach law. The Ankara Criminal 
Court of First Instance rejected their request on the ground that the blocking order had been 
imposed in accordance with the law and that the applicants did not have standing to challenge 
the blocking order. In total the YouTube website was blocked for a period of two and a half years. 
On 30 October 2010, the blocking order was lifted by the public prosecutor’s office following a 
request from the company owning copyright of the videos in question. 
 
The three law professors lodged an application before the Strasbourg Court, mainly relying on 
Article 10 ECHR. As active users, they complained about the impact of the blocking order on their 
right to freedom to receive and impart information and ideas. Relying on Article 46 (concerning 
the binding force and execution of judgments), they also requested that the Court indicate to the 
Turkish Government which general measures could be taken to put an end to the situation 
complained about. 
 
The Court first considered it necessary to determine whether the applicants had victim status as 
required by the Convention. It noted that although the applicants were not directly affected by 
the blocking order, they had actively used YouTube for professional purposes, particularly 
downloading or accessing videos used in their academic work. It also observed that YouTube was 
an important source of communication and that the blocking order precluded access to specific 
information which it was not possible to access by other means. Moreover, the platform permitted 
the emergence of citizen journalism which could impart political information not conveyed by 
traditional media. The Court accordingly accepted that in the present case YouTube had been an 
important means by which Cengiz, Akdeniz and Altıparmak could exercise their right to receive 
and impart information or ideas and that they could legitimately claim to have been affected by 
the blocking order even though they had not been directly targeted by it. In the Court’s view, the 
blocking order at issue could be regarded as an interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of the rights guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR. The Court went on to observe that the 
blocking order had been imposed under Section 8(1) of Law no. 5651, while in its judgment in 
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the case of Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey (see IRIS 2013-2/1) concerning a blocking order of Google 
Sites, it had already found that this law did not authorise the blocking of access to an entire 
Internet site on account of one element of its content. Under Section 8(1), a blocking order could 
only be imposed on a specific publication, hence there was no legislative provision allowing the 
Turkish judicial authorities to impose a blanket blocking order on access to YouTube. Therefore 
the interference with the applicants’ rights had not satisfied the condition of lawfulness required 
by Article 10 § 2 ECHR. The European Court also found that Cengiz, Akdeniz and Altıparmak had 
not enjoyed a sufficient degree of protection. Finally the Court did not consider it necessary to 
rule on Article 46 of the Convention, as it observed that Law no. 5651 has been amended and 
now allowed, under certain conditions, blocking orders to be imposed on an entire website. 
However, as the new Act was not of concrete application in the present case, the Court did not 
consider it necessary to elaborate and rule on this aspect of the case. 
• Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, ECHR 2015 (extracts). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Görmüş a.o. v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has once more confirmed the strong protection 
that is to be given to journalists’ sources, in a case also related to the disclosure of confidential 
information and the protection of whistle-blowers. The Court is of the opinion that the Turkish 
authorities have violated the right to freedom of expression of journalists, reporting on important 
matters related to the armed forces. 
 
The magazine Nokta published an article based on documents classified “confidential” by the 
Chief of Staff of the armed forces in Turkey. It revealed a system for classifying publishing 
companies and journalists according to whether they were “favourable” or “hostile” to the armed 
forces, so that specific journalists could be excluded from covering activities organised by the 
army. Following a complaint by the Chief of Staff of the armed forces, the Military Court ordered 
a search of all the magazine’s premises, demanding electronic and paper copies of the files stored 
on all private and professional computers. The Military Court considered the search and seizure 
lawful, as these measures had only been intended to elucidate the circumstances surrounding 
the disclosure of a document classified as “secret”, and not to identify those responsible for the 
leak of the confidential information. The Military Court also pointed out that the Criminal Code 
made it an offence to procure, use, possess or publish information whose disclosure was 
prohibited for the purposes of protecting State security, and that journalists were not exempted 
from criminal liability in that connection. The director of the magazine, the editors and some 
journalists lodged an application with the Strasbourg Court complaining of a violation of their 
right to freedom of expression and information (Article 10 ECHR). 
 
The European Court held that the article published by Nokta, on the basis of “confidential” 
military documents, was capable of contributing to public debate. It emphasised the need to 
protect journalistic sources, including when those sources are State officials highlighting 
unsatisfactory practices in their workplace. It considered the seizure, retrieval and storage by the 
authorities of all of the magazine’s computer data, with a view to identifying the public-sector 
whistle-blowers, as a disproportionate interference with the right to freedom of expression and 
information. The action taken by the authorities had undermined the protection of sources to a 
greater extent than an order requiring them to reveal the identity of the sources, since the 
indiscriminate retrieval of all the data had revealed information that was unconnected to the acts 
in issue. The Court also held that the impugned interference by the Turkish authorities could risk 
deterring potential sources from assisting the press in informing the public of matters involving 
the armed forces, including when they concerned a public interest. In the Court’s view, this 
intervention was likely not only to have very negative repercussions on the relationships of the 
journalists in question with their sources, but could also have a serious and chilling effect on 
other journalists or other whistle-blowers who were State officials, and could discourage them 
from reporting any misconduct or controversial acts by public authorities. 
 
Furthermore, the Court noted that the reasons for which the contested documents had been 
classified as confidential were not justified, as the government had not shown that there had 
been a detrimental impact as a result of their disclosure. Thus, the Court considered that the 
contested article had been highly pertinent in the debate on discrimination against the media by 
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State bodies, especially as the style used in the article and the time of its publication had not 
raised any difficulty that was such as to damage the interests of the State. The Court is also of 
the opinion that the journalists of Nokta had acted in accordance with professional ethics, and 
that they had had no intention other than to inform the public of a topic of general interest. The 
Court unanimously concluded that the Turkish authorities have violated Article 10 of the ECHR, 
holding that the interference with the journalists’ right to freedom of expression, did not meet a 
pressing social need, had not been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and that, in 
consequence, it had not been necessary in a democratic society. 
• Görmüş and Others v. Turkey, no. 49085/07, 19 January 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Kalda v. Estonia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
For the first time the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has stated that denying a prisoner 
access to the Internet may amount to a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR). In Estonia, Mr Kalda, who is serving a life sentence in prison, requested 
from the governor of the prison access to the online version of the State Gazette, to the decisions 
of the Supreme Court and administrative courts, and to the HUDOC database of the ECtHR. The 
governor refused this request, and so did the Administrative Court and the Tallinn Court of 
Appeal. The Supreme Court, however, decided that the refusal of the prison administration to 
grant detainees access to the rulings of the administrative courts and of the ECtHR interfered 
with their right to freely obtain information disseminated for public use, and considered the 
refusal unlawful. Some time later, Mr Kalda made a new application, requesting to be granted 
access to the Internet sites www.coe.ee of the Council of Europe Information Office in Tallinn, 
www.oiguskantsler.ee, the website of the Chancellor of Justice and www.riigikogu.ee, the website 
of the Estonian Parliament. He argued that he was involved in a number of legal disputes with 
the prison administration and that he needed access to those Internet sites in order to be able to 
defend his rights in court. Again Mr Kalda’s request was refused. The Supreme Court this time 
concluded that the prohibition of detainees’ access to the three Internet sites at issue was 
justified by the need to achieve the aims of imprisonment and in particular the need to secure 
public safety. Mr Kalda lodged an application with the ECtHR, complaining that the Estonian 
authorities’ refusal to grant him access to certain websites violated his right to receive 
information “without interference by public authority”, in breach of Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 
In its judgment of 19 January 2016, the European Court reiterated that the right to receive 
information basically prohibits a government from preventing a person from receiving 
information that others wished or were willing to impart. It also emphasises that in the light of 
its accessibility and its capacity to store and communicate vast amounts of information, the 
Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating the 
dissemination of information in general. However, as imprisonment inevitably involves a number 
of restrictions on prisoners’ communications with the outside world, including on their ability to 
receive information, the Court considered that Article 10 of the Convention cannot be interpreted 
as imposing a general obligation to provide access to the Internet, or to specific Internet sites, 
for prisoners. Nevertheless, since access to certain sites containing legal information is granted 
under Estonian law, the restriction of access to other sites that also contain legal information 
constitutes an interference with the right to receive information. Therefore the Court needed to 
examine whether this interference met the conditions of Article 10 paragraph 2 of the 
Convention. As there was no discussion that the interference with Mr Kalda’s right to receive 
information was prescribed by the Imprisonment Act and pursued the legitimate aims of the 
protection of the rights of others and the prevention of disorder and crime, the ultimate question 
was whether the refusal to grant access to the websites at issue was necessary in a democratic 
society. 
 
The Court noted that the websites to which Mr Kalda wished to have access predominantly 
contained legal information and information related to fundamental rights, including the rights 
of prisoners. It considers that the accessibility of such information promotes public awareness 
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and respect for human rights and gives weight to Mr Kalda’s argument that the Estonian courts 
used such information and that he needed access to it for the protection of his rights in the court 
proceedings. The Court drew attention to the fact that in a number of Council of Europe and other 
international instruments, the public-service value of the Internet and its importance for the 
enjoyment of a range of human rights has been recognised. By referring to the 2003 Declaration 
on freedom of communication on the Internet of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe (see IRIS 2003-7/3) and to the 2011 report to the Human Rights Council (A/HRC/17/27) 
of the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression (see also IRIS 2011-8/2), the Court held that Internet 
access has increasingly been understood as a right, and that calls have been made to develop 
effective policies to attain universal access to the Internet and to overcome the “digital divide”. 
The Court considered that these developments reflect the important role the Internet plays in 
people’s everyday lives, as an increasing amount of services and information is only available on 
the Internet. 
 
Finally the Court notes that under the Imprisonment Act, prisoners in Estonia have been granted 
limited access to the Internet via computers specially adapted for that purpose and under the 
supervision of the prison authorities. Thus, arrangements necessary for the use of the Internet by 
prisoners have in any event been made and the related costs have been borne by the authorities. 
While the security and economic considerations cited by the domestic authorities may be 
considered relevant, the Court noted that the domestic courts undertook no detailed analysis as 
to the security risks allegedly emerging from the access to the three additional websites in 
question, also having regard to the fact that these were websites of State authorities and of an 
international organisation. The Court also considered that the Estonian authorities have failed to 
convincingly demonstrate that giving Mr Kalda access to three additional websites would have 
caused any noteworthy additional costs. In these circumstances, the Court is not persuaded that 
sufficient reasons have been put forward in the present case to justify the interference with Mr 
Kalda’s right to receive information. The Court concluded, by six votes to one, that the 
interference with Mr Kalda’s right to receive information, in the specific circumstances of the 
present case, could not be regarded as having been necessary in a democratic society. 
Accordingly it found a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 
In his dissenting opinion, the Danish judge Kjølbro found that there is no violation of Article 10 
and that Mr Kalda’s application should have been dismissed. He also argues that the question of 
prisoners’ right to access to the Internet is a novel issue in the Court’s case law and that given 
the general importance of prisoners’ access to the Internet, as well as the practical and financial 
implications of granting prisoners access to the Internet, the question should not have been 
decided by a Chamber, but by the Grand Chamber. In the meantime, the Estonian Government 
has announced a request for a referral to the Grand Chamber in this case. 
• Kalda v. Estonia, no. 17429/10, 19 January 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: de Carolis and France Télévisions v. France 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has confirmed the robust Article 10 protection for 
investigative journalism expressed in a television documentary, holding that a conviction for 
defamation of a Saudi Arabian prince violated the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed 
by Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
In 2006, Prince Turki Al Faisal brought defamation proceedings against France Télévisions, 
Patrick de Carolis as its director, and a journalist, after the broadcasting on the TV channel France 
3 of a documentary entitled “11 September 2001: the prosecution case”. The documentary 
investigated why there had still been no trial five years after the events of 11 September. It 
focused on the complaints lodged by families of the victims of the 9/11 attacks in the US and the 
proceedings against persons suspected of having helped or funded al-Qaeda. The documentary 
highlighted the claimants’ concerns that the trial might be jeopardised by the economic links 
between the US and Saudi Arabia. Mr de Carolis and the journalist who made the documentary 
were found guilty of public defamation against the Prince and the Court declared France 3 civilly 
liable for the damage caused. In essence the French courts found that the journalist should have 
demonstrated prudence and objectivity, because she had referred to extremely serious 
accusations against Prince Turki Al Faisal, accusations that had not yet been examined by a court 
of law. 
 
Before the ECtHR, France 3 and its director complained of a violation of their right to freedom of 
expression. The European Court undertook a detailed examination of the content of the 
documentary and of the way in which the subject was dealt with, in particular the excerpts 
accusing Prince Turki Al Faisal of having assisted and financed the Taliban as head of the 
intelligence service in Saudi Arabia. The Court reached the conclusion that the allegations in the 
documentary had a sufficient factual basis, and that the documentary was balanced and did not 
contravene the standards of responsible journalism. As regards the sanctions, the fine to which 
Mr de Carolis had been sentenced and the civil liability finding against France 3 were considered 
a disproportionate interference with their right to freedom of expression. The Court is of the 
opinion that a moderate criminal sanction, combined with civil damages, does not take away the 
risk of a chilling effect that a criminal conviction may have on the right to freedom of expression. 
As the interference by the French authorities was not necessary in a democratic society, the Court 
unanimously came to the conclusion that Article 10 has been violated. The French government 
is ordered to pay the applicants EUR 11,500 in respect of pecuniary damages, and EUR 30,000 in 
respect of costs and expenses. 
• De Carolis and France Télévisions v. France, no. 29313/10, 21 January 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. 
Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
On 2 February 2016 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that a self-regulatory body 
(Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete, MTE) and an Internet news portal (Index.hu Zrt) were 
not liable for the offensive comments posted by their readers on their respective websites. 
Anonymous users of MTE and Index.hu had posted vulgar and offensive online comments 
criticising the misleading business practices of a real estate website. The European Court found 
that by holding MTE and Index.hu liable for the comments, the Hungarian courts have violated 
the right to freedom of expression. The present judgment is the first in which the principles set 
forth in the Grand Chamber’s judgment in Delfi AS v. Estonia were tested (see IRIS 2015-7/1). 
 
The case started in Hungary in 2010, when a real estate company brought a civil action claiming 
an infringement of its personality rights, on the basis that its right to a good reputation had been 
violated by readers’ comments posted on MTE and Index.hu. The operators of the websites 
immediately removed the allegedly offending comments from their websites. In the subsequent 
proceedings the domestic courts found that the comments at issue were insulting and went 
beyond the acceptable limits of freedom of expression. They rejected the applicants’ argument 
that they were only intermediaries and that their sole obligation was to remove certain content 
in the event of a complaint. As the comments attracted the applicability of the Hungarian Civil 
Code rules on personality rights, and since the comments were injurious for the plaintiff, the 
operators of the websites bore objective liability for their publication. As the applicants were not 
intermediaries, they could not invoke the limited liability of hosting service providers, as provided 
in the Directive 2000/31/EC on Electronic Commerce. Therefore the applicants were held liable 
for the offensive comments on their websites and they were ordered to pay the court fees, 
including the costs of the plaintiff’s legal representation. No award for non-pecuniary damages 
was imposed. 
 
MTE and Index.hu complained that the rulings of the Hungarian courts establishing objective 
liability on Internet websites for the contents of users’ comments amounts to a violation of 
freedom of expression as provided in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). As a consequence, liability for comments could only be avoided either by pre-moderation 
or by disabling commenting altogether: both solutions would work against the very essence of 
free expression on the Internet by having an undue chilling effect. They argued that the 
application of the “notice and take down” rule, as a characteristic of the limited liability for 
internet hosting providers, was the adequate way of enforcing the protection of reputation of 
others. 
 
Referring to Delfi AS v. Estonia, the European Court takes as its starting point that the provisions 
of the Hungarian Civil Code made it foreseeable for a media publisher running a large Internet 
news portal for economic purposes (Index.hu) and for a self-regulatory body of Internet content 
providers (MTE), that they could, in principle, be held liable under domestic law for unlawful 
comments of third-parties. Thus, the Court considers that the applicants were able to assess the 
risks related to their activities and that they must have been able to foresee, to a reasonable 
degree, the consequences which these could entail. It therefore concludes that the interference 
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in issue was “prescribed by law” within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 10. The 
decisive question remained whether there was a need for an interference with freedom of 
expression in the interests of the “protection of the reputation or rights of others”. By referring 
to its Grand Chamber’s judgment in Delfi AS again, the Court confirms that Internet news portals, 
in principle, must assume duties and responsibilities. However, because of the particular nature 
of the Internet, these duties and responsibilities may differ to some degree from those of a 
traditional publisher, notably as regards third-party content. The Court is of the opinion that the 
present case was different from Delfi AS: though offensive and vulgar, the incriminated 
comments did not constitute clearly unlawful speech; and they certainly did not amount to hate 
speech or incitement to violence, as they did in Delfi AS. Next the Court applied the relevant 
criteria developed in its established case-law for the assessment of whether the interference in 
situations not involving hate speech or calls to violence is proportionate. These criteria are: (1) 
the context and content of the impugned comments; (2) the liability of the authors of the 
comments; (3) the measures taken by the website operators and the conduct of the injured party; 
(4) the consequences of the comments for the injured party; and (5) the consequences for the 
applicants. 
 
The Court considers that the Hungarian courts, when deciding on the notion of liability in the 
applicants’ case, had not carried out a proper balancing exercise between the competing rights 
involved, namely between the applicants’ right to freedom of expression and the real estate 
website’s right to respect for its commercial reputation. Notably, the Hungarian authorities 
accepted at face value that the comments had been unlawful as being injurious to the reputation 
of the real estate websites. The European Court however is of the opinion that the comments 
were related to a matter of public interest, being posted in the context of a dispute over the 
business policy of the real estate company perceived as being harmful to a number of clients. It 
also observes that the expressions used in the comments, albeit belonging to a low register of 
style, are common in communication on many Internet portals - a consideration that reduces the 
impact that can be attributed to those expressions. 
 
Apart from that, the conduct of the applicants in providing a platform for third-parties to exercise 
their freedom of expression by posting comments is to be considered as a journalistic activity of 
a particular nature. Interferences with such activities, including the dissemination of statements 
made by other persons, may seriously hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of 
matters of public interest, and should not be envisaged unless there are particularly strong 
reasons for doing so. The Court continues to state that the applicants took certain measures to 
prevent defamatory comments on their portals or to remove them. Both applicants had a 
disclaimer in their general terms and conditions and had a notice-and-take-down system in place, 
whereby anybody could indicate unlawful comments to the service provider so that they could 
be removed. Holding the applicants liable merely for allowing unfiltered comments breaching 
the law would require excessive and impracticable forethought capable of undermining freedom 
of the right to impart information on the Internet. 
 
The Court also emphasises that there is a difference between the commercial reputational 
interests of a company and the reputation of an individual concerning his or her social status. 
Furthermore there were already ongoing inquiries into the plaintiff company’s business conduct. 
Consequently the Court is not convinced that the comments in question were capable of making 
any additional and significant impact on the attitude of the consumers concerned. 
 
Back to overview of case-law 
386 
The Court is of the view that the decisive question when assessing the consequence for the 
applicants is not the absence of damages payable, but the manner in which Internet portals can 
be held liable for third-party comments. Such liability may have foreseeable negative 
consequences for the comment environment of an Internet portal, for example by impelling it to 
close the commenting space altogether. For the Court, these consequences may have, directly or 
indirectly, a chilling effect on the freedom of expression on the Internet, this being particularly 
detrimental for a non-commercial website such as MTE. The Court is of the opinion that the 
Hungarian courts paid no heed to what was at stake for the applicants as protagonists of the free 
electronic media, as they did not embark on any assessment of how the application of civil-law 
liability to a news portal operator would affect freedom of expression on the Internet. Indeed, 
when allocating liability in the case, those courts did not perform any balancing analysis between 
this interest and that of the plaintiff at all. 
 
Finally, the Court refers once more to Delfi AS, in which it found that if accompanied by effective 
procedures allowing for rapid response, the notice-and-take-down-system could function in 
many cases as an appropriate tool for balancing the rights and interests of all those involved. 
The Court sees no reason to hold that such a system could not have provided a viable avenue to 
protect the commercial reputation of the plaintiff. It is true that, in cases where third-party user 
comments take the form of hate speech and direct threats to the physical integrity of individuals, 
the rights and interests of others and of the society as a whole might entitle Contracting States 
to impose liability on Internet news portals if they failed to take measures to remove clearly 
unlawful comments without delay, even without notice from the alleged victim or from third 
parties. As the present case did not involve such utterances, the European Court comes to the 
conclusion that the rigid stance of the Hungarian courts reflects a notion of liability which 
effectively precludes the balancing between the competing rights according to the criteria laid 
down in the Court’s case law. All these considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude 
that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
• Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, no. 22947/13, 2 
February 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Arlewin v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
On 1 March 2016 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found Sweden in breach of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) because it had denied access to court to a person 
who wanted to bring defamation proceedings in Sweden arising out of the content of a trans-
border television programme service (TV3), suggesting that they resort to the jurisdiction of the 
United Kingdom. The European Court is of the opinion that requiring a Swedish national to bring 
defamation proceedings in the UK courts following an alleged defamatory TV programme 
broadcasted by the London-based company Viasat Broadcasting UK, but targeting mostly, if not 
exclusively, a Swedish audience, was not reasonable and violated Article 6 paragraph 1 of the 
Convention, which guarantees access to a court. 
 
The programme in question had been broadcast live in Sweden and had accused Mr Arlewin, the 
applicant, of organised crime in the media and advertising sectors. Mr Arlewin brought a private 
prosecution for gross defamation against X. X was the anchorman of the television show and the 
CEO of Strix Television AB, the company that produced the TV3 programme. The Swedish courts 
subsequently found it did not have jurisdiction to examine Mr Arlewin’s complaint, finding that 
the UK-based company under jurisdiction of the UK authorities, which broadcasted the TV3 
programme, was responsible for its content. Mr Arlewin appealed to the Supreme Court, alleging 
that the Swedish courts’ position ran contrary to EU law. He also requested that a question 
concerning the interpretation of the Brussels I Regulation No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters be referred to the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling. According to him, the 
regulation entitled a person claiming non-contractual damages to bring actions in the territory 
where the harm had actually occurred, namely in Sweden, in his case. The Supreme Court rejected 
Mr Arlewin’s referral request, and refused leave to appeal in the case. Finally in Strasbourg, Mr 
Arlewin complained that the Swedish courts refused to examine the defamation case brought by 
him against X on the merits, and thereby failed to provide him with an effective remedy to protect 
his reputation. The Swedish Government argued that in application of the Audiovisual Media 
Services Directive 2010/13/EU, Viasat Broadcasting UK was a company established in the UK and 
that the editorial decisions about their audiovisual media service were taken in the UK. Therefore 
the UK, through its Office of Communication (“Ofcom”), had supervisory jurisdiction over TV3’s 
broadcasts. 
 
According to the Strasbourg Court, the jurisdiction over broadcasters vested in one State under 
the AVMS Directive did not have general application, extending to matters not regulated therein. 
It also referred to Article 28 of the Directive, addressing the situation where a person’s reputation 
and good name have been damaged by incorrect facts presented in a programme. This provision 
however only discusses a right of reply or equivalent remedies, and does not deal with 
defamation proceedings and an appurtenant claim for damages. The European Court was thus 
not convinced that the AVMS Directive determines, even for the purposes of EU law, the country 
of jurisdiction in which an individual brings a defamation claim and wishes to sue a journalist or 
a broadcasting company for damages. Rather, jurisdiction under EU law is regulated by the 
Brussels I Regulation No. 44/2001. According to Articles 2 and 5 of the Regulation, both the UK 
and Sweden appear to have jurisdiction over the present matter: X is domiciled in Sweden 
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whereas Viasat Broadcasting UK is registered and established in the UK, and the harmful event 
could be argued to have occurred in either country, as the television programme was broadcast 
from the UK and the alleged injury to the applicant’s reputation and privacy manifested itself in 
Sweden. The CJEU has earlier had the occasion to interpret and apply Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
I Regulation No. 44/2001, allowing courts assuming jurisdiction in a member State, not only in 
the place where the defendant has his residence, but also in the “place where the harmful event 
occurred” or where the centre of the alleged victim’s interests is based. Hence three options were 
available to hear an action for damages caused by the publication of a defamatory newspaper 
article or an Internet publication, according to EU law (CJEU in eDate Advertising and Martinez 
(Joined Cases C-509/09 and C‑161/10)) (see IRIS 2012/1: Extra). According to the European Court 
it may be assumed that the same would apply to a broadcast via satellite. 
 
While leaving open the question of whether a binding provision of EU law could justify the 
Swedish position, the ECtHR found that the Swedish Government had not shown that Swedish 
jurisdiction was barred in the case due to the existence of such a provision. Rather, jurisdiction 
was excluded by virtue of the relevant provisions of domestic law. The European Court found in 
particular that the programme and its broadcast were, for all intents and purposes, entirely 
Swedish and that the alleged harm to Mr Arlewin had occurred in Sweden. In those circumstances, 
the Swedish State had an obligation under Article 6 paragraph 1 ECHR to provide Mr Arlewin 
with an effective access to court. However, Mr Arlewin had been put in a situation in which he 
could not hold anyone responsible under Swedish law for his allegation of defamation. Requiring 
him to take proceedings in the UK courts could not be said to have been a reasonable, effective 
and practical alternative for him. In the European Court’s view, the limitations on Mr Arlewin’s 
right of access to court had therefore been too far-reaching and could not, in his particular case, 
be considered proportionate. 
The Court is unanimous in finding a violation of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Convention and 
ordered Sweden to pay Mr Arlewin EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 
20,000 in respect of costs and expenses. 
• Arlewin v. Sweden, no. 22302/10, 1 March 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Sousa Goucha v. Portugal 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
In finding that there had been no violation of the right to privacy and the right to reputation, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) upheld a high level of freedom of expression in a case 
concerning a joke in a TV-programme about the sexual orientation of a television celebrity in 
Portugal. For the ECtHR it was important that the domestic courts, in dismissing the defamation 
complaint by Mr Sousa Goucha, took into account the context in which the joke had been made, 
and referred to the playful and irreverent style of the television comedy show and its usual 
humour. It also noted that Mr Sousa Goucha, as a well-known television host, is a public figure, 
who had earlier publicly declared his homosexuality. 
 
Mr Sousa Goucha lodged a criminal complaint for defamation and insult against the television 
company (RTP), the production company, the television presenter, and the directors of 
programming and content, following the joke made during the broadcast of a late-night comedy 
show on television. Mr Sousa Goucha alleged that the joke, which had included him in a list of 
best female television hosts, damaged his reputation as it had conflated his gender with his 
sexual orientation. The Portuguese courts, however, dismissed his claim for damages as ill 
founded. They considered that for a reasonable person, the joke would not be perceived as 
defamatory because it referred to aspects of Mr Sousa Goucha’s characteristics, behaviour, and 
way of expressing himself, which could be seen as feminine. 
 
Relying on Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), Mr Sousa Goucha 
submitted an application to the ECtHR, alleging that the domestic courts had discriminated 
against him because of his sexuality, which he had made public. According to the ECtHR, the case 
also deserved an analysis from the perspective of Article 8 of the Convention, as the right of 
reputation is protected under that provision, while the concept of “private life” also covers the 
moral integrity of a person and can therefore embrace multiple aspects of a person’s identity, 
such as gender identity and sexual orientation. The Court stated that sexual orientation is a 
profound element of a person’s identity, and that gender and sexual orientation are two 
distinctive and intimate characteristics. However, the Court reiterated that in order for Article 8 
to be triggered, the attack on personal honour and reputation must have a certain level of 
seriousness and such a manner as to cause prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect 
for private life. The main issue in the present case was whether a fair balance had been achieved 
between Mr Sousa Goucha’s right to protection of his reputation, which is an element of his 
“private life” under Article 8, and the other parties’ right to freedom of expression, as guaranteed 
by Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 
It is in this balancing exercise that the Court first noted that Mr Sousa Goucha is a well-known 
television host in Portugal and thus a “public figure”. The Court then recalled that it had been 
required on numerous occasions to consider disputes involving humour and satire, and reiterated 
that satire is a form of artistic expression and social commentary and, by its inherent features of 
exaggeration and distortion of reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate. Accordingly, any 
interference with an artist’s right to such expression must be examined with particular care. 
Additionally, the Court also referred to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in the case of Deckmyn v. Vandersteen (IRIS 2014-9/5), acknowledging that a particularly 
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wide margin of appreciation should be given to parody in the context of freedom of expression. 
It must also be noted, however, that the joke was not made in the context of a debate of public 
interest and, as such, no matters of public interest were at stake. On the other hand, the Court 
considered that the joke would not be perceived as defamation by a reasonable person, and it 
referred to Mr Sousa Goucha’s characteristics, his behaviour, and way of expressing himself. Also 
of particular importance is the playful and irreverent style of the television comedy show and its 
usual humour. The Court considered that the domestic courts had convincingly established the 
need for placing the protection of freedom of expression above Mr Sousa Goucha’s right to 
protection of reputation. The Court noted that they also took into account the lack of intent to 
attack the applicant’s reputation and assessed the way in which a reasonable spectator of the 
comedy show in question would have perceived the impugned joke, as opposed to merely 
considering what the applicant felt or thought towards the joke. A limitation on freedom of 
expression for the sake of the applicant’s reputation would therefore have been disproportionate 
under Article 10 of the Convention. The Court concluded that the domestic courts had struck a 
fair balance between the television show’s freedom of expression under Article 10 and Mr Sousa 
Goucha’s right to have his reputation respected under Article 8. In sum, the Court found no reason 
to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts. 
 
With regard to the complaint under Article 14 ECHR (discrimination), the Court was of the opinion 
that the refusal to prosecute the TV-broadcaster and persons responsible for the impugned TV-
programme for defamation was not due to because he was homosexual. Rather, the Court stated 
that it was due to the weight given to freedom of expression in the circumstances of the case, 
and the lack of intention to attack the Mr Sousa Gaucho’s honour. The Court stated that although 
the relevant passages were “debatable” and “could have been avoided”, they did not have 
discriminatory intent. Consequently, in the absence of any firm evidence, it was not possible to 
speculate whether his sexual orientation had any bearing on the domestic courts’ decisions. 
Therefore, the Court stated that it cannot be said that the Mr Sousa Goucha was discriminated 
against on the grounds of his sexual orientation, and accordingly, there had been no violation of 
Article 14 read together with Article 8. 
• Sousa Goucha v. Portugal, no. 70434/12, 22 March 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Pinto Coelho v. Portugal (No. 2) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
In a judgment of 22 March 2016 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that Portugal 
has violated a journalist’s right to report about the hearing in a criminal case. The ECtHR 
emphasised that the domestic court hearing was public and that the criminal conviction of the 
journalist for having broadcast unauthorised recordings of the statements of witnesses during 
the hearing was not necessary in a democratic society. Therefore the journalist’s conviction 
amounted to a breach of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
The applicant in this case was Sofia Pinto Coelho, a TV-journalist and legal affairs correspondent. 
She was convicted for having broadcast in news report excerpts that included sound recordings 
from a court hearing, obtained without permission from the judge. The case on which Pinto 
Coelho had reported concerned the criminal conviction of an 18-year-old man for aggravated 
theft of a mobile phone. In her TV-report Ms Pinto Coelho argued that the defendant should have 
been acquitted, alleging a judicial error. She included in her report shots of the courtroom, 
extracts of sub-titled sound recordings, and the questioning of prosecution and defence 
witnesses, in which their voices and those of the three judges were digitally altered. The excerpts 
were followed by Ms Pinto Coelho’s commentary, in which she tried to demonstrate that the 
victims had not recognised the defendant during the trial, supporting the defendant’s claim  that 
he had been at work at the time of the incident. 
 
A short time later the president of the domestic court, who had presided over the case, lodged a 
complaint against Ms Pinto Coelho. No permission had been given to broadcast extracts of the 
recordings of the court hearing, and the failure to obtain such authorisation breached Article 348 
of the Criminal Code. After being convicted of non-compliance with a legal order and ordered to 
pay a fine of EUR 1,500, and after exhausting all national remedies, Ms Pinto Coelho submitted 
an application to the ECtHR in Strasbourg, alleging a breach of her right as a journalist to freedom 
of expression and information, under Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 
In essence, in this case the ECtHR had to balance the right of the journalist to inform the public 
and the public’s right to receive information against the right of those who testified to respect 
for their private lives and against the interest of maintaining the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary. The Court reiterated that in principle journalists must obey the law, which includes 
when reporting on a criminal case of public interest. The Court stated that although Ms Pinto 
Coelho had not obtained the recordings of the hearing in an illicit way, as a journalist she must 
have been aware that the unauthorised broadcasting of the recordings violated Article 348 of the 
Criminal Code. The Court took into consideration, however, the fact that when the news report 
was broadcast the case had already been decided, and hence there was no indication that the 
broadcast of the audio extracts could have negatively influenced the proper administration of 
justice. Furthermore, the hearing was public and none of the witnesses whose evidence had been 
broadcast had filed any complaint. The Court also considered it relevant to emphasise that the 
witnesses’ voices were distorted, which reduced the interest invoked by the Portuguese judicial 
authorities referring to the right to have the witnesses’ and judges’ voices protected under the 
right of privacy. The Court reiterated that Article 10 also protects the mode of expression of ideas 
and information, and that it is not for judges to substitute their own views for those of the press 
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as to how a story should be presented. According to the ECtHR the domestic authorities had not 
sufficiently justified the criminal sanction imposed, despite the fact that it might have a chilling 
effect on journalistic reporting on matters of public interest. By six votes to one, the Court found 
a violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The Court held that the finding of a violation 
constituted sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by Ms Pinto 
Coelho. It further awarded her EUR 1,500 in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 4,623.84 in 
respect of costs and expenses. 
• Pinto Coelho v. Portugal (no. 2), no. 48718/11, 22 March 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Bédat v. Switzerland (Grand Chamber) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
In a judgment of 29 March 2016, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in Bédat v. Switzerland found that a criminal conviction of a journalist, Arnaud Bédat, for 
having published documents covered by investigative secrecy in a criminal case is no violation 
of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The Grand Chamber is of the 
opinion that the Swiss authorities acted within their margin of appreciation and that recourse to 
criminal proceedings and the penalty imposed on the journalist did not amount to a 
disproportionate interference in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. 
 
The article published by Bédat in the weekly magazine L’Illustré concerned ‘M.B.’ and the criminal 
proceedings against him for having driven his car into pedestrians. The incident, in which three 
people died and eight others were injured, had caused great public outcry and controversy in 
Switzerland. The article contained a personal description of M.B., a summary of the questions put 
by the police officers and the investigating judge, and M.B.’s replies. It also contained the 
information that M.B. had been charged with premeditated murder and, in the alternative, with 
murder, and it was mentioned that M.B. appeared to show no remorse. The article was 
accompanied by several photographs of letters which M.B. had sent to the investigating judge. 
Criminal proceedings were brought against the journalist on the initiative of the public 
prosecutor for having published secret documents, in breach of Article 293 of the Swiss Criminal 
Code. It emerged from the investigation that one of the parties claiming damages in the 
proceedings against M.B. had photocopied the case file and lost one of the copies in a shopping 
centre. An unknown person had then brought the copy to the offices of the magazine which had 
published the impugned article. Bédat was found guilty of making public a series of documents 
which were at that stage to be considered protected as part of the secrecy of the criminal 
investigation, and he was ordered to pay a fine of 4,000 Swiss Francs (EUR 2,667). Bédat lodged 
a complaint before the ECtHR, arguing that this conviction had resulted in a violation of his right 
to freedom of expression. 
 
On 1 July 2014 the Second Section of the ECtHR found that the article reported on an important 
case and that although the interference was prescribed by law and pursued legitimate aims, it 
considered that the sanction did not respond to a pressing social need, not being sufficiently 
motivated and being disproportionate. Therefore, the majority of the Court, by four votes to three, 
found that the criminal fine imposed on the journalist breached Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
While the Grand Chamber agrees with the Chamber that the interference was prescribed by law 
and pursued legitimate aims, namely of preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary and protecting the 
reputation and the rights of others, the majority of the Grand Chamber, with 15 votes to two, 
comes to another conclusion on whether the fine imposed on the journalist was necessary in a 
democratic society. The Grand Chamber reiterates that the protection afforded to journalists by 
Article 10 of the ECHR “is subject to the proviso that they act in good faith in order to provide 
accurate and reliable information in accordance with the tenets of responsible journalism. The 
concept of responsible journalism, as a professional activity which enjoys the protection of Article 
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10 of the ECHR, is not confined to the contents of information which is collected and/or 
disseminated by journalistic means (..); the concept of responsible journalism also embraces the 
lawfulness of the conduct of a journalist, and the fact that a journalist has breached the law is a 
relevant, albeit not decisive, consideration when determining whether he or she has acted 
responsibly”. The Grand Chamber clarifies that it must adjudicate on a conflict between two rights 
which enjoy equal protection under the Convention, and the Court must weigh up the competing 
interests. Reference is made to cases where the right to privacy (Article 8) and the right to 
freedom of expression (Article 10) are conflicting (see IRIS 2012-3/1) and the Court considers 
that an analogous reasoning must be applied in weighing up the rights secured under Article 10 
and Article 6 paragraph 1 respectively. In such an approach to balancing rights, that the Court 
considers that where the national authorities have assessed the interests at stake in compliance 
with the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, strong reasons are required if it is to substitute 
its view for that of the domestic courts. 
 
The Grand Chamber takes into consideration six criteria as part of its balancing test: 
 
(i) How the applicant came into possession of the information at issue: although Bédat had not 
obtained the information by unlawful means, as a professional journalist he must have been 
aware of the confidential nature of the information which he was planning to publish. It was not 
disputed that the publication of the information in question fell within the scope of Article 293 
of the Swiss Criminal Code. 
 
(ii) Content of the impugned article: the Court qualifies the impugned article about M.B. as 
portraying “a highly negative picture of him, adopting an almost mocking tone”. The article had 
“a sensationalist tone”, and it formulated a series of questions which the judicial authorities were 
called upon to answer, at both the investigation and the trial stages. 
 
(iii) Contribution of the impugned article to a public-interest debate: according to the Court, the 
journalist failed to demonstrate how publishing records of interviews, statements by the 
accused’s wife and doctor, and letters sent by the accused to the investigating judge concerning 
banal aspects of his everyday life in detention, could have contributed to any public debate on 
the ongoing investigation. 
 
(iv)  Influence of the impugned article on the criminal proceedings: according to the Court it is 
“undeniable that the publication of an article slanted in that way at a time when the investigation 
was still ongoing entailed an inherent risk of influencing the course of proceedings in one way 
or another, whether in relation to the work of the investigating judge, the decisions of the 
accused’s representatives, the positions of the parties claiming damages, or the objectivity of the 
trial court, irrespective of its composition”. The Court agrees with the findings by the Swiss Courts 
that the records of interviews and the accused’s correspondence had been discussed in the public 
sphere before the conclusion of the investigation, before the trial and out of context, in a manner 
liable to influence the decisions taken by the investigating judge and the trial court. 
 
(v)  Infringement of the accused’s private life: the Court agrees that the criminal proceedings 
brought against Bédat conformed with the positive obligation incumbent on Switzerland under 
Article 8 to protect the accused’s private life. It also notes that when the impugned article was 
published the accused was in prison, and therefore in a situation of vulnerability. 
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(vi)  Proportionality of the penalty imposed: the Court considers that the recourse to criminal 
proceedings and the penalty imposed on Bédat did not amount to disproportionate interference 
in the exercise of his right to freedom of expression. The penalty was imposed for breaching the 
secrecy of a criminal investigation, and its purpose was to protect the proper functioning of the 
justice system and the rights of the accused to a fair trial and to respect for his private life. 
Therefore the Court states that such a penalty could not be considered liable to have a deterrent 
effect on the exercise of freedom of expression by Bédat or any other journalist wishing to inform 
the public about ongoing criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the Court sees no strong reason to 
substitute its own view for that of the domestic courts. Furthermore, having regard to the margin 
of appreciation available to States and to the fact that the balancing the various competing 
interests was properly conducted by the Swiss Federal Court, the Grand Chamber concludes that 
there has been no violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 
Two judges strongly dissented, Judges López Guerra and Yudkivska, the latter expressing the 
view that “(t)his Court had always regarded the press as the servant of an effective judicial system, 
granting little scope for restrictions on freedom of expression in such matters as the public 
interest in the proper administration of justice. … the present judgment constitutes a regrettable 
departure from this long-established position”. 
 
• Bédat v. Switzerland [GC], no. 56925/08, ECHR 2016. 
• A.B. v. Switzerland, no. 56925/08, 1 July 2014. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Diamant Salihu and others v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Ghent University (Belgium), Copenhagen University (Denmark), Legal Human Academy and 
member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF, 
Germany) 
 
A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that journalists who 
commit (minor) offences during newsgathering activities cannot invoke robust protection based 
on their rights to freedom of expression and information, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Journalists of the Swedish newspaper Expressen 
had undertaken to demonstrate the easy availability of illegal firearms by purchasing one. The 
Swedish courts were of the opinion that the editor and the journalists could not be exempted 
from criminal liability as they had wilfully breached the Swedish Weapons Act. In a unanimous 
decision, the ECtHR confirmed the necessity of the journalists’ criminal conviction. It declared 
the application for alleged breach of the right of journalistic newsgathering under Article 10 of 
the Convention manifestly ill founded. 
 
In 2010, a series of shootings took place in southern Sweden, prompting lively public debate and 
calls for more stringent firearms control. Thomas Mattsson, Andreas Johansson and Diamant 
Salihu, the editor-in-chief, news editor and a journalist at the tabloid newspaper Expressen, 
decided to prepare a news story on the easy availability of illegal firearms. They successfully 
contacted several people who claimed that they could sell them a gun. Salihu bought one, while 
a photographer of Expressen was present during the transfer, with Johansson listening in via a 
mobile telephone for safety reasons. On arrival in their hotel, they called the police, 
photographed the weapon and put it in the hotel room’s security box, until the police collected 
it half an hour later. The next day Expressen published an article portraying the events, including 
a large photograph of the firearm and a description of the contact leading up to its purchase. 
 
Shortly after, the public prosecutor decided to press charges against the journalists, and all three 
were convicted for (incitement to) a weapons offence. The District Court and later the Court of 
Appeals found that the journalists had shown clear intent to commit punishable actions, and 
could not rely on the protection of Article 10 of the ECHR in this case. The journalists were not 
on trial for publishing an article, but for actions taken before the publishing. Furthermore, their 
actions appeared to be premeditated risk-taking to create sensational news, while it had not been 
necessary for the journalists to complete the purchase of the firearm and to subsequently 
transport it in order to fulfil their journalistic mission. Their aim - to investigate whether illegal 
weapons were easily accessible in Sweden - had already been achieved when Salihu received the 
offer to buy the firearm. 
 
The Supreme Court upheld the journalists’ conviction, removing the suspended sentences, but 
increasing the level of the criminal fines from 30 to 80 day fines, which amounted, in total, to 
approximately EUR 8,400 for Mattsson, EUR 5,700 for Johansson and EUR 4,400 for Salihu. The 
Supreme Court emphasised the strong societal interest in controlling the handling of weapons, 
although it also recognised the journalistic purpose behind the purchase of the firearm. According 
to the Supreme Court, the question of whether it was easy to buy weapons could, however, have 
been illustrated by other means, and the weight of the journalistic interest was not sufficient to 
justify completion of the purchase of the firearm. With regard to the proportionality of the 
sanction, the Supreme Court noted that the conviction was not for the actual publication of the 
article, and that the sentences imposed were below those normally prescribed for the crime, in 
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view of the journalistic context and the precautions the journalists had taken after obtaining the 
weapon. The Expressen journalists subsequently lodged an application before the European 
Court of Human Rights, complaining that their conviction was unlawful (constituting a breach of 
Article 7 ECHR) and violated their rights as journalists guaranteed under Article 10 ECHR. 
 
In its decision of 10 May 2016, the ECtHR dismissed the double complaint. With regard to the 
alleged violation of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court finds that the journalists’ convictions 
were lawful and pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of public safety and prevention of 
disorder and crime. Regarding the decisive question of whether the interference was “necessary 
in a democratic society”, the Court refers to the fundamental principles concerning this issue, 
elaborated in some of its Grand Chamber judgments such as in Stoll v. Switzerland (see 
IRIS 2008-3/2) and recently in Bédat v. Switzerland (see IRIS 2016-5/1). Referring to its Grand 
Chamber judgment in Pentikäinen v. Finland (see IRIS 2016-1/2), it reiterated, “notwithstanding 
the vital role played by the media in a democratic society, journalists cannot, in principle, be 
released from their duty to obey the ordinary criminal law on the basis that, as journalists, Article 
10 affords them a cast-iron defence. In other words, a journalist cannot claim an exclusive 
immunity from criminal liability for the sole reason that, unlike other individuals exercising the 
right to freedom of expression, the offence in question was committed during the performance 
of his or her journalistic functions”. 
 
Turning to the facts, the ECtHR endorsed the main arguments developed by the domestic courts: 
the journalists wilfully infringed ordinary criminal law, they could have illustrated the easy 
availability of firearms in other ways, and the weight of the journalistic interest did not justify 
actually purchasing the firearm. The ECtHR furthermore observes that the question of the 
applicants’ rights under Article 10 ECHR had been the subject of arguments, including during 
hearings, before all three domestic instances. The domestic courts had stressed the importance 
of journalists’ role in society and made a balanced evaluation of all interests at stake. Taking into 
account the margin of appreciation afforded to the State in this area, and explicitly referring to 
the principle of subsidiarity, the ECtHR found that the reasons relied upon by the domestic courts 
were relevant and sufficient for the purposes of Article 10 ECHR, and that they struck a fair 
balance between the competing interests at stake. The conclusion is that the domestic courts 
were entitled to decide that the interference complained of was “necessary in a democratic 
society”. The application was thus considered manifestly ill founded and therefore inadmissible. 
• Diamant Salihu and others v. Sweden (dec.), no. 33628/15, 10 May 2016.  
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In a judgment of 2 June 2016 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that Ukraine 
had violated the right to freedom of expression by convicting a media company of the defamation 
of a political public figure. Although the impugned article had a highly sarcastic and offensive 
tone, the Court confirmed that journalistic freedom covers possible recourse to a degree of 
exaggeration, or even provocation, especially in the context of a public debate and discussions 
in the media on important features of political life. 
 
The case concerns defamation proceedings brought in 2007 against the editorial company 
(Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform - IER) of one of the nationwide newspapers in Ukraine, the 
Evening News. At the time, the newspaper was closely associated with Yuliya Tymoshenko, a 
political leader in Ukraine and the then major rival of Prime Minister Mr Victor Yanukovych’s. In 
May 2007, the newspaper published an article critical of Ms Ganna German, one of the main 
spokespeople for Mr Yanukovych. Ms German was also elected as a Member of Parliament on the 
list of the Party of Regions, led by Mr Yanukovych. At the material time she frequently presented 
the views of both her party and Mr Yanukovych on various television and radio programmes and 
debates. The article in the Evening News especially criticised the way Ms German, in an interview 
on the BBC, had commented on the institutional and political crisis in Ukraine, defending Mr 
Yanukovych’s and the Party of Regions’ policy. The article also suggested that Ms German had 
become a Member of Parliament for the sole purpose of obtaining a flat in Kyiv. 
 
In July 2007, Ms German brought a defamation claim against IER and the author of the article. 
The Kyiv Pecherskyy District Court found that some of the statements in the article constituted 
statements of fact that had not been verified or proved by either of the defendants, and were 
negative about and insulting to Ms German. Therefore, IER was ordered to retract the information 
about the acquisition by Ms German of the flat in Kyiv, by publishing the operative part of its 
judgment. IER was also ordered to pay the plaintiff UAH 1,700, approximately EUR 300, in 
compensation for non-pecuniary damage. After exhaustion of all remedies at the domestic level, 
IER lodged an application with the ECtHR, complaining of a violation of its right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
The Ukraine Government agreed that the judgments of the domestic courts had constituted an 
interference with the applicant company’s freedom of expression. However, it considered that 
the interference had been prescribed by law, being based on the relevant provisions of the Civil 
Code and the Information Act, and it had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation 
or rights of others. The Government also referred to the ECtHR’s decision in Vitrenko and Others 
v. Ukraine (no. 23510/02, 16 December 2008), which, according to the government, supported 
the principle that even during an election campaign an individual could not be subjected to unfair 
accusations by his opponent. Therefore, the interference was to be considered necessary in a 
democratic society. The government also submitted that the interference had been proportionate 
and had not put an undue burden on the applicant company’s right to freedom of political 
comment. 
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In a unanimous decision the ECtHR disagreed with both the findings by the Ukrainian courts and 
the government’s arguments as to the necessity of the disputed interference with IER’s right to 
freedom of expression. 
 
The ECtHR reiterated that Article 10 (2) of the ECHR allows little scope for restrictions on political 
speech or debate on matters of public interest. The Court stated that whilst a politician is 
certainly entitled to have his reputation protected, even when he is not acting in his private 
capacity, in such cases the requirements of that protection have to be balanced with the interests 
of the open discussion of political issues. The Court also recalled that satire is a form of artistic 
expression and social commentary and, by its inherent features of exaggeration and distortion of 
reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate. The Court observed that at the relevant time the 
struggle between Yulia Tymoshenko and Victor Yanukovych and their allies was an important 
feature of Ukrainian political life. The impugned article constituted the sarcastic reaction of the 
Evening News’ journalist to Ms German’s participation in a BBC radio programme, during which 
she had commented on the popularity of her party. The Court considered that the subject matter 
of the impugned article, namely the author’s speculation as to Ms German’s motives for making 
her statements and supporting the Party of Regions, was of significant public interest. 
 
In contrast with the findings by the domestic courts, the ECtHR was of the opinion that the 
statements concerning the acquisition of the flat were value judgments, having a sufficient 
factual basis. In this perspective the Court observed that the impugned statements were not 
particularly serious in tone. They were also not particularly damaging in substance, given that 
the author did not accuse Ms German of specific illegal or immoral conduct, even though he 
ascribed to her less than admirable motives. Read in the context of a highly-charged political 
debate, and in the context of the article as a whole, the expressions found untrue by the domestic 
courts were supposed to illustrate the author’s opinion that Ms German’s expression of her 
political opinions was insincere and guided by considerations of material gain. The Court 
furthermore referred to the “highly sarcastic language” of the article, reaffirming that Article 10 
also protects information and ideas that offend, shock, or disturb. In addition, the Court statetd 
that the extension of journalistic freedom to protect recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or 
even provocation, is an important principle, established in the Court’s case law. According to the 
ECtHR, the domestic courts failed to explain why they considered that the impugned statements, 
satirical in tone as they were, went beyond the permissible level of exaggeration or provocation, 
given the impugned article’s contribution to a debate of public interest and its subject’s role as a 
prominent politician and the essential role played by the press in a democratic society. The 
domestic courts focussed on the a person’s right to protection of their reputation, without 
sufficiently considering the right to freedom of expression of the applicant media company. 
Furthermore, while the sanction imposed on the applicant company was relatively modest, it 
nevertheless had symbolic value and could still have a chilling effect on the applicant company 
and other participants in the public debate. For all these reasons, the Court was not convinced 
that the balancing exercise had been undertaken by the national authorities in conformity with 
the criteria laid down in its case law. It thus concluded that the necessity of the interference with 
the media company’s exercise  of freedom of expression had not been demonstrated, and that, 
accordingly, there had been a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. 
 
• Instytut Ekonomichnykh Reform, TOV v. Ukraine, no. 61561/08, 2 June 2016. 
• Vitrenko and Others v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 23510/02, 16 December 2008. 
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The legality and acceptability of some controversial practices by journalists was at the heart of a 
recent case before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The case concerns the 
conviction of three journalists in Italy who intercepted radio communications between police 
officers (carabinieri) in order to arrive quickly at crime scenes and report on them for their local 
online newspaper. Stressing the notion of responsible journalism and noting that the decisions 
of the domestic courts had been duly reasoned and had focused primarily on the need to protect 
national security and prevent crime and disorder, the Court confirms the duty of journalists to 
comply with domestic law, which prohibits the interception by any persons of communications 
not addressed to them, including those of law-enforcement agencies. The Court also notes that 
the penalties ordered by the domestic courts, consisting of the seizure of the radio equipment 
and the imposition of suspended custodial sentences, were not disproportionate. It emphasises 
that the newspaper and the journalists have not been prevented or prohibited from bringing 
news items to the attention of the public. 
 
The applicants in this case were Mr Brambilla, the director of a local online newspaper, and Mr 
De Salvo and Mr Alfano, both journalists working for that newspaper. While using radio 
equipment to intercept the frequencies used by the police, they gained access to communications 
about a police patrol on its way to a location where weapons were being stored illegally. Mr De 
Salvo and Mr Alfano went to the scene immediately, but they were stopped and searched by the 
police on their arrival. The police found equipment in their car capable of intercepting radio 
communications between law-enforcement officers. A short time later, in the offices of Mr De 
Salvo and Mr Alfano, more items capable of intercepting police communications were seized. 
Subsequent criminal proceedings were instituted against the director of the newspaper and the 
two journalists, and all three were convicted, with suspended custodial sentences imposed. The 
Milan Court of Appeal, and finally the Court of Cassation, found that the communications had 
been confidential and that their interception was punishable under the Criminal Code, taking the 
view that the right to press freedom could not take precedence in a case concerning the illegal 
interception of communications between law-enforcement officers. 
 
Relying on Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the director of the 
newspaper and the two journalists complained about the search of their vehicle and their offices, 
the seizure of their radio equipment and their conviction. They argued that these actions and 
convictions amounted to a violation of their right to freedom of expression and information. 
 
The European Court agrees with the domestic courts that the newspaper and the journalists have 
not been prohibited from bringing the news items to the public’s attention, as their convictions 
were based solely on the possession and use of radio equipment to intercept communications 
between law-enforcement officers. The ECtHR reiterated that the notion of responsible 
journalism required that, where journalists acted to the detriment of the duty to abide by ordinary 
criminal law, they had to be aware that they risked being subjected to legal sanctions, including 
those of a criminal character. It noted that in seeking to obtain information for publication in a 
local newspaper, the journalists and the director of the newspaper had routinely intercepted 
police communications. This contravened the domestic criminal law, which in general terms 
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prohibited the interception by any persons of conversations not addressed to them, including 
conversations between law-enforcement officers. The Court observed that the penalties imposed 
on the applicants consisted of the seizure of their radio equipment and the imposition of 
custodial sentences of one year and three months in the case of the two journalists and six 
months in the case of the director of the newspaper. However, as these sentences had been 
suspended, the penalties the ECtHR found that it were not disproportionate and that the Italian 
courts had made an appropriate distinction between the journalists’ duty to comply with domestic 
law and the pursuit of their journalistic activity, which had not been otherwise restricted. 
Accordingly, the ECtHR held that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
This is the third time in 2016 that the ECtHR has found no infringement of journalists’ rights in 
cases related to illegal preparatory acts of newsgathering. The case of Boris Erdtmann v. Germany 
(Application no. 56328/10, 5 January 2016) concerned the conviction of a journalist for carrying 
a weapon on board an aeroplane. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in New York, 
Mr Erdtmann researched the effectiveness of security checks at German airports and made a short 
television documentary about his investigation and findings, filmed with a hidden camera. The 
ECtHR found that the criminal conviction of the journalist was pertinent and necessary in a 
democratic society and that there was no appearance of a violation of the journalist’s rights under 
Article 10 ECHR. Also in the case of Salihu and others v. Sweden (see IRIS 2016-8/1) the ECtHR 
held that the journalists’ convictions for illegally purchasing a firearm were lawful and necessary, 
while they pursued the legitimate aims of the protection of public safety and prevention of 
disorder and crime. In each of these cases however, the domestic courts, by deciding on the 
nature and severity of the criminal sanction, took into consideration the pursuit of journalistic 
activity, which had not been otherwise restricted. The interferences with the journalists’ right to 
freedom of expression and information in each of these cases finally resulted in only lenient 
sentences or convictions for the journalists, while without the journalistic context more severe 
sanctions could have been imposed. In such circumstances, the ECtHR was satisfied that the 
interferences with the journalists’ right to freedom of expression and information at issue do not 
discourage the press from investigating a certain topic or expressing an opinion on topics of 
public debate. 
 
• Brambilla and Others v. Italy, no. 22567/09, 23 June 2016. 
• Boris Erdtmann v. Germany (dec.), no. 56328/10, 5 January 2016. 
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A recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) clarifies that journalistic 
freedom of expression does not encompass the right to insult and offend an interviewee during 
a radio interview, including a politician. It also confirms the competence of a media regulatory 
body to interfere with a journalist’s or a radio station’s freedom of expression in a proportionate 
way. In the case at issue Ofcom, the independent regulator and competition authority for the 
United Kingdom communications industries, had launched an investigation into a radio interview 
about which it received a series of complaints. Ofcom concluded that the broadcast had breached 
the Broadcasting Code, as it had amounted to gratuitous and offensive insult without contextual 
content or justification. No sanction or penalty was imposed either on the radio station or the 
journalist, other than the publication of the decision by Ofcom. 
 
The case concerns an interview on Talksport, a speech-based radio station on which Jon Gaunt 
presented a programme which covered a broad range of news issues, often with a combative and 
hard-hitting interview style. In 2008 Gaunt conducted a live interview with M.S., the Cabinet 
Member for Children’s Services for Redbridge London Borough Council. The interview concerned 
the Council’s proposal to ban smokers from becoming foster parents on the ground that passive 
smoking could harm foster children. Gaunt showed a specific interest in the issue, as he spent 
some of his childhood in the care system himself. In a newspaper column he had expressed his 
appreciation for his foster mother who lavished love and care, although she “smoked like a 
chimney”. The first part of the interview was reasonably controlled, giving M.S. the opportunity 
to explain his Council’s policy. The rest of the interview, however, degenerated into a shouting 
match from the point when Gaunt first called M.S. “a Nazi”, an insult that was repeated several 
times. The journalist also called the interviewee an “ignorant pig”, while the whole interview 
style became gratuitously offensive and could be described as a rant. Within ten minutes of the 
end of the interview, Gaunt apologised to the listeners, accepting that he did not “hold it 
together”, that he had been “unprofessional”, and that he had “lost the rag”. One hour after the 
end of the broadcast, he made a further apology for having called M.S. a Nazi. The same day 
Gaunt was suspended from his programme and a short time later Talksport terminated his 
contract without notice. 
 
Following the broadcast, Ofcom received 53 complaints about Gaunt’s conduct during the 
interview. In a response to Ofcom, Talksport stated that it regretted what had happened and 
accepted that the interview “fell way below the acceptable broadcasting standards which it 
expected and demanded”. It regretted that Gaunt’s language had been offensive, and that the 
manner in which the interview was conducted had been indefensible. Subsequently Ofcom 
concluded that the broadcast had breached Rules 2.1 and 2.3 of the Broadcasting Code as it fell 
short of the generally accepted standards applied to broadcast content and included offensive 
material which was not justified by the context. In reaching this conclusion, Ofcom took into 
account the extremely aggressive tone of the interview style and the seriousness which the 
broadcaster attached to the incident, as demonstrated by its prompt investigation and dismissal 
of the journalist, as well as Gaunt’s two on-air apologies. Gaunt applied for a judicial review of 
Ofcom’s decision on the ground that it disproportionately interfered with his freedom of 
expression and infringed his rights under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
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Rights. After the national courts dismissed Gaunt’s complaint (see IRIS 2010-8/30), he lodged an 
application before the ECtHR. 
 
Although the ECtHR would not exclude the possibility that Ofcom’s finding was at least capable 
of interfering with the journalist’s freedom of expression (while Ofcom’s finding was only directed 
to Talksport), it finds Gaunt’s complaint manifestly ill-founded and therefore inadmissible. The 
Court found that the interference with Gaunt’s freedom of expression was prescribed by law and 
was justified and proportionate. The ECtHR agrees that the national authorities have weighed up 
the interests at stake in compliance with the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law. In 
assessing Gaunt’s Article 10 complaint, the national courts took properly into account that the 
interview was with a politician and involved political speech on a matter of general public 
interest, before concluding that his freedom of expression did not extend to what had amounted 
to gratuitous, offensive insult and abuse without contextual content or justification; “hectoring” 
and “bullying”; and a “particularly aggressive assault on M.S. and his opinions”. The ECtHR 
reiterates that a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation, is permitted, while it has repeatedly 
held that this does not extend to “manifestly insulting language” or a “gratuitous personal attack”. 
In the Court’s view, the content of the interview with M.S. certainly came close to being a 
“gratuitous personal attack” without any appreciable contribution to the subject being discussed. 
In deciding what is capable of offending a broadcast audience, weight must be given both to the 
opinion of the domestic courts and, to an even greater extent, to that of a specialist regulator of 
broadcast standards - such as Ofcom - which has considerable experience of balancing the 
parameters of potentially offensive content with the fluctuating expectations of contemporary 
radio audiences. Hence, the ECtHR shows reluctance to substitute its view on whether or not the 
interview amounted to a “gratuitous personal insult” for that of the specialist regulator, which 
has been confirmed by the domestic courts at two levels of jurisdiction. The Court is of the 
opinion that the publication of the Ofcom finding was proportionate to the legitimate aim of the 
protection of the rights of others. There has been accordingly no violation of Gaunt’s right to 
freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. 
 
• Jon Gaunt v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 26448/12, 6 September 2016. 
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Dirk Voorhoof 
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Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
On 8 November 2016, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
delivered a landmark judgment on the right of access to public documents. It found that the 
Hungarian authorities’ refusal to provide the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Magyar Helsinki 
Bizottság (MHB), with information relating to the work of ex officio defence counsels was in 
breach of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the 
right to freedom of expression. The Court noted that the information requested from the police 
by MHB was necessary for it to complete the study on the functioning of the public defenders’ 
system MHB was conducting in its capacity as a non-governmental human-rights organisation, 
with a view to contributing to discussion on an issue of obvious public interest. In the Court’s 
view, by denying MHB access to the requested information the Hungarian authorities had 
impaired the NGO’s exercise of its freedom to receive and impart information, in a manner striking 
at the very substance of its Article 10 rights. The Grand Chamber’s judgment is a victory for 
journalists, bloggers, academics, and NGOs, who rely on access to public documents in order to 
conduct investigations as part of their role as “public watchdogs”. 
Article 10 ECHR stipulates that “everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall 
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers (…)”. This article does not mention a 
right of access to public documents, nor a right to seek information. Neither is there a self-
standing right of access to State-held information under the ECHR, nor a corresponding 
obligation for public authorities to disclose such information. Nonetheless, since 2009 the Court 
in its case law recognises that such a right or obligation may be instrumental and necessary for 
effective protection of the rights under Article 10 (see Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary 
(IRIS 2009-7/1), Kenedi v. Hungary (IRIS 2009-7:Extra), Gillberg v. Sweden (IRIS 2011-1/1 and 
2012-6/1), Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia (IRIS 2013-8/1), Österreichische 
Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung eines Wirtschaftlich gesunden land- und 
forstwirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes v. Austria (IRIS 2014-2/2) and Roşiianu v. Romania 
(IRIS 2014-8/4)). Apart from these developments in its case law, the Court also referred to 
national and international sources of law recognising a right of access to public documents. This 
lead the Court to consider a right of access to information as a crucial instrument for the exercise 
of the right to receive and impart information as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention: “For 
the Court, in circumstances where access to information is instrumental for the exercise of the 
applicant’s right to receive and impart information, its denial may constitute an interference with 
that right. The principle of securing Convention rights in a practical and effective manner requires 
an applicant in such a situation to be able to rely on the protection of Article 10 of the 
Convention”. The Court further concentrated on the role of civil society and participatory 
democracy, and emphasised that access to public documents by the press and NGOs can 
contribute to “transparency on the manner of conduct of public affairs and on matters of interest 
for society as a whole and thereby allows participation in public governance”. It considers “that 
civil society makes an important contribution to the discussion of public affairs”, and that “the 
manner in which public watchdogs carry out their activities may have a significant impact on the 
proper functioning of a democratic society. It is in the interest of democratic society to enable 
Back to overview of case-law 
406 
the press to exercise its vital role of “public watchdog” in imparting information on matters of 
public concern … just as it is to enable NGOs scrutinising the State to do the same thing. Given 
that accurate information is a tool of their trade, it will often be necessary for persons and 
organisations exercising watchdog functions to gain access to information in order to perform 
their role of reporting on matters of public interest. Obstacles created in order to hinder access 
to information may result in those working in the media or related fields no longer being able to 
assume their “watchdog” role effectively, and their ability to provide accurate and reliable 
information may be adversely affected”. 
Before Article 10 can come into play, however, the information requested should not only be 
instrumental for the exercise of the right to freedom of expression: the information to which 
access is sought must also meet a “public-interest test” for the disclosure to be considered 
necessary under Article 10. In addition, whether the person seeking access to the information in 
question does so with a view to informing the public in the capacity of a public “watchdog” and 
whether the information requested is “ready and available” are also an “important consideration” 
for the Court. 
After finding that the denial to give MHB access to the requested information was an interference 
with MHB’s rights under Article 10, the Court explained why this amounted to a violation of 
Article 10. First, it considered that the information requested by MHB was “necessary” for it to 
exercise its right to freedom of expression. Second, the Court does not find that the privacy rights 
of the public defenders would have been negatively affected had the MHB’s request for 
information been granted. Although the information request by MHB concerned personal data, it 
did not involve information outside the public domain. According to the Court the relevant 
Hungarian law, as interpreted by the domestic courts, excluded any meaningful assessment of 
MHB’s freedom-of-expression rights under Article 10. Therefore the Court considered that the 
arguments advanced by the Hungarian Government, although relevant, were not sufficient to 
show that the interference complained of was “necessary in a democratic society”. By 15 votes to 
two the Grand Chamber comes to the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 10 of 
the Convention. 
• Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary [GC], no. 18030/11, ECHR 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Kaos GL v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media 
Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
The case of Kaos GL v. Turkey is an example of a case whose findings breach Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the right to freedom of expression of a 
particular kind. The case concerns the seizure of all the copies of a magazine published by Kaos 
GL, a cultural research and solidarity association for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
people (“LGBT”). The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the aim of protecting 
public morals relied upon by the Turkish authorities had been insufficient to justify the prior-
censorship of the LGBT-magazine for more than five years. The judgment also shows the 
European Court’s willingness to extend the protection of Article 10 ECHR to sexually explicit 
expression, while demonstrating the need for proportionate interferences with the right to 
freedom of expression in the light of the protection of minors against sexually explicit content. 
In 2006, the Criminal Court of First Instance of Ankara, at the request of the Chief Prosecutor, 
ordered the seizure of the 375 copies of issue 28 of the magazine Kaos GL with a view to 
launching criminal investigations. The issue in question contained articles and interviews on 
pornography related to homosexuality, illustrated with explicit images. The Criminal Court 
considered that the content of some of the articles and some of the images published were 
contrary to the principle of protection of public morals. An appeal against this decision was 
dismissed, while the president and editor-in-chief of Kaos GL magazine, Mr Güner, was 
subsequently charged with publishing obscene images via the press, an offence punishable under 
Article 226 § 2 of the Turkish Penal Code. In particular, a painting reproduced in the magazine, 
which showed a sexual act between two men whose sexual organs were visible, was considered 
obscene and pornographic. In 2007, however, the Ankara Criminal Court acquitted Mr Güner of 
the charge against him. It held that not all the factors constituting the offence were present. It 
also ordered the return of all the copies of the magazine seized, although the execution of this 
order was not implemented by the Turkish authorities. In 2012, the Court of Cassation upheld 
the judgment of the Ankara Criminal Court. In the meantime, relying on its right to freedom of 
expression, Kaos GL lodged an application before the ECtHR, complaining of the seizure and 
continued confiscation of its issue 28 and the criminal proceedings brought against Mr Güner. 
While the European Court decided that Kaos GL’s complaint about the criminal proceedings 
against Mr Güner was inadmissible ratione personae, it substantially evaluated whether the 
seizure and confiscation of the magazine amounted to a justified interference with the 
magazine’s right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR. While there was no 
doubt that the seizure of all copies of the magazine was prescribed by law and pursued the 
legitimate aim of protecting morals, the European Court considered that the reasons given by the 
domestic court were not convincing with regard to the necessity and the proportionate character 
of their seizure and confiscation. According to the Court, there was nothing in the decision of the 
Criminal Court to seize the magazines to suggest that the judge had examined in detail the 
compatibility of the magazine’s content with the principle of protection of public morals. Nor did 
the Criminal Court’s decision to dismiss the appeal against the seizure decision set out any further 
relevant details or reasoning. The European Court accordingly considered that the protection of 
public morals argument, advanced in such a broad, unreasoned manner, had been insufficient to 
justify the decision to seize and confiscate all the copies of issue 28 of Kaos GL for over five 
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years. Based on its own analysis of the impugned publication, having regard to the content of the 
articles and referring to the explicit nature of some of the images in the magazine at issue, the 
Court expressed the opinion that issue 28 of Kaos GL could be considered as a publication 
specifically aimed at a certain social category. Despite its intellectual and artistic characteristics, 
some of the content could indeed be considered as possibly offending the sensitivities of a non-
warned public. The Court accepted that the measures taken to prevent access by specific groups 
of individuals - including minors - to this publication might have met a pressing social need. 
However, it emphasised that the domestic authorities had not attempted to implement a less 
harsh preventive measure than the seizure of all the copies of the magazine, for example by 
prohibiting its sale to persons under the age of 18 or requiring special packaging with a warning 
for minors. Even if the issue seized, accompanied by a warning for persons under the age of 18, 
could have been distributed after the return of the confiscated copies, that is to say after the 
Court of Cassation judgment of 29 February 2012, the Court held that the confiscation of the 
copies of the magazine and the delay of five years and seven months in distributing the 
publication could not be considered as proportionate to the aim pursued. The Court therefore 
held that the seizure of all the copies of issue 28 of the magazine Kaos GL amounted to a 
disproportionate interference with the exercise of Kaos GL’s right to freedom of expression and 
had not been “necessary in a democratic society”. The Court is unanimous in finding that 
therefore there has been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Kaos GL v. Turkey, no. 4982/07, 22 November 2016. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Terentyev v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media 
Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
In one of its first judgments in 2017 related to the right to freedom of expression, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found a violation of a blogger’s right under Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The blogger, Mr Terentyev, a musician and jazz 
critic, had been convicted in Russia for defamation after he had published an article on his 
personal website about a local jazz festival which was scathingly critical of the festival and its 
president, Mr Y. Mr Terentyev used various corruptions of the festival president’s surname to 
mock his professional competence. The jazz festival was described as being “a shoddy piece of 
work” and Mr Y.’s performance “crappy”. Mr Y. sued the blogger for defamation, arguing that the 
article had been insulting and harmful to his reputation. The Syktyvkar Town Court found the 
applicant liable in defamation, stating that “[u]sing a distorted form of the plaintiff’s patronymic 
and last name … breaches the plaintiff’s right to his own name and to his good name, which is 
unacceptable under the law”. The Town Court also considered that the defamatory extracts 
undermined the honour and dignity of the plaintiff, while Mr Terentyev did not submit any 
evidence to the court showing that the impugned statements were true. The Town Court awarded 
Mr Y. 5,000 Russian roubles (about EUR 80) in damages and ordered Mr Terentyev to publish a 
retraction on his website. The Supreme Court of the Komi Republic dismissed his appeal. It 
endorsed the findings of the lower court in a summary judgment, holding that Article 10 of the 
Convention had not been breached because “the defendant published statements on the Internet 
which undermined the honour and dignity of the plaintiff as a person, pedagogue and musician 
and which contained negative information about him”. 
Mr Terentyev lodged a complaint with the ECtHR, arguing that his conviction for defamation 
amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. 
As this “interference” with Mr Terentyev’s right to freedom of expression was “prescribed by law” 
under Article 152 of the Russian Civil Code and pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of 
the rights of others - namely the reputation of Mr Y. - what remained to be established was 
whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. The European Court refers to 
its standard approach, according to which it may be required to ascertain whether the domestic 
authorities have struck a fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention 
- namely freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10, and the right to respect for private 
life enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR, including the right to reputation. In a balancing exercise 
between those two rights the European Court leaves a certain margin of appreciation to the 
national authorities of the defending state, while the Court would require strong reasons for 
substituting its view for that of the domestic courts. However the domestic courts are required 
to carefully examine the context of the dispute, the nature of the impugned remarks and the 
criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, as elaborated in the 2012 Grand Chamber judgment in 
Axel Springer AG v. Germany (see IRIS 2012-3/1). In the present case, the ECtHR observes that 
the judgments of the domestic courts offer no insight into the context of the dispute: they did 
not discuss whether the article had contributed to a debate on a matter of public interest or 
whether it had been a form of artistic criticism, and did not explain why Mr Y.’s reputation had 
to be afforded greater protection on account of his being “a person, pedagogue and musician”. 
The judgments at the domestic level were also remarkably laconic and contained nothing that 
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would help the European Court to grasp the rationale behind the interference. The domestic 
courts made no genuine attempt to distinguish between statements of fact and value judgments; 
rather, they reprinted the impugned extracts of the article in their entirety, without subjecting 
them to meaningful scrutiny. Faced with this failure to give relevant and sufficient reasons to 
justify the interference, the ECtHR finds that the domestic courts cannot be said to have “applied 
standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10” or to have “based 
themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts”. Therefore the European Court 
concludes unanimously that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. The Russian 
state is ordered to pay Mr Terentyev EUR 144 in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 2,500 in 
respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 
• Terentyev v. Russia, no. 25147/09, 26 January 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Selmani and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media 
Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
On 9 February 2017, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered an important 
judgment, condemning the forcible removal of journalists from the national parliament gallery 
where they were reporting on a parliamentary debate in the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. During the debate a group of opposition members of parliament (MPs) had started 
creating a disturbance in the parliamentary chamber, and had been ejected by security officers. 
The applicants, all accredited journalists, had refused to leave the gallery but were finally forcibly 
removed by security officers. The journalists brought proceedings before the Constitutional Court 
to complain about the incident, and contested the fact that there was no oral hearing in order to 
challenge the facts as disputed between them and the government. They submitted that the 
parliamentary debate, and the related events regarding the approval of the State budget, had 
been of particular public interest, and that the intervention of the parliament security officers 
had been neither “lawful” nor “necessary in a democratic society”. The Constitutional Court 
dismissed the journalists’ complaint, emphasising that in the circumstances of the case at issue, 
the Parliament security service was entitled to move the journalists to a safer place, where they 
would not be in danger. Such an assessment should not be viewed as conflicting with the 
journalists’ right to attend parliamentary proceedings and report on events they witnessed. In 
fact, the journalists published their reports in the evening editions of their newspapers, which 
implies that there was no violation of their freedom of expression. 
The journalists lodged an application with the ECtHR, complaining about their forcible removal 
from the parliament gallery from where they had been reporting. In its judgment, the ECtHR 
agreed with the government that the removal of the journalists was “prescribed by law” and 
pursued the “legitimate aim” of ensuring public safety and the prevention of disorder. The ECtHR 
however was of the opinion that the government had failed to establish that the removal of the 
journalists was “necessary in a democratic society”. In particular, there was no indication that 
there had been any danger from the protests which had taken place outside the parliament 
building on the day of the incident, either from the journalists themselves (who had neither 
contributed to nor participated in the disturbance in the chamber), or from the MPs who had been 
at the origin of the disorder. Nor was the ECtHR convinced that the journalists had effectively 
been able to view the ongoing removal of the MPs, a matter which had been of legitimate public 
concern. In its reasoning the ECtHR referred to the crucial role of the media in providing 
information on the authorities’ handling of public demonstrations and the containment of 
disorder, such as in the present case. It reiterated that the “watchdog” role of the media assumes 
particular importance in such contexts, since their presence is a guarantee that the authorities 
can be held to account for their conduct vis-à-vis the demonstrators and the public at large when 
it comes to the policing of large gatherings, including the methods used to control or disperse 
protesters or to preserve public order. Any attempt to remove journalists from the scene of 
demonstrations must therefore be subject to strict scrutiny, especially “when journalists exercise 
their right to impart information to the public about the behaviour of elected representatives in 
Parliament and about the manner in which authorities handle disorder that occurs during 
Parliamentary sessions”. According to the ECtHR, it was not presented with any evidence that the 
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disturbance in the chamber had been violent or that anyone, in the chamber or elsewhere, had 
sustained an injury as a result of that disturbance. The journalists’ removal, on the other hand, 
entailed immediate adverse effects that instantaneously prevented them from obtaining first-
hand and direct knowledge based on their personal experience of the events unfolding in the 
chamber. The Court found that these are important elements in the exercise of the applicants’ 
journalistic functions, of which the public should not have been deprived in the circumstances of 
the present case. Against this background, the ECtHR considered that the government failed to 
establish convincingly that the journalists’ removal from the gallery was necessary in a 
democratic society, and came to the conclusion that there has been a violation of Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),. It also found a breach of Article 6 of the 
ECHR, as the journalists were refused an oral hearing before the Constitutional Court, without 
being provided any reasons for this refusal. 
• Selmani and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 67259/14, 9 February 
2017. 
IRIS 2017-4/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Rubio Dosamantes v. Spain 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media 
Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has, once again, clarified that media freedom and 
entertainment news must respect the right of privacy of individuals, including when commenting 
on the private life of media celebrities. The case of Rubio Dosamantes v. Spain deals with an 
application by the Mexican pop singer whose artist name is Paulina Rubio, complaining that her 
reputation and private life had been harmed by remarks in various Spanish TV programmes. The 
ECtHR held that the dismissal of Dosamantes’ claims by the Spanish courts was a breach of Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The fact that the singer was well known 
to the public and that rumours about her private life and sexuality had been widely circulated, 
including on the Internet, did not justify the broadcast of interviews about her relationships and 
sexuality, merely repeating such rumours. The ECtHR found that Ms. Rubio’s fame as a singer did 
not mean that her activities or conduct in her private life should be regarded as necessarily falling 
within the public interest. 
In 2005 Ms. Rubio’s former manager gave interviews on three television programmes concerning 
various aspects of the singer’s private life. Ms. Rubio brought a civil action, seeking protection of 
her right to honour and to privacy, against her former manager and various television presenters 
and staff members, television production companies, and television stations. The first-instance 
court, and later the court of appeal, dismissed Ms. Rubio’s claims. They found that the comments 
concerning the drug use of Ms. Rubio’s boyfriend, R.B., had related solely to the state of their 
relationship and had not alleged that Ms. Rubio had incited him directly to take drugs. As to the 
references to Ms. Rubio’s sexual orientation, the Spanish courts considered that they had not 
impugned her honour, as homosexuality should no longer be considered dishonourable. 
Furthermore Ms. Rubio herself had tacitly consented to the debate on the subject. Lastly, the 
Spanish courts found that the remarks concerning Ms. Rubio’s alleged ill-treatment of R.B. were 
likewise not damaging to her reputation. Further appeals were declared inadmissible by the 
Supreme Court, and finally also by the Constitutional Court. 
In her complaint lodged with the ECtHR, Ms. Rubio alleged that the remarks made about her 
during the disputed TV programmes had impugned her honour and breached her right to respect 
for her private life, as protected by Article 8 of the Convention. As in former cases dealt with by 
the ECtHR (see IRIS 2012-3/1 and IRIS 2016-1/3), the question was whether a fair balance had 
been struck by the national courts between the right to respect for private life, including her right 
to reputation, and the right of the opposing party to freedom of expression. The ECtHR refers to 
the relevant criteria applied in other cases in this balancing, and focuses on (1) the contribution 
to a debate of public interest and the degree of notoriety of Ms. Rubio; (2) the prior conduct of 
Ms. Rubio; and (3) the content, form, and consequences of the comments uttered in the TV 
programmes at issue. 
The ECtHR observed that the domestic courts had based their decisions merely on the fact that 
Ms. Rubio was famous, while emphasising that a public figure well known as a singer also has a 
right of privacy with regard to activities or conduct in his or her private life. According to the 
ECtHR, the TV programmes in question, based as they were on strictly private aspects of Ms. 
Rubio’s life, did not have any public interest that could legitimise the disclosure of the 
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information, in spite of her fame, as the public had no legitimate interest in knowing certain 
intimate details about her private life. Even assuming that there had been a public interest, in 
parallel to the commercial interest of the television channels in broadcasting the programmes, 
the ECtHR found that those interests were outweighed by a person’s individual right to the 
effective protection of his or her privacy. Next the ECtHR found that the fact that Ms. Rubio had 
earlier benefitted from extensive media attention did not authorise the TV channels to broadcast 
unchecked and unlimited comments about her private life. It reiterated that certain events of 
private and family life were given particularly careful protection under Article 8 of the 
Convention, and that therefore journalists and media had to show prudence and precaution when 
discussing them. The Spanish courts had therefore had a duty to assess the TV programmes in 
question, in order to distinguish between, and to weigh in the balance, those matters which were 
intimately part of Ms. Rubio’s private life and those which might have had a legitimate public 
interest. The ECtHR however observed that the national courts had not carefully weighed those 
rights and interests in the balance, but had merely taken the view that the comments in question 
had not impugned Ms. Rubio’s honour. They had not examined the criteria to be taken into 
account in order to make a fair assessment of the balance between the right to respect for 
freedom of expression and the right to respect for a person’s private life. Having regard to the 
margin of appreciation afforded to the domestic authorities when it came to weighing up the 
various interests, the ECtHR found unanimously that they had failed in their positive obligations 
to ensure the protection of Ms. Rubio’s privacy. There had therefore been a violation of Article 8 
(see also IRIS 2016-6/1). 
• Rubio Dosamantes v. Spain, no. 20996/10, 21 February 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media 
Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
In Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has further developed 
its case law regarding freedom of expression and press freedom during election periods. The case 
concerns the application of a specific provision in Russian electoral law restricting the freedom 
of media reporting at election time. The Court’s judgment deals with the applicant’s conviction 
for an administrative offence for publishing critical articles about a politician during the 2007 
parliamentary election campaign in Russia. 
The applicant is a non-governmental organisation that publishes Orlovskaya Iskra, a newspaper 
in the Orel Region, a region south-west of Moscow. The Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation and the People’s Patriotic Union of Russia were listed as the Orlovskaya Iskra’s 
founders. This information was specified on the front page of the newspaper. During the 2007 
parliamentary election campaign the newspaper published two articles criticising the then 
governor of the Orel Region, who stood as first candidate on the regional list of the United Russia 
political party. The Communist Party was one of the main opposition parties at those elections. 
The articles contained accusations of corrupt and controversial practices and focused on the fact 
that the governor had closed down a publicly-owned newspaper. The Working Group on 
Informational Disputes of the regional Electoral Committee examined both articles and 
concluded that the articles contained elements of electoral campaigning, because they were 
critically focused on one candidate. It found that the articles had not been paid for by the official 
campaign fund of any political party participating in the election campaign, as was required by 
the Russian Electoral Rights Act. For that reason Orlovskaya Iskra was found guilty of an 
administrative offence and fined. It complained under Article 10 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) about the classification of the material it published as “election 
campaigning” and the fine imposed for failure to indicate who had commissioned the publication 
of this material. Joint submissions as third-party interventions in support of Orlovskaya Iskra were 
produced by the Media Legal Defence Initiative and the Mass Media Defence Centre. 
The ECtHR accepted that the applicable provisions of the Russian Electoral Rights Act were aimed 
at transparency of elections, including campaign finances, as well as at enforcing the voters’ right 
to impartial, truthful and balanced information via mass media outlets. The Court found however 
that the application of the Electoral Rights Act impinged upon Orlovskaya Iskra’s freedom to 
impart information and ideas during the election period, and that the interference with its 
freedom of expression was not shown to achieve, in a proportionate manner, the aim of running 
fair elections. 
The ECtHR reiterated that free elections, as guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the EHCR, 
and freedom of expression, together form the bedrock of any democratic system. The two rights 
are inter-related and operate to reinforce each other, freedom of expression being one of the 
“conditions” necessary to ensure free elections. For this reason, it is particularly important in the 
period preceding an election that opinions and information of all kinds are permitted to circulate 
freely. According to the ECtHR in the case at issue there was little scope for restrictions, especially 
on account of the strong interest of a democratic society in the press exercising its vital role as 
a public watchdog. The content of the publications was part of the normal journalistic coverage 
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of a political debate in the print media. The ECtHR stated that it saw no reason to consider that 
any candidates or political parties were at the origin of the impugned articles and it considered 
that that the publication of the articles constituted a fully-fledged exercise of Orlovskaya Iskra’s 
freedom of expression, namely the choice to publish the articles, thus imparting information to 
the readers and potential voters. According to the ECtHR it has not been convincingly 
demonstrated, and there was certainly no sufficient basis for upholding the Government’s 
argument, that the print media should be subjected to rigorous requirements of impartiality, 
neutrality and equality of treatment during an election period. The ECtHR recognised however 
that in certain circumstances the rights under Article 10 ECHR and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 may 
conflict and it may be considered necessary, in the period preceding or during an election, to 
place certain restrictions on freedom of expression, of a type which would not usually be 
acceptable, in order to secure the “free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of 
the legislature”. It also considers that unfavourable publications before Election Day can indeed 
damage one’s reputation. However the focus of the domestic legislation was not on the falsity or 
truth of the content or its defamatory nature. In the opinion of the ECtHR the “public watchdog” 
role of the press, also at election time, is not limited to using the press as a medium of 
communication, for instance by way of political advertising, but also encompasses an 
independent exercise of freedom of the press by mass media outlets such as newspapers on the 
basis of free editorial choice aimed at imparting information and ideas on subjects of public 
interest. In particular, discussion of the candidates and their programmes contributes to the 
public’s right to receive information and strengthens voters’ ability to make informed choices 
between candidates for office. In addition, the ECtHR stated that any damage caused to 
reputation could be addressed, possibly before Election Day, by way of other appropriate 
procedures. 
The ECtHR concluded that, in view of the regulatory framework, Orlovskaya Iskra was restricted 
in its freedom to impart information and ideas. By subjecting the expression of comments to the 
regulation of “campaigning” and by prosecuting the applicant with reference to this regulation, 
there was an interference with Orlovskaya Iskra’s editorial choice to publish a text taking a critical 
stance and to impart information and ideas on matters of public interest. The Court affirmed that 
no sufficiently compelling reasons had been shown to justify the prosecution and conviction of 
Orlovskaya Iskra for its publications at election time. Therefore the ECtHR concluded that there 
had been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia, no. 42911/08, 21 February 2017. 
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Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media 
Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
The decision in Rolf Anders Daniel Pihl v. Sweden deals with a complaint about an alleged breach 
of the applicant’s right to privacy and reputation under Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), because the Swedish authorities had refused to hold the operator of a 
website liable for a defamatory blog post and an anonymous online comment. Again, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) applies a crucial distinction between illegal hate speech 
and defamation, limiting the liability of the operator of the blog when it (only) concerns 
defamation, and not incitement to violence. The blog post at issue had wrongfully accused Mr. 
Pihl of being involved in a Nazi political party. The day after publication of the post, an 
anonymous person posted a comment calling Pihl “a real hash-junkie”. The blog, which was run 
by a small non-profit association, allowed comments to be posted without being checked before 
publication. The commentators were considered responsible for their own statements, and 
therefore they were requested to “display good manners and obey the law”. Nine days later Pihl 
posted a comment on the blog in reply to the blog post and comment about him, stating that 
both allegations were false and requesting their immediate removal. The following day the blog 
post and the comment were removed and a new post was added on the blog by the association 
- stating that the earlier post had been wrong and based on inaccurate information - and it 
apologised for the mistake. However, Pihl sued the association and claimed symbolic damages 
of SEK 1, approximately EUR 0.10. He submitted that the post and the comment constituted 
defamation, and that the association was responsible for the fact that the blog and the comment 
had remained on the website for nine days. The Swedish courts however rejected Pihl’s claim. 
They agreed that the comment constituted defamation, but found no legal grounds on which to 
hold the association responsible for failing to remove the blog post and comment sooner than it 
had done. Pihl complained before the ECtHR that his right to privacy and reputation under Article 
8 ECHR had been breached. 
First the Court considered that the comment, although offensive, certainly did not amount to 
hate speech or incitement to violence, and accepted the national courts’ finding that the 
comments at issue constituted defamation and, consequently, fell within the scope of Article 8. 
Next, the Court referred to its case law in Delfi AS v. Estonia (see IRIS 2015-7/1) and Magyar 
Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary (see IRIS 2016-3/2), and 
summarised the aspects that are relevant for the concrete assessment of the interference in 
question: “the context of the comments, the measures applied by the company in order to prevent 
or remove defamatory comments, the liability of the actual authors of the comments as an 
alternative to the intermediary’s liability, and the consequences of the domestic proceedings for 
the company”. As regards the context of the comment, the Court noted that the underlying blog 
post accused Pihl, incorrectly, of being involved in a Nazi political party, but also that the post 
and the subsequent comment were promptly removed and an apology published when Pihl 
notified the association of the inaccurate allegations about him. The Court attached particular 
importance to the fact that the association is a small non-profit association, and observed that it 
was also unlikely that the blog post and the comment at issue would be widely read. It considered 
that “expecting the association to assume that some unfiltered comments might be in breach of 
the law would amount to requiring excessive and impractical forethought capable of 
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undermining the right to impart information via internet”. As regards the measures taken by the 
association to prevent or remove defamatory comments, the Court noted that it was clearly stated 
on the blog that the association did not check such comments before they were published and 
that commentators were responsible for their own statements. The Court also referred to its 
earlier case law in which it held that “liability for third-party comments may have negative 
consequences on the comment-related environment of an internet portal and thus a chilling 
effect on freedom of expression via internet. This effect could be particularly detrimental for a 
non-commercial website”. Turning to the liability of the originator of the comment, the Court 
observed that Pihl obtained the IP-address of the computer used to submit the comment, but 
that there were no indications that he took any further measures to try to obtain the identity of 
the author of the comment. Lastly the Court noted that Pihl’s case was considered on its merits 
by two judicial instances at the domestic level before the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. 
The Court further observed that the scope of responsibility of those running blogs is regulated 
by domestic law and that, had the comment been of a different and more severe nature, the 
association could have been found responsible for not removing it sooner, e.g. if it had concerned 
child pornography or incitement to rebellion or violence. In its overall conclusion the ECtHR 
again emphasised the fact that the comment, although offensive, did not amount to hate speech 
or incitement to violence and was posted on a small blog run by a non-profit association, which 
removed it the day after the applicant’s request and nine days after it had been posted. In view 
of this, the Court finds that the domestic courts acted within their margin of appreciation and 
struck a fair balance between Pihl’s rights under Article 8 and the association’s opposing right to 
freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. Therefore the Court found the application to be 
manifestly ill-founded. 
• Rolf Anders Daniel PIHL v. Sweden (dec.), no. 74742/14, 7 February 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Ólafsson v. Iceland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media 
Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Iceland has breached the right to 
freedom of expression of the editor of a web-based media site, by holding him liable for 
defamation. The applicant in this case is Mr. Ólafsson, editor of the web-based media site Pressan. 
He published articles alleging that a political candidate (‘A.’) had sexually abused children. The 
allegations were based on statements made by relatives of ‘A.’ who had declared that he had 
sexually abused them when they were children. These allegations were also forwarded to the 
police and the child protection services, but for an unknown reason, the police had not instigated 
an investigation. 
The Supreme Court of Iceland held Mr. Ólafsson liable for defamation, because statements in the 
articles had indeed insinuated that ‘A.’ was guilty of having abused children. Whilst the Supreme 
Court accepted that candidates for public service had to endure a certain amount of public 
scrutiny, it held that this could not justify the accusations of criminality against ‘A.’ in the media, 
particularly because A. had not been found guilty of the alleged conduct and had not been under 
criminal or other investigation for it. The Supreme Court also held that Mr. Ólafsson, as an editor, 
had a supervisory obligation which entailed that he should conduct his editorial duties in such a 
way that the published material would not harm anyone by being defamatory. Mr. Ólafsson was 
ordered to pay, under the Tort Act, EUR 1,600 for non-pecuniary damages, and compensation for 
‘A.’’s legal costs of EUR 6,500. Under Article 241 of the Penal Code the statements at issue 
published on Pressan were declared null and void. 
Mr. Ólafsson complained to the ECtHR of a violation of his right to freedom of expression as 
guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR found 
that it has been adequately established that Mr. Ólafsson’s liability was prescribed by domestic 
law within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR, and that the interference complained of 
pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the reputation or rights of others. The ECtHR 
however found the arguments for the interference with Mr. Ólafsson’s right to freedom of 
expression as an editor insufficiently convincing. In doing so the ECtHR referred to the standards 
and principles that the ECtHR has developed when considering disputes requiring an 
examination of the fair balancing of the right to respect for private life under Article 8 and the 
right to freedom of expression. The ECtHR recalled that in order for Article 8 to come into play, 
an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and its manner must 
cause prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life. The criteria which 
are relevant when balancing the right to freedom of expression against the right to respect for 
private life are: (1) the extent to which the impugned statement contributes to a debate of general 
interest; (2) how well known the person concerned is and what the subject of the report is; (3) 
his or her prior conduct; (4) the method of obtaining the information and its veracity; (5) the 
content, form, and consequences of the publication and (6) the severity of the sanction imposed. 
The ECtHR confirmed that the general public had a legitimate interest in being informed about 
‘A.’’s running for general election and of such serious matters as child abuse. It also considers 
that, by running for office in general elections, ‘A.’ must be considered to have inevitably and 
knowingly entered the public domain and laid himself open to closer scrutiny of his acts. The 
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limits of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider than in a case of a private individual. Next 
the ECtHR referred to the obligation for journalists to rely on a sufficiently accurate and reliable 
factual basis which can be considered proportionate to the nature and degree of their allegations, 
such that the more serious the allegations, the more solid the factual basis has to be. The ECtHR 
accepted that the journalist tried to establish the credibility and the truth of the allegations by 
interviewing several relevant persons, and that the impugned articles offered ‘A.’ an opportunity 
to comment on the allegations. The Court reiterated that a general requirement for journalists 
systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content of a quotation that might 
insult, or provoke others, or damage their reputation, is not reconcilable with the press’s role of 
providing information on current events, opinions, and ideas and that “punishment of a journalist 
for assisting in the dissemination of statements made by another person in an interview would 
seriously hamper the contribution of the press to discussion of matters of public interest and 
should not be envisaged unless there are particularly strong reasons for doing so”. The ECtHR 
was of the opinion that Mr. Ólafsson acted in good faith and made sure that the article was 
written in compliance with ordinary journalistic obligations to verify a factual allegation. 
Although the ECtHR agreed that the allegations were of such nature and gravity as to be capable 
of causing harm to ‘A.’’s honour and reputation, it emphasised that the disputed statements did 
not originate from Mr. Ólafsson himself nor from the journalist who wrote the articles, but from 
the alleged victims. Insofar as Mr. Ólafsson’s conviction may have been in the legitimate interest 
of protecting ‘A.’ from the impugned defamatory allegations made by the alleged victims, that 
interest was, in the Court’s view, largely preserved by the possibility available to him under 
Icelandic law to bring defamation proceedings against the persons who made the claims. The 
ECtHR regarded it as significant that ‘A.’ opted to institute proceedings against Mr. Ólafsson only. 
‘A.’ had indeed chosen not to sue the persons making the claims, and that might have prevented 
Mr. Ólafsson from establishing that he had acted in good faith and had ascertained the truth of 
the allegations. With regard the proportionate character of the order by the Iceland Supreme 
Court to pay compensation and costs, the ECtHR considered that what matters is the very fact of 
judgment being made against the person concerned, even where such a ruling is solely civil in 
nature. It emphasised that any undue restriction on freedom of expression effectively entails a 
risk of obstructing or paralysing future media coverage of similar questions. 
The ECtHR concluded that the Supreme Court had failed to strike a reasonable balance between 
the measures restricting Mr. Ólafsson’s freedom of expression, and the legitimate aim of 
protecting the reputation of others. The ECtHR held, unanimously, that there had been a breach 
of Mr. Ólafsson’s freedom of expression and that the Icelandic judicial authorities had violated 
Article 10 ECHR. 
• Ólafsson v. Iceland, no. 58493/13, 16 March 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Milisavljević v. Serbia 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media 
Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has recently found that the Republic of Serbia has 
acted in breach of the right to freedom of expression by convicting a journalist for insult of a 
well-known human rights activist. The ECtHR emphasises that criminal prosecution for insult of 
public figures is likely to deter journalists from contributing to the public discussion of issues 
affecting the life of the community. More than 10 years after the journalist lodged an application 
with the Court, the ECtHR came unanimously to the conclusion that the Serbian authorities’ 
reaction to the journalist’s article was disproportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting the 
reputation of others, and was therefore not necessary in a democratic society, within the meaning 
of Article 10 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The applicant is Ljiljana Milisavljević, who was a journalist employed at Politika, a major Serbian 
daily newspaper. In September 2003, Milisavljević wrote an article in Politika about Nataša 
Kandić, a Serbian human rights activist primarily known for her activities in investigating crimes 
committed during the armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Kandić also advocated for full 
cooperation of the Yugoslav, and later Serbian authorities with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a highly controversial issue at that time in Serbia. A 
few weeks after the publication of the article Kandić started a private prosecution against 
Milisavljević. She claimed that the article had been written with the intent of belittling her in the 
eyes of the public, to present her as a traitor to Serbian interests and as a “paid servant of foreign 
interests and a prostitute who sells herself for money”. 
The First Municipal Court in Belgrade found that Milisavljević had indeed insulted Kandić by 
writing that “she has been called a witch and a prostitute”. The court established that although 
the impugned phrase had been previously published in another article by another author in a 
different magazine, Milisavljević had not put it in quotation marks which meant that she agreed 
with it, thus expressing her opinion, with the intention of insulting Kandić. In view of no 
aggravating circumstances and a number of mitigating ones, no prison sentence or fines were 
imposed: the court only gave Milisavljević a judicial warning. This judgment was confirmed by 
the court of appeal, while in separate proceedings Milisavljević was ordered to pay Kandić 
approximately EUR 386 in respect of costs and expenses. 
In 2006, Milisavljević lodged a complaint with the ECtHR, arguing that her right to freedom of 
expression as a journalist had been violated by the conviction for criminal insult. She also 
submitted that she had been later discharged from Politika and that her conviction appeared to 
have been the cause thereof, while her conviction also represented a threat and warning to all 
Serbian journalists. In determining whether the interference with the journalist’s freedom of 
expression was necessary in a democratic society in the terms of Article 10 (2) ECHR, the Court 
applied the relevant considerations of (a) whether the article contributed to a debate of general 
interest; (b) how well known the person concerned was and what the subject was of the report; 
(c) the conduct of the person concerned prior to publication of the article; (d) the method of 
obtaining the information and its veracity; (e) the content, form, and consequences of the 
publication; and (f) the severity of the sanction imposed. When examining the necessity of an 
interference in a democratic society in the interests of the “protection of the reputation or rights 
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of others”, the ECtHR has to verify whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance between 
the competing rights and values. 
While there was no doubt that the article was published in the context of a debate on matters of 
public interest, the ECtHR further observed that the applicant is a journalist and in that capacity 
her task was to write an article about Kandić, a well-known human rights activist and undeniably 
a public figure. The crucial question was to determine what the impact was of the allegation that 
Kandić had been called “a witch and a prostitute”. The ECtHR considered that the impugned 
words are offensive, but that it is clear from the formulation of the sentence that this is how 
Kandić was perceived by others, not by Milisavljević herself. It reiterated that a general 
requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content 
of a quotation that might insult or provoke others or damage their reputation is not reconcilable 
with the press’s role of providing information on current events, opinions, and ideas. 
According to the ECtHR, the domestic courts also failed to make any balancing exercise 
whatsoever between Kandić’s reputation and Milisavljević’s freedom of expression, also referring 
to the latter’s “duty, as a journalist, to impart information of general interest”. The Serbian courts 
made no reference to the overall context of the text and the circumstances under which it was 
written, as their findings were rather limited to the fact that the impugned words were not put 
in quotation marks. In the ECtHR’s view this amounted to a “terse and undeveloped reasoning” 
at the domestic level, which is in itself problematic “as it rendered any defence raised by the 
applicant devoid of any practical effect”. The ECtHR found that the impugned article offered both 
positive and negative views about Kandić, and it considered that the impugned words could not 
be understood as a gratuitous personal attack on, or insult to, Kandić. The article did not refer to 
her private or family life, but showed how she was perceived professionally, as a human rights 
activist and a public figure. That being so, the ECtHR considered that she inevitably and 
knowingly exposed herself to public scrutiny, and should therefore have displayed a greater 
degree of tolerance than an ordinary private individual. 
With regard the proportionality of the interference, the ECtHR disagreed with the Serbian 
Government’s argument that the journalist’s sentence was lenient: what matters was not that 
Milisavljević was “only” issued a judicial warning, but that she was convicted for an insult at all. 
The ECtHR emphasised that “irrespective of the severity of the penalty which is liable to be 
imposed, a recourse to the criminal prosecution of journalists for purported insults, with the 
attendant risk of a criminal conviction and a criminal penalty, for criticising a public figure in a 
manner which can be regarded as personally insulting, is likely to deter journalists from 
contributing to the public discussion of issues affecting the life of the community”. On the basis 
of all these considerations, the ECtHR concluded that there has been a violation of Article 10 
ECHR. 
• Milisavljević v. Serbia, no. 50123/06, 4 April 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Huseynova v. Azerbaijan 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University (Belgium), University of Copenhagen (Denmark), Legal 
Human Academy and member of the Executive Board of the European Centre for Press and Media 
Freedom (ECPMF, Germany) 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recently dealt with a case that illustrates the 
dramatic situation of violence against journalists in some countries and the often remaining 
impunity for crimes against journalists (see IRIS 2017-3/3 and IRIS 2016-5/3). It also shows the 
difficulties the victims or their families can be confronted with in invoking the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Elmar Huseynov was a prominent independent journalist in Azerbaijan and the editor-in-chief of 
the weekly magazine Monitor. Various civil and criminal proceedings had been brought against 
him for the publication of critical articles about the President of Azerbaijan and members of his 
family, and about members of the parliament, government and other state officials. Moreover, 
copies of the magazine had been confiscated on several occasions and the domestic authorities 
sometimes prevented its publication. After having received threats because of his critical articles, 
and in particular shortly after having been told by a public official to stop writing about the 
President and his family, on 2 March 2005, Mr Huseynov was shot dead in his apartment building 
as he returned home from work. Huseynov’s murder received widespread local and international 
media coverage and was unanimously condemned by various politicians, international 
organisations, and local and international NGOs. Criminal investigations were instituted 
immediately after the murder and numerous investigative actions were taken, but 12 years later 
the criminal proceedings were still ongoing and the perpetrators of the crime had not yet been 
prosecuted. Before the ECtHR, Ms Rushaniya Saidovna Huseynova alleged that her husband had 
been murdered by Azerbaijani State agents and that the authorities had failed to conduct an 
effective investigation, and hence breached Article 2 (the right to life) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). She further alleged that the killing of her husband had 
constituted a breach of the right to freedom of expression (Article 10 ECHR), as he had been 
targeted on account of his journalistic activity. 
With regard to the merits of the complaint and the alleged violation of Article 2 ECHR, the ECtHR 
observes that Ms Huseynova made allegations about the involvement of state agents or the state 
in general in the murder of her husband, because of his journalistic activity. The ECtHR however 
considered that there was no evidence for these allegations. The Court next referred to the duty 
of the state not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take 
appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction. This involves a primary 
duty for the state to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal law provisions 
to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law enforcement machinery 
for the prevention, suppression, and punishment of breaches of such provisions. It also extends, 
in appropriate circumstances, to a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive 
operational measures to protect an individual or individuals whose lives are at risk. However, for 
a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have 
known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of a particular 
individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party, and that they failed to take 
measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected 
to avoid that risk. The ECtHR points out that Mr Huseynov had never applied to the domestic 
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authorities for protection or informed them of any danger or threat to his life and it further 
observes that the law enforcement authorities had not been aware of any danger to his life, nor 
had they held any information which might give rise to such a possibility. The ECtHR concluded 
that it had no evidence indicating that the domestic authorities knew or ought to have known at 
the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of Mr Huseynov and failed to 
protect his right to life. Accordingly, there has been no violation of the substantive limb of Article 
2 ECHR. 
As to the procedural limb of Article 2 ECHR, with regard the alleged failure to carry out an 
effective investigation, the ECtHR did find a violation. The ECtHR referred to a number of 
shortcomings in the criminal investigation carried out by the domestic authorities. The ECtHR is 
of the opinion that the Azerbaijani authorities did not effectively examine the possibility of 
prosecuting the alleged perpetrators of the murder in Georgia by transferring the criminal case 
there, after the investigation had identified two suspects who were on the territory of the State 
of Georgia, which refused to extradite them. The ECtHR also noted that even though Ms 
Huseynova was granted victim status in the investigation, she has been constantly denied access 
to the case file during the investigation, and she only obtained copies of some documents from 
the case file for the first time when the Government submitted its observations to the ECtHR. 
That situation deprived her of the opportunity to safeguard her legitimate interests and 
prevented any scrutiny of the investigation by the public. The ECtHR furthermore considered that 
the criminal investigation was not carried out promptly, taking into account its overall length of 
over 12 years. Finally, it was apparent that the murder of Mr Huseynov could have a “chilling 
effect” on the work of other journalists in Azerbaijan. According to the ECtHR it does not appear 
that adequate steps were taken during the investigation to inquire sufficiently into the motives 
behind the killing of Mr Huseynov and to investigate the possibility that the attack could have 
been linked to his work as a journalist. On the basis of these findings the ECtHR concludes that 
the domestic authorities failed to carry out an adequate and effective investigation into the 
circumstances surrounding the killing of Ms Huseynova’s husband. It accordingly held that there 
had been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 2 ECHR. 
With regard to the complaint under Article 10, the ECtHR noted that the allegations arise out of 
the same facts as those already examined under Article 2. Having regard to its finding of a 
violation of Article 2 under its procedural limb because of the ineffectiveness of the investigation 
into the killing of Ms Huseynova’s husband, the ECtHR considers that it is not necessary to 
examine the complaint under Article 10 ECtHR separately. 
• Huseynova v. Azerbaijan, no. 10653/10, 13 April 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Herbert Haupt v. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
In a case against Austria, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) decided that a satirical 
report aired during a comedy show on television that allegedly tarnished the reputation of a 
high-ranking and controversial politician had not violated the politician’s right to private life, as 
guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR is of 
the opinion that the Austrian courts struck a fair balance between the competing interests in the 
case, in finding that the broadcaster’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR had 
outweighed the politician’s right to private life under Article 8 ECHR. 
The applicant in this case is Mr Herbert Haupt, who was the Chairperson of the Austrian Freedom 
Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, or FPÖ) from 2002 to 2004; in 2003 he was Vice-
Chancellor of the Federal Government. In September 2013 a comedy show was aired on the 
television channel ATV+ called “The Worst of the Week” (Das Letzte der Woche). One of the 
reports concerned the fact that Mr Haupt, then the Vice-Chancellor of Austria, had become 
“godfather” to a baby hippopotamus at Vienna Zoo, as part of a fundraising incentive designed 
to encourage people to become sponsors of the zoo. The report contained blatant mockery and 
satirical comments, mentioning, inter alia, that there were many similarities between Mr Haupt, 
as the leader of the FPÖ, and his godchild, the baby hippopotamus, as both were usually 
surrounded by a lot of brown rats. Mr Haupt lodged a claim for compensation for non-pecuniary 
damage under section 6 of the Media Act (Mediengesetz), in conjunction with Article 115 of the 
Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), against ATV Privat TV GmbH & Co KG (hereinafter “ATV”), the 
owner of ATV+, alleging that he had been insulted by the expression “brown rats”. In a first set 
of proceedings the Austrian courts ruled in favour of Mr Haupt, ordering ATV to pay him 
compensation of EUR 2,000, as the statement about the brown rats had amounted to defamation 
under Article 111 of the Criminal Code. After the Supreme Court annulled the Vienna Regional 
Court’s and the Vienna Court of Appeal’s judgments, it allowed the extraordinary reopening of 
the proceedings against ATV. In the reopened proceedings the Austrian courts dismissed Mr 
Haupt’s claim for compensation and also ordered him to bear the costs in respect of the 
proceedings incurred by the opposing party. As regards the alleged defamatory statement and its 
examination of evidence, the Regional Court listed a number of extreme right-wing or neo-Nazi 
statements made by high-ranking politicians belonging to the Freedom Party, while it found that 
Mr Haupt had not publicly dissociated himself from these statements. The impugned remark 
made during the broadcast about brown rats did not concern Mr Haupt’s private and personal 
sphere but rather his professional, public position as a politician. The Court of Appeal confirmed 
the findings by the Regional Court, including the observation that the statement about the brown 
rats had constituted political criticism of the attitude and statements of FPÖ politicians. Before 
the ECtHR Mr Haupt complained that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the ECHR because 
the Austrian courts had failed to strike a fair balance between freedom of expression and his 
interest in protecting his reputation. His interest in the protection of his reputation should have 
outweighed ATV’s interest in disseminating on its television channel a statement which was of a 
lurid and degrading nature. 
Firstly, the ECtHR reiterates that according to its case-law the right to reputation is an 
independent right guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR, as part of the right to respect for private 
life, which the State has a positive obligation to protect. In order for Article 8 to come into play, 
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however, an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and be 
carried out in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private 
life. The ECtHR refers to its earlier case law in which it identified the relevant principles which 
must guide its assessment within the context of balancing Article 8 and 10 as competing rights. 
The relevant criteria thus defined are: contribution to a debate of public interest, the degree of 
notoriety of the person affected, the subject of the news report, the prior conduct of the person 
concerned, the content, form and consequences of the publication, and, where appropriate, the 
circumstances in which the statement was made. The ECtHR also considers that, notwithstanding 
the fact that the Mr Haupt claims a violation of Article 8 ECHR, it is the task of the ECtHR to 
determine whether the principles inherent in Article 10 ECHR were properly applied by the 
Austrian courts when examining Mr Haupt’s actions. Next the ECtHR emphasises that the most 
careful scrutiny under Article 10 ECHR is required where measures or sanctions imposed on the 
press are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in debates on matters of 
legitimate public concern. Furthermore, the limits of acceptable criticism are drawn more widely 
as regards a politician than they are as regards a private individual. Unlike the latter, the former 
inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both 
journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of 
tolerance. The ECtHR reiterates that satire is a form of artistic expression and social commentary 
and, by its inherent features of exaggeration and distortion of reality, naturally aims to provoke 
and agitate. Accordingly, any interference with an artist’s or social commentator’s right to such 
expression must be examined with particular care. 
The ECtHR considers important, inter alia, the fact that Mr Haupt was a well-known politician 
and that he thus has to display a greater degree of tolerance in the face of such provocation in a 
satirical television programme. Furthermore, the ECtHR finds that the report dealt with an issue 
of legitimate public concern - namely, statements made by high-ranking members of the FPÖ 
which were criticised in the media as expressing extremist right-wing positions and the question 
of whether Mr Haupt (in his position as Chairperson of that party) had distanced himself 
sufficiently from such statements. The ECtHR is also satisfied that there was a sufficient factual 
basis for the reference to the brown rats around the FPÖ, having regard to the detailed findings 
reached by the Regional Court in which it quoted various problematic statements made by 
politicians of the FPÖ. For these reasons, the ECtHR is satisfied that the judgment of the Vienna 
Regional Court, as upheld by the Vienna Court of Appeal, struck a fair balance between the 
competing interests in the present case. Consequently, the ECtHR concludes unanimously that 
there is no appearance of a violation of Article 8 ECHR. Therefore the complaint by Mr Haupt is 
rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 ECHR, and 
consequently Mr Haupt’s application is declared inadmissible. 
• Herbert Haupt v. Austria (dec.), no. 55537/10, 2 May 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Fouad Belkacem v. Belgium 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
In a case concerning religious extremism on the Internet, the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECtHR”) confirmed that defending “Sharia law” while calling for violence to establish it could 
be regarded as “hate speech”. The Court held that, in accordance with Article 17 (prohibition of 
abuse of rights) of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), the discourse at issue 
did not fall under the protection of Article 10 of the ECHR, which guarantees the right to freedom 
of expression. 
The case concerns the conviction of Mr Belkacem, the leader and spokesperson of the 
organisation “Sharia4Belgium” (which was dissolved in 2012) for incitement to discrimination, 
hatred and violence on account of remarks he made in YouTube videos concerning non-Muslim 
groups and Sharia law. Mr Belkacem was prosecuted for various offences under Belgium’s Anti-
Discrimination Law of 10 May 2007 and for online harassment with discriminatory intent. In the 
videos in question Mr Belkacem called on viewers, among other things, to overpower non-
Muslims, “teach them a lesson” and to fight them. He also advocated jihad and Sharia law. In 
2013 the Antwerp Court of Appeal sentenced Mr Belkacem to a suspended term of one year and 
six months’ imprisonment and to a fine of EUR 550. The Antwerp court specified that the offence 
of public incitement to discrimination, violence and hatred was undoubtedly intentional, explicit, 
firm and repeated. The Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal lodged by Mr Belkacem. It found 
that Mr Belkacem had not simply expressed his views, but had unquestionably incited others to 
engage in discrimination on the basis of faith and discrimination, segregation, hatred or violence 
towards non-Muslims, and had done so knowingly and therefore intentionally. 
Relying on Article 10 ECHR, Mr Belkacem argued before the ECtHR that he had never intended 
to incite others to hatred, violence or discrimination but had simply sought to propagate his ideas 
and opinions. He maintained that his remarks had merely been a manifestation of his freedom of 
expression and religion and had not constituted a threat to public order. 
The ECtHR reiterates that, while its case-law enshrines the overriding and essential nature of 
freedom of expression in a democratic society, it also lays down its limits by excluding certain 
statements from the protection of Article 10. The ECtHR notes that Mr Belkacem published a 
series of videos on the YouTube platform in which he called on viewers to overpower non-
Muslims, teach them a lesson and fight them. The ECtHR is in no doubt as to the markedly hateful 
nature of Mr Belkacem’s views, and agrees with the domestic courts’ finding that Mr Belkacem, 
through his recordings and video messages on the Internet, had sought to stir up hatred, 
discrimination and violence towards all non-Muslims. In the Court’s view, such a general and 
vehement attack is incompatible with the values of tolerance, social peace and non-
discrimination underlying the Convention. With particular reference to Mr Belkacem’s remarks 
concerning Sharia law, the Court reiterates that it has ruled that the fact of defending Sharia law 
while calling for violence to establish it could be regarded as “hate speech”, and that each 
Contracting State was entitled to oppose political movements based on religious 
fundamentalism. The ECtHR also observes that the Belgian legislation, as applied in the present 
case, appeared to be in conformity with the relevant provisions and recommendations of the 
Council of Europe and the European Union aimed at combating incitement to hatred, 
discrimination and violence. Lastly, the ECtHR considers that Mr Belkacem had attempted to 
deflect Article 10 of the Convention from its real purpose by using his right to freedom of 
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expression for ends which were manifestly contrary to the spirit of the Convention. Although 
reiterating that the abuse clause of Article 17 is only applicable on an exceptional basis and in 
extreme cases, the ECtHR finds it applicable in the case at issue. Accordingly, it holds that, in 
accordance with Article 17 of the ECHR, Mr Belkacem could not claim the protection of Article 
10 of the ECHR. The ECtHR decides that the application is therefore incompatible ratione 
materiae with the provisions of the ECHR (Article 35 §§ 3(a) and 4) and is inadmissible. 
• Fouad Belkacem v. Belgium (dec.), no. 34367/14, 20 July 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Ghiulfer Predescu v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in a case against Romania, has confirmed the 
strong protection of the right to freedom of expression to be guaranteed to statements by 
journalists made within the context of a lively debate in a television show on a matter of public 
interest. 
Ms Predescu, an investigative journalist, complained of a violation of her right to freedom of 
expression. She appeared on a television show on a national television channel together with 
the Mayor of Constanţa, R.M., to discuss certain violent incidents that had taken place in Mamaia, 
a seaside resort on the outskirts of Constanţa. During the broadcast, Ms Predescu had made 
allegations that the Mayor was personally connected to a vendetta between violent rival clans 
operating in the area. The Mayor had lodged a civil complaint against her for defamation, 
essentially arguing that Ms Predescu’s allegations about specific facts had not been previously 
verified, nor ever proved to be true. He had further argued that by associating his name and image 
with that of criminal groups or clans, the journalist had seriously harmed his reputation as a 
public person and a locally elected official. After the case went to appeal, the Mayor’s claim was 
ultimately successful and Ms Predescu was ordered to pay RON 50,000 (approximately EUR 
10,000) in damages, plus costs, and to publish at her own expense the judgment against her in 
two newspapers. 
The question before the ECtHR was whether the domestic authorities had struck a fair balance 
between the protection of freedom of expression, as enshrined in Article 10, and the protection 
of the reputation of those against whom allegations are made, a right which, as an aspect of 
private life, is protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Firstly, the ECtHR reiterated that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR for 
restrictions on political speech or on debate on matters of public interest, and that the limits of 
acceptable criticism are therefore wider with regard to a civil servant or a politician acting in his 
public capacity than in relation to a private individual. Journalistic freedom also covers possible 
recourse to a degree of exaggeration or even provocation, while the safeguard afforded by Article 
10 of the ECHR to journalists in relation to the reporting of issues of general interest is subject 
to the proviso that they are acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable 
information, in accordance with the ethics of journalism. 
Focusing on the concrete elements of the case, the ECtHR observed that the impugned television 
show had been an attempt to debate publicly the question of the possible implication of R.M. - 
the Mayor of the city of Constanţa and a local businessman - in violent incidents in which a large 
group of armed persons had wrecked several hotels in Mamaia, including a hotel belonging to a 
company in which R.M. was a shareholder. It stressed that the role of the press certainly entails 
a duty to alert the public when it has learned of presumed misappropriation on the part of local 
elected representatives and public officials. The ECtHR also noted that the format of the 
television show was designed to encourage an exchange of views or even an argument, in such 
a way that the opinions expressed would counterbalance each other and the debate hold the 
viewers’ attention. The show had been broadcast live on television, so Ms Predescu had had only 
a limited possibility to reformulate, refine or retract any statements before they were made 
public. Furthermore, the statements expressed by Ms Predescu had had a sufficient factual basis, 
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as they had been based on information which was already known to the general public - namely 
articles and journalistic investigative material that had been previously published about R.M. 
In contrast with the judgment by the domestic appeal court that found Ms Predescu liable for 
defamation, the ECtHR was of the opinion that there was nothing in the case to suggest that the 
journalist’s allegations had been made otherwise than in good faith and in pursuit of the 
legitimate aim of debating a matter of public interest. Finally the ECtHR noted that the amount 
that Ms Predescu had been ordered to pay had been extremely high and was capable of having 
a “chilling”, dissuasive effect on her freedom of expression. The sanction imposed on the 
journalist had also lacked appropriate justification and the standards applied by the domestic 
courts had failed to ensure a fair balance between the relevant rights and related interests. 
Accordingly, the interference complained of was not “necessary in a democratic society” within 
the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR; therefore the ECtHR found that there has been a 
violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Ghiulfer Predescu v. Romania, no. 29751/09, 27 June 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
Following the Chamber judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) two years ago 
(see IRIS 2015-8/1), the Grand Chamber has also come to the conclusion that the right to freedom 
of expression and information was not violated in Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia 
Oy v. Finland. By fifteen votes to two the Grand Chamber found that a prohibition issued by the 
Finnish Data Protection Board that had prevented two media companies from publishing 
personal taxation data in the manner and to the extent that they had published these data before 
was to be considered as a legal, legitimate and necessary interference with the applicants’ right 
to freedom of expression and information. The ECtHR approved the approach of the Finnish 
authorities, who had rejected the applicants’ reliance on the exception provided in respect of 
journalistic activities by the law which protects personal data. 
The ECtHR observed that at the heart of the present case lay the question of whether a correct 
balance had been struck between the right to freedom of expression and press freedom under 
Article 10 of the ECHR, on the one hand, and the right to privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR, on 
the other hand (both rights must be accorded equal respect). In addition, the ECtHR referred to a 
set of principles that are (i) related to press freedom, including “the gathering of information (as) 
an essential preparatory step in journalism and an inherent, protected part of press freedom” and 
(ii) related to privacy protection, emphasising that “the fact that information is already in the 
public domain will not necessarily remove the protection of Article 8 of the Convention”. The 
ECtHR was of the opinion that the interference at issue was one that was prescribed by law and 
that had pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others. The question 
however remains whether the interference at issue was necessary in a democratic society. The 
relevant criteria in such a case are: a contribution to a debate of public interest, the degree of 
notoriety of the person affected, the subject of the news report, the prior conduct of the person 
concerned, the content, form and consequences of the publication, the way in which the 
information was obtained (and its veracity), and the gravity of the penalty imposed on the 
journalists or publishers. 
The ECtHR pointed out that the derogation of journalistic purposes (which is indeed provided by 
the Finnish Personal Data Act) “is intended to allow journalists to access, collect and process data 
in order to ensure that they are able to perform their journalistic activities, themselves recognised 
as essential in a democratic society”, while the right of access to public documents does not by 
itself justify the dissemination en masse of such “raw data in unaltered form without any 
analytical input”. The ECtHR was not persuaded that the publication of taxation data in the 
manner and to the extent undertaken by the applicant companies contributed to a debate of 
public interest, or that its principal purpose was to do so. Rather, considered that the 
dissemination of the data at issue might have enabled curious members of the public to 
categorise named individuals, who are not public figures, and that this could be regarded “as a 
manifestation of the public’s thirst for information about the private life of others and, as such, a 
form of sensationalism, even voyeurism”. Because the impugned publication cannot be regarded 
as contributing to a debate of public interest, nor as a form of political speech, it cannot enjoy 
the traditionally privileged position of such speech, which calls for strict scrutiny by the ECtHR 
of interferences with press freedom, and allows little scope for restrictions under Article 10 § 2 
of the ECHR. The vast majority of the Grand Chamber agreed with the findings at the domestic 
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level “that the publication of the taxation data in the manner and to the extent described did not 
contribute to a debate of public interest and that the applicants could not in substance claim that 
it had been done solely for a journalistic purpose, within the meaning of domestic and EU law”. 
This led the ECtHR to the conclusion that the Finnish authorities had acted within their “margin 
of appreciation” in striking a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. Therefore, 
the ECtHR found that there had been no violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
The Grand Chamber on the other hand confirmed the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the 
ECHR (right to a fair trial), as the length of the proceedings at the domestic level (six years and 
six months) had been excessive and had failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement, even 
taking into account the complexity of the case. 
• Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, ECHR 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Halldórsson v. Iceland 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
In a case against Iceland, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) stated that a journalist 
responsible for a TV news item causing prejudice to an identifiable public person must give 
relevant evidence that he or she has been acting in good faith as pertains to the accuracy of the 
allegations in the news item. The ECtHR also made clear that a journalist cannot shield behind 
his right to protect his sources where he cannot produce evidence of serious accusations uttered 
in a news item, tarnishing a person’s reputation as protected under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
The applicant is a journalist working for the newsroom of the Icelandic National Broadcasting 
Service (RUV). RUV broadcasted a series of news reports about a loan transaction of about EUR 
20 million between an Icelandic company and a shelf company in Panama. It was reported that 
three Icelandic businessmen (A, B and C) had planned the Panama deal in advance in order to 
send the money to Panama and then back into their own company again. Pictures of A, B and C 
were shown on the screen with the text “under investigation”, accompanied by the message that 
the authorities were investigating the case and the role of A, B and C. In another news item, 
pictures of A, B and C were shown above a world map, with a pile of money being visually 
transferred to the pictures of the men, mentioning that the money went back in “the pockets of 
the threesome”. An article summarising the content of the broadcasted news items was also 
published on RUV’s website. After the news broadcast, A issued a press release denying any link 
with the alleged suspect transaction. The online news article was promptly updated to include 
the press release. 
A few weeks later, A lodged defamation proceedings against Svavar Halldórsson, the RUV 
journalist who produced the news items. He requested that the reference to his name and the 
word “threesome” in the news report and on the website be declared null and void. The Supreme 
Court, overturning the judgment by the District Court which found for the journalist, ordered 
Halldórsson to pay approximately EUR 2,600 to A in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, 
and about EUR 8,800 for A’s legal costs before the domestic courts. The mentioning of A’s name 
and the word “threesome” were declared null and void. Before the ECtHR, Halldórsson maintained 
that the statements in the news items had not affected A’s reputation to a sufficient degree, and 
that therefore A could not invoke the protection of Article 8 ECHR. He also argued that the 
statements were not defamatory and that there was nothing presented in the news item to the 
effect that A had been guilty of a financial crime or other actions punishable by law. 
In evaluating whether the interference with Halldórsson’s freedom of expression was justified as 
being necessary in a democratic society, the ECtHR first clarifies that a person’s reputation, even 
if that person is being criticised in the context of a public debate, forms part of his or her personal 
identity and psychological integrity and therefore falls within the scope of his or her “private 
life”. The attack on personal honour and reputation must however attain a certain level of gravity 
and in a manner causing prejudice to the personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private 
life in order for Article 8 ECHR to come into play. In line with the findings by the domestic courts, 
the ECtHR confirms that the news items indeed contained a serious accusation of a factual nature 
concerning unlawful and criminal acts; therefore the ECtHR is of the opinion that the dispute 
requires an examination of the fair balance to be struck between the right to respect for private 
life and the right to freedom of expression. The ECtHR refers to the criteria which are relevant 
Back to overview of case-law 
434 
when balancing these rights, such as the contribution to a debate of general interest; how well 
known the person concerned is and what the subject of the report is; his or her prior conduct; the 
method of obtaining the information and its veracity; the content, form and consequences of the 
publication; and the severity of the sanction imposed. 
The ECtHR agrees that A was to be considered a public person and that the subject matter of the 
disputed news items was an issue of public interest; however, it confirms the findings by the 
Icelandic Supreme Court that Halldórsson had not been acting in good faith, as he had not 
presented any documents supporting the legitimacy of the statements, for which he had to bear 
the burden. Halldórsson had also omitted to seek information from A while preparing the news 
item. The ECtHR reiterates that the safeguard afforded by Article 10 ECHR to journalists in 
relation to reporting on issues of general interest is subject to the condition that they are acting 
in good faith and on an accurate factual basis and that they provide “reliable and precise” 
information in accordance with the ethics of journalism. It finds that there were no special 
grounds to dispense the journalist from his ordinary obligation to verify factual statements that 
are defamatory of private individuals, and it observed that there was no confirmation that A had 
been charged, indicted, or was on trial or had been convicted of a crime. 
Next, the ECtHR dismisses Halldórsson’s arguments referring to the right to protect his sources 
and to keep his sources and the documentation behind the news items confidential. The ECtHR 
confirms that the protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press 
freedom, without which sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public 
on matters of public concern. In the present case, however, the journalist was at no stage required 
to disclose the identity of his sources. The ECtHR clarifies that “a mere reference to protection of 
sources cannot exempt a journalist from the obligation to prove the veracity of or have sufficient 
factual basis for serious accusations of a factual nature, an obligation that can be met without 
necessarily having to reveal the sources in question”. 
Finally, the ECtHR does not find the financial compensation and payment of the costs of the 
domestic proceedings excessive or to be of such a kind as to have a “chilling effect” on the 
exercise of media freedom. The ECtHR also considers the potential impact of the medium an 
important factor in the consideration of the proportionality of an interference. In this respect, the 
ECtHR reiterates “that the audio-visual media have a more immediate and powerful effect than 
the print media”. Because the Icelandic Supreme Court balanced the right of freedom of 
expression with the right to respect for private life, and took into account the criteria set out in 
the ECtHR’s case law, it acted within the margin of appreciation afforded to it and struck a 
reasonable balance between the measures imposed, restricting the right to freedom of 
expression. Therefore, the ECtHR concludes, unanimously, that there has been no violation of 
Halldórsson’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. 
• Halldórsson v. Iceland, no. 44322/13, 4 July 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Axel Springer SE and RTL Television GmbH v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
In a case against Germany, two media companies - Axel Springer SE, a publishing house, and 
RTL, a broadcasting company - complained about a restriction on publishing pictures of the 
accused (S.) in a brutal murder case. S. was charged with killing his parents, dismembering their 
bodies, burning some of the parts, flushing others down the toilet and disposing of the rest by 
putting them in barrels. S. had already confessed to the police, while a psychiatric expert opinion 
ordered for the trial had concluded that S. was suffering from a schizoid personality disorder at 
the time when he had committed the offence. Prior to the start of the court hearings, the 
presiding judge informed the photojournalists orally that the face of S. would have to be made 
unidentifiable “in the usual manner” before any images of him were published. Axel Springer and 
RTL protested against the order, and a week later, a written order was issued confirming that the 
only media representatives who were permitted to take photographs and make video recordings 
of S. were those who had previously registered with the court and given an assurance that prior 
to the publication or forwarding of the material, the face of S. would be disguised by a technical 
process (for example by pixelization) so that it would only be possible to use the images in such 
a form. Journalists would be barred from further reporting on the case if they failed to comply 
with the order. The order stressed the importance of the presumption of innocence, finding that 
reporting on S. in a way which identified him could have a “pillory effect”; moreover, the wording 
of the order noted that S. had never been in the public eye and had expressly requested that his 
identity be concealed. According to the presiding judge, in this case the personality rights of S. 
clearly outweighed the public interest in being informed of his identity and physical appearance. 
After exhausting all national legal channels to have the order suspended, Axel Springer and RTL 
lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), complaining that the 
judicial order banning the publication of images by which S. could be identified had violated their 
right to freedom of expression, as provided in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). 
The ECtHR starts by referring to its earlier case law, balancing the right to freedom of expression 
against the right to respect for private life, and to the criteria that have to be taken into account 
in such cases. It clarifies that the criteria thus defined are not exhaustive and should be 
transposed and adapted in the light of the specific circumstances of the case, in particular where 
the presumption of innocence under Article 6 paragraph 2 ECHR comes into play. The Court 
identifies the following relevant criteria in the context of balancing competing rights: the 
contribution to a debate of public interest, the degree to which the person affected is known, the 
influence of the publication of the photographs on the criminal proceedings, the circumstances 
in which the photographs were taken, the content, form and consequences of the publication, 
and the severity of the sanction imposed. 
The ECtHR acknowledges that the crime at issue was brutal, but had been committed within a 
family following a private dispute and in a domestic setting. It agrees with the domestic court’s 
assessment that there was only a limited degree of public interest in the case. The judicial order 
at issue did not restrict the content of reporting but rather concerned the publication of images 
by which S. could be identified. The ECtHR does not consider that information on S.’s physical 
appearance could have contributed significantly to the debate on the case, in particular as S. was 
undoubtedly not a public figure, but an ordinary person who was the subject of criminal 
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proceedings. The ECtHR dismisses the argument that S. no longer benefitted from the 
presumption of innocence, as he had confessed to the murder: a confession in itself does not 
remove the protection of the presumption of innocence, and as S. suffered from a schizoid 
personality disorder, the criminal court had to review carefully the confession in order to satisfy 
itself that it was accurate and reliable. The Court also refers to the fact that images of an accused 
person taken in a court room may show the person in a state of great distress and possibly in a 
situation of reduced self-control. The ECtHR finds that under the circumstances in question there 
was a strong need to protect S.’s privacy, given that S. had never sought to contact the media nor 
make any public comments. Furthermore, the ECtHR refers to the harmful effect which the 
disclosure of information enabling the identification of suspects, accused or convicted persons 
or other parties to criminal proceedings may have on these persons, and to the negative 
implications this might have on the later social rehabilitation of convicted persons. It was also in 
the interest of safeguarding due process not to increase the psychological pressure on S. - 
particularly in view of his personality disorder. Finally, the ECtHR notes that the judicial order 
did not constitute a particularly severe restriction on reporting: the taking of images as such was 
not prohibited, the order banned merely the publication of images from which S. could be 
identified, and any other reporting on the proceedings was not restricted. Thus, the presiding 
judge chose the least restrictive of several possible measures in order to safeguard due process 
and protect S.’s privacy. Therefore, the ECtHR does not consider that the order had a “chilling 
effect” on the media companies, contrary to their rights under Article 10 ECHR. 
The ECtHR recognises the careful balancing act carried out by the presiding judge, clearly 
addressing the conflict between opposing interests and carefully weighing the relevant aspects 
of the case. The ECtHR unanimously concludes that the interference with the media companies’ 
right to freedom of expression was “necessary in a democratic society”. Accordingly, there has 
been no violation of their right to freedom of expression and information, as guaranteed by 
Article 10 of the ECHR. 
• Axel Springer SE and RTL Television GmbH v. Germany, no. 51405/12, 21 September 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Becker v. Norway 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University, Copenhagen University and Legal Human Academy 
A recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) emphasises once more the 
importance of the protection of journalistic sources for press freedom. The ECtHR emphasises 
that a journalist’s protection under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) cannot automatically be removed by virtue of a source’s own conduct, and that the 
principle of protecting a source applies even when that source’s identity is known. 
The case concerns a journalist, Cecilie Langum Becker, working for DN.no, a Norwegian Internet-
based newspaper. Ms Becker was ordered to give evidence in a criminal case brought against one 
of her sources, Mr X, who was accused of market manipulation. Mr X had confirmed to the police 
that he had been Ms Becker’s source for an article she had written about the allegedly difficult 
situation being faced by the Norwegian Oil Company (DNO). The price of DNO stock decreased 
by 4.1% on the first trading day after the publication of Ms Becker’s article. Mr X was subsequently 
charged with using Ms Becker to manipulate the financial market. Ms Becker refused to testify 
against Mr X, and the courts therefore ordered her to testify about her contacts with him, finding 
that there was no source to protect as he had already come forward. They also considered that 
her evidence might significantly assist the courts in elucidating the case. Mr X was, however, 
convicted as charged before the final decision on Ms Becker’s duty to give evidence had been 
made. Relying on Article 125 of the Norwegian Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 10 of the 
ECHR, Ms Becker argued that she was under no obligation to give evidence and she refused at 
any stage of the proceedings to answer questions about possible contact between her and Mr X 
and other sources. On account of her refusal to comply, the High Court ordered Ms Becker to pay 
a fine of approximately EUR 3,700 for the offence of impeding the good order of court 
proceedings, failing which she would be liable to ten days’ imprisonment. A short time later Ms 
Becker lodged an application with the ECtHR, alleging that she had been compelled to give 
evidence that would have enabled one or more journalistic sources to be identified, in violation 
of her right under Article 10 of the ECHR to receive and impart information. It took the ECtHR 
more than five years to decide on the case, but finally, with a unanimous vote, the Fifth Section 
of the ECtHR on 5 October 2017 found that Norway violated Ms Becker’s right to protect her 
sources. 
The ECtHR builds on its earlier case law in which it has developed the principles governing the 
protection of journalistic sources, such as in Goodwin v. the United Kingdom (see IRIS 1996-4/4) 
and in Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. v. the Netherlands (see IRIS 2010-10/2), reiterating that “the Court 
has always subjected the safeguards for respect of freedom of expression in cases under Article 
10 of the Convention to special scrutiny. Having regard to the importance of the protection of 
journalistic sources for press freedom in a democratic society, an interference cannot be 
compatible with Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding requirement 
in the public interest.” The Court reiterated that in Nagla v. Latvia (see IRIS 2013-8/2) it found 
that the fact that a source’s identity had been known to the investigating authorities prior to a 
search at the premises of a journalist did not remove the journalist’s protection under Article 10 
of the ECHR and it emphasises that a journalist’s protection under Article 10 cannot automatically 
be removed by virtue of a source’s own conduct. The ECtHR furthermore holds that protection 
afforded to journalists when it comes to their right to keep their sources confidential is “two‑
fold, relating not only to the journalist, but also and in particular to the source who volunteers 
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to assist the press in informing the public about matters of public interest”, while in Voskuil v. 
the Netherlands (see IRIS 2008-4/2) the ECtHR found that the potential significance in criminal 
proceedings of the information sought from a journalist was insufficient under Article 10 of the 
ECHR as a reason to justify compelling him to disclose his source or sources. It also emphasised 
that a “chilling effect” will arise wherever journalists are seen to assist in the identification of 
anonymous sources. 
The ECtHR went on to rule that the possible effects of the order were of such a nature that the 
general principles developed with respect to orders to disclose a source were applicable to the 
case, and that Ms Becker’s refusal to disclose her source or sources did not at any point in time 
hinder the investigation of the case or the proceedings against Mr X. On the contrary, there was 
no indication that Ms Becker’s refusal to give evidence attracted any concerns on the part of the 
Norwegian courts as regards the case or the evidence against Mr X. It also bore in mind that Ms 
Becker’s journalistic methods had never been called into question and that she had not been 
accused of any illegal activity. Having regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic 
sources for press freedom, the ECtHR finds that the reasons adduced in favour of compelling Ms 
Becker to testify on her contact with Mr X, though relevant, were insufficient. Accordingly, the 
ECtHR is not convinced that the impugned order was justified by an “overriding requirement in 
the public interest” and, hence, necessary in a democratic society. The ECtHR accordingly 
concludes that there has been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Becker v. Norway, no. 21272/12, ECHR 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Tamiz v. the United Kingdom 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh  
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam 
On 12 October 2017, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued its decision in Tamiz 
v. U, concerning a politician’s claim that his right to protection of reputation had been violated 
following the UK courts’ refusal to find Google liable for allegedly defamatory comments on 
Google’s Blogger platform. The applicant was a Conservative Party candidate in local UK 
elections, and on 27 April 2011, a blog post was published on the "London Muslim” blog, hosted 
on blogger.com, which is owned by Google Inc. The blog post concerned the applicant, and 
included the observation that “this Tory prat with Star Trek Spock ears might have engaged the 
odd brain cell before making these offensive remarks.” A number of anonymous comments were 
posted under the blog post, including that the applicant “is a known drug dealer” and a “class A 
prat”. 
The applicant used the blog’s “report abuse” function to indicate that he considered certain 
comments to be defamatory, and sent a letter of claim to Google in respect of “defamatory” 
comments. Google confirmed that it would not itself remove the comments, but forwarded the 
claim to the blog’s author, who three days later removed the post and comments. Meanwhile, the 
applicant also sought to bring a libel claim against Google Inc. (US) in relation to the comments. 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal held that the claim should not be allowed to proceed. The Court 
held that since it could not be said that Google Inc. had known or ought reasonably to have 
known of the defamatory comments prior to it being notified by the applicant, Google Inc. could 
not be viewed as a secondary publisher prior to that notification. In relation to the period 
following notification, the Court held that the claim should not be allowed because it was “highly 
improbable that any significant number of readers will have accessed the comments after that 
time and prior to the removal of the entire blog”, any damage to the appellant’s reputation arising 
from the continued publication of the comments will have been trivial, and the costs of the 
exercise would be out of all proportion to what would be achieved. 
The applicant then made an application to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), claiming 
that in refusing him permission to serve a claim on Google Inc., the UK was in breach of its 
positive obligation under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to 
protect his reputation. 
The ECtHR stated that the case concerned whether an appropriate balancing exercise was 
conducted by the national courts between the applicant’s right to respect for his private life under 
Article 8 ECHR and the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 10 of the ECHR and 
enjoyed by both Google Inc. and its end users. Firstly, the Court reiterated that in considering the 
gravity of the interference with the applicant’s Article 8 rights, an attack on personal honour and 
reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and must have been carried out in a manner 
causing prejudice to the personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life. The Court 
stated that this threshold test is important, and that the reality is that millions of Internet users 
post comments online every day and many of these users express themselves in ways that might 
be regarded as offensive or even defamatory. On the facts, the Court was inclined to agree with 
the national courts that while the majority of comments about which the applicant complains 
were undoubtedly offensive, for the large part they were little more than “vulgar abuse” of a kind 
which is common in communication on many Internet portals and which the applicant, as a 
budding politician, would be expected to tolerate. Furthermore, many of those comments which 
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made more specific allegations would, in the context in which they were written, likely be 
understood by readers as conjecture which should not be taken seriously. 
Secondly, the Court noted that although the applicant was ultimately prevented from serving 
proceedings on Google Inc., this was not because such an action was inherently objectionable to 
the national courts. Rather, having assessed the evidence before them, they concluded that the 
applicant’s claim did not meet the “real and substantial tort” threshold required to serve 
defamation proceedings. This conclusion was based, to a significant extent, on the courts’ finding 
that Google Inc. could only, on the most generous assessment, be found responsible in law for 
the content of the comments once a reasonable period had elapsed after it was notified of their 
potentially defamatory nature. The Court noted that the approach of the national courts is 
entirely in keeping with the position in international law that information society service 
providers (ISSPs) should not be held responsible for content emanating from third parties unless 
they failed to act expeditiously in removing or disabling access to it once they became aware of 
its illegality. The Court concluded that it was satisfied that the appropriate balancing exercise 
was conducted by the national courts, and the applicant’s Article 8 complaint was therefore 
rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. 
• Tamiz v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 3877/14, 12 October 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Einarsson v. Iceland 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh  
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam 
On 7 November 2017, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in 
Einarsson v. Iceland, concerning a public figure’s claim that his right to reputation had been 
violated following an Icelandic Supreme Court decision that a post on the image-sharing platform 
Instagram was not defamatory. The applicant in the case was a well-known author and media 
personality in Iceland. On 22 November 2012, X published an altered picture of the applicant on 
his Instagram account, drawing an upside-down cross on the applicant’s forehead, writing “loser” 
across his face, and with the caption “Fuck you, rapist bastard”. The original picture of the 
applicant had been included in a newspaper interview with the applicant that same day in which 
the applicant had discussed a rape accusation made against him. A week earlier, the Public 
Prosecutor had terminated proceedings against the applicant that had been initiated after an 18- 
year-old woman had reported to the police in November 2011 that the applicant and his girlfriend 
had raped her. 
On 17 December 2012, the applicant initiated defamation proceedings against X before the 
District Court of Reykjavík and asked for him to be punished, under the applicable provisions of 
the Penal Code, for altering the picture and for publishing it on Instagram with the caption “Fuck 
you, rapist bastard”. However, the District Court found against the applicant, a decision that was 
ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that the applicant was a well-
known person who had controversial views - “views which [included] his attitudes towards 
women and their sexual freedom”, and that “there [had] been instances when his criticism had 
been directed towards named individuals, often women, and in some cases his words could be 
construed to mean that he was in fact recommending that they should be subjected to sexual 
violence.” In this context, the Court found that the altered picture and comment ‘Fuck you, rapist 
bastard’ should be taken , and was a case of invective on the part of X against the applicant as 
part of a ruthless public debate, which the latter had instigated. It therefore constituted a value 
judgment regarding the applicant and not a factual statement that he was guilty of committing 
rape. Thus, X had expressed himself within the limits of freedom of expression, and should be 
acquitted. 
The applicant made an application to the ECtHR, claiming that the Iceland Supreme Court’s 
judgment had constituted a violation of his right to respect for his private life, as provided in 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR considered that the 
question was whether the domestic courts had struck a fair balance between the applicant’s right 
to respect for his private life and X’s right to freedom of expression, as protected by Article 10 of 
the ECHR. In this regard, the ECtHR considered it appropriate to consider the following 
criteria: how well-known was the person concerned, the subject matter of the statement and the 
prior conduct of the person concerned; and the contribution to a debate of general interest and 
the content, form and consequences of the publication (including the method of obtaining the 
information and its veracity). 
Firstly, the ECtHR agreed that the applicant was well-known, and that the limits to acceptable 
criticism must thus accordingly be wider in the present case than in the case of an individual who 
was not well-known. Secondly, the Court agreed with the domestic courts that the publication of 
the picture had constituted a part of a general public debate: The applicant had participated in 
public discussions about his professional activities and the complaints against him of sexual 
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violence, and was thus an object of general interest. Thirdly, the ECtHR examined whether the 
statement “Fuck you, rapist bastard” had constituted a statement of fact or a value judgment. The 
ECtHR admitted that the classification of a statement as a fact or as a value judgment is a matter 
which in the first place falls within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities - in 
particular the domestic courts. However, the Court may consider it necessary to make its own 
assessment of the impugned statements. In this regard, the Court held that the Supreme Court 
had not taken sufficient account of the relevant elements so as to be able to justify the conclusion 
that the statement had constituted a value judgment. In particular, the Supreme Court had failed 
to take adequate account of the important chronological link between the publication of the 
statement on 22 November 2012 and the discontinuance of the criminal proceedings against the 
applicant in respect of alleged rape. Moreover, the Supreme Court had failed to explain 
sufficiently the factual basis that could have justified deeming the use of the term “rapist” to 
constitute a value judgment, the Supreme Court “merely” referring to the applicant’s participation 
in a “ruthless public debate” which he had “instigated”. In conclusion, the Court found that the 
domestic courts had ailed to strike a fair balance between the applicant’s right to respect for 
private life under Article 8 and X’s right to freedom of expression, and that this had therefore 
constituted a violation of Article 8. 
• Egill Einarsson v. Iceland, no. 24703/15, 7 November 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Fuchsmann v. Germany 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh  
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam 
On 19 October 2017, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in the 
case of Fuchsmann v. Germany, which concerned the online version of a New York Times article 
accessible in Germany. The applicant in the case is an internationally active entrepreneur in the 
media sector, and holds the position of Vice-President of the World Jewish Congress. In June 
2001, the New York Times published an article about an investigation into corruption against 
R.L. The article was entitled “[L] Media Company Faces a Federal Inquiry”, and included the 
statements that the applicant had “ties to Russian organized crime, according to reports by the 
FBI and European law enforcement agencies”, and a “1994 FBI report on Russian organized crime 
in the United States described [the applicant] as a gold smuggler and embezzler, whose company 
in Germany was part of an international organized crime network. He is barred from entering the 
United States.” 
In July 2002, the applicant sought injunctions against certain parts of the article, including the 
statements above. Ultimately, in 2011, the Düsseldorf Court of Appeal granted the injunction in 
so far as the article stated that the applicant had been banned from entering the US. As regards 
the rest of the statements, the Court of Appeal held that there was a great informational interest 
on the part of the public in reporting that the applicant, as a German businessman internationally 
active in the media sector, was suspected by the secret service of being involved in gold 
smuggling, embezzlement and organised crime. This assessment was not changed by the fact 
that the criminal offences mentioned had occurred more than sixteen years previously. The court 
furthermore considered that the reporting made it sufficiently clear that only insights from FBI 
reports and the law-enforcement authorities were being reported. The court concluded that the 
defendant had complied with the required journalistic duty of care and that the reporting had 
relied on sources and background information, which the journalist could reasonably consider 
reliable. The injunctions were thus refused. 
The applicant made an application to the ECtHR, claiming that the domestic courts had failed to 
protect his reputation under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In 
this regard, the Court first held that allegations that the applicant was involved in gold 
smuggling, embezzlement and organised crime were allegations grave enough for Article 8 to 
come into play. The Court then considered that the case required an examination of whether a 
fair balance had been struck between the applicant’s right to the protection of his private life 
under Article 8 and the newspaper’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10. The relevant 
criteria within the context of balancing these competing rights were: the contribution to a 
debate of public interest; the degree to which the person affected was well-known; the subject 
of the news report; the prior conduct of the person concerned; the method of obtaining the 
information and its veracity; and the content, form and consequences of the publication. 
Firstly, the Court agreed that the article had contributed to a debate of public interest and that 
there had been a public interest in the alleged involvement of the applicant and mentioning him 
by name. The Court also held that a public interest also existed in the publication of the article 
in the online archive of the newspaper, and noted “the substantial contribution made by Internet 
archives to preserving and making available news and information”. Secondly, the Court held that 
the Court of Appeal’s assessment that there was a certain interest in the applicant as a German 
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businessman internationally active in the media sector, was in compliance with the ECtHR’s case 
law. Thirdly, the Court reiterated that that the press should normally be entitled, when 
contributing to public debate on matters of legitimate concern, to rely on the contents of official 
reports without having to undertake independent research. The Court observed that the main 
source for the statements regarding the applicant was an internal FBI report and not an officially 
published report. The Court agreed that there was a sufficient factual basis for the remaining 
statements at issue. Fourthly, the Court agreed with the Court of Appeal that the article was free 
from polemical statements and insinuations, and made it sufficiently clear that only insights from 
reports by the FBI and other law-enforcement authorities were being reported. Moreover, the 
Court found that the information disseminated had mainly concerned the applicant’s professional 
life and had not divulged any intimate private details. The ECtHR also noted that the Court of 
Appeal found that the online article was accessible only as a result of a directed search with an 
online search engine. Therefore, the Court accepted the conclusion of the domestic courts that 
the consequences of the article in Germany were limited. In conclusion, the Court considered that 
the Court of Appeal, in balancing the right to respect for private life with the right to freedom of 
expression, had taken into account and applied the criteria set out in the Court’s case-law. Thus, 
there had been no violation of Article 8. 
• Fuchsmann v. Germany, no. 71233/13, 19 October 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Frisk and Jensen v. Denmark 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh  
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam 
On 5 December 2017, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in the 
case of Frisk and Jensen v. Denmark. The applicants in the case were journalists with the public 
broadcaster Danmarks Radio (DR), and had produced the documentary “When the doctor knows 
best”, broadcast in September 2008. The documentary concerned the treatment of pleural 
mesothelioma cancer at Copenhagen University Hospital, where consultant S was in charge of 
treatment. It focused on two types of chemotherapy medication (Alimta and Vinorelbine) used by 
the hospital, and followed four patients and relatives, and a narrator spoke as a voice-over. During 
the programme, the narrator stated that “doctors chose to treat her with a substance that has not 
been approved [in cases of such a diagnosis], and whose effect on pleural mesothelioma cancer 
is not substantiated”. While “there is only one treatment which, in comparative studies, has 
proved to have an effect on pleural mesothelioma cancer”, S “chose not to use that medication 
on his patients”, and “the question remains: why does S carry out tests with Vinorelbine.” It “turns 
out that S has received more than DKK 800,000 over the last five and a half years from the 
company F. This is the company behind the test medication Vinorelbine. The money has been 
paid into S’s personal research account.” 
Following the broadcast, the hospital and consultant S instituted defamation proceedings against 
DR’s director, and the two applicants (the journalists concerned), claiming that the programme 
had made accusations of malpractice. In 2010, the Copenhagen City Court found that the 
applicants and DR’s director had violated Article 267 of the Penal Code, and sentenced them each 
to fines totalling DKK 10,000 (EUR 1,340), and the applicants jointly liable for costs of DKK 
62,250 (EUR 8,355). The High Court of Eastern Denmark upheld the judgment, finding that the 
programme had given “the impression that malpractice has occurred at Copenhagen University 
Hospital, in that S deliberately used medication (Vinorelbine) which is not approved for treatment 
of pleural mesothelioma cancer; the test medication has resulted in patients dying or having their 
lives shortened; and the clear impression has been given that the reasons for this choice of 
medication (Vinorelbine) were S’s professional prestige and personal finances”. The applicants 
were ordered to pay costs to the hospital and S, totalling DKK 90,000 (EUR 12,080). The applicant 
journalists made an application to the ECtHR, claiming a violation of their right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The main 
question for the ECtHR was whether a fair balance had been struck between the right to respect 
for private life and the right to freedom of expression, and reiterated the criteria for this 
assessment: the contribution to a debate of general interest; how well-known the person 
concerned is and what the subject of the report is; his or her prior conduct; the method of 
obtaining the information and its veracity; the content, form and consequences of the 
publication; and the severity of the sanction imposed. 
Firstly, the Court held that the programme had dealt with issues of legitimate public interest, 
namely that it had involved a discussion about risk to life and health, as regards public hospital 
treatment. Secondly, the criticism had been directed at S and Copenhagen University Hospital, 
who were vested with official functions, and there was a need for wider limits for public scrutiny. 
Thirdly, however, the Court noted that the domestic courts had found that the applicants had 
made allegations that S and the hospital had administered to certain patients suffering from 
mesothelioma improper treatment, resulting in their unnecessary death and the shortening of 
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their lives to promote the professional esteem and personal financial situation of S., and that 
those accusations rested on a factually incorrect basis. The Court held that it had “no reason to 
call into question those conclusions”. The Court rejected the applicants’ argument the impact of 
the programme had had various important consequences, inter alia, a public demand for Alimta 
therapy and a change in practice at Copenhagen University Hospital. The Court stated that the 
reason why the public demand for Alimta therapy may have increased and Copenhagen University 
Hospital changed its standard therapy for operable patients to Cisplatin in combination with 
Alimta, was that the programme, on an incorrect factual basis, had encouraged patients to 
mistrust Vinorelbine therapy. Fourthly, in respect of the method of the obtaining of the 
information and its veracity, the Court noted that the domestic courts did not dispute that the 
applicants had conducted thorough research, over a period of approximately one year. However, 
the Court held that it had no reason to call into question the High Court’s conclusion that the 
applicants had made accusations resting on a factually incorrect basis, of which they must be 
deemed to have become aware through the research material. Finally, the Court held that it did 
not find the conviction and sentence to have been excessive or of such a kind as to have a 
“chilling effect” on media freedom. Furthermore, the decision that the applicants should pay legal 
costs did not appear unreasonable or disproportionate. In conclusion, the Court held that the 
reasons relied upon were both relevant and sufficient to show that the interference complained 
of was “necessary in a democratic society”. Thus, there had been no violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
• Frisk and Jensen v. Denmark, no. 19657/12, 5 December 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: MAC TV s.r.o. v. Slovakia 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh  
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam 
On 28 November 2017, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in 
MAC TV s.r.o. v. Slovakia, which concerned the fining of a broadcaster over a television 
programme’s commentary on the death of the late President of Poland. The case involved MAC 
TV, which operates two private television channels, and broadcasts the television programme 
“JOJ PLUS”. During an episode of the programme broadcast in April 2010, following the fatal 
plane crash in which the President of Poland, Lech Kaczynski, had been travelling, a commentary 
was delivered entitled “Compassion in Accordance with Protocol”. The commentary included the 
statement that “Jews, homosexuals, liberals, feminists and left‑oriented intellectuals are bitterly 
sorry for the death of a man who represented an extreme Polish conservativism, and who was a 
symbol of a country where people who are not white heterosexual Catholic Poles were born as a 
punishment. I am sorry, but I do not pity Poles. I envy them.” 
Following the broadcast, the Broadcasting Council initiated administrative proceedings against 
MAC TV under section 19(1)(a) of the Broadcasting and Retransmission Act, which stipulates the 
protection of human dignity. The Broadcast Council found that the broadcaster had breached its 
obligations under the Broadcasting Act, in that the manner of processing and presenting the 
content of the commentary had interfered with the dignity of the late Polish President, and 
imposed a fine of EUR 5,000. In particular, the Broadcasting Council concluded that the manner 
in which the commentator had presented his opinion - that is to say his lack of regret for the 
Polish President’s death - had contravened the duty to respect his human dignity. Moreover, the 
degree of sarcasm and irony in the broadcast commentary had been so high that its content and 
the manner in which the author’s opinion had been presented had dishonoured the late President. 
The Broadcasting Council’s decision was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court. MAC TV then 
lodged an application with the ECtHR, claiming a violation of its right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) The ECtHR first noted that 
the Broadcasting Council’s decision had constituted an interference with the applicant company’s 
right to freedom of expression, had been prescribed by law under the Broadcasting Act, and 
pursued the legitimate aim of the protection of the reputation or rights of others (the Court held 
that it was not required to reach a general conclusion on whether or not the interference created 
by a measure concerning a deceased person’s reputation pursued a legitimate aim). Thus, the 
main question was whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. 
Firstly, the ECtHR emphasised that under Article 10 ECHR, very strong reasons were required to 
justify restrictions on political speech. Secondly, the ECtHR noted that the applicant’s reaction 
to the political governance of the late President and his political conservatism gave rise to a 
matter of public interest, and the late President, as a public figure, was subject to wider limits of 
acceptable criticism. Thirdly, the ECtHR noted that the domestic authorities had essentially based 
their conclusions predominantly on the closing remarks in the commentary (“I am sorry, but I do 
not pity the Poles. I envy them”). However, in this regard, the ECtHR reiterated that one criterion 
of responsible journalism is that it should recognise the fact that it is the commentary (or article) 
as a whole that the reporter presents to the public. The ECtHR held that the domestic authorities’ 
assessment was narrow in scope, and had not been conducted within the wider context of the 
commentary. The Court considered that the impugned commentary, seen within its context, could 
not be understood to have constituted a gratuitous personal attack on, or insult to Lech 
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Kaczynski. While it had contained a sarcastic tone that had been unsympathetic to the political 
ideology of the late President, it had remained within the acceptable degree of stylistic 
exaggeration used to express the journalist’s opinion concerning the political views that the late 
President had represented. The Court reiterated that journalistic freedom also covered possible 
recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation. Thus, the Court considered that 
nothing in that commentary suggested that the applicant company had overstepped the limits of 
freedom of expression tolerated under Article 10 ECHR by using a sarcastic tone and ironic 
language. The Court concluded that the domestic authorities had failed to demonstrate that the 
interference with the applicant company’s Article 10 rights had been necessary, and that there 
had accordingly been a violation of Article 
10. In addition, the ECtHR awarded the applicant company EUR 5,000 in respect of pecuniary 
damage, EUR 5,850 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, and EUR 6,900 in costs. 
• MAC TV s.r.o. v. Slovakia, no. 13466/12, 28 November 2017. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v. Hungary 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam 
On 23 January 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in the 
case of Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v. Hungary, concerning a mobile application (“app”) which 
allowed voters to anonymously share photographs of their ballot papers. Notably, the Court held 
that a fine imposed on a political party for distributing the app had violated the party’s right to 
freedom of expression. The applicant in the case was the Hungarian political party Magyar 
Kétfarkú Kutya Párt. Three days before Hungary’s 2016 referendum on the EU’s migrant 
relocation plan, the applicant made the mobile app available to voters. The app allowed voters 
to upload and share photographs taken of their ballots, and also enabled voters to give the 
reasons for how they cast their ballot. The posting and sharing of photographs was anonymous. 
Following a complaint about the app, the National Election Commission issued a decision, finding 
that the app had infringed the principles of fairness of elections, voting secrecy, and the proper 
exercise of rights, and ordered the applicant to refrain from further breaches of section 2(1)(a) 
and (e) of the Act on Electoral Procedure and Article 2(1) of the Fundamental Law. The 
Commission also imposed a fine of EUR 2,700. On appeal, the Kúria (the Hungarian Supreme 
Court) upheld the Commission’s decision regarding the infringement of the principle of the proper 
exercise of rights. The Kúria held that the purpose of the ballots had been to enable voters to 
express their opinion on the referendum question, and that taking photographs of ballots and 
subsequently publishing them had not been in line with this purpose. The Kúria overturned the 
remainder of the Commission’s decision on the infringement of the secrecy of the electoral 
process. It found that there was no regulation prohibiting voters from taking photographs of their 
ballot papers in the voting booths and that their identity could not have been revealed through 
the mobile app. The Kúria reduced the fine to EUR 330. 
The applicant made an application to the ECtHR, claiming a violation of its right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The first 
question for the Court was whether there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to 
freedom of expression. The Court noted that the app had been developed by the applicant 
precisely in order that voters could share, via information and communication technologies, 
opinions through anonymous photos of invalid ballot papers. The app therefore possessed a 
communicative value, and constituted expression on a matter of public interest, as protected by 
Article 10 of the ECHR. What the applicant was reproached for was precisely the provision of the 
means of transmission for others to impart and receive information within the meaning of Article 
10. Thus, there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. 
The main question for the Court was then whether the interference had had a legitimate aim. 
Notably, the Court rejected both arguments put forward by the Government. Firstly, the 
Government argued that the measure had been aimed at ensuring the orderly conduct of the 
voting procedure and ensuring the proper use of ballot papers, and that these aims could fall 
under “the protection of the rights of others” (Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR). However, the Court 
held that the Government had not pointed to any other actual rights of “others” that would or 
could have been adversely affected by the anonymous publication of images of marked or spoiled 
ballots. The Government had not provided any elements showing that there had been a resultant 
deficiency in the voting procedure, facilitated by the posting of images of those ballot papers, 
which should have been addressed through a restriction on the use of the mobile app. 
The Government’s second argument focused on the violation of the principle of the proper 
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exercise of rights, as laid down in section 2(1)(e) of the Act on Electoral Procedure, which, in their 
estimation, would also entail a violation of the rights of others. However, the Court held that it 
was not persuaded by this suggestion. The Court stated that while it was true that the domestic 
authorities had established that the use of the ballot papers for any other purpose than that of 
casting a vote infringed that provision, the Government had not convincingly established any link 
between this principle of domestic law and the aims exhaustively listed in paragraph 2 of Article 
10. The Court concluded that the foregoing considerations were sufficient to enable the Court to 
conclude that the sanction imposed on the applicant political party for operating the mobile app 
did not meet the requirements of Article 10 § 2. There had therefore been a violation of Article 
10. 
• Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v. Hungary, no. 201/17, 23 January 2018. 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber, which returned its judgment on 20 
January 2020 (see IRIS 2020-3:1). 
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European Court of Human Rights: Faludy-Kovács v. Hungary 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh  
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam 
On 23 January 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in the 
case of Faludy-Kovács v. Hungary, concerning media coverage of a non-political public figure 
who had “actively sought the limelight”, and the extent of her right to reputation. 
The applicant in the case was the widow of the well-known Hungarian poet, György Faludy. In 
2008, the Helyi Téma newspaper published a front-page article, with a photograph of the 
applicant and her late husband, with the headline “Trampling on the memory of Faludy. The 
widow does anything for the limelight”. The article concerned an interview the applicant had 
given to another newspaper in which she revealed she wanted to have a child who would be a 
blood relative of both her and her late husband, and explained that she envisaged her own sister 
and her late husband’s grandson being the parents of that child. 
The applicant lodged a civil action against the publisher of Helyi Téma under Article 78 of the 
(old) Hungarian Civil Code, alleging a violation of her right to reputation. The Budapest Regional 
Court ordered a public apology and obliged the publisher to pay EUR 2,000 in damages. The court 
held that the statement that she had trampled on her husband’s memory had infringed her right 
to reputation and dignity. However, the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed the previous judgment 
and held that the headline had not been a statement of fact but a value judgment expressed in 
connection with the applicant’s own “peculiar” statements. The court also found that the headline 
could not have infringed the applicant’s reputation since her own statements had been irrational 
and undignified, putting György Faludy’s grandson in an embarrassing situation. The Kúria (the 
Hungarian Supreme Court) subsequently dismissed an appeal by the applicant, finding that the 
headline had constituted a value judgment concerning the unusual manner in which the 
applicant intended to start a family. 
The applicant made an application to the ECtHR, claiming a violation of her right to reputation 
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The main question for the 
Court was whether the domestic courts had struck a fair balance between the journalist’s right 
to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR and the applicant’s right to have her 
reputation respected under Article 8 of the Convention. Firstly, the Court held that the applicant, 
in her capacity as the widow of György Faludy and a well-known person in contemporary society, 
was a public figure and that she inevitably and knowingly exposed herself to public scrutiny. 
Secondly, the Court held that the applicant had actively sought the limelight so, having 
regard to the degree to which she was known to the public, her “legitimate expectation” that 
her private life would not attract public attention and would not be commented on was hence 
reduced. Thirdly, regarding the content, form and consequences of the publication, the Court 
held that the headline merely related to the applicant’s own statements, as reproduced in the 
accompanying article, and did not contain unsubstantiated allegations. The fact that the headline 
had employed an expression which, to all intents and purposes, had been designed to attract the 
public’s attention cannot in itself raise an issue under the Court’s case-law. The Court considered 
that the headline introducing the statements of the applicant had to be considered as a matter 
of editorial choice that had been intended to provoke a reaction. 
Fourthly, the information to which the journalist had reacted had been expressed voluntarily by 
the applicant in the course of an interview, and had not been acquired in circumstances 
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unfavourable to her. Finally, regarding the contribution of the article to a debate of public 
interest, the Court noted that the domestic courts had reached their conclusions without going 
into an analysis of whether the article had concerned an issue of legitimate public interest. 
However, in the Court’s view, in the circumstances of the present case, where the applicant gave 
an interview about her family plans clearly for the purposes of satisfying the curiosity of a certain 
readership, the question of whether the accompanying expression in issue covered a subject of 
public interest is of minor relevance. Thus, the absence of this element in the domestic courts’ 
reasoning did not have an effect on the balancing exercise that they have conducted. 
In the light of the foregoing, the Court held that domestic courts had struck a fair balance 
between the journalist’s freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention and the 
applicant’s right to have her reputation respected under Article 8. The potential negative 
consequences that the applicant might have suffered after the publication of the headline were 
not so serious as to justify a restriction on the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by 
Article 10. Thus, there had been no violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
• Faludy-Kovács v. Hungary, no. 20487/13, 23 January 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh  
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam 
On 30 January 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in the 
case of Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, concerning freedom of expression and the regulation of 
commercial advertising deemed offensive. Notably, the Court unanimously found that an 
advertising company’s freedom of expression had been violated by the imposition of a fine under 
Lithuania’s advertising law. 
The applicant in the case - a Vilnius-based applicant company ran an advertising campaign in 
October 2012 introducing a clothing line by the designer R.K., including advertisements on R.K.’s 
website. The first advertisement showed a young man with long hair, a headband, a halo around 
his head and several tattoos wearing a pair of jeans, with a caption reading “Jesus, what trousers!” 
The second advertisement showed a woman wearing a white dress and with a halo around her 
head, accompanied by the reading “Dear Mary, what a dress!”. After receiving over 100 complaints 
about the advertisements, the Lithuanian State Consumer Rights Protection Authority adopted a 
decision against the applicant company concerning a violation of Article 4 § 2 (1) of the Law on 
Advertising, which prohibits advertising that “violates public morals”. The Authority held that the 
use of religious symbols for commercial gain exceeds the limits of tolerance; using the name of 
God for commercial purpose was not in line with public morals; and the inappropriate depiction 
of Christ and Mary in the advertisements was likely to offend the feelings of religious people. 
The applicant company was fined EUR 580. The decision was upheld on appeal. 
The applicant company made an application to the ECtHR, claiming that there had been a 
violation of its right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The main question for the Court was whether the interference with 
applicant company’s freedom of expression had been “necessary in a democratic society”. 
The Court ultimately found that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, and 
held that he domestic authorities had given absolute primacy to protecting the feelings of 
religious people, without adequately taking into account the applicant company’s right to 
freedom of expression. In reaching this conclusion, the Court firstly accepted that the 
advertisements had created an unmistakable resemblance between the persons depicted therein 
and religious figures, and that the advertisements had had a commercial purpose, had had made 
no contribution to public debate. However, the Court considered that the advertisements did not 
appear to have been gratuitously offensive or profane, and nor had they incited hatred on the 
grounds of religious belief or attacked a religion in an unwarranted or abusive manner. 
Notably, the Court reiterated that freedom of expression also extends to ideas which offend shock 
or disturb. In a pluralist democratic society those who choose to exercise the freedom to manifest 
their religion cannot reasonably expect to be exempt from all criticism. They must tolerate and 
accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs and even the propagation by others of 
doctrines hostile to their faith. In the Court’s view, even though the advertisements had a 
commercial purpose and cannot be said to constitute “criticism” of religious ideas, the applicable 
principles are nonetheless similar. 
Finally, the Court held that even assuming that the majority of the Lithuanian population would 
indeed find the advertisements offensive, the Court reiterated that it would be incompatible with 
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the underlying values of the Convention if the exercise of Convention rights by a minority group 
were made conditional on its being accepted by the majority. Were this to be so, that minority 
group’s right to, inter alia, freedom of expression would become merely theoretical rather than 
practical and effective, as required by the Convention. In the light of these considerations, the 
Court concluded that the domestic authorities had failed to strike a fair balance between, on the 
one hand, the protection of public morals and the rights of religious people, and, on the other 
hand, the applicant company’s right to freedom of expression. There had therefore been a 
violation of Article 10 of the Convention. 
• Sekmadienis Ltd. v. Lithuania, no. 69317/14, 30 January 2018.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Alpha Doryforiki Tileorasi Anonymi Etairia v. Greece 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh  
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam 
On 22 February 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in 
Alpha Doryforiki Tileorasi Anonymi Etairia v. Greece concerning the fining of a broadcaster over 
hidden camera footage of a politician. The applicant in the case was the owner of a Greek 
television channel, ALPHA. In January 2002, ALPHA broadcast a television show named “Jungle” 
(Ζούγκλα) in which three videos filmed with a hidden camera were broadcast. In the first video, 
A.C., then a member of the Hellenic Parliament and chairman of the parliamentary committee on 
electronic gambling, was shown entering a gambling arcade and playing on two machines. The 
second video showed a meeting between A.C. and associates of the television host of “Jungle”, 
M.T., during which the first video was shown to A.C. The third video showed a meeting between 
A.C. and M.T. in the latter’s office. 
Following a hearing in May 2002, the National Radio and Television Council (NRTC) found that 
the use of a hidden camera by the broadcaster in the three videos had not been in accordance 
with the law. The NRTC ordered the applicant company to pay EUR 100,000 for each of the two 
television shows in which the videos were shown, and to broadcast on three days in a row on its 
main news show the content of its decision. The applicant company appealed against the 
decision to the Supreme Administrative Court, and in April 2010, the court dismissed the appeal. 
The court held that broadcasting a secretly recorded image can only be justified if the legitimate 
broadcasting of such news is completely impossible or particularly difficult without broadcasting 
the image that was recorded by hidden means and which constitutes the source of the news. The 
Court found that the applicant company had not disputed that the images had been recorded by 
secret means and had not claimed that broadcasting of the news was absolutely impossible or 
extremely difficult without broadcasting the relevant images. Therefore, the applicant company’s 
allegation that it had broadcast the impugned images for reasons of journalistic interest and of 
public interest was dismissed. 
The applicant made an application to the ECtHR, claiming a violation of its right to freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The main 
question was whether the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression had 
been necessary in a democratic society. In this regard, the Court examined a number of criteria. 
Firstly, the Court held that the report contributed to a debate of public interest, including the 
conduct vis-à-vis electronic gambling of an elected representative who, additionally, was 
chairman of an inter-party committee on electronic gambling. Secondly, the Court found that A.C. 
was undeniably a prominent political figure. Thirdly, the Court examined the method of 
obtaining the information and its veracity - namely the circumstances under which the videos 
were taken. With regard to the first video, the Court held that the domestic authorities had failed 
to take into consideration the fact that it had been filmed in a public place - an element which, 
in the Court’s view, weakens the legitimacy of any expectation of privacy A.C. might have had 
when he entered the gambling arcade. However, with regard to the second and third videos, the 
Court considered that it was clear under Greek criminal law that A.C. had been entitled to an 
expectation of privacy as he had entered private spaces with a view to discussing the recorded 
incidents and for his conversations not to be recorded without his explicit consent. Lastly, the 
Court examined the severity of the sanctions, and the Court held that the sanctions imposed were 
relatively lenient, though not insignificant, and that a number of factors were taken into account 
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when imposing them, such as the applicant company’s past behaviour in relation to similar 
incidents. The Court also considers that the sanctions imposed cannot be said to have had a 
deterrent effect on the press reporting on matters of public interest. In conclusion, the Court held 
that the reasons given by the Greek authorities were “relevant” and “sufficient” to justify the 
interference in respect of the second and third videos. However, the Court held that in so far as 
the first video is concerned, the domestic authorities failed to take into account the circumstances 
under which it was obtained. The Court attached great importance to the fact that it was not 
recorded in private premises and that the interference with A.C.’s rights under Article 8 was 
therefore significantly less serious. The Court is thus of the opinion that the domestic authorities 
should have included in their assessment the fact that A.C., by entering a gambling arcade, could 
legitimately have expected his conduct to have been closely monitored and even recorded on 
camera, especially in view of the fact that he was a public figure. Thus, there has been a violation 
of Article 10 of the ECHR in respect of the first video (the Court also found a violation of Article 
6 of the ECHR over the length of the proceedings).The Court awarded the applicant EUR 33,000 
in pecuniary damage (finding the applicant had paid only EUR 100,000 of the fine imposed in 
relation to all three videos), and awarded EUR 7,000 in compensation for non‑pecuniary damage. 
• Alpha Doryforiki Tileorasi Anonymi Etairia v. Greece, no. 72562/10, 22 February 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Butkevich v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
In a case about a Ukrainian journalist being arrested during an anti-globalisation protest in 
Russia, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has clarified that the gathering of 
information is an essential preparatory step in journalism, solidly protected as a part of press 
freedom. The ECtHR recognises that the media fulfil an important task in a democratic society, 
when providing information on the authorities’ handling of public demonstrations and the 
containment of disorder. Therefore, any attempt to remove journalists from the scene of 
demonstrations must be subject to “strict scrutiny”. The ECtHR found that the arrest, prosecution 
and conviction of the journalist had violated his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 
of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR also stated that in cases relating 
to public events, there is a close link between the freedoms protected by Articles 10 (freedom of 
expression) and 11 (freedom of peaceful demonstration) of the ECHR. 
The case concerns the arrest and conviction of Maksim Aleksandrovich Butkevich, who was 
covering as a journalist an anti-globalisation protest in July 2006 in St Petersburg, during a G8 
Summit. While observing the demonstration and taking photographs - including when the police 
started to disperse the gathering and to arrest some of the participants - two police officers 
approached the journalist and ordered him to cease his “unlawful actions”. As Butkevich 
continued taking pictures, he was ordered to come in the police vehicle and was taken to and 
detained in a police station. Administrative-offence proceedings were brought against him for 
disobeying a lawful order of the police. The case was examined in an expedited procedure, and 
on the same evening as that on which the events had occurred he was heard by a judge and 
convicted as charged. He was sentenced to three days’ detention. Two days later the appeal court 
reduced this sentence to two days and ordered his release, with immediate effect. 
Butkevich lodged a complaint with the ECtHR, alleging that his administrative arrest and delayed 
release from detention had been unlawful (breach of Article 5 § 1 of the ECHR), that he had 
not been given a fair trial by an impartial court (breach of Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR), and that his 
freedom of expression had been interfered with in an unlawful and disproportionate manner by 
the Russian authorities (Article 10 of the ECHR). Third-party submissions were made by the 
Ukraine Government and by three NGOs - the Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), Article 19: 
Global Campaign for Free Expression, and the Mass Media Defence Centre. After finding breaches 
of Article 5 § 1 and Article 6 § 1 of the ECHR, the ECtHR also came to the conclusion that 
Butkevich’s rights as a journalist under Article 10 of the ECHR were violated by the Russian police 
and judiciary. 
As regards Butkevich’s pre-trial deprivation of liberty at the police station, the ECtHR considered 
that the Russian authorities had not provided any justification for the administrative arrest. Thus, 
the ECtHR concluded that this aspect of interference with the journalist’s right to freedom of 
expression had not been “prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 10 of the ECHR. 
With regard to Butkevich’s prosecution and his being sentenced to administrative detention, the 
ECtHR accepted the legality of the interference, as it had been aimed at pursuing the legitimate 
aim of prevention of disorder, but it did not accept that it had been necessary in a democratic 
society, in accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR. The ECtHR considered as a pertinent issue 
the question of whether Butkevich had identified himself as a journalist in a timely and adequate 
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manner during the demonstration and in the subsequent proceedings, but it left no doubt that 
Butkevich was to be considered as acting as a journalist during the event at issue. The fact that 
Butkevich on the day of the event had not been acting on a journalistic assignment from any 
media outlet did not influence the finding that he had been acting as a journalist, with the 
intention of collecting information and photographic material relating to a public event and to 
impart them to the public via means of mass communication. While the ECtHR noted that the 
legitimate aim of preventing disorder weighed heavily in Pentikäinen v. Finland (see IRIS 2016-
1/2), it was of the opinion that the present case was different in this respect, as there was nothing 
in the case file confirming that the demonstration had not been peaceful or that it had turned 
violent. According to the ECtHR the domestic authorities should also have questioned and 
investigated whether Butkevich’s alleged actions had been excusable or had otherwise been 
mitigated, given his argument that he had been acting as a journalist. As the ECtHR was of the 
opinion that the domestic decisions did not suggest that there had been any kind of adequate 
assessment of this aspect of the case, and as the Russian authorities have not produced any 
relevant and pertinent reasons in order to justify the prosecution and conviction of Butkevich, it 
came to the conclusion, unanimously, that the journalist’s right to gather information had been 
violated. The ECtHR lastly considered that it was not necessary in the present case to make 
further findings concerning Butkevich’s removal from the venue of the demonstration. 
In application of Article 41 of the ECHR, the ECtHR awarded Butkevich EUR 7,000 in respect of 
non‑pecuniary damage, and EUR 2,000 for costs and expenses related to the proceedings before 
the ECtHR. 
• Butkevich v. Russia, no. 5865/07, 13 February 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Ivashchenko v. Russia 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh  
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam 
On 13 February 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued its judgment in 
Ivashchenko v. Russia concerning the inspection and copying of a journalist’s laptop and storage 
devices by customs officials. The applicant in the case was a photojournalist with a photo agency, 
Photographer.ru. In early August 2009, the applicant travelled to Abkhazia to prepare a report (to 
be illustrated by photographs) on “the life of this unrecognised republic”. On 27 August 2009, the 
applicant returned to Russia, and on arrival at the Adler customs checkpoint, presented his 
Russian passport, press card and a customs declaration, stating that he had electronic 
information devices (a laptop and flash memory cards) in his luggage. The applicant was 
examined by a customs officer to verify the information contained in the applicant’s customs 
declaration by way of an “inspection procedure”. After finding in the directory of the laptop an 
electronic folder entitled “Extremism (for RR)”, which contained a number of photographs, the 
customs officer decided to copy it and other folders from the laptop for further examination by 
an expert, who could determine whether they contained any information of an extremist nature. 
34 folders (containing some 480 subfolders with over 16,300 electronic files) were copied. The 
laptop remained with a customs officer for several hours. On 9 September 2009 the applicant 
was informed that a report had been commissioned from a criminal forensics expert to determine 
whether the data copied from his laptop contained any prohibited “extremist” content. In 
December 2009 a report concluded that the data contained no extremist material. According to 
the applicant, the DVDs with his data were handed back to him in November 2011. 
The applicant applied for judicial review, challenging the actions of the customs officials. In 
January 2010, the Prikubanskiy District Court of Krasnodar dismissed his application, finding that 
the data from the applicant’s laptop had been copied for the purposes of examination, in 
compliance with Presidential Decree no. 310 on combating fascism and political extremism. On 
appeal, the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the judgment, holding that the customs inspection 
had been authorised and carried out according to official customs procedures and that the data 
had been copied in line with Russian Presidential Decree no. 310 of 23 March 1995. 
The applicant made an application to the ECtHR, claiming a violation of his right to private life 
under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Firstly, the Court held that 
there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to private life, noting the search of his 
laptop (which had lasted several hours, allegedly without any reasonable suspicion of any offence 
or unlawful conduct), the copying of his personal and professional data (followed by their being 
forwarded for a specialist assessment), and the retention of his data for some two years. In 
the Court’s view, those actions had gone beyond what could be perceived as procedures that 
were “routine”, relatively non-invasive and for which consent was usually given. The Court then 
examined whether the interference had been in accordance with the law, and in particular 
whether Russian law provided protection against arbitrariness and adequate safeguards. Firstly, 
the Court held that it did not appear that the comprehensive measure used in the present case 
had to be based on some notion of a reasonable suspicion that someone making a customs 
declaration has committed an offence - namely one arising from the anti-extremist legislation 
pertinent to the present case. The apparent lack of any need for reasonable suspicion relating to 
an offence was exacerbated by the fact that the domestic authorities (ultimately the courts at the 
judicial review stage) had not attempted to define and apply such notions as “propaganda for 
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fascism”, “social, racial, ethnic or religious enmity” to any of the ascertained facts. Secondly, the 
Court held that the domestic authorities, including the courts, had not been required to give, and 
had not given, relevant and sufficient reasons for justifying the “interference” in the present case. 
In particular, it had not been considered pertinent by the domestic authorities to ascertain 
whether the impugned measures had been taken in pursuance of any actual legitimate aim (for 
instance the ones referred to by the Government). It was merely assumed that the identification 
of possible “extremist material” was required by the 1995 Presidential decree. It was not 
considered relevant, at any stage and in any manner, that the applicant was carrying journalistic 
material. The Court concluded that Russian Government had not convincingly demonstrated that 
the relevant legislation and practice afforded adequate and effective safeguards against abuse 
in a situation of applying the sampling procedure in respect of electronic data contained in an 
electronic device. Thus, they were not “in accordance with the law”, and violated Article 8 ECHR 
(the Court also concluded that having regard to this finding, it was not necessary to examine the 
complaint under Article 10 ECHR). The Court awarded the applicant EUR 3,000 in damages, and 
EUR 1,700 for costs. 
• Ivashchenko v. Russia, no. 61064/10, 13 February 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Endy Gęsina-Torres v. Poland 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
A recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) confirms that journalists who 
are found guilty of a criminal offence during newsgathering activities cannot invoke robust 
protection based on their rights to freedom of expression and information, as guaranteed by 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Following the decisions in the 
cases of Diamant Salihu and others v. Sweden (IRIS 2016-8/1), Brambilla and others v. Italy (IRIS 
2016-9/1) and Boris Erdtmann v. Germany (IRIS 2016-9/1), the Court on this occasion dismissed 
a complaint lodged by an undercover television journalist who was fined for using forged 
documents and giving false testimony in court during proceedings concerning his placement in 
a refuge detention centre on the Polish border. 
In 2013 Endy Gęsina-Torres was working as a journalist for Polish public television. Alarmed by 
the number of reports about the alleged ill treatment of aliens in a detention centre for refugees 
run by the Border Guard Service near the town of Białystok and about the conditions there, he 
decided to draw the attention of the public to the issue by making an undercover documentary 
about conditions in the refugee centre. Arriving at the border near Bialystok he was stopped by 
police officers who wanted to check his identity papers. Gęsina-Torres told the police officers 
that he had crossed the Polish border illegally after losing his documents. He gave them a 
fictitious name and was arrested. By a subsequent judicial decision, he was placed in the Border 
Guard Service’s closed centre for aliens in Białystok. Gęsina-Torres stayed at the centre for three 
weeks, making recordings with a device placed in his watch. When his real identity was 
discovered, criminal proceedings were instituted against the journalist, and he was found guilty 
of using forged documents (by virtue of his having signed documents relating to his arrest and 
detention under a false name) and of giving false testimony (by making false statements about 
how he had illegally crossed the Polish border prior to his arrest). The Polish court was also of 
the view that Gęsina-Torres’ conduct had jeopardised the administration of justice, as the court 
that had decided to place him in the detention centre for aliens had been misled about his 
identity. The fine was set at PLN 2,000, with the court noting that Gęsina-Torres did not have any 
criminal record; he was furthermore ordered to pay court costs of PLN 300. 
Gęsina-Torres alleged before the ECtHR that finding him criminally responsible for the use of 
forged identity documents and giving false testimony in the context of investigative journalism 
had amounted to an interference with his right to freedom of expression, in breach of Article 10 
ECHR. His arguments were supported by “Article 19”, a non-governmental organisation 
intervening as a third party. According to “Article 19”, it had been long recognised that in order 
to bring important information to the public notice, journalists might have to resort to 
unconventional forms of information gathering (such as undercover reporting, when undercover 
reporting was the only way to report on situations that public authorities were trying to cover 
up). 
Although the domestic authorities did not interfere with the content of the programme, the 
ECtHR finds that Gęsina-Torres’ criminal conviction may be regarded as interfering with his rights 
under Article 10 of the ECHR. The crucial question is whether this interference could be justified 
as being “necessary in a democratic society” under the terms of Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR. 
The ECtHR reiterates that the protection afforded by Article 10 ECHR to journalists “is subject to 
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the proviso that they act in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information in 
accordance with the tenets of responsible journalism”, and that the concept of responsible 
journalism also embraces “the lawfulness of the conduct of a journalist, including, and of 
relevance to the instant case, his or her public interaction with the authorities when exercising 
journalistic functions. The fact that a journalist has breached the law in that connection is a most 
relevant, albeit not decisive, consideration when determining whether he or she has acted 
responsibly”. The ECtHR refers to “the vital role played by the media in a democratic society”, but 
it especially emphasises that “journalists cannot, in principle, be released from their duty to obey 
the ordinary criminal law on the basis that, as journalists, Article 10 affords them a cast-iron 
defence. In other words, a journalist cannot claim an exclusive immunity from criminal liability 
for the sole reason that, unlike other individuals exercising the right to freedom of expression, 
the offence in question was committed during the performance of his or her journalistic 
functions”. 
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the ECtHR noted that the investigation carried 
out by Gęsina-Torres had concerned a matter of public interest, given that allegations of harsh 
treatment in closed detention camps for refugees and of breaches of fundamental rights by staff 
clearly fell within the ambit of that notion. However, as a journalist, Gęsina-Torres knew that by 
using forged documents and a false identity he would be acting in breach of the law. The ECtHR 
was of the opinion that the breach (namely lying about his identity) was the very foundation of 
his modus operandi and was not merely an accessory element of his actions in gathering 
information. The ECtHR furthermore did not find the journalist’s argument that this was the only 
manner that he could have used to gather information about the situation in the detention 
centres convincing, as by then this kind of information was already in the public domain. In the 
ECtHR’s view, this showed that other means of gathering information had proved effective for 
disclosing and establishing facts concerning allegations of the ill-treatment of foreigners in the 
detention centres. The ECtHR was of the view that the domestic courts had been meticulous and 
that they had balanced the journalist’s freedom of expression against another important interest 
- namely the interest that a democratic society had in preserving the authority of the judiciary. 
According to the ECtHR, the Polish courts had not overstepped their margin of appreciation and 
had made use of it in good faith, carefully and reasonably. Finally, the fine imposed on the 
journalist had certainly not constituted a “harsh sentence”. Therefore, the ECtHR concluded that 
the domestic authorities, when justifying the interference concerned in the present case, had 
relied on grounds which had been both relevant and sufficient. The ECtHR found that there was 
no appearance of a violation of Article 10 ECHR and accordingly, it declared the journalist’s 
application manifestly ill-founded, and therefore inadmissible. 
• Endy Gęsina-Torres v. Poland (dec.), no. 11915/15, 15 March 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights:Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey and Şahin Alpay v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
On 20 March 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered two important 
judgments in cases brought by two prominent journalists detained in Turkey after the attempted 
coup d’état of 15 July 2016. In both cases it found a violation of the journalists’ right to freedom 
of expression. The ECtHR clarified that the existence of a “public emergency threatening the life 
of the nation” cannot serve as a pretext for limiting the freedom of political debate, which is at 
the very core of the concept of a democratic society. Even in a state of emergency the Contracting 
States must bear in mind that any measures taken should seek to protect the democratic order 
from the threats to it, and every effort must be made to safeguard the values of a democratic 
society, such as pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness.” The ECtHR is of the opinion that the 
pre-trial detention and the criminal prosecution of the journalists will inevitably have a chilling 
effect on freedom of expression by intimidating civil society and silencing dissenting voices in 
Turkey. 
Mehmet Hasan Altan is an economics professor and a journalist in Turkey. Prior to the attempted 
military coup of 15 July 2016, he presented a political discussion programme on Can Erzincan TV, 
a television channel that was closed down following the adoption of Legislative Decree no. 668, 
issued on 27 July 2016 in connection with the state of emergency that was declared by the 
Government on 20 July 2016. Şahin Alpay is a journalist who had been working for the daily 
newspaper Zaman, which was viewed by the Turkish government as the principal publication 
medium of the so-called “Gülenist” network. Zaman was also closed down in a move arising from 
the declaration of the state of emergency in Turkey. In the years leading up to the attempted 
coup, both Mehmet Hasan Altan and Şahin Alpay had been known for their critical views of the 
Government’s policies. Both journalists had been arrested and held in pre-trial detention since 
the summer of 2016. They were charged, on the basis of articles written by them and their public 
statements, with attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, the Turkish Grand National 
Assembly and the Government by force and violence, and of committing offences on behalf of a 
terrorist organisation (without actually being members of it). Mehmet Hasan Altan was sentenced 
on 16 February 2018 by the Istanbul Assize Court to aggravated life imprisonment for attempting 
to overthrow the constitutional order. 
However, the Turkish Constitutional Court in the meantime found that the journalists’ initial and 
continued pre-trial detention could not be regarded as a necessary and proportionate 
interference in a democratic society and that their pre-trial detention could have a chilling effect 
on freedom of expression and freedom of the press, in so far as it had not been based on any 
concrete evidence (see IRIS 2018-3/31). The Istanbul Assize Court has rejected the judgments of 
the Constitutional Court, and both journalists remained in prison. While the proceedings were 
still pending, both journalists lodged a complaint with the ECtHR alleging the violation of their 
rights under Article 5 (right to liberty and security), Article 10 (right to freedom of expression) 
and Article 18 (limitation on the use of restrictions on rights) of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR). The journalists were supported in their claims by the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and by a range of non-governmental 
organisations acting jointly, such as “Article 19”, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the 
European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, the European Federation of Journalists, the 
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International Federation of Journalists, the International Press Institute and Reporters Without 
Borders. 
Apart from finding a breach of Article 5 § 1 of the ECHR (specifically, the arbitrary pre-trial 
detention of the journalists, given that there had been a lack of reasonable suspicion that they 
had committed the criminal offences that they were charged with), the ECtHR came to the 
conclusion that the journalists’ right to freedom of expression had been violated by the Turkish 
authorities. The ECtHR pointed to a general problem in Turkey concerning the interpretation of 
anti- terrorism legislation by prosecutors and the competent courts, as journalists have often 
been subjected to severe measures such as detention for addressing matters of public interest. 
According to the ECtHR, views expressed that do not constitute incitement to violence and do 
not justify the commission of terrorist acts or cannot be interpreted as likely to encourage 
violence by instilling deep- seated and irrational hatred towards specified individuals should not 
be restricted with reference to the aims set out in Article 10 § 2 − namely the protection of 
territorial integrity or national security or the prevention of disorder or crime. 
The ECtHR recognises in particular the difficulties facing Turkey in the aftermath of the 
attempted military coup, as the coup attempt and other terrorist acts have clearly posed major 
threats to Turkey’s vulnerable democracy. However, the ECtHR considers that one of the principal 
characteristics of democracy is the possibility it offers of resolving problems through public 
debate, and that democracy thrives on freedom of expression. In this context, it considers that 
criticism of governments and the publication of information regarded by a country’s leaders as 
endangering national interests should not attract criminal charges for particularly serious 
offences such as belonging to or assisting a terrorist organisation, attempting to overthrow the 
Government or the constitutional order, or disseminating terrorist propaganda. Moreover, even 
where such serious charges have been brought, pre-trial detention should only be used as an 
exceptional measure of last resort when all other measures have proved incapable of fully 
guaranteeing the proper conduct of proceedings: the pre-trial detention of anyone expressing 
critical views produces a range of adverse effects, both for the detainees themselves and for 
society as a whole, since the imposition of a measure entailing deprivation of liberty will 
inevitably have a chilling effect on freedom of expression by intimidating civil society and 
silencing dissenting voices. Therefore, the ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of 
Article 10 ECHR in both cases. Only the ad hoc national judge, Judge Ergül dissented, justifying 
the interferences with the journalists rights on the basis of the state of emergency after the 
attempted military coup and the severe danger posed to the democratic constitutional order, 
public security and respect for human rights, amounting to a threat to the life of the Turkish 
nation within the meaning of Article 15 ECHR (derogation in times of emergency). He also 
referred to certain media in Turkey that have played a significant role in legitimising the actions 
that gave rise to the “despicable attempted military coup by manipulating public opinion”. 
• Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey, no. 13237/17, 20 March 2018. 
• Şahin Alpay v. Turkey, no. 16538/17, 20 March 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Sinkova v. Ukraine 
Ronan Ó Fathaigh & Dirk Voorhoof  
Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam & Human Rights Centre, Ghent 
University and Legal Human Academy 
On 27 February 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered its judgment in 
Sinkova v. Ukraine concerning a conviction for a performance-art protest at a war memorial, 
which had been filmed and published online. The performing artist was prosecuted and convicted 
of the “desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier”. The ECtHR held, by four votes to three, 
that the interference by the Ukrainian authorities with the protestor’s right to freedom of 
expression did not amount to a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR). 
The case concerns Anna Olegovna Sinkova, acting as a member of the artistic group the 
Brotherhood of St. Luke. In December 2010, Sinkova and three group members decided to protest 
“against the wasteful use of natural gas by the State while turning a blind eye to the poor living 
standards of veterans,” and staged an artistic performance at a war memorial in central Kyiv. The 
performance involved Sinkova frying eggs over the Eternal Flame at the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier. A member of the group also filmed the performance. Two police officers approached the 
group and remarked that their behaviour was “inappropriate,” but they undertook no further 
interference. 
Sinkova posted the video of her performance online as an act of protest, with the commentary 
that “precious natural gas has been burned, pointlessly, at the Memorial of Eternal Glory in Kyiv 
for fifty-three years now. This luxury costs taxpayers about 300,000 hryvnias per month.” 
Following the video’s publication, a number of complaints were made to the police. In late March 
2011, Sinkova was arrested and charged with the “desecration of the Tomb of the Unknown 
Soldier,” which is an offence under Article 297 of Ukraine’s Criminal Code. The District Court 
granted a request for Sinkova’s pre-trial detention, as she was accused of a “serious offence 
punishable by imprisonment of between three and five years.” Following three months in pre-
trial detention, Sinkova was convicted of the offence. The District Court held that Sinkova’s 
argument that her performance had not been meant to desecrate the tomb “had no impact on 
the legal classification of her actions” and the “deliberate acts” had shown “disrespect for the 
burial place of the Unknown Soldier.” The District Court imposed a three-year prison sentence, 
which was suspended for two years. The conviction was upheld on appeal, with the Kyiv City 
Court of Appeal rejecting Sinkova’s argument that there had been a violation of her right to 
freedom of expression, ruling that her conviction was “in accordance with the law and pursued a 
legitimate aim.” Sinkova subsequently made an application to the ECtHR, claiming that her pre-
trial detention had violated her right to liberty under Article 5 ECHR and that her conviction 
had violated her right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR. In respect of Article 
5, the ECtHR unanimously found three separate violations concerning her pre-trial detention, 
including a violation arising from the fact that the courts “had maintained her detention on 
grounds which cannot be regarded as sufficient,” and finding that her detention in June 2011 
“was not covered by any judicial decision.” However, in respect of Article 10, the ECtHR, by four 
votes to three, found that there had been no violation of Sinkova’s freedom of expression. 
The ECtHR judgment noted that the interference with Sinkova’s Article 10 right to freedom of 
expression had been based on the sufficiently precise criminal code provision on “desecration;” 
and that the conviction had the legitimate aim of “protecting the morals and the rights of others.” 
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The main question was whether the conviction had been “necessary in a democratic society.” The 
ECtHR held that Sinkova had been prosecuted and convicted “only” on account of her frying eggs 
over the Eternal Flame. The ECtHR pointed out that she had not been charged over the video, 
nor the content of the “rather sarcastic and provocative text” in the video. Thus, the applicant 
“was not convicted for expressing the views that she did”; rather, her conviction “was a narrow 
one in respect of particular conduct in a particular place” and based on a “general prohibition on 
contempt for the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, [which formed] part of ordinary criminal law.” 
Secondly, while the ECtHR stated that the domestic courts “paid little attention to the applicant’s 
stated motives, given their irrelevance for the legal classification of her actions,” it noted that 
the courts “did take into account the applicant’s individual circumstances in deciding on her 
sentence.” Thirdly, the ECtHR rejected Sinkova’s argument that her conduct could not be 
reasonably interpreted as contemptuous towards those the memorial honoured, with the Court 
noting that “eternal flames are a long-standing tradition in many cultures and religions most 
often aimed at commemorating a person or event of national significance.” The ECtHR held that 
there were many “suitable” opportunities for Sinkova to express her views, or participate in 
“genuine” protests, without breaking the criminal law, and without “insulting the memory of 
soldiers who perished and the feelings of veterans.” Lastly, the ECtHR examined the “nature and 
severity of the penalty,” and noted that “peaceful and non-violent forms of expression in principle 
should not be made subject to the threat of a custodial sentence.” The ECtHR, however, found 
Sinkova’s conviction acceptable and proportionate, as she was only “given a suspended sentence 
and did not serve a single day of it.” The majority thus held there had been no violation of Article 
10. 
By contrast, the dissenting ECtHR judges found a violation of Article 10, partly in the light of the 
domestic courts’ failure to address the “purpose of the applicant’s performance” and the courts’ 
disregard of the performance’s satirical nature. Furthermore, the dissenting judges noted an 
“inconsistency” in the majority’s position and the Court’s prior case-law that a suspended prison 
sentence is “likely to have a chilling effect on satirical forms of expression.” Given “the lack of 
adequate assessment by the national authorities of the applicant’s performance from the 
standpoint of Article 10 of the Convention,” and the “complete disregard of its satirical nature,” 
in addition to the “disproportionate nature of the sentence,” the dissenting judges found that 
Article 10 was violated in the present case. 
• Sinkova v. Ukraine, no. 39496/11, 27 February 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: GRA Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus v. 
Switzerland 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
In a case against Switzerland, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) strongly emphasised 
the right of a non-governmental organisation (NGO) to use robust language on its website to 
criticise a politician, and to label his discourse as racist speech. The NGO had posted a blog post 
during the heated political debate on the referendum on banning the construction of minarets in 
Switzerland, in which it referred to B.K., the president of a local branch of the Young Swiss 
People’s Party (JSVP). In a public speech, B.K. had said that the Swiss guiding culture 
(“schweizerische Leitkultur”) was based on Christianity and that minarets, as a symbolic sign of 
another culture, should not be tolerated. It was this speech and this reasoning that the NGO GRA 
Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus qualified as “verbal racism” on a blog post. 
B.K. filed a claim with the District Court for the protection of his personality rights, requesting 
that the blog post be removed from the NGO’s website and that the text be replaced with the 
court’s judgment. After the District Court had dismissed his request, the High Court found the 
blog post at issue insulting, while considering that B.K.’s speech itself had not been racist. It 
therefore ordered that the impugned article be removed from the NGO’s website and be replaced 
with the High Court’s judgment. This judgment was confirmed by the Federal Supreme Court 
finding that the speech by B.K. did not deserve to be qualified as “verbal racism” as B.K. had only 
defended his own beliefs and culture, which did not result in a blanket denigration of the 
followers of Islam or show fundamental contempt for Muslims. The Federal Supreme Court also 
explained that although political debate on important issues for society deserved a solid and 
broad right of freedom of expression, this could not justify the dissemination of untruths nor the 
publication of value judgments that did not appear to be justified with regard to the underlying 
facts. 
The ECtHR, however, did not agree with the Swiss Courts’ findings and came to the conclusion 
that the interference with the rights of GRA Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus 
amounted to a violation of the NGO’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. While 
the ECtHR accepted that the interference was prescribed by law, and that the interference 
pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation and rights of others, it found that the 
interference with the NGO’s rights not necessary in a democratic society. When examining the 
necessity of an interference in a democratic society in cases where the interests of the “protection 
of the reputation or rights of others” bring Article 8 ECHR into play, the ECtHR verified whether 
the domestic authorities struck a fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the 
Convention which may come into conflict with each other in certain cases, namely freedom of 
expression protected by Article 10 and the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8. 
The ECtHR repeated that “where the balancing exercise between those two rights has been 
undertaken by the national authorities in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court’s 
case-law, the Court would require strong reasons to substitute its view for that of the domestic 
courts”. The ECtHR had, on earlier occasions, identified a number of criteria which may come into 
play in the context of balancing the competing rights at issue. The relevant criteria thus defined 
include: contribution to a debate of public interest; the degree of notoriety of the person affected; 
the subject of the news report; the prior conduct of the person concerned; and the content, form 
and consequences of the publication. The ECtHR recalled that it had previously accepted that 
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when an NGO drew attention to matters of public interest, it was exercising a “public watchdog” 
role of similar importance to that of the press and may be characterised as a social “watchdog” 
warranting similar protection under the ECHR as that afforded to the press. 
According to the ECtHR, there was no doubt that B.K.’s speech and the NGO’s blog post concerned 
a very sensitive topic of “intense public debate in Switzerland” at the material time, while B.K. 
had willingly exposed himself to public scrutiny by stating his political views. Therefore, he had 
to show a higher degree of tolerance towards potential criticism of his statements by persons or 
organisations which did not share his views. According to the ECtHR, it could not be said that 
classifying B.K.’s speech as “verbal racism”, when it supported an initiative which had already 
been described by various organisations as discriminatory, xenophobic or racist, could be 
regarded as devoid of any factual basis. Nor could the impugned description be understood as a 
gratuitous personal attack on, or an insult to B.K. The NGO’s blog post did not refer to his private 
or family life, but to the manner in which his political speech had been perceived. In view of the 
foregoing, the impugned categorisation of B.K.’s statement as “verbal racism” on the NGO’s 
website could hardly be said to have had harmful consequences for his private or professional 
life. The ECtHR particularly disagreed with the Swiss authorities’ argument that describing 
someone’s words as “verbal racism” could be associated by the average reader with an accusation 
of an offence punishable under Swiss criminal law. The ECtHR observed that the NGO had never 
suggested that B.K.’s statements fell within the scope of the criminal offence of racial 
discrimination under Article 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code, and it referred to the NGO’s 
argument stressing the need to be able to describe an individual’s statement as racist without 
necessarily implying criminal liability. As for the nature of the interference (the order to remove 
the impugned article from the NGO’s website, to publish the conclusion of the second-instance 
court, the payment of CHF 3 335 plus tax in court fees and the reimbursement of B.K.’s legal 
costs amounting to CHF 3 830), the ECtHR was of the opinion that it may have had a “chilling 
effect” on the exercise of the NGO’s freedom of expression “as it may have discouraged it from 
pursuing its statutory aims and criticising political statements and policies in the future”. 
In the light of all of the above-mentioned considerations, the ECtHR considered that the 
arguments advanced by the Swiss Government with regard to the protection of B.K.’s personality 
rights, although relevant, could not be regarded as sufficient to justify the interference at issue. 
The domestic courts did not give due consideration to the principles and criteria laid down by 
the Court’s case law for balancing the right to respect for private life and the right to freedom of 
expression. Therefore, the ECtHR unanimously found that there had been a violation of Article 
10 ECHR. The applicant NGO is to receive EUR 35 000 from the Swiss Government in respect of 
non-pecuniary damages and to cover the costs and expenses incurred both at domestic level and 
for the proceedings before the ECtHR. 
• GRA Stiftung gegen Rassismus und Antisemitismus v. Switzerland, no. 18597/13, 9 January 
2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Hans Burkhard Nix v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
A recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) confirms the limits of freedom 
of expression in Germany in relation to the publication of Nazi- symbols. A German blogger 
complained under Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) about his 
criminal conviction for the offence of using symbols of unconstitutional organisations; however 
the ECtHR recently found no violation of his right to freedom of expression. 
The applicant, Mr Nix, has a blog in which he writes about certain matters concerning economics, 
politics and society. One of his blog posts contained a picture of former SS chief Heinrich 
Himmler in SS uniform with the badge of the Nazi party, a swastika on his front pocket and a 
swastika armband. The picture, accompanied by a quotation by Himmler, was meant to illustrate 
the blog post in which Mr Nix accused a public official of acting in a racist and discriminatory 
manner towards his daughter, who is of German-Nepalese origin, with regard to a registration 
for a vocational training course. Parts of the post were written in vulgar and offensive language. 
The Munich prosecution authorities instituted criminal proceedings against Mr Nix, charging him 
with the offence of using symbols of unconstitutional organisations. After long proceedings, Mr 
Nix was ordered to pay EUR 10 per day for a period covering 120 days in application of Article 
86a of the German Criminal Code that prohibits the publication of symbols of unconstitutional 
organisations. A constitutional request on the grounds that the Regional Court and the Court of 
Appeal had not examined his right to freedom of expression as protected by Article 5 of the 
German Basic Law, and Article 10 ECHR, was dismissed by the Federal Constitutional Court. In 
his complaint, Mr Nix referred to the case of Vajnai v. Hungary, in which the ECtHR had found 
that the applicant’s criminal conviction for wearing a red star at a demonstration constituted a 
violation of Article 10 ECHR. The Federal Constitutional Court, however, considered the 
constitutional complaint inadmissible. Finally, Mr Nix lodged a complaint before the ECtHR, 
referring to his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. He submitted, in essence, 
that the domestic courts had not taken all the circumstances of the case into account and had 
thus failed to consider that his blog post had constituted a protest against discrimination against 
children with a migrant background and against the working methods of the employment office, 
which he deemed to resemble those employed by the Nazis. 
The ECtHR reiterated that Article 10 ECHR applies to the Internet as a means of communication 
and that the publication of photographs on an Internet site falls under the right to freedom of 
expression. It considered that Mr Nix’s conviction for having displayed a picture of Himmler in 
SS uniform with a swastika armband in his blog post amounted to an interference with his right 
to freedom of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR; such interference would infringe 
the ECHR if it did not meet the requirements of Article 10 section 2. It was therefore to be 
determined whether Mr Nix’s conviction was “prescribed by law”, whether it pursued one or more 
of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and whether it was “necessary in a democratic 
society” in order to achieve those aims. 
The ECtHR noted that the purpose of Article 86a of the German Criminal Code was to prevent the 
revival of prohibited organisations and the unconstitutional ideas pursued by them, to maintain 
political peace, and to ban symbols of unconstitutional organisations in German political life. It 
therefore considered that the interference in question was in accordance with the law and 
pursued the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder. Although there is little scope under 
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Article 10 section 2 ECHR for restrictions on political expression or on debating questions of 
public interest, the ECtHR reiterated that it had always been sensitive to the historical context of 
the High Contracting Party concerned when reviewing whether there existed a pressing social 
need for interference with rights under the Convention. In the light of their historical role and 
experience, states which experienced the Nazi horrors may therefore be regarded as having a 
special moral responsibility to distance themselves from the mass atrocities perpetrated by the 
Nazis. The ECtHR considered that the legislature’s choice to criminally sanction the use of Nazi 
symbols, to ban the use of such symbols from German political life, to maintain political peace, 
and to prevent the revival of Nazism, must be seen against this background. It observed that the 
picture and symbol used in Mr Nix’s blog post could not be considered as having any meaning 
other than that of Nazi ideology, which differentiated this case from the findings on the use of 
the red star in the Vajnai v. Hungary and Fratanoló v. Hungary cases. 
The ECtHR accepted that Mr Nix had not intended to spread totalitarian propaganda, to incite 
violence, or to utter hate speech, that his expression had not resulted in intimidation, and that 
he may have intended to contribute to a debate of public interest. It noted, however, that the 
gratuitous use of the picture at issue was exactly what the provision sanctioning the use of 
symbols of unconstitutional organisations was intended to prevent; it was meant to pre-empt 
anyone becoming used to certain symbols by banning them from all means of communication. 
Having regard to the circumstances of the case, the ECtHR saw no reason to depart from the 
domestic courts’ assessment that the applicant did not clearly and obviously reject Nazi ideology 
in his blog post, and while the criminal conviction of 120 day-fines was not negligible, the ECtHR 
noted that the sentence had been reduced from a prison sentence to a fine in the course of the 
proceedings and that Mr Nix had been convicted of a similar offence only a few weeks before he 
published the blog post at issue. 
The ECtHR found, in light of all the circumstances of the case and referring to the historical 
experience of Germany, that the German authorities had adduced relevant and sufficient reasons 
and had not overstepped their margin of appreciation when interfering with Mr Nix’s right to 
freedom of expression. The interference was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and 
was thus “necessary in a democratic society”. Therefore, the application was considered 
manifestly ill-founded and was rejected as inadmissible. 
• Hans Burkhard Nix v. Germany, Application No. 35285/16, 5 April 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Stern Taulats and Roura Capellera v. Spain 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
Shortly after the majority judgment in the case of Sinkova v. Ukraine (see IRIS 2018-5/3), the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has delivered a new judgment in a case of symbolic 
speech and expressive conduct as part of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed under 
Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). The case concerns the conviction 
of two Spanish nationals, Enric Stern Taulats and Jaume Roura Capellera, for setting fire to a 
photograph of the royal couple, turned upside down, at a public demonstration held during the 
Spanish King’s official visit to the Catalan city of Girona in 2007. The ECtHR considered the act 
at issue as a political statement that did not constitute incitement to hatred or violence: 
according to the Court, an act of this type should be interpreted as the symbolic expression of 
dissatisfaction and protest. The ECtHR held that the criminal conviction of the applicants for 
insult of the Crown was not necessary in a democratic society. 
In September 2007, while the King was on an official visit to Girona, the applicants set fire to a 
large photograph of the royal couple during a public demonstration. As a result, they were 
sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment for insult to the Crown in application of Article 490 
section 3 of the Criminal Code. The penalty was subsequently replaced by a fine of EUR 2 700 
each; in the event of failure to pay the fine in whole or in part, the applicants would have to serve 
a prison term. This judgment was upheld by the Audiencia Nacional, by ten votes to six, and the 
applicants did indeed pay the fine. However, they lodged an amparo appeal with the 
Constitutional Court, which concluded, by a majority of seven to four, that the act at issue fell 
outside the scope of freedom of expression, given that the applicants had been guilty of 
incitement to hatred and violence against the King and the monarchy. It stated that “burning in 
public, in the circumstances described, the photograph or image of a person entails incitement 
to violence against the person and the institution he or she represents, encourages feelings of 
aggression against the person and expresses a threat”. 
Relying on Article 10 ECHR, the applicants complained before the ECtHR that the judgment 
finding them guilty of insult to the Crown amounted to a violation of their right to freedom of 
expression. On the same grounds, they also complained of a breach of Article 9 ECHR (freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion) read in conjunction with Article 10 ECHR. 
The ECtHR agreed that the applicants’ conviction amounted to an interference with their right to 
freedom of expression, and it considered that the interference was prescribed by law and 
pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others. 
As regards its necessity in a democratic society, the Court noted that the act at issue had been 
part of a political, rather than a personal critique of the monarchist institution in general, and of 
the Kingdom of Spain as a nation in particular. The impugned “staged event” had been part of a 
debate on the independence of Catalonia and the monarchistic structure of the state and a 
critique of the King as a symbol of the Spanish nation. Burning the picture had not constituted a 
personal attack on the King of Spain geared to insulting and vilifying his person, but a 
denunciation of what the King represented as the Head and the symbol of the state apparatus 
and the forces which, according to the applicants, had occupied Catalonia. This kind of expression 
falls within the sphere of political criticism or dissidence and corresponds to the expression of 
rejection of the monarchy as an institution. The ECtHR emphasised that the applicants had used 
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symbolical elements clearly and manifestly linked to their practical political criticism of the 
Spanish State and its monarchistic form: the effigy of the King of Spain was the symbol of the 
King as the Head of the state apparatus; using fire and turning the photograph upside down 
expressed a radical rejection or refusal, and those two elements were used as the manifestation 
of criticism of a political or other nature; and the size of the photograph appeared to have been 
intended to ensure the visibility of the act in question, which had taken place in a public square. 
The applicants’ act had therefore been one of the provocative “events” which were increasingly 
being staged to attract media attention and which merely used a certain permissible degree of 
provocation to transmit a critical message in the context of freedom of expression. 
The ECtHR also found that the applicants’ intention had not been to incite anyone to commit acts 
of violence against the King, even though the “performance” had entailed burning an image of 
the figurehead of the state. Indeed, an act of this type should be interpreted as the symbolic 
expression of dissatisfaction and protest. Even though the “staged event” had involved burning 
an image, it was a means of expressing an opinion in a debate on a public-interest issue, namely 
the institution of the monarchy. The ECtHR reiterated that freedom of expression extends to 
“information” and “ideas” that offend, shock or disturb: such are the demands of pluralism, 
tolerance and broad-mindedness, without which there would be no “democratic society”. The 
ECtHR was not convinced that the impugned act could reasonably be construed as incitement to 
hatred or violence, neither could it be considered as constituting hate speech, given the 
irrelevance of Article 17 ECHR (prohibition of abuse of rights) to the present case. Finally, the 
ECtHR pointed out that the criminal penalty imposed on the applicants - a prison sentence, to be 
executed in the event of failure to pay the fine - amounted to an interference with freedom of 
expression which had been neither proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued nor necessary in 
a democratic society. The ECtHR therefore unanimously found a violation of Article 10 ECHR, 
while it deemed unnecessary any separate consideration of the complaint under Article 9 
concerning the same facts. The applicants are to receive EUR 14 400 from the Spanish 
Government in respect of pecuniary damage and to cover costs and expenses both at domestic 
level and for the proceedings before the ECtHR. 
• Stern Taulats and Roura Capellera v. Spain, nos. 51168/15 and 51186/15, 13 March 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: ROJ TV A/S v. Denmark 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has rejected the application by the Denmark-based 
TV company ROJ TV A/S, which was convicted and deprived of its licence because some of its 
programmes were considered to have promoted the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is 
listed as a terrorist organisation within the EU and in the US, Canada and Australia. 
The case concerned the conviction of ROJ TV A/S for terrorism offences, as the Danish courts had 
found that a series of programmes broadcast by ROJ TV A/S between 2006 and 2010 had 
promoted the PKK. The Danish courts had found it established that the PKK could be considered 
a terrorist organisation within the meaning of the Danish Penal Code and that ROJ TV A/S had 
supported the PKK’s terror operations by broadcasting propaganda for the PKK. It was fined and 
its licence withdrawn. ROJ TV A/S invoked Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) by complaining that its conviction and the withdrawal of its licence had interfered with 
and violated its freedom of expression. 
The ECtHR found that the domestic courts had carefully assessed the evidence before them and 
conducted a balancing exercise, taking ROJ TV’s right to freedom of expression into account. It 
did not find any elements indicating that the Danish courts did not base their findings on an 
acceptable assessment of the relevant facts. Most importantly, the ECtHR found that the 
television station could not benefit from the protection afforded by Article 10 ECHR, as it had 
tried to employ that right for ends which were contrary to the values of the ECHR by inciting 
violence and supporting terrorist activity. Because such expressions are in violation of Article 17 
of the ECHR (prohibition on the abuse of rights), the complaint by ROJ TV A/S did not attract the 
protection of the right to freedom of expression. Under Article 17 of the ECHR “nothing in this 
Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in 
any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set 
forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.” The 
purpose of Article 17 is to make it impossible for persons, groups or organisations to derive from 
the Convention a right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at destroying any of 
the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention. The ECtHR reiterated that the decisive point 
when assessing whether statements, verbal or non-verbal, are removed from the protection of 
Article 10 by Article 17 of the ECHR is whether the statements in question are directed against 
the Convention’s underlying values - for example, by stirring up hatred or violence - and whether 
by making the statement, the author attempted to rely on the ECHR to engage in an activity or 
perform acts aimed at the destruction of the rights and freedoms laid down in it. 
The ECtHR reiterated that Article 17 ECHR is only applicable on an exceptional basis and in 
extreme cases (see Perinçek v. Switzerland, IRIS 2016-1/1). In the present case however, the 
ECtHR attached significant weight to the fact that the City Court of Copenhagen had found that 
the one-sided coverage (with repetitive incitement to participate in fighting and actions, 
incitement to join the organisation in question and its guerrillas, and the portrayal of deceased 
guerrilla members as heroes) had amounted to propaganda for the PKK, a terrorist organisation, 
and that it could not be considered to constitute only a declaration of sympathy. In addition, ROJ 
TV A/S had been financed to a significant extent by the PKK in the years 2006-2010. Furthermore, 
the High Court of Eastern Denmark had found explicitly that, having regard to the content, 
presentation and connection of the programmes of ROJ TV, the case concerned the promotion of 
Back to overview of case-law 
474 
the PKK’s terror operations. The ECHR referred to the nature of the impugned programmes, which 
included incitement to violence and support for terrorist activity (elements extensively examined 
by the national courts). It also considered the fact that the views expressed in the programmes 
of ROJ TV A/S had been disseminated to a wide audience through television broadcasting and 
that they related directly to an issue which is paramount in modern European society - the 
prevention of terrorism and terrorist-related expressions advocating the use of violence. For 
these reasons ROJ TV A/S could not, under Article 17 of the ECHR, rely on the protection afforded 
by Article 10 of the ECHR. Therefore, the ECtHR was of the opinion that ROJ TV A/S was 
attempting to deflect Article 10 of the ECHR from its real purpose by employing this right for 
ends which were clearly contrary to the values of the ECHR. Consequently, the Court found 
unanimously that, by reason of Article 17 ECHR, ROJ TV A/S could not benefit from the protection 
afforded by Article 10 of the ECHR. The ECtHR considered the application incompatible ratione 
materiae with the provisions of the Convention; accordingly, the application by ROJ TV A/S was 
rejected by the Court. The decision by the ECtHR is final. 
• ROJ TV A/S v. Denmark (dec.), no. 24683/14, 24 May 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Unifaun Theatre Productions Limited and Others v. Malta 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
On 15 May 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered a judgment regarding 
a peculiar application of the Maltese Cinema and Stage Regulations. A theatre group, Unifaun 
Theatre Productions, had been prevented from producing and performing the play Stitching, 
owing to a ban imposed by the Board for Film and Stage Classification (“the Board”). This 
interference with the theatre group’s right to freedom of expression was subsequently confirmed 
by the domestic courts, including the Constitutional Court of Malta. According to the 
Constitutional Court, the play contained several scenes that affected the morality and decency 
of the entire production, and it was within the Board’s authority to assess that in line with the 
Cinema and Stage Regulations. The Constitutional Court referred to phrases which constituted 
disparaging and insolent remarks in respect of more than one belief, towards women and towards 
the suffering of the Jews in the Second World War. In the Court’s view, the limits of decency had 
been breached by the blasphemy (an offence under Maltese law) contained within the play and 
by the vilification of the dignity of a people, a woman, children, and human beings in general, as 
well by the extreme glorification of sexual perversion. In upholding the legitimate and justified 
character of the interference with the theatre group’s freedom of expression, the Constitutional 
Court, inter alia, referred to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Otto-
Preminger-Institut v. Austria (see IRIS 1995-1/1). 
The theatre group lodged an application with the ECtHR, arguing that the complete ban on the 
production of the play Stitching was contrary to Article 10 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression. The application was joined by 
two directors of Unifaun Theatre Productions, the artistic director of the play and two actors 
engaged to perform in the above-mentioned production. 
Firstly, the ECtHR noted that the Government had not rebutted the applicants’ claim that the 
Guidelines for Film Classification (on which the ban was based) had only been cited for the first 
time in the domestic proceedings, and that the Guidelines did not meet the requisite standard of 
law in so far as they were not accessible to the public. Secondly, in so far as the domestic 
authorities had relied on the Cinema and Stage Regulations, the ECtHR was of the opinion that 
the criteria mentioned in the Regulations (such as levels of morality, decency and good general 
behaviour), left room for unfettered power, since the law did not indicate with sufficient clarity 
the scope of any discretion conferred on such authorities and the manner of its exercise. 
Thirdly, the ECtHR found that a total ban was only possible in the case of films; stage 
productions did not fall under category to which such a ban could apply. Thus, there was no legal 
basis for the impugned ban. 
On the basis of these considerations the ECtHR found that the law relied on by the Maltese 
Government was not of a sufficient quality and that the interference had been the result of a 
procedure not prescribed by law. As the interference had not been lawful within the meaning of 
the ECHR, the ECtHR deemed that it was not necessary to further determine whether the 
interference had been necessary in a democratic society. The ECtHR unanimously concluded that 
there had been a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. 
The judgment also contained a specific interpretation with regard to just satisfaction and the 
awarding of damages to victims of a violation of the ECHR under Article 41 of the ECHR. The 
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applicants claimed EUR 4 299.20 in respect of pecuniary damage, covering the fees for the 
classification exercise, the purchase of performance rights, theatre bookings, promotional 
material and advertisements, and EUR 30 000 in non-pecuniary damage. The Maltese 
Government submitted that the applicants had been well aware that they would have to obtain 
the requisite permit to perform the play; thus, the expenses that they had incurred in respect of 
the play had constituted a self-imposed business risk taken in the knowledge that the play might 
be banned. The Government also considered that a finding of a violation would constitute 
sufficient just satisfaction, and that in any event the ECtHR should not award more than EUR 3 
500 in non-pecuniary damage. 
The ECtHR was of the opinion that despite the lack of clarity in the law as to whether a total ban 
might be possible, the applicants should have waited for a decision on the specific classification 
of the play (and thus knowledge of the applicable audience) before venturing into theatre 
bookings and promotional material and advertisements. It also considered that performance 
rights are likely to be required before such a procedure is undertaken at a cost, no matter its 
outcome. Thus, the ECtHR did not discern any causal link between the violation found and the 
pecuniary damage alleged it therefore rejected this part of the claim. 
On the other hand, making its assessment on an equitable basis, the ECtHR awarded the 
applicants EUR 10 000, jointly, in respect of non-pecuniary damage. In addition, the ECtHR 
considered it reasonable to also award the applicants the sum of EUR 10 000, jointly, covering 
the costs for professional legal fees and court expenses. 
• Unifaun Theatre Productions Limited and Others v. Malta, no. 37326/13, 15 May 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Stomakhin v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
On 9 May 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered, unanimously, an 
important judgment with regard to the conditions regarding interferences by public authorities 
with extremist speech. The ECtHR found that the Russian authorities had violated Article 10 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees the right to freedom of 
(political) expression. With its judgment, the ECtHR urged governments to be cautious when 
considering what constitutes hate speech and what constitutes criticism of the authorities. 
The case concerned Boris Vladimirovich Stomakhin’s conviction for newsletter articles he had 
written on the armed conflict in Chechnya. Acting both as a journalist working for a magazine, 
but mostly as an activist (being the founder, owner, publisher and editor-in-chief of a monthly 
newsletter, Radikalnaya Politika (“Radical Politics”), Stomakhin published in 2003 a series of 
articles touching, to a great extent, on events in the Chechen Republic. The articles sharply 
criticised the Russian Government and the actions by the army there, and expressed support for 
the Chechen rebel separatist movement. According to the domestic courts, Stomakhin had 
justified extremist activities and had incited racial, national, and social hatred. He had justified 
and glorified acts of terrorism by Chechens, called for violence against the Russian people and 
declared that the Orthodox faith was an inferior one. Stomakhin argued that he had simply 
expressed his opinion on political events in Russia (in particular the conflict in Chechnya) and he 
denied supporting extremism. Stomakhin was found guilty of “having publicly appealed to 
extremist activities through the mass media” (Article 280 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code) and 
of having committed “actions aimed at inciting hatred and enmity, as well as at humiliating the 
dignity of an individual or group of individuals on the grounds of ethnicity, origin, attitude 
towards religion and membership of a social group, through the mass media” (Article 282 § 1). 
The domestic courts also concluded that the impugned texts had had a clear extremist leaning 
and had incited actions prohibited by the Federal Law on Suppression of Extremist Activities. 
Stomakhin was sentenced to five years in prison and given a three-year ban on practising 
journalism. He served the sentence in full and was released in March 2011. 
In 2007, while in prison, Stomakhin lodged an application with the ECtHR, complaining mainly 
about a violation of his right to freedom of expression. In its judgment, more than ten years later, 
the ECtHR reiterated that there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 ECHR for restrictions on 
political speech or on debate on questions of public interest and that “the limits of permissible 
criticism are wider with regard to the government than in relation to a private citizen or even 
a politician. In a democratic system the actions or omissions of the Government must be subject 
to the close scrutiny not only of the legislative and judicial authorities but also of public opinion. 
Moreover, the dominant position which the government occupies makes it necessary for it to 
display restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly where other means are 
available for replying to the unjustified attacks and criticisms of its adversaries”. The ECtHR also 
reiterated that it may be considered necessary in democratic societies to sanction or even prevent 
all forms of expression that spread, incite, promote or justify violence, hatred or intolerance, 
provided that the restrictions or penalties imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued. Turning to the wording of the texts in question, the ECtHR considered that the impugned 
statements could be divided into three groups, and it examined each group separately. The first 
group of statements had justified terrorism, vilified Russian servicemen to the extent that they 
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might have become targets for actual attack, and had praised Chechen leaders within the context 
of approving of violence. Those statements had therefore gone beyond the limits of acceptable 
criticism and the ECtHR found that the Russian courts’ treatment of them had been proportionate. 
The ECtHR also found that some of Stomakhin’s criticisms of Orthodox believers and ethnic 
Russians had incited hatred and enmity and that the Russian courts’ considerations had been 
“relevant and sufficient” to justify a conviction. 
However, the domestic courts had been too harsh in other aspects. In particular, some statements 
about the war had not gone beyond acceptable limits of criticism, which are wide when it comes 
to governments. The domestic courts had also taken other comments on Russian servicemen out 
of context, or had failed even to refer to any particular texts which, according to them, had had 
discriminatory or humiliating connotations with regard the national dignity of people practising 
the Orthodox religion. The ECtHR emphasised that it is an integral part of freedom of expression 
to seek historical truth, and that a debate on the causes of acts of particular gravity which may 
amount to war crimes or crimes against humanity should be able to take place freely. Moreover, 
it is in the nature of political speech to be controversial and often virulent, and the fact that 
statements contain hard-hitting criticism of official policy and communicate a one- sided view of 
the origin of and responsibility for the situation addressed by them is insufficient, in itself, to 
justify an interference with freedom of expression. Although some of Stomakhin’s statements 
had been admittedly quite virulent in their language and had contained strongly worded 
statements, the ECtHR discerned no elements in them other than a criticism of the Russian 
Government and its actions during the armed conflict in the Chechen Republic and held that 
however acerbic they might have appeared, those statements had not gone beyond the 
acceptable limits, given the fact that those limits are particularly wide with regard to the 
Government. Other statements had been published during an electoral campaign, a period “where 
it was particularly important that opinions and information of all kinds were permitted to 
circulate freely”. 
The ECtHR also stressed that it is vitally important that the domestic authorities adopt a cautious 
approach in determining the scope of “hate speech” crimes and strictly construe the relevant 
legal provisions in order to avoid excessive interference under the guise of action taken against 
“hate speech”, where such charges are brought for the purpose of merely criticising the 
Government, state institutions, and their policies and practices. 
Lastly, the ECtHR found that the Russian courts’ reasons for the penalty imposed on Stomakhin 
had been limited to his personality and the social danger he had presented. The ECtHR referred 
to the fact that Stomakhin had been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and banned from 
practising journalism for three years, and that he had served this sentence in full. It left open the 
question of whether a ban on the exercise of journalistic activities, as such, was compatible with 
Article 10 of the ECHR. But the punishment to five years imprisonment it considered not 
proportionate. The ECtHR observed that Stomakhin had had no criminal record and thus had 
never been convicted of any similar offence. It also found that the circulation of the newsletter 
at issue was insignificant, and that it could not be said that the incriminated statements had been 
disseminated in a form that had been impossible to ignore. On the contrary, in the present case 
the potential impact of the impugned statements had been very limited. Therefore, the ECtHR 
found the punishment of five years imprisonment “an extremely harsh measure”. Particularly 
bearing in mind the Russian authorities’ failure to demonstrate convincingly “the pressing social 
need” to interfere with Stomakhin’s freedom of expression in respect of a number of the 
impugned statements, as well as the severity of the penalty imposed on him, the ECtHR found 
that the interference in question had not been “necessary in a democratic society”, and hence 
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that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. 
• Stomakhin v. Russia, no. 52273/07, 9 May 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: M.L. and W.W. v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
Since the judgment by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the case of Google 
Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (see IRIS 2014-6/3), and the 
explicit recognition in Article 17 of the General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679) of the 
right to erasure (“the right to be forgotten - see IRIS 2018-6/7), the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has introduced and applied important principles with regard to the “right to be 
forgotten” with respect to both Article 8 (the right to respect for private life) and Article 10 (the 
right to freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In its 
judgment of 28 June 2018, the ECtHR dismissed a “right to be forgotten” application under Article 
8 in respect of online information published on German media portals concerning the conviction 
for murder of two persons, M.L. and W.W. 
The case concerned the refusal by the German Federal Court of Justice to issue an injunction 
prohibiting three different media organisations from continuing to allow Internet users access to 
documentation about a murder case, which listed the full names of the convicted murderers. In 
1993 M.L. and W.W. were convicted of murdering a popular actor and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. When they were released on probation in 2007 and 2008, M.L. and W.W. brought 
proceedings against the radio station Deutschlandradio, the weekly magazine Der Spiegel, and 
the daily newspaper Mannheimer Morgen, requesting the anonymisation of the personal data in 
the documentation on them which had appeared on those media organisations’ respective 
Internet sites. In first-instance and appeal judgments the courts granted W.L.’s and W.W.’s 
requests, considering in particular that their interest in no longer being confronted with their 
past actions so long after their convictions prevailed over the public interest in being informed. 
However, the Federal Court of Justice overturned those decisions on the grounds that insufficient 
account had been taken of the media’s right to freedom of expression and, with regard to the 
mission of the media, the public’s interest in being informed. 
Relying on Article 8 of the ECHR, M.L. and W.W. lodged an application with the ECtHR, 
complaining of a violation of their right to privacy constituted by the refusal of the German 
Federal Court of Justice to issue an injunction prohibiting the defendant media from keeping on 
their respective Internet portals personal data concerning M.L.’s and W.W.’s criminal trial and 
conviction for murder. The ECtHR considered that although it was primarily on account of search 
engines that the information about the murder case could easily be obtained by Internet users, 
the interference complained of by M.L. and W.W. resulted from the decision by the media 
organisations themselves to publish and conserve this material on their respective websites; the 
search engines hence merely amplified the scope of the interference. It also observed that M.L. 
and W.W. were not asking for the removal of the reports in question, but only that they be 
anonymised, and that rendering material anonymous was a less restrictive measure in terms of 
press freedom than the removal of an entire article. On the other hand the substantial 
contribution made by Internet archives to preserving and making available news and information 
was to be taken into account, as archives constitute an important source for education and 
historical research, particularly as they are readily accessible to the public and are generally free. 
The ECtHR confirmed that the media have the task of participating in the creation of democratic 
opinion, by making available to the public old news items that they have preserved in their 
archives. 
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The ECtHR next examined the relevant criteria applied in other cases when balancing Article 8 
and Article 10 rights, focusing on (1) the contribution to a debate of public interest, (2) the degree 
of notoriety of M.L. and W.W., (3) their prior conduct in relation to the media, and (4) the content, 
form and consequences of online reports (containing M.L. and W.W.’s names and photographs ) 
at issue. 
The ECtHR reiterated that the approach to covering any subject is a matter of journalistic 
freedom, leaving it to journalists to decide what details ought to be published, provided that 
these decisions corresponded to the profession’s ethical norms. The inclusion in a report of 
individualised information, such as the full name of the person in question, is an important aspect 
of the press’s work, especially when reporting on criminal proceedings which have attracted 
considerable attention and contributed to a debate of public interest that remains undiminished 
with the passage of time. As to how well known M.L. and W.W. were, the ECtHR observed that 
they were not simply private individuals who were unknown to the public at the time their 
request for anonymity was made. The reports in question concerned either the conduct of their 
criminal trial, or one of their requests for the reopening of that trial, and thus constituted 
information capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society. The ECtHR also noted 
that at an earlier stage, some years before their release on probation, M.L. and W.W. had 
themselves contacted the press, transmitting a number of documents while inviting journalists 
to keep the public informed about their requests to reopen the case. According to the ECtHR, this 
attitude put a different perspective on their hope of obtaining anonymity in the media reports, 
or on the right to be forgotten online. With regard to the content and form of the contested 
documentation, the ECtHR considered that the texts at issue described a judicial decision in an 
objective and non-denigrating manner, the original truthfulness or lawfulness of which had never 
been challenged. It found that the dissemination of the contested publications had been limited 
in scope, especially as some of the material was subject to restrictions such as paid access or a 
subscription. The ECtHR also referred to the fact that M.L. and W.W. did not provide information 
about any attempts made by them to contact search engine operators with a view to making it 
harder to trace information about them. 
In conclusion, having regard to the margin of appreciation left to the national authorities 
when weighing up divergent interests, the importance of maintaining the accessibility of press 
reports that have been recognised as lawful, and M.L.’s and W.W.’s conduct vis-à-vis the press, 
the ECtHR, unanimously, considered that there were no substantial grounds for it to substitute 
its view for that of the German Federal Court of Justice. Hence the ECtHR concluded that there 
had been no violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. 
• M.L. and W.W. v. Germany, nos. 60798/10 and 65599/10, 28 June 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
After the international condemnation of the Russian authorities’ targeting of the punk band Pussy 
Riot, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has found various violations of the band 
members’ rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR found 
violations under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 5 § 3 (the right 
to liberty and security) and 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the ECHR (the right to a fair trial), in relation to the 
conditions of their transportation and detention in the courthouse, their pre- trial detention, their 
treatment during the court hearings and restrictions on the legal assistance afforded to them. 
Most importantly the ECtHR found that the criminal prosecution of and prison sentence imposed 
on the Pussy Riot members constituted a breach of their freedom of expression under Article 10 
of the ECHR. The ECtHR also found a violation of Article 10 for having declared extremist and 
banned video material of the Pussy Riot available on the Internet. 
The three applicants are members of the feminist punk band, Pussy Riot: Ms Mariya Vladimirovna 
Alekhina, Ms Nadezhda Andreyevna Tolokonnikova and Ms Yekaterina Stanislavovna 
Samutsevich. The group carried out a series of impromptu performances of their songs in various 
public areas in Moscow. According to Pussy Riot, their actions and performances were a response 
to the ongoing political process in Russia, and their songs contained “clear and strongly worded 
political messages critical of the government and expressing support for feminism, the rights of 
minorities and ongoing political protests”. 
The Pussy Riot members complained to the ECtHR about their conviction and imprisonment for 
attempting to perform one of their protest songs in a Moscow cathedral in 2012. The performance 
was meant to express disapproval of the political situation in Russia at the time and of Patriarch 
Kirill, the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, who had strongly criticised the large-scale 
street protests across the country against the recently held elections. No service was taking place, 
but some people were inside the cathedral, including journalists invited by the band for the 
purposes of publicity. The performance only lasted slightly over a minute because cathedral 
guards quickly forced the band out. The band uploaded the video footage of their attempted 
performance to their website and to YouTube. The three Pussy Riot members were arrested 
shortly after the performance for “hooliganism motivated by religious hatred” and were held in 
custody and pre-trial detention for just over five months before being convicted as charged. The 
trial court found that the Pussy Riot action had been offensive and insulting. The court rejected 
the applicants’ arguments that their performance had been politically and not religiously 
motivated, and they were sentenced to one year and eleven months imprisonment. All appeals 
against this decision were dismissed. The domestic courts also ruled that the performance had 
been offensive and banned access to the “extremist” video recordings Pussy Riot had 
subsequently uploaded onto the Internet. 
With regard to the punk band’s right to freedom of expression the ECtHR reiterated that this right 
includes freedom of artistic expression, which affords the opportunity to take part in the public 
exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all kinds; the ECtHR considered 
that such an exchange of ideas by those who create and perform art was essential for a 
democratic society. The ECtHR also emphasised that opinions or artistic works, apart from being 
capable of being expressed through the media, can also be expressed through conduct. 
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In its assessment of the necessity in a democratic society of the interferences at issue, the ECtHR 
emphasised that Pussy Riot’s actions had contributed to the debate about the political situation 
in Russia and the exercise of parliamentary and presidential powers. The ECtHR reiterated that 
there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the ECHR for restrictions on political speech or debates 
on questions of public interest, and that very strong reasons are required to justify such 
restrictions. On the other hand, the ECtHR noted that Article 10 of the ECHR does not bestow any 
freedom of forum for the exercise of that right and does not create an automatic right of entry to 
private or publicly owned property. As the Pussy Riot performance had taken place in a cathedral, 
it could be considered to have violated the accepted rules of conduct in a place of religious 
worship; this conduct could have justified the imposition of certain sanctions in order to protect 
the rights of others. However, the applicants were charged with a criminal offence and sentenced 
to one year and eleven months in prison. The ECtHR noted that the applicants’ actions did not 
disrupt any religious services, and nor did they cause any injury to people inside the cathedral or 
any damage to church property. It also observed that it was unable to discern any element in the 
domestic courts’ analysis which would allow the applicants’ conduct to be deemed to constitute 
incitement to (religious) hatred. The ECtHR found that the Pussy Riot performance neither 
contained elements of violence, nor stirred up or justified violence, hatred or intolerance of 
believers, and it reiterated that, in principle, peaceful and non-violent forms of expression should 
not be made subject to the threat of the imposition of a custodial sentence. The ECtHR reiterated 
that interference with freedom of expression in the form of criminal sanctions could have a 
“chilling effect” on the exercise of that freedom. The ECtHR concluded that the domestic courts 
had failed to adduce “relevant and sufficient” reasons to justify the criminal conviction and prison 
sentence imposed on the applicants and that the sanctions were not proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued. 
With regard to the finding that the Pussy Riot video materials available on the Internet were 
“extremist” and to the placing of a ban on access to that material, the ECtHR found that the 
domestic courts had made no attempt to conduct its own analysis of the video materials in 
question; rather, it had relied solely on a report by linguistic experts, without specifying which 
particular elements of the videos were problematic under the Suppression of Extremism Act. 
The ECtHR was also of the view that a domestic court could never be in a position to provide 
“relevant and sufficient” reasons to justify interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 10 
of the ECHR without some form of judicial review based on an assessment of the arguments 
advanced by the public authority against those of the interested party. 
However, the domestic law had not allowed Pussy Riot to participate in the proceedings that led 
to the finding that their activities and material had been “extremist”; they had thus been deprived 
of any possibility to contest the allegations made by the public authority. There is no doubt that 
this kind of state action curtailing the right to freedom of expression is incompatible with Article 
10 of the ECHR. The ECtHR thus came to the conclusion that declaring Pussy Riot’s online video 
materials “extremist” and placing a ban on access to them had not met a “pressing social need” 
and had accordingly been disproportionate to the legitimate aim invoked. The interference had 
thus not been “necessary in a democratic society” and had therefore violated Article 10 of the 
ECHR. 
• Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia, no. 38004/12, 17 July 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Centrum för Rättvisa v. Sweden 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
According to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Swedish law permitting the bulk 
interception of electronic signals in Sweden for foreign intelligence purposes does not violate 
the right to privacy and correspondence under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). The ECtHR reached this conclusion after a Swedish human rights not-for-profit 
organisation, Centrum för Rättvisa (“the Centrum”), lodged a complaint with the Strasbourg Court, 
alleging that Swedish legislation and practice in the field of signals intelligence violated and 
continued to violate its privacy rights under Article 8 of the ECHR. 
“Signals intelligence” can be defined as the interception, processing, analysis and reporting of 
intelligence derived from electronic signals. These signals may be converted to text, images and 
sound. In Sweden, signals intelligence is conducted by the National Defence Radio Establishment 
(Försvarets radioanstalt - “the FRA”) and regulated by the Signals Intelligence Act. Owing to the 
nature of its function as a non-governmental organisation scrutinising the activities of state 
actors, the Centrum argued that there is a risk that those of its communication activities carried 
out by means of mobile telephones and mobile broadband had been or could be intercepted and 
examined by way of signals intelligence. The Centrum has not brought any domestic proceedings, 
contending that there was or is no effective remedy for its Convention complaints. 
The ECtHR considered that the contested legislation regulating signals intelligence establishes 
a system of secret surveillance that potentially affects all users of, for example, mobile telephone 
services and the Internet, without their being notified of such surveillance. And, because no 
domestic legal remedies provide detailed grounds in response to a complainant who suspects 
that his or her communications have been intercepted. 
In these circumstances, the ECtHR accepted that an examination of the Swedish legislation in 
abstracto is justified. It emphasised that, especially where a power vested in the executive is 
exercised in secret, the risk of arbitrariness is evident; therefore it is essential to have clear, 
detailed rules on the interception of telephone and Internet communications, especially as the 
relevant technology available is continually becoming more sophisticated. In view of the risk that 
a system of secret surveillance set up to protect national security may undermine, or even 
destroy, democracy under the cloak of defending it, the ECtHR must be satisfied that there are 
adequate and effective guarantees against abuse. Any assessment of this question must depend 
on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and duration of possible 
measures, the grounds required for ordering them, the authorities competent to authorise, carry 
out and supervise them, and the kind of remedy provided by the national law. 
As the ECtHR considered that it is clear that the Swedish law permitting signals intelligence 
pursues legitimate aims in the interest of national security, it remained to be ascertained whether 
the law is accessible and contains adequate and effective safeguards and guarantees to be 
considered “foreseeable” and “necessary in a democratic society”. 
The ECtHR found that the Swedish law indicates the scope for mandating and performing signals 
intelligence conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of the exercise thereof 
sufficient clarity, and it was satisfied that there are safeguards in place which adequately regulate 
the duration, renewal and cancellation of interception measures. Most importantly, permission 
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to undertake interception measures have to be authorised by court order, and only after a 
detailed examination; it was only permitted in respect of communications crossing the Swedish 
border and not within Sweden itself; such measures could only last for a maximum of six months; 
and any renewal required a court review. The ECtHR found that the provisions and procedures 
regulating the system of prior court authorisation, on the whole, provide important guarantees 
against abuse. Examining the legislation on storing, accessing, examining, using and destroying 
intercepted data, the ECtHR was also satisfied that it provides adequate safeguards against the 
abusive treatment of personal data and thus serves to protect individuals’ personal integrity. 
Although a certain lack of specification in the provisions regulating the communication of 
personal data to other states and international organisations gives some cause for concern with 
respect to the possible abuse of the rights of individuals, on the whole, the ECtHR considered 
that the supervisory elements in place sufficiently counterbalance these regulatory shortcomings. 
Lastly, the ECtHR agreed with the Swedish Government that the lack of notification of 
surveillance measures is compensated for by the fact that there are a number of complaint 
mechanisms available - in particular those that could be exercised via the Data Protection 
Authority, the Parliamentary Ombudsmen and the Chancellor of Justice. However, the ECtHR 
observed that the Swedish remedies available in relation to complaints relating to secret 
surveillance do not include recourse to a court, nor do they offer other effective remedies. 
Furthermore, individuals are not informed of whether their communications have actually been 
intercepted, and neither are they generally given reasoned decisions. However, it ruled that the 
total number of available remedies, although not providing a full and public response to the 
objections raised by the Centrum, must be considered sufficient in the present context, which 
concerns an abstract challenge to the signals intelligence regime itself and does not concern a 
complaint against a particular intelligence measure. In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
attaches importance to the earlier stages of supervision of the signals intelligence regime, 
including the detailed judicial examination by the Foreign Intelligence Court of the FRA’s 
requests for permits to conduct signals intelligence and the extensive and partly public 
supervision by several bodies (in particular the Foreign Intelligence Inspectorate). 
Although the ECtHR stressed that it is mindful of the potentially harmful effects that the 
operation of a signals intelligence scheme may have on the protection of privacy, it 
acknowledged the importance for national security operations of a system such as the Swedish 
one, having regard to the present-day threats being posed by global terrorism and serious cross-
border crime, as well as the increased sophistication of communications technology. The ECtHR 
was of the opinion that the Swedish system on signals intelligence reveals no significant 
shortcomings in its structure and operation and that it provides adequate and sufficient 
guarantees against arbitrariness and the risk of abuse. It therefore ruled that there had been no 
violation of Article 8 of the ECHR. 
• Centrum för rättvisa v. Sweden, no. 35252/08, 19 June 2018. 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber on 4 February 2019. 
IRIS 2018-8:1/3 
  
Back to overview of case-law 
486 
European Court of Human Rights: Gîrleanu v. Romania 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
On 26 June 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered an interesting judgment 
in support of investigative journalism, criticising the Romanian authorities’ negligence in 
allowing leaks of secret, sensitive military information. The ECtHR found that the criminal 
prosecution of a journalist and the measures taken against him for disclosing classified 
information that gave evidence of the leaks, violated the journalist’s right to freedom of 
expression as guaranteed under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The applicant is Marian Gîrleanu, a local correspondent for the national daily newspaper România 
liberă. His articles covered various fields, including investigations into the activities of the armed 
forces and the police. In a television show, examples of leaks of secret, sensitive military 
information were criticised, and it was suggested that such information could also have reached 
terrorists. During the show, it was mentioned that some daily newspapers had received classified 
secret information about military operations, but had decided not to publish it, fearing possible 
damage to national security. A few days later, the newspapers România liberă and Ziua published 
articles drawing attention to the fact that confidential information which could have threatened 
national security had been leaked from a military unit in Afghanistan under the authority of the 
Romanian Ministry of Defence. Shortly afterwards, criminal proceedings were instituted against 
Gîrleanu and four other people, including another journalist and a former member of the army, 
for disclosing classified information on national security under Article 169 of the Criminal Code, 
and for the gathering and sharing of secret or confidential information under Article 19(1) of Law 
No. 51/1991 on national security. Gîrleanu’s house was searched by the police, the hard drive of 
his computer was seized and he was taken into police custody. The next day, his pre-trial 
detention was authorised by a judge for a period of ten days, but after two days, he was released. 
Finally, he was convicted of having committed the crime proscribed by Article 19(1) of Law No. 
51/1991 and ordered to pay an administrative fine of EUR 240 and the court fees. The hard drive 
that was seized remained confiscated. Gîrleanu complained to the ECtHR that he had been 
arrested, investigated and fined for gathering and sharing secret information, and that this 
interference with his right as a journalist to gather and disclose confidential information on 
national security had infringed his rights under Article 10 ECHR. Although the fine he had been 
ordered to pay might appear to be low, he argued that the detention and criminal proceedings 
had damaged his reputation as a journalist and led to him losing his permanent employment, 
and later to his dismissal from his job with the newspaper. The journalist received support before 
the ECtHR from the Guardian News and Media, Open Society Justice Initiative and the 
International Commission of Jurists as third- party interveners. 
The ECtHR reiterated that the press exercises the vital role of “public watchdog” in imparting 
information on matters of public concern, while the gathering of information is an essential 
preparatory step in journalism and an inherent, protected part of press freedom. The ECtHR also 
referred to the concept of responsible journalism as a professional activity which enjoys the 
protection of Article 10 ECHR. That concept also embraces the lawfulness of the conduct of a 
journalist, and the fact that a journalist has breached the law is a relevant, albeit not decisive 
consideration when determining whether he or she has acted responsibly. While the interferences 
with Gîrleanu’s right to freedom of expression were prescribed by law and could be considered 
to protect national security, the ECtHR did not agree with the Romanian government’s view that 
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the interferences at issue were necessary in a democratic society. In its assessment of this crucial 
aspect, the ECtHR applied the criteria of Stoll v. Switzerland (IRIS 2008/3-2) and it analysed the 
interests at stake, the conduct of the journalist, the review of the measure by the domestic courts 
and whether the penalty imposed was proportionate. In the Court’s view, the documents in 
Gîrleanu’s possession, as well as the fact that they had been leaked from the Romanian army, 
were likely to raise questions of public interest. He had not obtained the information in question 
by unlawful means and the investigation had failed to prove that Gîrleanu had actively sought to 
obtain such information. The ECtHR also noted that the information in question had already been 
seen by other people before Gîrleanu obtained the documents, and that it was the state’s 
responsibility to organise its intelligence and military services and to train its personnel in such 
a way as to ensure that no confidential information is disclosed. The ECtHR noted that Gîrleanu 
was a journalist claiming to have made the disclosure in the context of a journalistic 
investigation, not a member of the army who collected and transmitted secret military 
information to others. The ECtHR was of the opinion that the domestic courts had not addressed 
the prosecutor’s finding that the disclosure of the information under dispute was not likely to 
endanger national security and had failed to actually verify whether the information at issue 
could indeed have posed a threat to military structures. Moreover, although Gîrleanu invoked the 
guarantees provided by Article 10 ECHR, the domestic courts did not appear to have weighed the 
interests in maintaining the confidentiality of the documents in question over the interests of a 
journalistic investigation and the public’s interest in being informed of the information leak and 
maybe even of the actual contents of the documents. Although the amount of the fine appears 
to be relatively low, the domestic courts held as established that Gîrleanu had intentionally 
committed a criminal offence against national security. In this perspective, the ECtHR reiterated 
that the fact that a person had been convicted may, in some cases, be more important than the 
minor nature of the penalty imposed. Furthermore, the sanctions against Gîrleanu had been 
imposed before publication of the secret information in question, which meant that the measures 
taken had the purpose of preventing him from publishing and sharing the secret documents he 
had in his possession. Finally, the ECtHR was of the opinion that after the de-classification of the 
documents in question and the prosecutor’s finding that they were outdated and not likely to 
endanger national security, the decision on whether to impose any sanctions against the 
applicant should have been more thoroughly weighed. Therefore, the ECtHR considered that the 
measures taken against Gîrleanu were not reasonably proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued, in view of the interests of a democratic society in ensuring and maintaining freedom of 
the press. Accordingly, the ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Gîrleanu v. Romania, no. 50376/09, 26 June 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Egill Einarsson v. Iceland (No. 2) 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
In Iceland, a person (hereafter, X) posted a critical and defamatory comment on a Facebook page, 
commenting on a recent interview given by Egill Einarsson, against whom complaints had been 
formulated concerning the rape of women. At the material time, Einarsson was a well-known 
personality in Iceland who, for years, had published articles, blogs and books and had appeared 
in films, on television and other media, under pseudonyms. Upon completion of the police 
investigation, the public prosecutor dismissed all cases against Einarsson because the evidence 
which had been gathered had not been sufficient or likely to lead to a conviction. The interview, 
with a photo of Einarsson on the cover of the magazine, initiated many reactions and a Facebook 
page was set up to encourage the editor of the magazine to remove Einarsson’s picture from its 
front page. Extensive dialogue took place on the site that day, and X posted the comment: “This 
is also not an attack on a man for saying something wrong, but for raping a teenage girl ... It is 
permissible to criticise the fact that rapists appear on the cover of publications which are 
distributed all over town ...”. A district court found X’s comment on Facebook defamatory and 
declared the statements null and void. However, it dismissed Einarsson’s claim for the imposition 
of a criminal punishment on X under the Penal Code, and it rejected the claim to have X carry 
the cost of publishing the main content and reasoning of the judgment in a newspaper. 
Furthermore, the district court did not award Einarsson non-pecuniary damage and concluded, 
finally, that each party should bear its own legal costs. These findings were confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Iceland. 
Einarsson complained to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) about a violation of his 
right to respect for his private life and reputation, as provided in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The starting point for this was indeed that the right to 
protection of one’s honour and reputation is encompassed by Article 8 ECHR of the Convention 
as part of the right to respect for private life, even if the person is criticised in a public debate. In 
order for Article 8 to come into play, the attack on personal honour and reputation must attain a 
certain level of seriousness and must have been carried out in a manner causing prejudice to the 
personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life. The ECtHR pointed out that the choice 
of the means to secure compliance with Article 8 in the sphere of inter-individual relationships 
is, in principle, a matter that falls within the contracting states’ margin of appreciation, and that 
the nature of the state’s obligation to potentially restrict to some extent the rights secured under 
Article 10 for another person depends on the particular aspect of private life that is at issue. The 
Court reiterated that where the balancing exercise between the rights under Article 8 and 10 
ECHR had been undertaken by the national authorities in conformity with the criteria laid down 
in the Court’s case law, the ECtHR would require strong reasons to substitute its view for that of 
the domestic courts. It also recalled that the member States of the Council of Europe may regulate 
questions of compensation for non-pecuniary damage differently. The ECtHR also recalled that 
domestic courts have a margin of appreciation in assessing how to remedy a finding at national 
level that a violation of the right to private life had occurred. 
With regard to the concrete circumstances of the case, the ECtHR referred to the fact that the 
district court, confirmed by the Supreme Court, had taken into account Einarsson’s previous 
behaviour; the public reputation he had made for himself; the material produced by him and its 
substance, which was often ambiguous and provocative and could be interpreted as an 
Back to overview of case-law 
489 
incitement to sexual violence; the dissemination of the comment: on a Facebook page amongst 
hundreds or thousands of other comments; and the fact that the statements were removed by X 
as soon as Einarsson had so requested. The Icelandic courts found that Einarsson had received 
“full judicial satisfaction” by the comments being declared null and void. The ECtHR found that 
it could not be held that the protection afforded to Einarsson by the Icelandic courts - finding 
that he had been defamed and declaring the statements null and void - was not effective or 
sufficient with regard to the state’s positive obligations or that the decision not to grant him 
compensation deprived Einarsson of his right to reputation and, thereby, emptied the right under 
Article 8 ECHR of its effective content. The ECtHR further noted that although the domestic courts 
had accepted to declare the impugned statements null and void, they had not accepted all of 
Einarsson’s claims. Against this background, it could not be said that the domestic courts had 
handled the issue of legal costs in a manner that appeared unreasonable or disproportionate. 
These elements were sufficient for the ECtHR to conclude that the national authorities had not 
failed in their positive obligations and had afforded Einarsson sufficient protection. Accordingly, 
there had been no violation of Article 8 ECHR. 
• Egill Einarsson v. Iceland (no. 2), no. 31221/15, 17 July 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Savva Terentyev v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
In its judgment in Savva Terentyev v. Russia, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
recognised a very high level of protection of freedom of speech concerning insulting comments 
about police officers published on a weblog. The ECtHR confirmed that some of the wording in 
the blog post was offensive, insulting and virulent, but it found that the (emotional) comments, 
as a whole, could not be seen as inciting to hatred or violence against police officers. The 
applicant in this case, Savva Terentyev, a resident of the Komi Republic of Russia, had a blog 
hosted by livejournal.com, a popular blog platform. Police action on the premises of a local 
newspaper during a pre-election period had resulted in sharp criticism on social media and 
websites. Savva Terentyev also posted a comment on his website entitled “I hate the cops, for 
fuck’s sake”. In his blog post, he compared police officers to pigs, and he went on to say that 
“only lowbrows and hoodlums - the dumbest and least educated representatives of the animal 
world” become police officers in Russia. He also suggested that it would be great “if in the centre 
of every Russian city, in the main square ... there was an oven, like at Auschwitz, in which 
ceremonially (..) infidel cops would be burnt. The people would be burning them. This would be 
the first step to cleansing society of this cop-hoodlum filth.” Soon afterwards, criminal 
proceedings were brought against Terentyev under Article 282, section 1 of the Russian Criminal 
Code. Terentyev was found guilty of “having publicly committed actions aimed at inciting hatred 
and enmity and humiliating the dignity of a group of persons on the grounds of their membership 
of a social group”. The town court found that he had “negatively [influenced] public opinion with 
the aim of inciting social hatred and enmity, escalating social conflict and controversy in society 
and awakening base instincts in people” and “[set] the community against police officers in 
calling for [their] physical extermination by ordinary people”. It considered that the crime 
committed by Terentyev was “particularly blatant and dangerous for national security [as] it [ran] 
against the fundamentals of the constitutional system and State security”. Terentyev was given 
a suspended sentence of one year’s imprisonment. He complained to the ECtHR that this criminal 
conviction had violated his right to freedom of expression, as provided in Article 10 ECHR. The 
ECtHR assumed that the interference with Terentyev’s right to freedom of expression was 
“prescribed by law” and aimed to protect the rights of others, namely Russian police personnel. 
With regard to the assessment of the question of necessity in a democratic society, the ECtHR 
first recalled that “there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 ECHR for restrictions on political 
speech or on debate on questions of public interest. It is the Court’s consistent approach to 
require very strong reasons for justifying restrictions on such debate, for broad restrictions 
imposed in individual cases would undoubtedly affect respect for the freedom of expression in 
general in the State concerned”. The ECtHR accepted that it may be necessary in democratic 
societies to sanction or even prevent forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify 
violence or hatred based on intolerance, provided that any “formalities”, “conditions”, 
“restrictions” or “penalties” imposed are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Next, the 
ECtHR examined the nature and wording of the impugned statements, the context in which they 
were published, their potential to lead to harmful consequences, and the reasons adduced by the 
Russian courts to justify the interference in question. 
The ECtHR reiterated that offensive language may fall outside the protection of freedom of 
expression if it amounts to wanton denigration; but the use of vulgar phrases in itself is not 
decisive in the assessment of an offensive expression as it may well serve merely stylistic 
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purposes: style constitutes part of the communication as the form of expression and is as such 
protected together with the substance of the ideas and information expressed. The ECtHR 
stressed that not every remark which may be perceived as offensive or insulting by particular 
individuals or their groups justifies a criminal conviction in the form of imprisonment. It is only 
through careful examination of the context in which the insulting or aggressive words appear 
that one can draw a meaningful distinction between shocking and offensive language which is 
protected by Article 10 ECHR and that which forfeits its right to tolerance in a democratic society. 
The key issue in the present case was whether Terentyev’s statements, when read as a whole and 
in their context, could be seen as promoting violence, hatred or intolerance. It was also 
emphasised that the statements had raised the issue of the alleged involvement of the police in 
silencing and oppressing political opposition during the period of an electoral campaign and 
therefore touched upon a matter of general and public concern, a sphere in which restrictions of 
freedom of expression are to be strictly construed. With regard to the content of the statements, 
the ECtHR noted that the passage about “[ceremonial]” incineration of “infidel cops” in 
“Auschwitz-[like]” ovens was particularly aggressive and hostile in tone. However, contrary to the 
domestic courts’ construal, it was not convinced that that passage could actually be interpreted 
as a call for “[the police officers’] physical extermination by ordinary people”. Rather, it was used 
as a provocative metaphor, which frantically affirmed Terentyev’s wish to see the police 
“cleansed” of corrupt and abusive officers (“infidel cops). It is furthermore of relevance that the 
remarks in Terentyev’s blog did not personally attack any identifiable police officers, but rather 
concerned the police as a public institution. A certain degree of immoderation may be acceptable, 
particularly where it involves a reaction to what is perceived as the unjustified or unlawful 
conduct of civil servants. In the Court’s view, as a member of the state’s security forces, the police 
should display a particularly high degree of tolerance to offensive speech, unless such 
inflammatory speech is likely to provoke imminent unlawful actions in respect of its personnel 
and expose them to a real risk of physical violence. The ECtHR was not convinced that Terentyev’s 
comment was likely to encourage violence capable of putting the Russian police officers at risk. 
Furthermore, his blog had only a minor impact, as it drew seemingly very little public attention, 
and the comments had remained online for only one month, as Terentyev removed them from 
the Internet after he found out the reasons for a criminal case being brought against him. Finally, 
the Court reiterated that a criminal conviction is a serious sanction; moreover, the imposition of 
a prison sentence for an offence in the area of a debate on an issue of legitimate public interest 
is compatible with freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 ECHR only in exceptional 
circumstances, notably where other fundamental rights have been seriously impaired, as, for 
example, in the case of hate speech or incitement to violence. The ECtHR was not convinced that 
Terentyev’s comment had the potential to provoke any violence with regard to the Russian police 
officers, thus posing a clear and imminent danger which required his criminal prosecution and 
conviction. The ECtHR stressed “that it is vitally important that criminal law provisions directed 
against expressions that stir up, promote or justify violence, hatred or intolerance clearly and 
precisely define the scope of relevant offences, and that those provisions be strictly construed in 
order to avoid a situation where the State’s discretion to prosecute for such offences becomes 
too broad and potentially subject to abuse through selective enforcement”. On the basis of these 
considerations, the ECtHR came to the conclusion that Terentyev’s criminal conviction did not 
meet a “pressing social need” and was disproportionate to the legitimate aim invoked. The 
interference was thus not “necessary in a democratic society” and accordingly violated Article 10 
ECHR. 
• Savva Terentyev v. Russia, no. 10692/09, 28 August 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
A short time after the judgment in Centrum för Rättvisa v. Sweden (see IRIS 2018- 8/3), the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has delivered a new judgment on the bulk interception 
of communications and intelligence sharing. This time, the ECtHR has found several violations 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the United Kingdom’s regime for bulk 
interception of communications, including a violation of the right of journalists to protect their 
sources. It is important, however, to underscore that the UK has updated its surveillance rules 
under new legislation, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016), which has not yet fully 
come into force. The ECtHR did not examine the new legislation in its judgment of 13 September 
2018. 
The judgment in the case of Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom deals with a 
complex set of statutory laws, codes of conduct, procedures and monitoring instruments on the 
bulk interception of communications, intelligence sharing and requesting data from 
communications service providers. The judgment counts 204 pages, including separate opinions, 
though with a very helpful structure produced by the ECtHR itself, accompanied by an instructive 
press release and even an explanatory Q&A-document as “a tool for the press”. 
The applications with the Strasbourg Court were lodged by organisations and individuals who 
actively campaign on issues of civil liberties; by a newsgathering organisation; and by a journalist 
complaining about the scope and magnitude of the electronic surveillance programmes operated 
by the UK Government. The applications were lodged after Edward Snowden, a former US 
National Security Agency (NSA) contractor, revealed the existence of surveillance and 
intelligence- sharing programmes operated by the intelligence services of the United States and 
the UK. The applicants believed that the nature of their activities meant that their electronic 
communications and/or communications data were likely to have been intercepted or obtained 
by the UK intelligence services. 
The ECtHR expressly recognised the severity of the threats currently facing many contracting 
states, including the scourge of global terrorism and other serious crime, such as drug trafficking, 
human trafficking, the sexual exploitation of children and cybercrime. It also recognised that 
advancements in technology have made it easier for terrorists and criminals to evade detection 
on the Internet. It therefore held that states should enjoy broad discretion in choosing how best 
to protect national security. Consequently, a state may operate a bulk interception regime if it 
considers it necessary in the interests of national security. However, the ECtHR does not ignore 
the fact that surveillance regimes have the potential to be abused, with serious consequences 
for individual privacy. In order to minimise this risk, the ECtHR reiterated that six minimum 
safeguards must exist. These safeguards are that the national law must clearly indicate: the 
nature of offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the categories of 
people liable to have their communications intercepted; a limit on the duration of interception; 
the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions 
to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which 
intercepted data may or must be erased or destroyed. 
With regard to the bulk interception of communications, the ECtHR came to the conclusion that 
the UK intelligence services take their Convention obligations seriously and do not abuse their 
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powers; however, it considered that there was inadequate independent oversight of the selection 
and search processes involved in the operation, in particular when it came to selecting the 
Internet bearers for interception and choosing the selectors and search criteria used to filter and 
select intercepted communications for examination. Furthermore, there were no real safeguards 
applicable to the selection of related communications data for examination, even though this 
data could reveal a great deal about a person’s habits and contacts. The ECtHR also referred to a 
wide range of possibilities for public bodies to request access to communications data from 
communications companies in various ill-defined circumstances. According to the ECtHR, the 
legal regime in the UK allowing access to data held by communications service providers was 
not limited to the purpose of combatting “serious crime”, and there were no sufficient guarantees 
to prior review by a court or independent administrative body. Therefore, the ECtHR came to the 
conclusion that Article 8 of the ECHR was being breached. 
On the issue of requesting intelligence from foreign intelligence agencies, the ECtHR found that 
the regulatory provisions in the UK were formulated with sufficient clarity in the domestic law 
and in the relevant code of practice. As there was no evidence of any significant shortcomings in 
the application and operation of the regime, or evidence of any abuse, the ECtHR found no 
violation of Article 8 of the ECHR on this matter. 
The specific complaint with regard to Article 10 of the ECHR by the Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism and the journalist Alice Ross, supported by third party interventions submitted by the 
National Union of Journalists, the International Federation of Journalists, the Media Lawyers’ 
Association and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, led to the finding that the bulk 
surveillance regimes in the UK did not provide sufficient protection for journalistic sources or 
confidential journalistic material. The ECtHR reiterated that the protection of journalistic sources 
is one of the cornerstones of freedom of the press, and that interference cannot be compatible 
with Article 10 of the ECHR unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public 
interest. Carrying out searches at a journalist’s home and workplace with a view to uncovering 
his or her sources, even if unproductive, constitutes a more drastic measure than an order to 
divulge the source’s identity, since investigators who raid a journalist’s workplace have access to 
all the documentation held by the journalist. Therefore special consideration is to be given to the 
interception of communications that involve confidential journalistic material and confidential 
personal information. The ECtHR expressed particular concern about the absence of any 
published safeguards in the UK relating both to the circumstances in which confidential 
journalistic material could be selected intentionally for examination, and to the protection of 
confidentiality where it had been selected, either intentionally or otherwise, for examination. In 
view of the potential chilling effect that any perceived interference with the confidentiality of 
their communications and, in particular, their sources might have on the freedom of the press 
and, in the absence of any published arrangements limiting the intelligence services’ ability to 
search and examine such material other than where “it was justified by an overriding requirement 
in the public interest”, the ECtHR found the bulk interception regime in violation of Article 10 of 
the ECHR. With regard to the requests for data from communications service providers, yet again, 
the ECtHR did not find sufficient guarantees to protect journalists’ sources: the relevant 
safeguards do not apply in every case where there is a request for a journalist’s communications 
data, or where collateral intrusion is likely. In addition, there are no special provisions restricting 
access for the purpose of combatting “serious crime”. As a consequence, the ECtHR also found a 
violation of journalists’ rights under Article 10 of the ECHR in respect of the regime for data 
requests from communication service providers. 
• Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 58170/13 and 2 others, 13 
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September 2018. 
Editor’s note: This case was referred to the Grand Chamber on 4 February 2019. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Annen (No. 2 and 5) v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
Yet again, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been requested to balance the right 
to reputation and the right to freedom of expression with regard to Internet content. The cases 
of Annen v. Germany are about a series of interferences with the right to freedom of expression 
of Klaus Günter Annen, a campaigner against abortion who also operates an anti-abortion 
website. While the other cases deal with distributing leaflets and campaigning in the immediate 
vicinity of medical practices and clinics where abortions are performed, two of the cases concern 
injunctions against Annen, as well as a judicial order to pay damages for the violation of the 
personality rights of doctors performing abortions who had been accused by Annen of 
“aggravated murder”. Annen’s website had also associated one of the medical doctors with the 
Third Reich, equating abortions with the crimes of the Third Reich and stigmatising the doctor 
as a murderer. 
Annen lodged a complaint with the ECtHR, arguing that the injunctions and the order to pay 
damages had violated his freedom of expression as provided in Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). At the outset, the ECtHR considered that it was not in 
dispute that the injunction and the order to pay damages interfered with Annen’s right to freedom 
of expression, that the interferences were prescribed by German law (Articles 823 and 1004 of 
the Civil Code), and that they pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others. 
Therefore, it remained to be determined whether the interferences by the German judicial 
authorities were ‘necessary in a democratic society’. The ECtHR reiterated that when examining 
whether there is a need for an interference with freedom of expression in a democratic society 
in the interests of the “protection of the reputation or rights of others”, it may be required to 
ascertain whether the domestic authorities have struck a fair balance when protecting two values 
guaranteed by the ECHR which may come into conflict with one another in certain cases, namely 
on the one hand freedom of expression protected by Article 10, and on the other the right to 
respect for private life and the right to reputation enshrined in Article 8. 
The ECtHR referred to the wording on Annen’s website and agreed with the findings by the 
domestic courts that the website contained the general statement that abortions, as performed 
by the named doctors, were acts of aggravated murder. According to the ECtHR, these accusations 
had no factual basis, as Article 218A of the Criminal Code exempts doctors from criminal liability 
and there is no domestic case law or other evidence in domestic law supporting Annen’s claim. 
The ECtHR also noted that these accusations were not only very serious, something reflected in 
the fact that a conviction for aggravated murder would carry a life sentence, but that they 
might also incite to hatred and aggression. The ECtHR, in Annen No. 5, further observed that the 
domestic courts additionally justified the injunction and the order to pay damages by Annen’s 
comparison of abortion with the Holocaust and the atrocities under the Nazi regime. It agreed 
with the findings of the domestic courts that Annen had equated the medical activities of the 
named doctor to the utterly unjustifiable atrocities inflicted on Jews under the Nazi regime. It 
reiterated that the impact an expression of opinion has on another person’s personality rights 
cannot be detached from the historical and social context in which the statement was made and 
that references to the Holocaust must be seen in the specific context of German history. 
Lastly, the ECtHR observed that Annen had not been criminally prosecuted or convicted for 
slander and that he had not been prevented from campaigning against abortions in general. 
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Indeed, Annen had only been prohibited from describing abortions, as performed by the named 
doctors, as aggravated murder, and therefore from implying that they were committing that 
criminal offence. As far as damages were concerned, the ECtHR observed that the domestic courts 
had elaborated in detail why the violations of the doctor’s personality rights had been particularly 
serious and why they had considered damages appropriate. On these grounds, the ECtHR 
concluded that the injunction and the order to pay damages were not disproportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued, and that the reasons given by the domestic courts were relevant and 
sufficient. The interference with Annen’s right to freedom of expression could therefore 
reasonably be regarded as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation 
and rights of the named doctors. Accordingly, in both judgments, the ECtHR found no violation 
of Article 10 of the ECHR. 
• Annen v. Germany (no. 2), no. 3682/10, 20 September 2018. 
• Annen v. Germany (no. 5), no. 70693/11, 20 September 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: E.S. v. Austria 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
Over the last 25 years the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been regularly asked to 
decide whether specific interferences with certain forms of religion, or specifically worded insults 
directed at a religion or the spreading of religious enmity were protected under the right to 
freedom of expression established by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) (see, inter alia, Otto-Preminger Institut v. Austria, IRIS 1995-1/1; Wingrove v. the United 
Kingdom, IRIS 1997-1/8; I.A. v. Turkey, IRIS 2005-10/3; Giniewski v. France, IRIS 2006-4/1; Tatlav 
v. Turkey, IRIS 2006-7/2; Klein v. Slovakia, IRIS 2007-1/1; Fouad Belkacem v. Belgium, IRIS 2017-
9/1; and Mariya Alekhina and Others v. Russia (Pussy Riot), IRIS 2018-8/2). In line with its earlier 
case law the ECtHR recently reiterated that expressions that seek to spread, incite or justify 
hatred on the basis of intolerance (including religious intolerance) do not enjoy the protection 
afforded by Article 10 of the ECHR. The ECtHR confirms that people with a religious conviction - 
irrespective of whether they belong to a religious majority or a minority - cannot expect to be 
exempt from criticism and must tolerate and accept the denial by others of their religious beliefs 
and even the propagation by others of doctrines hostile to their faith. However, expressions that 
go beyond the limits of a critical denial of other people’s religious beliefs and are likely to incite 
religious intolerance - for example in the event of an improper or even abusive attack on an 
object of religious veneration - may be legitimately considered as incompatible with respect for 
the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as protected by Article 9 ECHR. In such 
situations the state can take proportionate restrictive measures. According to the ECtHR, there is 
a general requirement to ensure the peaceful enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under Article 
9 of the ECHR by the holders of such beliefs - including a duty to avoid as far as possible an 
expression that is, in regard to objects of veneration, gratuitously offensive to others and profane. 
In the case of E.S. v. Austria the ECtHR decided on whether a criminal conviction was necessary 
in respect of someone found guilty of disparaging religious doctrines in application of Article 188 
of the Austrian Criminal Code. The applicant, E.S., held seminars entitled “Basic Information on 
Islam” at the right- wing Freedom Party Education Institute. At one such seminar, referring to the 
marriage that Muhammad concluded with Aisha, a six-year old, and consummated when she was 
aged nine, she stated, inter alia, that “Muhammad liked to do it with children”. And she added: 
“What do you call that? Give me an example? What do we call it, if it is not paedophilia?” An 
undercover journalist who attended the seminar recorded these statements and requested that 
a preliminary investigation be opened against E.S. The Vienna Public Prosecutor brought charges 
against E.S., which eventually led to her criminal conviction for disparagement of religious 
precepts, pursuant to Article 188 of the Criminal Code. She was sentenced to pay a fine of EUR 
480, or to serve 60 days’ imprisonment in the event that she failed to pay the fine. 
E.S. complained to the ECtHR that this conviction had violated her right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10 of the ECHR. She stressed that by stating that Muhammad had had sexual 
intercourse with a nine-year-old, she had cited a historically proven fact and questioned whether 
this could be regarded as paedophilia. Furthermore, through the impugned statements, she had 
expressed criticism concerning Islam, within the framework of an objective and lively discussion, 
which the domestic courts had failed to take into account. In essence, 
E.S. argued that the impugned statements had formed part of a criticism of a religion, 
contributing to a public debate, without the aim of defaming the Prophet of Islam. 
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The ECtHR, however, was of the opinion that the Austrian courts had extensively explained why 
they considered that the statements uttered by E.S. had been capable of arousing justified 
indignation, as they had not been made in an objective manner aimed at contributing to a debate 
of public interest, but in a manner that could only be understood as being intended to 
demonstrate that Muhammad was not a worthy subject of worship. The domestic courts found 
that 
(i) E.S. had subjectively labeled Muhammad as someone whose general sexual preference was 
that of paedophilia, and (ii) she had failed to neutrally inform her audience of the relevant 
historical background - consequently there could have been no serious debate on the issue. The 
ECtHR also referred to its findings in other cases where the impugned statements had not only 
offended or shocked, or had expressed a “provocative” opinion, but had amounted to an abusive 
attack on a religious group. In such cases a criminal conviction was considered necessary in order 
to protect the freedom of religion of others. Indeed, owing to their positive obligations under 
Article 9 of the ECHR, member states’ authorities are to enable the peaceful co-existence of 
religious and non-religious groups and individuals under their jurisdiction by ensuring an 
atmosphere of mutual tolerance. The ECtHR agrees with the Austrian courts’ approach - that is 
to say, that presenting objects of religious worship in a provocative way capable of hurting the 
feelings of the followers of that religion could be conceived as a malicious violation of the spirit 
of tolerance, which is one of the bases of a democratic society. Furthermore, the fine imposed 
was at the lower end of the statutory range of punishments, and could therefore not be 
considered as constituting a disproportionately severe sanction. In conclusion, the ECtHR found 
that the Austrian courts had comprehensively assessed the wider context of E.S.’s statements, 
and carefully balanced her right to freedom of expression with the rights of others to have their 
religious feelings protected and the need to have religious peace preserved in Austrian society. 
By considering the impugned statements as going beyond the permissible limits and containing 
elements of incitement to religious intolerance, the Austrian courts put forward relevant and 
sufficient justification for the interference with E.S.’s rights under Article 10 ECHR. Hence the 
interference corresponded to a pressing social need and was proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued, and the domestic courts did not overstep their wide margin of appreciation when 
convicting E.S. of disparaging religious doctrines. Accordingly, the ECtHR finds that there has 
been no violation of Article 10 of the ECHR. 
• E.S. v. Austria, no. 38450/12, 25 October 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Annen (No. 6) v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
In a new judgment with regard to Internet content, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
found that a criminal conviction for insult was a justified interference with the right to freedom 
of expression as guaranteed under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The case of Annen (No. 6) v. Germany concerns a conviction for posting a press release 
on the Internet and distributing leaflets with insulting statements about a German professor at 
the University of Bonn, professor B., who was conducting embryonic stem cell research. Annen is 
a campaigner against abortion and operates an anti-abortion website. In line with the criticism 
of a catholic Bishop, Annen referred to the similarity between the team of scientists around 
professor B. carrying out stem cell research and the Nazis who had performed experiments on 
humans. The text mentioned that professor B. ‘uses embryos - people - that were murdered in 
Israel and then sold to Germany for significant sums of money for research purposes at the 
University of Bonn. During Nazi times, German scientists performed research experiments on Jews 
and then murdered them’. Annen’s press release also expressed the opinion that the professors 
of Bonn University ‘appear to have forgotten that these experiments were performed in Nazi 
times by willing doctors and scientists. These doctors and scientists, who were clearly in bondage 
to the rogue State and subservient to it, also carried out their research solely ‘for the good of the 
people’. The research performed during the Nazi regime took place at a later stage of human life. 
The present-day research takes place at an earlier stage of human life.’ 
Annen was convicted of insult and sentenced to a penalty of thirty daily fines of EUR 15 each. 
This sentence was imposed by a district court and later confirmed by the regional court. The 
German courts acknowledged Annen’s right to freedom of expression and to impart to others his 
beliefs that the fusion of an egg and a sperm represented the beginning of human life and that 
research using imported stem cells from terminated embryos involved the destruction of human 
life. They also acknowledged that his statements contributed to a debate of public interest. The 
courts however found that referring to professor B. by name and to the criminal and 
dehumanising medical experiments under the Nazi-regime had been equivalent to linking his 
professional conduct to the atrocities committed by the Nazis, which represented a serious 
infringement of his personality. After exhausting all national remedies in Germany, Annen 
complained to the ECtHR that his criminal conviction for insult had violated his right to freedom 
of expression as provided in Article 10 ECHR. 
At the outset, the ECtHR observed that the criminal conviction interfered with Annen’s right to 
freedom of expression, that it was prescribed by law - namely Article 185 of the Criminal Code - 
and that it pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the reputation or rights of others. It therefore 
remained to be determined whether the interferences were ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
It further reiterated that the right to protection of reputation is guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR as 
part of the right to respect for private life, and that in order for Article 8 ECHR to come into play, 
an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and be made in a 
manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to respect for private life. The ECtHR 
also repeated that it had to ascertain whether the domestic authorities had struck a fair balance 
when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with 
each other in certain cases, namely on the one hand freedom of expression protected by Article 
10 ECHR, and on the other the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8 ECHR. It also 
Back to overview of case-law 
501 
emphasised that a clear distinction had to be made between criticism and insult: ‘If the sole 
intent of a particular form of expression is to insult a person, an appropriate sanction would not, 
in principle, constitute a violation of Article 10 ECHR’. The ECtHR referred in particular to some 
statements in Annen’s press release expressing a comparison between modern-day stem cell 
research and experiments carried out on humans during the Nazi regime, with a reference to 
Auschwitz. Given these statements, the ECtHR saw no reason to call into question the domestic 
courts’ conclusion that Annen did indeed directly link the work of the scientists - and in particular 
of professor B. - to the atrocities committed during Nazi times. Even if, as in the instant case, 
regarded as value judgment, such serious and particularly offensive comparisons demand a 
particularly solid factual basis. While the ECtHR accepted that the moral responsibility of 
scientists was the issue discussed, this alone did not provide a solid factual basis for personally 
targeting professor B.’s scientific work. The ECtHR found the comparison with the Nazi atrocities 
not only shocking and disturbing, but also transgressing the limits of any acceptable criticism. It 
found that even though the intention behind Annen’s press release was not mainly to defame the 
scientists, by naming professor B. it still had a stigmatising and defaming effect. Furthermore, in 
the German historical context, the attack on professor B.’s reputation was serious. 
Notwithstanding the fact that Annen’s statements sought to contribute to a public debate and 
that professor B. had entered the public stage to a certain degree, the ECtHR concluded that the 
German courts had provided relevant and sufficient reasons for the criminal conviction of Annen. 
It found that the decisions by the domestic courts were based on a reasonable assessment of the 
statements in question, the rights of professor B. and of the circumstances of the present case. 
Lastly, the ECtHR observed that the sanction was criminal in nature, which is - in view of the 
existence of other means of intervention and rebuttal, particularly through civil remedies - one 
of the most serious forms of interference with the right to freedom of expression. The ECtHR 
recalled that criminal sanctions for insult or defamation must not be such as to dissuade the 
press or others who engage in public debate from taking part in the discussion of matters of 
legitimate public concern. The ECtHR noted however that Annen was sentenced (only) to a 
penalty of 30 daily fines of EUR 15 each and thereby to a sentence at the lower end of the 
possible criminal sanctions for insult. The ECtHR found this penalty moderate, having regard to 
the seriousness of the violations of professor B.’s personality rights and the nature of the 
personalised attacks, when seen in the historical context. Therefore, there had been no violation 
of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Annen v. Germany (no. 6), no. 3779/11, 18 October 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Magyar Jeti Zrt v. Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
On 4 December 2018 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) issued, unanimously, another 
landmark judgment on freedom of expression in the digital world (see also [Ed.: Delfi] IRIS 2015-
7/1, [Ed.: Cengiz & others] IRIS 2016-2/1, [Ed.: MTE & Index] IRIS 2016-3/2, [Ed.: M.L. & W.W.] 
IRIS 2018-8/1 IRIS 2018-10/1). In the case of Magyar Jeti Zrt v. Hungary the ECtHR made clear 
that automatically holding media companies liable for defamatory content hyperlinked in their 
reports violates the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). In its judgment the ECtHR emphasised that the very purpose of 
hyperlinks was to allow Internet users to navigate to and from online material and to contribute 
to the smooth operation of the Internet by rendering different pieces of information accessible 
by linking them to each other. Accordingly, the ECtHR cannot accept the strict or objective 
liability of media platforms that embed, in their editorial content, a hyperlink to defamatory or 
other illegal content. The ECtHR found that such an objective liability “may have foreseeable 
negative consequences on the flow of information on the Internet, impelling article authors and 
publishers to refrain altogether from hyperlinking to material over whose changeable content 
they have no control. This may have, directly or indirectly, a chilling effect on freedom of 
expression on the Internet”. The ECtHR did, however, not exclude the possibility that, “in certain 
particular constellations of elements”, the posting of a hyperlink could potentially engage the 
question of liability - for instance, where a journalist does not act in good faith and in accordance 
with the ethics of journalism and with the diligence expected in responsible journalism. 
In September 2013 the Hungarian media platform 444.hu, which is operated by the company 
Magyar Jeti Zrt, published an article about an incident in which a group of apparently drunk 
football supporters had made racist remarks in front of an elementary school in Konyár, whose 
pupils are predominately of Roma origin. In an interview later that day, the head of a local Roma 
organisation asserted that the football supporters were associate with Jobbik, a right-wing 
political party in Hungary which has been criticised in the past for its anti-Roma and anti- Semitic 
stance. The interview was uploaded to YouTube.com by another media outlet. The article on 
444.hu included a hyperlink to that interview on YouTube. Jobbik brought proceedings against 
eight defendants, including the Roma community leader, Magyar Jeti Zrt and other media outlets 
who had provided links to the impugned video. Jobbit argued that by using the term “Jobbik” to 
describe the football supporters and by publishing a hyperlink to the YouTube video, the 
defendants had infringed its right to reputation. The Hungarian courts upheld the plaintiff’s claim, 
finding that the statements in the video had indeed falsely conveyed the impression that Jobbik 
had been involved in the incident in Konyár. Magyar Jeti Zrt was considered “objectively liable” 
for disseminating defamatory statements, having infringed the political party’s right to 
reputation, and was ordered by the court to publish excerpts of the judgment on the 444.hu 
website and to remove the hyperlink to the YouTube video from the online article. This finding 
was finally confirmed by a judgment issued by the Hungarian Constitutional Court on 19 
December 2017. 
Magyar Jeti Zrt complained under Article 10 ECHR that the Hungarian courts had unduly restricted 
its freedom of expression by finding it liable for the posting of a hyperlink leading to defamatory 
content. The application lodged with the ECtHR was supported by an impressive group of third-
party interveners, including the European Publishers’ Council, the Newspaper Association of 
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America, Index on Censorship, Article 19 and European Digital Rights.After referring to the 
general principles related to interferences with the right freedom of expression that are upheld 
by the Court’s case law, the ECtHR scrutinised the question of whether or not the interference at 
issue had been necessary in a democratic society. The ECtHR explicitly referred to the importance 
of online freedom of expression and to the important role of the Internet in enhancing the 
public’s access to news and in facilitating the dissemination of information in general, without 
neglecting “the risk of harm posed by content and communications on the Internet to the exercise 
and enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, particularly the right to respect for private life”, 
which includes the right to reputation. The ECtHR is of the opinion that hyperlinks, as a technique 
of reporting, are essentially different from traditional acts of publication. Indeed, hyperlinks 
merely direct users to content available elsewhere on the Internet: they do not present the linked 
statements to the audience or communicate its content, but only serve to call readers’ attention 
to the existence of material on another website. Another distinguishing feature of hyperlinks, 
compared to acts involving the dissemination of information, is that a person referring to 
information through a hyperlink does not exercise control over the content of the website to 
which a hyperlink enables access, and which might be changed after the creation of the link. 
Additionally, the content behind the hyperlink has already been made available by the initial 
publisher on the website to which it leads, providing unrestricted access to the public. Given the 
particularities of hyperlinks, the ECtHR cannot agree with the approach of the Hungarian courts, 
which consists of equating the mere posting of a hyperlink with the dissemination of the 
defamatory information, thus automatically giving rise to liability in respect of the content itself. 
The ECtHR considers that the issue of whether the posting of a hyperlink may give rise to such 
liability requires an individual assessment in each case, regard being had to a number of 
elements. 
The ECtHR identified he following questions as relevant to an analysis of the liability of the 
publisher of a hyperlink: (i) Did the journalist endorse the impugned content? (ii) Did the 
journalist republished the impugned content (without endorsing it)? (iii) Did the journalist merely 
put a hyperlink to the impugned content (without endorsing or repeating it)? (iv) Did the 
journalist know (or could he or she have reasonably known) that the impugned content was 
defamatory or otherwise unlawful? (v) Did the journalist act in good faith, respect the ethics of 
journalism and undertake the due diligence expected in the practice of responsible journalism? 
After assessing these aspects, the ECtHR considers that 444.hu has embedded a hyperlink without 
repeating or endorsing the content of the interview on YouTube. 444.hu could reasonably assume 
that the contents, to which it provided access, although perhaps controversial, would remain 
within the realm of permissible criticism of political parties and, as such, would not be unlawful. 
Although the statements in the interview on YouTube were ultimately found to be defamatory, 
the ECtHR is satisfied that such utterances could not be seen as clearly unlawful from the outset. 
Finally the ECtHR criticised the relevant Hungarian law, as interpreted by the competent 
domestic courts, excluding any meaningful assessment of the Magyar Jet Zrt’s freedom of 
expression rights under Article 10 ECHR, precisely in a situation where restrictions would have 
required the utmost scrutiny, given the debate on a matter of general interest. Indeed, the 
Hungarian courts held that the hyperlinking amounted to dissemination of information and 
allocated objective liability - a course of action that effectively precluded any balancing between 
the competing rights, that is to say, the right to reputation of the political party and the right to 
freedom of expression of Magyar Jeti Zrt. According to the ECtHR such objective liability for 
hyperlinks could have, directly or indirectly, a chilling effect on freedom of expression on the 
Internet. For these reasons, the ECtHR found that the Hungarian courts’ imposition of objective 
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liability on Magyar Jeti Zrt had not been based on relevant and sufficient grounds. Therefore, the 
measure had constituted a disproportionate restriction on its right to freedom of expression, thus 
violating Article 10 of the ECHR. 
• Magyar Jeti Zrt v. Hungary, no. 11257/16, 4 December 2018. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
A recent judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) reveals how 
powerful persons and their entourage sometimes use clearly illegal and immoral techniques to 
intimidate investigative journalists in order to make them stop critically reporting on their 
actions, policy or corruptive activities. The judgment in the case of Khadija Ismayilova v. 
Azerbaijan once more illustrates the practice of harassment and intimidation, and the blatant 
lack of respect for the rights of journalists to critically report on the government or the president 
in Azerbaijan (see [Ed.: Fatullayev] IRIS 2010-8/2, [Ed.: Uzeyir Jafarov] IRIS 2015-3/1 and [Ed.: 
Huseynova] IRIS 2017-7/1). The case mainly concerns a smear campaign against a well-known 
journalist who is reporting on corruption and human rights violations in her country. Khadija 
Rovshan qizi Ismayilova worked as a staff reporter and director at the Azerbaijani service of Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Azadliq Radio, whose broadcasts were often critical of the 
government. In addition, she trained journalists in investigation techniques and cross-border 
reporting, and she has received a number of international awards for her journalistic activity. 
After publishing a series of articles on government corruption involving the president of 
Azerbaijan and his family, she began receiving threats and was subject to acts of intimidation 
and gross violations of her privacy, all designed to prevent her from pursuing her journalistic 
work. In particular, she was sent a letter threatening her with public humiliation if she did not 
stop her investigative reporting. When she refused, a video recorded with a hidden camera 
featuring scenes of a sexual nature involving her and her then boyfriend was posted on the 
Internet. Around the same time, newspapers ran stories accusing her of anti-government bias, 
immoral behaviour and being involved in “sex scandals”. A short time later, Ismayilova discovered 
several hidden cameras in her flat. She reported the threats and the intrusion into her privacy to 
the authorities, complaining that she felt intimidated in connection with her journalistic activity, 
and asking the prosecution authorities to ensure her safety, to investigate the matter, and to hold 
those responsible for the threat and the video accountable. About a month later, Ismayilova 
published a press release in which she criticised the authorities for failing to conduct an adequate 
investigation, and she lodged a complaint against the officials of the Baku City Prosecutor’s 
Office. Instead of effectively investigating the threats and the gross violation of her privacy, the 
authorities published a status report, referring to a number of investigative steps which had been 
taken. The report also criticised Ismayilova for spreading false information and it disclosed more 
private information not only about her, but also about some of her friends and family. Having 
received no effective redress from the Azerbaijani authorities, and after exhausting all relevant 
national judicial remedies, in September 2013, Ismayilova petitioned the ECtHR. 
The ECtHR was in no doubt that the covert filming of highly intimate aspects of Ismayilova’s life 
in her own home clearly concerned a matter of “private life”, a concept that covers the physical 
and moral integrity of a person, as well as his or her sexual life. But the ECtHR found no sufficient 
evidence “beyond reasonable doubt” that the state itself was responsible for the very serious 
invasion of Ismayilova’s privacy. Her arguments were based on circumstantial evidence or on 
assertions requiring corroboration and further investigation. According to the ECtHR, the question 
of whether state agents had abused their official power remains an open one, although it 
emphasised its concerns as regards the answer to that question, referring to Ismayilova’s credible 
allegations and the contextual information provided by reports from various international and 
regional human rights organisations, including the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the United 
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Nations, who had repeatedly called upon the Azerbaijani authorities to improve respect for the 
rights of journalists who report on human rights violations or critically report on the government. 
The ECtHR specifically focused on the authorities’ positive obligation under Article 8 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) to secure respect for private life, and it found that 
there had been significant flaws and delays in the manner in which the authorities had 
investigated the case. By failing to conduct an effective criminal investigation, the Azerbaijani 
authorities had not fulfilled their duty to adequately protect Ismayilova against such a serious, 
flagrant and extraordinarily intense invasion of her private life. The ECtHR also found that Article 
8 ECHR had been violated through the public disclosure of confidential and personal information 
in the status report published by the authorities. By not effectively investigating the flagrant 
invasion of her privacy and by acting carelessly in further compounding the already existing 
breach of Ismayilova’s privacy, the Azerbaijani authorities had clearly interfered with her right to 
private life in an unjustified manner. 
In connection with the incidents involving the threatening letter, the unauthorised installation 
of wires and hidden cameras in her flat, the dissemination of the covertly filmed videos on the 
Internet, the publication of newspaper articles about her in pro-government newspapers, the 
ineffectiveness of the investigation and the lack of remedies against the inaction of the 
prosecuting authorities, as well as the publication of the status report by the investigating 
authorities, Ismayilova also complained that the Azerbaijani State authorities had breached their 
obligations under Articles 10 ECHR, which guaranteed the right to freedom of expression. The 
ECtHR reiterated that it had repeatedly stressed that interference with freedom of expression 
may have a “chilling effect” on the exercise of that freedom and even more so in cases of serious 
crimes committed against journalists, making it of utmost importance for the authorities to check 
a possible connection between the crime and the journalist’s professional activity. Therefore, the 
ECtHR examined the entirety of Ismayilova’s complaint from the standpoint of the positive 
obligations of the Azerbaijani State under Article 10 ECHR. Referring to its findings under Article 
8 ECHR and emphasising that the acts of a criminal nature committed against Ismayilova were 
apparently linked to her journalistic activity, the ECtHR was of the opinion that the authorities 
had failed to comply with their positive obligation to protect her in the exercise of her freedom 
of expression. The ECtHR referred to the significant flaws and delays in the criminal investigation, 
the articles published in the newspapers, and the unjustified public disclosure in the status report 
on the criminal investigation. In the context of many other reported violations of journalists’ 
rights in Azerbaijan, the ECtHR unanimously came to the conclusion that the authorities had 
acted “contrary to the spirit of an environment protective of journalism”, and that, accordingly, 
there had been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. The Azerbaijani Government was ordered to pay 
the journalist EUR 15 000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 1 750 for the costs and 
expenses of the proceedings before the ECtHR. 
• Khadija Ismayilova v. Azerbaijan, nos. 65286/13 and 57270/14, 10 January 2019. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Catt v. the United Kingdom 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has delivered a judgment on the compatibility of 
the right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) with 
the collection, retention and further use of personal data for purposes of police intelligence, 
while two earlier cases reported in IRIS on the bulk interception of personal communications for 
intelligence purposes and the right to privacy are pending before the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (Centrum för Rättvisa v. Sweden, IRIS 2018-8/3, and 
Big Brother Watch and Others v. the United Kingdom, IRIS 2018- 10/1). 
The applicant in Catt v. the United Kingdom has been active in the peace movement for many 
years and has regularly attended public demonstrations. He participated in demonstrations and 
meetings organised by labour unions, in a pro- Gaza protest and in several (violent) 
demonstrations against a United States- owned company which produces weapons in the United 
Kingdom. Mr Catt was arrested twice at such demonstrations for obstructing the public highway, 
but he has never been convicted of any offence. In 2010, he made a subject access request to the 
police under the Data Protection Act for information relating to him. Sixty‑six entries from 
nominal records for other individuals and information reports concerning incidents at 
demonstrations which incidentally mentioned him were disclosed to him. Those records were 
held in a police database known as the “Extremism database”. Mr Catt requested the Association 
of Chief Police Officers (“ACPO”) to delete all entries from nominal records and information 
reports which mentioned him. As his request was dismissed, he issued proceedings against the 
ACPO for judicial review, contending that the retention of his data was not “necessary” within 
the meaning of Article 8, section 2 ECHR. The Supreme Court finally upheld the refusal to delete 
the data, identifying three reasons for the need to retain the data at issue: (1) to enable the police 
to make a more informed assessment of the risks and threats to public order; (2) to investigate 
criminal offences where there have been any, and to identify potential witnesses and victims; (3) 
to study the leadership, organisation, tactics and methods of protest groups which have been 
persistently associated with violence. The majority of the Supreme Court was of the view that 
sufficient safeguards existed to ensure that personal information was not retained for longer 
than required for the purpose of maintaining public order and preventing or detecting crime. It 
observed that political protest is a basic right recognised by the common law and protected by 
Articles 10 and 11 ECHR, but that the collection and retention of the data concerning Mr Catt 
was justified and proportionate, as the material was not usable or disclosable for any purpose 
other than police purposes, except as a result of an access request by the subject under the 
Data Protection Act, and it was not used for political purposes or for any kind of victimisation of 
dissidents. The Supreme Court also underlined a basic principle about intelligence gathering: 
that it is necessarily acquired indiscriminately in the first instance and that its value can only be 
judged in hindsight, as subsequent analysis for particular purposes discloses a relevant pattern. 
Mr Catt lodged an application with the ECtHR, complaining that the retention of his data by the 
police was in violation of his right to privacy as protected by Article 8 ECHR. The ECtHR expressed 
its concern that the collection of data by the police relating to persons involved in “domestic 
extremism” did not have a clearer and more coherent legal base. It observed that in light of the 
general nature of police powers and the variety of definitions for the term “domestic extremism”, 
there was significant ambiguity over the criteria being used by the police to govern the collection 
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of the data in question. After this consideration, the ECtHR focused on the question of whether 
the collection, retention and use of Mr Catt’s personal data was necessary in a democratic society. 
The government argued that due to the extensive amount of judicial scrutiny at domestic level, 
the question of whether it was necessary to collect and retain Mr Catt’s data fell within the state’s 
margin of appreciation and it was therefore not for the ECtHR to decide. However, the ECtHR was 
of the opinion that in this case there were “compelling reasons” to substitute its own assessment 
of the merits of the case for that of the competent national authorities. In the first place, the 
ECtHR considered it significant that personal data revealing a political opinion fell within the 
special categories of sensitive data attracting a heightened level of protection. The ECtHR also 
reiterated the importance of examining compliance with the principles of Article 8 ECHR where 
the powers vested in the state are obscure, creating a risk of arbitrariness, especially where the 
technology available is continually becoming more sophisticated. As to whether there was a 
pressing need to collect the personal data concerning Mr Catt, the ECtHR accepted that there 
was: it agreed with the UK Supreme Court that the nature of intelligence gathering was such that 
the police first needed to collect the data before evaluating its value. Although Mr Catt himself 
was not suspected of being directly involved in any criminal activities, it was justifiable for the 
police to collect his personal data, as he had participated repeatedly and publicly aligned himself 
with the activities of a violent protest group. As to whether there was a pressing need to retain 
Mr Catt’s data, the ECtHR considered that there was not. It referred to the absence of effective 
safeguards relating to personal data revealing political opinions. The ECtHR emphasised that 
“engaging in peaceful protest has specific protection under Article 11 of the Convention, which 
also contains special protection for trade unions, whose events the applicant attended”. In this 
connection, it noted that the definition of “domestic extremism” referred to the collection of data 
on groups and individuals who act “outside the democratic process”. Therefore, the police did not 
appear to have respected their own definition (fluid as it may have been) in retaining data on Mr 
Catt’s association with peaceful, political events, while such events are “a vital part of the 
democratic process”. Referring to the danger of an ambiguous approach to the scope of data 
collection in the present case, the ECtHR considered that the decisions to retain Mr Catt’s 
personal data did not take into account the heightened level of protection it attracted as data 
revealing a political opinion, and that under the circumstances, its retention must have had a 
“chilling effect”. Furthermore, the retention of Mr Catt’s data, in particular the data concerning 
peaceful protest, has neither been shown to be absolutely necessary, nor for the purposes of a 
particular inquiry. Finally, the ECtHR was not convinced that the deletion of the data would be 
as burdensome as the government had contended. According to the ECtHR, it would be entirely 
contrary to the need to protect private life under Article 8 if the authorities could create a 
database in such a manner that the data in it could not be easily reviewed or edited, and then 
use this development as a justification to refuse to remove information from that database. On 
the basis of the foregoing considerations, the ECtHR unanimously concluded that there had been 
a violation of Article 8 ECHR. 
• Catt v. the United Kingdom, no. 43514/15, 24 January 2019. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Høiness v. Norway 
Dirk Voorhoof Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has delivered a new judgment with regard to the 
liability of an Internet portal for offensive content allegedly tarnishing one’s reputation (see also 
Delfi v. Estonia (Grand Chamber), IRIS 2015- 7/1; Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete and 
Index.hu Zrt v. Hungary, Iris 2016-3/2 and Pihl v. Sweden, Iris 2017-5/3). The ECtHR agreed with 
the findings by the Norwegian courts that although some anonymous comments were 
inappropriate and tasteless, the expeditious removal of the offensive comments upon actual 
knowledge by the media company and the editor exempted the Internet portal from liability. 
Therefore, the dismissal by the Norwegian courts of the applicant’s complaint against the Internet 
portal for alleged violation of her right to privacy and reputation was not in breach of Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The applicant in this case, Ms Mona Høiness, is a well-known lawyer in Norway who was formerly 
a talk show host and active participant in public debate. The Internet portal Hegnar Online 
published articles concerning her role and relationship with a wealthy, elderly widow from whom 
she had inherited. The inheritance case was covered extensively by some media, and the Hegnar 
Online website featured a forum - at a separate web address, but to which access was given via 
the online newspaper - where readers could start debates and submit comments. There was no 
editorial content in the forum: all content was user- generated, and it was possible for users to 
comment anonymously, without the requirement to register. After a few readers had posted some 
vulgar and sleazy comments about Ms Høiness, she initiated civil proceedings against the Hegnar 
Media AS company and Mr H., an editor working for Hegnar Online. Ms Høiness complained that 
her honour had been infringed, particularly because of sexual harassment in three comments on 
the Hegnar Online’s forum. The defendants argued that they had not been aware of the comments 
and that the offensive comments had been removed as soon as they had become aware of them. 
It was recognised by the Norwegian High Court that each of the three comments were 
‘inappropriate, unserious and tasteless’, but that was, in itself, not sufficient. Ms Høiness’ claim 
for compensation could only succeed if ‘sufficient culpability’ could be demonstrated by Hegnar 
Online and Mr H. for not having done enough to discover and thereafter remove the impugned 
comments. As two comments had been rapidly removed after the notification by Ms Høiness, and 
one comment had been deleted on the portal staff’s own motion, there was no reason to consider 
Hegnar Online liable in this case. Furthermore, the Norwegian courts awarded the defendants for 
their litigation costs, to be paid by Ms Høiness for a total of approximately EUR 45 000. 
Before the ECtHR, Ms Høiness complained that the Norwegian authorities, by not sufficiently 
protecting her right to respect for her private life and requiring her to pay the defendants’ 
litigation costs, had acted contrary to Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The ECtHR observed that what was at issue in the present case was not an act by the 
state, but the alleged inadequacy of the protection afforded by the domestic courts to Ms Høiness’ 
private life. While the essential object of Article 8 ECHR was to protect the individual against 
arbitrary interference by public authorities, it did not merely compel the state to abstain from 
such interference: in addition to this negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations 
inherent in effective respect for private or family life. These obligations may also involve the 
adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the 
relations of individuals between themselves. The ECtHR reiterated that in order for Article 8 ECHR 
to come into play, however, the attack on personal honour and reputation must attain a certain 
level of seriousness and must have been carried out in a manner causing prejudice to personal 
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enjoyment of the right to respect for private life, while the rights guaranteed under Articles 8 
and 10 ECHR deserved equal respect. Thus, the question was whether the state had struck a fair 
balance between Ms Høiness’ right to respect for her private life under Article 
8 ECHR and the online news agency and forum host’s right to freedom of expression guaranteed 
by Article 10 ECHR. In this regard, the ECtHR first and foremost emphasised that the impugned 
comments had not amounted to hate speech or incitement to violence. In balancing the 
conflicting rights at issue, the ECtHR referred to the specific aspects of freedom of expression as 
being relevant for the concrete assessment of the interference in question: the context of the 
comments, the measures applied by the company in order to prevent or remove defamatory 
comments, the liability of the actual authors of the comments as an alternative to the 
intermediary’s liability, and the consequences of the domestic proceedings for the company. 
The ECtHR agreed that Ms Høiness would have faced considerable obstacles in attempting to 
pursue claims against the individuals behind the anonymous comments, while it also took 
account of the fact that Hegnar Online was a large, commercially run news portal and that the 
debate forums were popular. It did not appear, however, that the debate forum was particularly 
integrated in the presentation of news and thus could be taken to be a continuation of the 
editorial articles. Most importantly, the ECtHR referred to the measures adopted by Hegnar 
Online: it had an established system of moderators who monitored content, and readers could 
click on ‘warning’ buttons in order to notify their reaction to comments. In the present case, the 
news portal company and its editor had acted appropriately by rapidly removing the offensive 
comments upon notification. The ECtHR saw no reason to substitute a different view for that of 
the domestic courts, and it found that the Norwegian courts had acted within their margin of 
appreciation when seeking to establish a balance between Ms Høiness’ rights under Article 8 
ECHR and the news portal and host of the debate forum’s opposing right to freedom of expression 
under Article 10 ECHR. 
The ECtHR finally noted that a considerable amount of litigation costs had been imposed on Ms 
Høiness, but it agreed with the Norwegian courts that there had been no reason to deviate from 
the starting point which had established that the winning party be awarded compensation for 
their fees and expenses. Taking account of the nature of the claim lodged before the national 
courts, the subject matter and the ‘welfare and relative strength’ of the applicant, the ECtHR did 
not consider that it could call into question the domestic courts’ assessment as to the imposition 
of costs. Unanimously, the ECtHR held that there had been no violation of Article 8 ECHR. 
• Høiness v. Norway, no. 43624/14, 19 March 2019. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Richard Williamson v. Germany 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered a decision in a case of Holocaust denial 
expressed in an interview broadcast on Swedish television, published on YouTube and reported 
in German media. The ECtHR found that the statements in the interview at issue were not 
protected by the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The applicant is Mr Richard Williamson, a British national and former 
member of the Society of Saint Pius X, opposing the ecclesiastical reforms of the Second Vatican 
Council. He was excommunicated under the Code of Canon Law, but in 2009 the Congregation 
for Bishops decided to lift the excommunication, a decision that attracted significant media 
coverage. In an interview with the Swedish television channel SVT-1 - recorded in Germany -, 
Williamson made some statements about the Holocaust, denying the existence of gas chambers 
and stating that about two to three hundred thousand Jews perished in Nazi concentration camps. 
He also said that the Germans had a guilt complex about the gas chambers and the killing of six 
million Jews. The broadcast with the interview was soon also available on the video website of 
SVT-1 and on the video- sharing Internet site YouTube. The German weekly magazine Der Spiegel 
published an article in which Williamson’s statements about the gas chambers during the Nazi 
regime were quoted verbatim. Subsequently, a variety of major German newspapers, television, 
and radio stations reported on Williamson’s statements. 
Williamson applied for a preliminary injunction from the German civil courts, for an order for the 
removal of the recording of the interview from the Internet, but this request was rejected by the 
Nuremberg-Fürth Regional Court, mainly finding that the dissemination of his statements, 
including via the Internet, had been covered by Williamson’s general consent to the interview. 
In 2012 the Regensburg District Court, at the public prosecutor’s request, issued a penal order 
against Williamson, finding him guilty of incitement to hatred under Article 130 § 3 of the 
Criminal Code. This conviction was upheld by the Regensburg Regional Court in 2013, confirming 
that Williamson’s statements in the interview had been capable of disturbing the public peace in 
Germany and constituted a criminal act. Williamson was sentenced to 90 day‑fines of EUR 20 
each. After the Nuremburg Court of Appeal rejected his appeal and the Federal Constitutional 
Court in 2017 declined his constitutional complaint, Williamson lodged an application before the 
ECtHR, complaining under Article 10 ECHR that his criminal conviction of incitement to hatred 
had breached his right to freedom of expression. In particular, he argued that German law was 
not applicable to the statement at issue as the offence had not been committed in Germany: 
criminal liability for the offence of incitement to hatred could only be triggered once his 
statement became “public”; that is, once it had been broadcast in Sweden - where that statement 
was not subject to criminal liability - and when it was uploaded on the Internet. Williamson also 
argued that he had never intended that his statement be broadcast in Germany and that he had 
tried everything in his power to prevent its broadcast there. 
The ECtHR observes that Williamson in essence argues that the German courts wrongfully applied 
domestic law and that the exercise of his right to freedom of expression, which had been lawful 
in one member Sstate, had been restricted by another member State where it was not lawful. The 
ECtHR however is of the opinion that Williamson agreed to provide the interview in Germany, 
while knowing that the statements he made were subject to criminal liability in Germany, and 
that he did not make a statement during the interview to insist that it not be broadcast in 
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Germany. All he had done was to tell the interviewer to “be careful” as the statements were 
subject to criminal liability in Germany. The ECtHR accepts the findings by the German courts 
that the offence was committed in Germany, because the key feature of the offence, the interview, 
was carried out there and that his statements had been made “publicly” also with respect to 
Germany. The ECtHR is also satisfied that Williamson’s conviction was prescribed by law, and 
that it pursued the legitimate aim of preventing a disturbance of the public peace in Germany 
and thus the prevention of disorder and crime. 
On the question of whether the interference with Williamson’s right to freedom of expression 
was necessary in a democratic society, the ECtHR refers to its Grand Chamber judgment in the 
case of Perinçek v. Switzerland (see IRIS 2016-1/1). In this decision, it confirms the findings by 
the German courts that Williamson explicitly denied the existence of gas chambers and the killing 
of Jews in those gas chambers under the Nazi regime and explicitly stated that not more than 
two or three hundred thousand Jews had perished in Nazi concentration camps. Williamson thus 
had downplayed acts of genocide. The ECtHR concludes that Williamson sought to use his right 
to freedom of expression with the aim of promoting ideas contrary to the text and spirit of the 
Convention and this circumstance weighs heavily in the assessment of the necessity of the 
interference. Referring to the findings by the German courts that Williamson had acted with 
intent, and with the awareness that his statements were subject to criminal liability in Germany, 
the ECtHR sees no reason to depart from that assessment and reiterates that it has always been 
sensitive to the national historical context when reviewing whether there exists a pressing social 
need for interference with rights under the ECHR. It reiterates that, in the light of their historical 
role and experience, States which have experienced the Nazi horrors may be regarded as having 
a special moral responsibility to distance themselves from the mass atrocities perpetrated by the 
Nazis. 
The ECtHR finally observes that the sentence of 90 day-fines of EUR 20 each was very lenient 
and that the domestic authorities have justified the interference with Williamson’s right to 
freedom of expression with relevant and sufficient reasons, not overstepping their margin of 
appreciation. As the interference at issue was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and 
was “necessary in a democratic society”, Williamson’s complaint is declared manifestly ill-
founded and therefore inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4 ECHR. 
• Richard Williamson v. Germany (dec.), no. 64496/17, 31 January 2019. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Rebechenko v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered an interesting judgment on the freedom 
of expression of a blogger (see also Egill Einarsson v. Iceland (No. 2), IRIS 2018-9/2 and Savva 
Terentyev v. Russia, IRIS 2018-9/3). The ECtHR values the statements of the blogger as those of 
a “public watchdog” and finds that his conviction for defamation violated Article 10 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
In 2015 Mr Maksim Sergeyevich Rebechenko published on YouTube a video with the title 
“Kolkhoz TV on Ukrainian crisis”. In the video he made a series of critical comments about a 
speech by Ms F, the head of the Ust-Labinsky District and of the non-governmental organisation 
Human Rights Defender. In that speech on television Ms F had commented on the situation in 
the eastern region of Ukraine and relations between Russia and Ukraine. On the basis of Article 
152 of the Russian Civil Code Ms F brought an action against Rebechenko, stating that he had 
offended her and had harmed her reputation. The Russian courts found that Rebechenko in an 
abusive and obscene language had disseminated untrue statements about Ms F which damaged 
her honour, dignity and reputation. The courts found that Ms F has sustained damage of a 
non‑pecuniary nature due to emotional distress caused by the defamatory and discrediting 
statements and allusions to her unethical conduct. In accordance with the principle of 
reasonableness, taking into account the seriousness of the wrongful acts, the nature of the 
offence, and the contents of the publication, the degree of suffering involved, and that the 
information concerned a public activist and was available for the general public, Ms F was 
awarded 50,000 roubles (about 714 EUR) for non‑pecuniary damages. Rebechenko was also 
ordered to delete the video from the Internet and to publish a retraction. After exhaustion of all 
national remedies, Rebechenko lodged an application before the ECtHR, complaining about a 
violation of his right to impart information under Article 10 ECHR. 
The ECtHR first reiterates that freedom of expression has paramount importance as an essential 
foundation of a democratic society and a basic condition for its progress and the development of 
every person. It also confirms that this right applies not only to information or ideas that are 
favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those 
that offend, shock, or disturb the State or any sector of the population. The ECtHR refers to its 
practice recognising the essential role played by the press in a democratic society, while it has 
previously established that the press, as well as NGOs, exercise watchdog functions, and that the 
function of bloggers and popular users of social media may be also assimilated to that of “public 
watchdogs” as far as the protection afforded by Article 10 is concerned. As it was not disputed 
that the interference Rebechenko complained of was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate 
aim to protect the reputation or rights of others, the ECtHR examines whether the interference 
was necessary in a democratic society, and specifically whether it was proportionate to the aim 
pursued. In this regard the ECtHR recalls that whether an interference is necessary in a 
democratic society will depend on who spoke, about whom, on what subject of debate, whether 
the expressions used were facts or value judgments, and on procedural guarantees in the 
domestic courts, including reasoning of decisions and the nature and seriousness of penalties. 
The ECtHR emphasises that in the present case, the applicant was a blogger who uploaded his 
video to a YouTube channel with more than 2,000 subscribers, while more than 80,000 visitors 
viewed the video. In such circumstances the interference must be examined on the basis of the 
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same principles applied when assessing the role of a free press in ensuring the proper functioning 
of a democratic society. The ECtHR observes that Ms F had a profile similar to that of professional 
politicians, who should be prepared to tolerate a more demanding public scrutiny, while the 
issues raised in the video were undeniably part of a political debate on a matter of general and 
public concern: relations between Russia and Ukraine, Russia’s position in the international 
arena, and the impact of its foreign policy. The ECtHR reiterates in this connection that its 
approach has been consistently to require very strong reasons for justifying restrictions on 
political speech. Furthermore, Rebechenko has acted in good faith and in pursuit of the legitimate 
aim of protecting the democratic development of, and contributing to free political debate, while 
his statements were value judgments, the truth of which cannot be proven. Moreover, as far as 
the reasoning of the domestic decisions is concerned, the ECtHR notes that the Russian courts 
failed to analyse the contents of the video; they did not even use any extracts from the video to 
support their position on the case and did not perform a balancing exercise between the need to 
protect Ms F’s reputation and Rebechenko’s right to impart information on issues of general 
interest. As to the sanctions imposed, the order to delete the video, publish a retraction, and pay 
about EUR 714 in non-pecuniary damages, the ECtHR notes that these sanctions could discourage 
the participation of the press in debates on matters of legitimate public concern. The ECtHR 
concludes that the domestic courts failed to strike a fair balance between the relevant interests 
and to establish a “pressing social need” for putting the protection of Ms F’s reputation above 
Rebechenko’s right to freedom of expression. Therefore, the Court considers that the domestic 
courts overstepped the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them in matters of debate of 
public interest and that the interference was not necessary in a democratic society. Accordingly 
there has been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. Russia is ordered to pay Rebechenko EUR 714 in 
respect of pecuniary damage; EUR 500 in respect of non-pecuniary damages; and EUR 71 in 
respect of costs and expenses. 
• Rebechenko v. Russia, no. 10257/17, 16 April 2019. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Kablis v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
On 30 April 2019, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the blocking by 
Russian authorities of an activist’s social networking account and entries on his blog had 
breached his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The applicant, Grigoriy Kablis, had called for participation in a ‘people’s 
assembly’ at a square in Syktyvkar, the capital of the Komi Republic, after the local authorities 
had already refused Kablis’ request to organise a public event at that venue, and had proposed 
another specially designated location for holding public events. The ECtHR also found that Kablis’ 
right to freedom of peaceful assembly as guaranteed by Article 11 ECHR has been violated, as 
well as his right to an effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR. The most important part of the 
judgment concentrates on the blocking measures as a form of prior restraint on Kablis’ right to 
freedom of expression. The Court’s judgment is a clear warning against too vague and overbroad 
legislation leaving too much power to the Public Prosecutor’s office or other authorities to block 
social networking accounts or to remove alleged illegal material from the Internet without 
sufficient guarantees on effective and prompt judicial review. 
In 2015, the Governor of the Komi Republic and several high-ranking officials were arrested and 
criminal proceedings were opened on suspicion of their membership of a criminal gang and of 
them having committed fraud. After a refusal by the local authorities to organise a ‘picket’ to 
discuss the arrest of the Komi Republic Government, Kablis posted a message on his blog calling 
for participation in the unauthorised public event. He also published a post with similar content 
on VKontakte, a popular online social networking service. The next day, Kablis’ VKontakte 
account was blocked following an order by the Federal Service for Supervision of 
Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media and a deputy Prosecutor General of 
the Russian Federation, because Kablis had been campaigning for participation in an unlawful 
public event in breach of the Public Events Act, justifying the blocking of the account pursuant 
to section 15.3(1) of the Information Act. Kablis was also informed by the administrator of the 
Internet site that hosted his blog that access to the blog entries campaigning for the announced 
picket had been restricted on the order of the Prosecutor General’s office. Kablis challenged the 
decisions of the Prosecutor General’s office, but his complaint was dismissed at all domestic 
levels. 
Kablis lodged an application before the ECtHR, complaining that the blocking of his social 
networking account and entries on his blog calling for participation in an unauthorised public 
event had breached his right to freedom of expression. The ECtHR first of all disagrees with 
the Russian authorities’ argument that there was no restriction of Kablis’ right to freedom of 
expression, as his account could have been unblocked if he had deleted the unlawful content 
and he could also have created a new social networking account and written new Internet blogs. 
The ECtHR leaves no doubt that the blocking of Kablis’ social networking account and of the 
entries on his blog amounted to ‘interference by a public authority’ with Kablis’ right to freedom 
of expression. Next, the ECtHR focuses on the fact that the blocking order has been taken before 
a judicial decision was issued on the illegality of the published content, and that therefore the 
interference with Kablis’ right to freedom of expression amounted to a prior restraint. Although 
Article 10 ECHR does not prohibit prior restraints on publication as such, the dangers inherent in 
prior restraints call for the most careful scrutiny on the part of the ECtHR and are justified only 
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in exceptional circumstances. This approach of ‘careful scrutiny’ is especially applicable as far as 
the press is concerned, ‘for news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, even for 
a short period, may well deprive it of all its value and interest’. The ECtHR clarifies that this 
danger ‘also applies to publications other than periodicals that deal with a topical issue’ and it 
reiterates that ‘in cases of prior restraint, a legal framework is required, ensuring both tight 
control over the scope of bans and effective judicial review to prevent any abuse of power’. The 
Court is of the opinion that the blocking order was based on a ‘too broad and vague’ provision in 
law, while the law does not require the Prosecutor General’s office to examine whether the 
wholesale blocking of the entire website or webpage, rather than of a specific information item 
published on it, was necessary, having regard to the criteria established and applied by the ECtHR 
under Article 10 ECHR. The Court, referring to its judgments in Ahmet Yıldırım v. Turkey (IRIS 
2013/2-1) and Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (IRIS 2016/2-1) emphasises that ‘Article 10 requires 
the authorities to take into consideration, among other aspects, the fact that such a measure, by 
rendering large quantities of information inaccessible, is bound to substantially restrict the rights 
of Internet users and to have a significant collateral effect on the material that has not been 
found to be illegal’. The ECtHR recognises that the exercise of the Prosecutor General’s powers 
to block Internet posts is subject to judicial review, but that it is ‘likely to be difficult, if not 
impossible’, to challenge effectively the blocking measure on judicial review and it concludes 
that the blocking procedure provided for by section 15.3 of the Information Act ‘lacks the 
necessary guarantees against abuse required by the Court’s case law for prior restraint measures, 
in particular tight control over the scope of bans and effective judicial review to prevent any 
abuse of power’. 
Finally, the ECtHR observes that the fact that Kablis breached a statutory prohibition by calling 
for participation in a public event held in breach of the established procedure is not sufficient in 
itself to justify an interference with his freedom of expression. It takes into account a number of 
considerations, including that (a) the aim of the public event was to express an opinion on a 
topical issue of public interest, namely the recent arrest of the regional government officials; (b) 
approval of the public event had been refused on formal grounds, rather than on the grounds 
that the event in question presented a risk of public disorder or public safety; (c) the impugned 
Internet posts did not contain any calls to commit violent, disorderly or otherwise unlawful acts; 
(d) in view of the event’s location, small size and peaceful character, there is no reason to 
believe that it would have been necessary for the authorities to intervene to guarantee its smooth 
conduct; and (e) as Kablis explicitly stated on his blog that the public event had not been duly 
approved, he did not try to mislead prospective participants by making them believe that they 
were going to participate in a lawful event. According to the ECtHR, it follows that the breach of 
the procedure for the conduct of public events in the present case was minor and did not create 
any real risk of public disorder or crime. On these grounds, the Court is not convinced that there 
was ‘a pressing social need’ to apply prior restraint measures and to block access to the impugned 
Internet posts calling for participation in that event and thereby expressing an opinion on an 
important matter of public interest. The ECtHR concludes unanimously that Russian law lacks 
the necessary guarantees against abuse required by the Court’s case law for prior restraint 
measures, and that the standards applied by the domestic courts were not in conformity with the 
principles embodied in Article 10 ECHR. As the Russian courts did not provide ‘relevant and 
sufficient’ reasons for the interference with Kablis’ right to freedom of expression, the ECtHR 
finds that there has been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Kablis v. Russia, nos. 48310/16 and 59663/17, 30 April 2019. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Brzeziński v. Poland 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
In its committee judgment in the case of Brzeziński v. Poland, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) unanimously held that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) with regard to the applicant’s right to freedom of expression 
as a politician at election time. The case concerns in particular a provision in Poland’s election 
law which allows a court, within 24 hours, to consider whether ‘untrue information’ has been 
published, and to issue an order prohibiting its further distribution. 
In October 2006, during a political campaign for election to municipal and district councils and 
regional assemblies, Mr Zenon Brzeziński was standing for the post of municipal councillor. In a 
brochure in which the public was called to vote for the members of his electoral group, Brzeziński 
criticised the way in which the municipality was run. These criticisms mainly concerned the mayor 
and the members of the municipal council. Brzeziński implied that the members of the local 
council had concluded a form of agreement, with the sole aim of taking advantage of the posts 
that they held. The mayor and a local politician who were targeted in the brochure sued 
Brzeziński, applying for an injunction to prevent the dissemination of the brochure and obliging 
its author to rectify the incorrect information and offer a public apology. On the morning of 27 
October 2006, Mr Brzeziński was summoned by telephone to a hearing scheduled for 1.30 p.m. 
on the same date at the Częstochowa Regional Court. Brzeziński did not attend the hearing. By a 
decision of the same date, the court barred Brzeziński from continuing to distribute his brochure 
and ordered him to apologise and to correct the inexact information contained therein. It also 
ordered him to pay 5000 Polish zlotys (PLN) to a charitable organisation and PLN 360 to the 
complainants for costs incurred. The court noted that Brzeziński had implied that fraud had been 
committed in the allocation of public grants, although, in the findings of the court, these facts 
had not been established. It found that the allegations in the brochure were ‘untrue’, ‘malicious’ 
and ‘exceeded the permissible forms of electoral propaganda’. The regional court’s judgment was 
later upheld by the court of appeal. 
Brzeziński lodged an application before the ECtHR in 2007, claiming a violation of his right to 
freedom of expression. Twelve years later, in its judgment of 25 July 2019, the ECtHR holds that 
there has been a violation of Brzeziński’s freedom of expression. The ECtHR considers that the 
election law provision was ‘prescribed by law’ pursued the legitimate aim of the ‘protection of 
the reputation or rights of others’, while the main question was whether the interference with 
the right to freedom of expression had been ‘necessary in a democratic society’. First, the Court 
reiterates that under Article 10 ECHR there is little room for restrictions on political and public 
interest expression, which makes the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation for restricting 
such expression very limited. The ECtHR does not consider the summary proceedings problematic 
as it finds Brzeziński had been lawfully summoned to the first-instance hearing, and that his 
absence from the first-instance hearing and the resultant impossibility of presenting his 
arguments to the domestic court were not imputable to the national authorities alone. It notes 
that Brzeziński was expressing himself as a candidate for the post of municipal councillor and as 
a representative of an electoral group which was distinct from that of the outgoing mayor. 
However, it did not appear from the reasoning of the domestic courts that they had examined 
whether the impugned remarks had a credible factual basis, or whether Brzeziński had acted with 
requisite diligence. The contested remarks had been immediately classified as lies and regarded 
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as damaging the good reputation and standing of the complainants as candidates in the local 
elections. The ECtHR disagrees with the domestic courts’ finding that Brzeziński was required in 
the present case to prove the truth of his statements, and it holds that the language used in the 
brochure had remained within the limits of admissible exaggeration or provocation, having 
regard to the ordinary tone and register of the political debate at local level. The ECtHR finds 
that no fair balance has been struck between the need to protect Brzeziński’s rights to freedom 
of expression and the need to protect the complainants’ rights and reputation, and that the 
reasons provided by the domestic courts to justify Brzeziński’s conviction cannot be considered 
relevant and sufficient, and did not correspond to any pressing need. Furthermore, in addition to 
the ban on continuing to publish the brochure, Brzeziński had been ordered to apologise and to 
rectify the comments that were held to be inexact by having a statement published on the front 
page of two local newspapers. He had also been ordered to pay a sum of money to a charitable 
organisation. The ECtHR is of the opinion that the cumulative application of these sanctions 
would likely have an inhibiting effect on individuals engaged in local political debate and it 
concludes that there had been a disproportionate interference with Brzeziński’s right to freedom 
of expression, in violation of Article 10 ECHR. The ECtHR held that Poland was to pay the 
applicant EUR 9 700 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 100 in respect of costs and 
expenses. 
• Brzeziński v. Poland, no. 47542/07, 25 July 2019. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Pryanishnikov v. Russia 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has delivered a judgment concerning the refusal 
to grant a film reproduction licence to a Russian film producer on the ground that he was 
suspected of producing and distributing pornographic films. The ECtHR found that the refusal 
was a too far-reaching and non-justified restriction on the film producer’s freedom of expression, 
violating Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
The applicant in Pryanishnikov v. Russia is a film producer who owns the copyright to over 1 500 
erotic films. The films were approved for public distribution by the Ministry of Culture for 
audiences over eighteen years of age, and Pryanishnikov held valid distribution certificates in 
respect of them. However, the Ministry of the Press, Broadcasting and Mass Media refused 
Pryanishnikov’s application for a licence for the reproduction of his films because he was involved 
in investigative measures concerning the illegal production, advertising and distribution of erotic 
and pornographic material and films, an offence under Article 242 of the Criminal Code. 
Pryanishnikov challenged the refusal before the Commercial Court of Moscow, which upheld the 
refusal, as did the Commercial Appeal Court and the Federal Commercial Court of the Moscow 
Circuit. The charges of producing and distributing pornography were subsequently dropped. 
Before the ECtHR, Pryanishnikov alleged that the refusal to grant him a film reproduction licence 
had violated his freedom of expression. In essence, he argued that the domestic decisions 
refusing to grant him a film reproduction licence had not contained any proof that he had ever 
distributed pornography. The Russian Government argued that the interference was prescribed 
by law and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting morals and the rights of others, in particular 
protecting children from access to pornographic material. 
First, the ECtHR referred to the general principles concerning freedom of expression, also 
reiterating that freedom of expression includes freedom of artistic expression – notably within 
freedom to receive and impart information and ideas – which affords the opportunity to take part 
in the public exchange of cultural, political and social information and ideas of all kinds. It also 
recalled the principle that those ‘who create, perform, distribute or exhibit works of art contribute 
to the exchange of ideas and opinions which is essential for a democratic society’. However, 
artists and those who promote their work are certainly not immune to the possibility of 
limitations, as provided for in Article 10, section 2 ECHR. Furthermore, under the third sentence 
of Article 10, section 1, states are permitted to regulate, by means of a licensing system, the way 
in which broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises are organised in their territories, 
particularly in respect of their technical aspects. The granting of a licence may also be made 
conditional on such matters as the nature and objectives of a broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprise; its potential audience at national, regional or local level; the rights and needs of a 
specific audience; and the obligations deriving from international legal instruments. As regards 
the protection of morals as a legitimate aim to interfere with the right to (artistic) freedom of 
expression, the ECtHR observed that it is not possible to find a uniform European conception of 
morals. The view taken on the requirements of morals varies from time to time and from place 
to place. By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, 
state authorities are, in principle, in a better position than the international judge to give an 
opinion on the exact content of these requirements, as well as on the necessity of a restriction 
or penalty intended to protect morals. 
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Next, the ECtHR observed that under the domestic law in force at the material time, a film 
producer needed a film reproduction licence to be able to make copies of his films for the purpose 
of selling, broadcasting, or distributing them to cinemas, video libraries or video rental facilities. 
Without such a licence, the applicant was therefore de facto unable to distribute them; hence, the 
refusal amounted to an interference with Pryanishnikov’s right to freedom of expression. As this 
licencing duty was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aims of protecting morals and 
the rights of others, in particular children, it remained to be determined whether the interference 
was ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
The ECtHR found that the domestic judgments – in so far as they relied on a suspicion regarding 
the involvement in producing and distributing pornography – were based on assumptions rather 
than on reasoned findings of fact. Therefore, the domestic courts did not provide relevant and 
sufficient reasons for the finding that Pryanishnikov produced or distributed pornography; and 
although, in their judgments, the domestic courts briefly referred to the need to protect minors 
from pornographic material, the ECtHR found no evidence that Pryanishnikov was ever suspected 
of distributing pornography to children. Next, it observed that the ban on distributing 
pornography in Russia was not limited to minors, and extended to any audience. The ECtHR 
referred to its judgment in Kaos GL v. Turkey (IRIS 2017-2/1) in which it found that even a 
temporary ban on distributing a piece of pornographic material to any audience was not justified. 
In that judgment, the ECtHR held that the domestic authorities could have applied a less 
restrictive measure, for example, a ban on selling the material in question to persons under 
eighteen years of age; an obligation to sell it with a special cover displaying a warning addressed 
to persons under eighteen years of age; or an obligation to sell it via a subscription only. Finally, 
the ECtHR observed that the refusal to grant a film reproduction licence made it impossible for 
the applicant to distribute any films, including the more than 1 500 films for which the competent 
authorities had issued distribution certificates after verifying that they were not pornographic, or 
indeed any other audiovisual products or audio recordings on any types of medium, while there 
was no evidence in the text of the domestic judgments that the domestic courts weighed the 
impact which the refusal of a film reproduction licence would have on the film producer’s ability 
to distribute the films for which he had distribution certificates or on his freedom of expression 
in general. The domestic courts therefore failed to recognise that the present case involved a 
conflict between the right to freedom of expression and the need to protect public morals and 
the rights of others, and failed to perform a balancing exercise between them. On this ground, 
the ECtHR unanimously came to the conclusion that such a far-reaching restriction on 
Pryanishnikov’s freedom of expression, which deprived him of the opportunity to distribute any 
audiovisual products or audio recordings to any audiences, could not be considered justified. 
There was, therefore, no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed 
and the aim sought to be achieved, and accordingly there has been a violation of Article 10 ECHR. 
• Pryanishnikov v. Russia, no. 25047/05, 10 September 2019. 
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European Court of Human Rights: Szurovecz v. Hungary 
Dirk Voorhoof  
Human Rights Centre, Ghent University and Legal Human Academy 
In the case Szurovecz v. Hungary, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that a 
refusal to grant a journalist access to a reception centre for asylum seekers in Hungary violated 
his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The ECtHR emphasised that newsgathering, including first-hand observation by a 
journalist reporting on a matter of significant public interest, was an essential part of journalistic 
research and press freedom. 
In 2015, the Hungarian journalist Illes Szurovecz, working for the Internet newsportal abcug.hu, 
requested access to the Debrecen Reception Centre, a major housing centre for asylum seekers 
entering Hungary. Szurovecz sought permission to visit the centre in order to interview asylum 
seekers and take photographs after serious concerns had been raised about their treatment. 
Indeed, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights had issued a report condemning the living 
conditions in the centre, which amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. Furthermore, the 
reception centre was constantly presented in the state-owned media as part of the government’s 
anti‑immigration campaign. The Office of Immigration and Nationality (OIN), however, rejected 
Szurovecz’s request, noting that there was constant media interest in asylum seekers and that 
regular visits to the reception centre would infringe their private lives. Moreover, many people 
accommodated in the reception centre had fled from some form of persecution, and information 
about them appearing in the press could endanger both their own security and that of their 
families. Szurovecz appealed, but his action was declared inadmissible, as the OIN’s decision was 
not subject to judicial review. 
Before the Strasbourg Court, Szurovecz complained that the Hungarian authorities had violated 
his right to impart information under Article 10 ECHR by refusing his request to enter the 
premises of the Debrecen Reception Centre with a view to writing a report on the living 
conditions of asylum seekers. A coalition of international organisations, including the Media 
Legal Defence Initiative, Index on Censorship and the European Centre for Press and Media 
Freedom, supported Szurovecz’s complaint. The third-party intervention emphasised that 
newsgathering, including physical access to the places where important events are developing, 
is an essential component of investigative journalism (see also Butkevich v. Russia, IRIS 2018-4/2 
and compare with Endy Gęsina-Torres v. Poland, IRIS 2018-5/1). 
The Hungarian Government argued that the complaint was based on a claim to a right of access 
to information which did not fall within the scope of Article 10 ECHR. Furthermore, the 
government submitted that should the ECtHR find that Article 10 was applicable, access to the 
reception centre had not been necessary for Szurovecz to express his opinion on an issue of 
public interest, since he had had access to information provided by international organisations 
and NGOs, as well as other alternative sources. Furthermore, he could have interviewed refugees 
outside the premises of the reception centre and he could have obtained photographs taken by 
others. Finally, the government argued that the interference with the right to receive information 
under Article 10 was justified by referring to the asylum seekers’ right to respect for private life 
under Article 8, as well as their right to life, physical integrity and personal liberty (Articles 2, 3 
and 5 ECHR). 
The ECtHR disagreed with the Hungarian Government on all points. First, it referred to its earlier 
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case law according to which the gathering of information is an essential preparatory step in 
journalism and an inherent and protected part of press freedom. The Court reiterated that 
‘obstacles created in order to hinder access to information which is of public interest may 
discourage those working in the media or related fields from pursuing such matters. As a result, 
they may no longer be able to play their vital role as “public watchdogs”, and their ability to 
provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected’. The Court found that the 
Hungarian authorities had prevented Szurovecz from gathering information first hand and from 
verifying the information about the conditions of detention provided by other sources. This 
constituted an interference with the exercise of his right to freedom of expression in that it 
hindered a preparatory step prior to publication, that is to say, journalistic research (see Dammann 
v. Switzerland, IRIS 2006-6/3, Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, IRIS 2009/7-1 and 
Schweizerische Radio- und Fernseh gesellschaft SRG v. Switzerland, IRIS 2012-8/3).The ECtHR 
accepted that the interference at issue was prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of 
protecting the private lives of asylum seekers and camp residents. However, in view of the 
importance of the media in a democratic society and of reporting on matters of considerable 
public interest, the ECtHR considered that the rather summary reasoning put forward by the OIN 
and the absence in its decision of any real balancing of the interests at issue, failed to 
demonstrate convincingly that the refusal of permission to enter and conduct research in the 
reception centre was necessary in a democratic society. Above all, the fact that the refusal was 
absolute rendered it disproportionate to the aims pursued and did not meet a “pressing social 
need”. 
The ECtHR considered that the matter of how residents were accommodated in state-run 
reception centres, whether the state fulfilled its international obligations towards asylum seekers 
and whether this vulnerable group had the ability to fully enjoy their human rights, was 
‘undisputedly newsworthy and of great public significance’. It emphasised that ‘the public interest 
in reporting from certain locations is especially relevant where the authorities’ handling of 
vulnerable groups is at stake'. The watchdog role of the media assumes particular importance in 
such contexts, since their presence is a guarantee that the authorities can be held to account for 
their conduct (see Pentikäinen v. Finland, IRIS 2016-1/2). The ECtHR found that the conclusion of 
the OIN in refusing access to the reception centre was reached without any sensible 
consideration of Szurovecz’s interest as a journalist in conducting his research or of the interest 
of the public in receiving information on a matter of public interest. 
Although the ECtHR ultimately agreed that the reasons adduced by the OIN, relying on the safety 
and private lives of refugees and asylum seekers, were undoubtedly “relevant”, it did not find 
them “sufficient” in the light of the necessity test under Article 10, section 2 ECHR. The ECtHR 
referred to the fact that Szurovecz explained that he would only take photos of individuals who 
had given their prior consent and, if needed, also obtain written authorisation from them, while 
the OIN has not taken any notice of this argument. Furthermore, neither the OIN nor the 
government have indicated in what respect the safety of asylum seekers would have been 
jeopardised in practice by the proposed research, especially if it had taken place only with the 
consent of the individuals involved. The Court was also of the opinion that the existence of other 
alternatives to direct newsgathering within the reception centre did not extinguish Szurovecz’s 
interest in having face-to-face discussions on and gaining first-hand impressions of living 
conditions there. Hence, the availability of other forms and tools of research were not sufficient 
reasons to justify the interference complained of or to remedy the prejudice caused by the refusal 
to grant authorisation to enter the reception centre. Finally, there was no legal possibility or 
judicial review open to Szurovecz to allow him to argue for the need to gain access to the 
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reception centre in order to exercise his right to impart information. The Court unanimously 
concluded that Article 10 ECHR has been violated. 
• Szurovecz v. Hungary, no. 15428/16, 8 October 2019. 
IRIS 2019-10:1/2 
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Appendix I: List and summaries of cases reported on in IRIS, but not included in the main selection (cases that were struck off the list/in which 
friendly settlements were reached). 
 Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
1 Telesystem Tirol v. Austria  19281/91 09/06
/1997 
FS Public policy, prohibition of commercial 
broadcasting  
Full text 377 
2 Altan v. Turkey  32985/96 14/05
/2002 
FS Friendly settlement, positive obligations, political 
expression, incitement to hatred or hostility 
Full text 378 
3 Ali Erol v. Turkey 35076/97 20/06
/2002 
FS Friendly settlement, propaganda, terrorism, hate 
speech, incitement to hatred or hostility based on 
race or religion 
Full text 379 
4 Özler v. Turkey 25753/94 11/07
/2002 
FS Friendly settlement, propaganda, terrorism, hate 
speech, incitement to hatred or hostility based on 
race or religion 
Full text 379 
5 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 5)  26976/95, 
28305/95 
and 
28307/95 
16/07
/2002 
FS Friendly settlement, propaganda, terrorism, hate 
speech, incitement to hatred or hostility based on 
race or religion 
Full text 379 
6 Freiheitliche Landesgruppe 
Burgerland v. Austria  
34320/96 18/07
/2002 
FS Friendly settlement, insulting caricature, satire, 
artistic expression 
Full text 379 
7 Mehmet Bayrak v. Turkey 27307/95 03/09
/2002 
FS Positive obligation, separatist propaganda, 
terrorism 
Full text 381 
8 Zarakolu v. Turkey (Nos. 1-
3)  
37059/97, 
37061/97 
and 
37062/97 
02/10
/2003 
FS Political expression, separatist propaganda, 
terrorism 
Full text 382 
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European Court of Human Rights: Case of Telesystem Tirol Kabeltelevision Struck Out of the List 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Telesystem Tirol Kabeltelevision applied to the European Commission of Human Rights in 1991, 
relying on Article 10 of the European Convention for the protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. As a local cable TV network (Gemeinschaftsantennenanlage - in the USA referred to as 
cable TV system), it complained that, pursuant to Austrian law, it had been refused permission to 
distribute its own TV programmes ("active broadcasting") and was only authorised to receive already 
existing broadcast programmes and retransmit them to the subscribers of the local network ("passive 
broadcasting"). 
 
The refusal to grant the right to distribute its own programmes was based on the general 
broadcasting monopoly in favour of the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation. The Commission, in its 
report of 18 October 1995, considered that arguments similar to those in the case of 
Informationsverein Lentia vs. Austria (ECourtHR, 24 November 1993, vol. 276), led to the conclusion 
that the restriction on the freedom to impart information by prohibiting private broadcasting, as this 
was based on the Austrian Broadcasting monopoly, was not necessary in a democratic society and 
hence was in breach of Article 10, par. 2 of the Convention. The Telesystem Tirol Kabeltelevision 
case then was referred to the European Court of Human Rights. 
 
In the meantime however, the Austrian Constitutional Court in two judgments (Constitutional Court, 
27 September 1995 (see IRIS 1996-6: 8) and 8 October 1996 (see IRIS 1997-2: 5) declared that the 
prohibition of "active broadcasting" by local TV networks and the prohibition of commercial 
advertising by private broadcasters is in breach of Article 10 of the European Convention, under 
reference also to the European Court's judgment of 24 November 1993 in the case of 
Informationsverein Lentia . The European Court now in its judgement of 9 June 1997 took formal 
note of a friendly settlement of the matter between the Austrian government and the applicant. The 
Court follows the request by the applicant to strike the case out of the list, since active broadcasting 
and the dissemination of commercial advertising by local TV networks are now legally permissible 
in Austria. The Court is of the opinion that there is no reason of public policy to continue the 
litigation. The Austrian broadcasting law finally seems to be in accordance now with Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, in as far as the Monopoly of the Public Broadcasting 
Organisation Case come to an end. 
 
• Telesystem Tirol Kabeltelevision v. Austria (friendly settlement), 9 June 1997, Reports of Judgments 
and Decisions 1997-III. 
 
IRIS 1997-7/5 
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European Court of Human Rights: Friendly Settlement in Altan v. Turkey 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Since 1998, the European Court of Human Rights has come to the conclusion that there has been a 
violation of freedom of (political) expression in Turkey in more than 15 cases. All of these cases 
concerned the criminal convictions of journalists, editors, publishers, writers, lawyers, politicians or 
human rights activists for infringement of Articles 159 or 312 of the Criminal Code or of Articles 6-
8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, nr. 3712. In all of these cases, the applicants were convicted in 
Turkey for inciting the people to hatred and hostility based on distinctions of race or religion, or for 
undermining territorial integrity and the unity of the nation. The Strasbourg Court, however, 
considered these convictions to be violations of Article 10 of the European Convention, as they failed 
to give due recognition to the importance of freedom of critical and political speech in a democratic 
society (see IRIS 1999-8: 4, IRIS 2000-4: 2, IRIS 2000-7: 2, IRIS 2000-8: 2, IRIS 2000-10: 3and 
IRIS 2002-3: 2). On several occasions, the Committee of Ministers has requested the Turkish 
authorities to bring their legislation and jurisprudence into conformity with the case-law of the 
European Court of Human Rights. 
 
In a judgment of 14 May 2002, the Court has now enacted a friendly settlement between a Turkish 
applicant and the Turkish Government in a case in which freedom of political expression was also at 
stake. Ahmet Hüsrev Altan, who is a writer and journalist for the national daily, Milliyet, was given a 
suspended sentence of one year and eight months' imprisonment and a fine of TRL 500,000 by the 
National Security Court in 1995, for incitement to hatred and hostility on the basis of a distinction 
based on membership of a race or a religion. Relying on Article 10, he complained in Strasbourg of 
an infringement of his right to freedom of expression. The Turkish authorities have now recognised 
that steps have to be taken at the domestic level in order to guarantee freedom of expression 
according to Article 10 of the Convention. Before the Court, the Turkish Government made the 
following statement: "The Court's rulings against Turkey in cases involving prosecutions under 
Article 312 of the Penal Code or under the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act clearly show 
that Turkish law and practice urgently need to be brought into line with the Convention's 
requirements under Article 10 of the Convention. This is also reflected in the interference underlying 
the facts of the present case. The Government undertake to this end to implement all necessary 
reform of domestic law and practice in this area, as already outlined in the National Programme of 
24 March 2001." 
 
Referring to this commitment, the Court has decided to strike out the case following the friendly 
settlement in which the applicant is to be paid EUR 4,573.47 for any pecuniary damages and for 
costs and expenses incurred. 
 
• Altan v. Turkey (friendly settlement), no. 32985/96, ECHR 2002-III.  
 
IRIS 2002-7/2 
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European Court of Human Rights: Four Friendly Settlements in Cases on Freedom of Expression 
(Turkey and Austria) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
After the finding by the European Court of Human Rights of several violations of freedom of 
expression in Turkey, it seems that the Turkish Government has now become aware of the fact that 
some restrictions and penalties can manifestly no longer be tolerated from the perspective of Article 
10 of the Convention. Shortly after the adoption of a friendly settlement in the case of Altan v. Turkey 
on 14 May 2002 (see IRIS 2002-7: 2-3), the Court again took note of the agreements reached between 
the parties in three different cases against Turkey. 
 
In each of these cases, the Turkish Government promised that steps would be taken in order to 
guarantee the right to freedom of expression and information, including the offer to pay an amount 
of damages to the applicants. Before the Court, the Turkish Government made the following 
statement: "The Court's rulings against Turkey in cases involving prosecutions under Article 312 of 
the Criminal Code and under Article 8 para. 1 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act show that Turkish 
law and practice urgently need to be brought into line with the Convention's requirements under 
Article 10 of the Convention. This is also reflected in the interference underlying the facts of the 
present case. The Government undertake to this end to implement all necessary reform of domestic 
law and practice in this area, as already outlined in the National Programme of 24 March 2001. The 
Government refer also to the individual measures set out in Interim Resolution adopted by the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 23 July 2001 (ResDH (2001) 106), which they 
will apply to the circumstances of cases such as the instant one". While this statement was made in 
the Özler case, the essence of the statements delivered by the Turkish Government in the other cases 
was the same. 
 
All applicants had been found guilty some years ago of dissemination of propaganda against the 
indivisibility of the State (Prevention of Terrorism Act) or incitement to hatred and hostility arising 
from a distinction based on race or religion (Article 312 of the Criminal Code). Ali Erol (a journalist), 
Sürek (a lawyer and publisher) and Özler (a human rights activist) had criticised the policy of the 
Turkish authorities on the Kurdish Question in newspapers or in public speeches. Each of them had 
initiated an application against Turkey, complaining, inter alia, of a violation of Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
 
Referring to the commitments undertaken by the Turkish Government in each case and recognising 
that the friendly settlements are based on respect for human rights as defined by the European 
Convention, the Court has accordingly struck these cases out of the list. 
 
Another friendly settlement was reached in the case of Freiheitliche Landesgruppe Burgenland v. 
Austria on 18 July 2002. In this case, the applicant (a periodical) had been convicted because of an 
insulting caricature under Section 115 of the Austrian Criminal Code. In order to reach a friendly 
settlement before the Court, the Austrian Government has promised to pay the applicant a sum of 
money as compensation in respect of any possible claims relating to the present application, 
including an amount for costs and expenses incurred both in the domestic proceedings and in the 
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Convention proceedings. The applicant waives any further claims against Austria relating to the 
application concerned. Referring to the agreement reached between the parties and satisfied that 
the settlement is based on respect for human rights as defined by the Convention, the Court struck 
the case out of the list. 
 
• Ali Erol v. Turkey (friendly settlement), no. 35076/97, 20 June 2002.  
• Özler v. Turkey (friendly settlement), no. 25753/94, 11 July 2002.  
• Sürek v. Turkey (no. 5) (friendly settlement), nos. 26976/95, 28305/95 and 28307/95, 16 July 
2002.  
• Freiheitliche Landesgruppe Burgenland v. Austria, no. 34320/96, 18 July 2002.  
 
IRIS 2002-9/4 
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European Court of Human Rights: Another Friendly Settlement in Freedom of Expression Case 
(Turkey) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
Once again, the Turkish Government has recognised that an interference by the Turkish authorities 
with freedom of political expression could not be legitimised from the perspective of Article 10 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. After reaching a friendly settlement in the cases of Altan 
v. Turkey on 14 May 2002 (see IRIS 2002-7: 2); Ali Erol v. Turkey on 20 June 2002; Özler v. Turkey on 
11 July 2002 and Sürek (no. 5) v. Turkey on 16 July 2002 (see IRIS 2002-9: 3), the Court again took 
note of an agreement that has been reached between the Turkish Government and a Turkish citizen 
who had applied to the European Court of Human Rights because of an alleged breach of Article 10 
of the Convention. 
 
The applicant, Mehmet Bayrak, had been convicted in 1994 and 1995 by the Ankara National Security 
Court of disseminating separatist propaganda on account of three books with Kurdish themes written 
or published by him. After the seizure of the books, Bayrak was sentenced to a total of two years' 
imprisonment and fined a total of TRL 250 million. The content of the books was considered a crime 
under Article 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. 
 
The case has been struck out of the Court's list following a friendly settlement, after the Turkish 
Government promised that steps would be taken to guarantee freedom of expression and 
information, including the offer to pay an amount of damages to the applicant. The Turkish 
Government made the following statement: "The judgments against Turkey given by the Court in 
cases concerning prosecutions under Article 312 of the Criminal Code or the provisions of the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act clearly show that Turkish law and practice must as a matter of urgency 
be brought into conformity with the requirements of Article 10 of the Convention. That is further 
evidenced by the interference complained of in the instant case. The Government accordingly 
undertakes to make all the necessary changes to domestic law and practice in this field, as set out 
in the National Programme of 24 March 2001. The Government further refers to the individual 
measures mentioned in the Interim Resolution adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe on 23 July 2001 (ResDH(2001)106), which it will implement in circumstances such as those 
of the instant case." 
 
• Mehmet Bayrak v. Turkey (friendly settlement), no. 27307/95, 3 September 2002.  
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European Court of Human Rights: Friendly Settlements in Freedom of Expression Cases (Turkey) 
Dirk Voorhoof 
Media Law Section of the Communication Sciences Department, Ghent University, Belgium 
 
In three cases involving Turkey concerning freedom of expression, an agreement was reached 
between the applicant's widower, Mr. Zarakolu, and the Turkish Government. All three cases concern 
the seizures of several books because of separatist propaganda. The Court, in its judgments of 2 
October 2003, took notice of the friendly settlements, referring to the declaration from the Turkish 
Government in which it is recognised that the (former) Court's rulings against Turkey in cases 
involving prosecutions under the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act relating to freedom 
of expression, and also the facts underlying the present cases, "show that Turkish law and practice 
urgently need to be brought into line with the Convention's requirements under Article 10 of the 
Convention". In all three cases the Court took note of the agreement reached between the parties. 
The Court expresses its satisfaction that the settlement is based on respect for human rights as 
defined in the Convention and its Protocols. It is ordered that the cases be struck out of the list. 
 
It is to be emphasised that recent modifications in Turkish law, as part of the 6 and 7 reform packages 
of July and August 2003 (see IRIS 2003-9: 15), are significant steps forward with a view to ensuring 
compliance with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The abrogation of Article 
8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the amendments to Articles 159 and 312 of the Criminal 
Code are of particular relevance in this context. Also, a comprehensive reform of the Turkish Press 
Law is announced and will be discussed in Parliament in December 2003. 
 
• Zarakolu v. Turkey (nos. 1-3) (friendly settlement), nos. 37059/97, 37061/97 and 37062/97, 2 
October 2003.  
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151 A. v. Norway 28070/06 09/04
/2009 
V 8 Crime reporting, defamation, presumption 
of innocence, privacy, margin of 
appreciation, moral and psychological 
integrity, protection of minors 
Full text 211 
89 A. v. the United Kingdom 35373/97 17/12
/2002 
NV 6, 
8, 13, 
14 
Political expression, right of access, 
defamation, discrimination, privacy 
 
Full text 120 
100 Abdullah Aydin v. Turkey 42435/98 09/03
/2004 
V Political expression, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, social, ethnic and regional 
differences 
Full text 135 
19 Ahmed & others v. the 
United Kingdom 
22954/93 02/09
/1998 
NV Impart information, political expression, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 65 
201 Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey 3111/10 18/12
/2012 
V Internet, defamation, blocking of Google 
Sites, disproportionate measure, 
prescribed by law 
Full text 291 
170 Akdas v. Turkey 41056/04 16/02
/2010 
V Artistic expression, obscene or immoral 
information, fiction, 
exaggeration, humorous, duties and 
responsibilities, protection of morals  
Full text 238 
58 Akkoç v. Turkey 22947/93 
and 
22948/93 
10/10
/2000 
NV Interview, disciplinary sanction, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence, armed 
resistance or an uprising 
Full text 89 
173 Aksu v. Turkey 4149/04 
and 
41029/04 
27/07
/2010 
NV 14, 
8, >GC 
Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation, racial 
discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy 
Full text 244 
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190 Aksu v. Turkey [Grand 
Chamber] 
4149/04 
and 
41029/04 
15/03
/2012 
NV 8 Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation, racial 
discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy  
Full text 272 
162 Alfantakis v. Greece 49330/0 11/02
/2010 
V Television interview, defamation, insult, 
reputation, live broadcasting, facts or 
value judgments 
Full text 232 
282 Alpha Doryforiki Tileorasi 
Anonymi Etairia v. Greece 
72562/10 22/02
/2018 
V 10 
NV 10 
V 6  
Broadcast, secretly filmed, public figure, 
public place, private premises, fair balance 
Full text 446 
50 Andreas Wabl v. Austria  24773/94 21/03
/2000 
NV Political expression, defamation, Nazism, 
offensive information 
Full text 81 
172 Andreescu v. Romania 19452/02 08/06
/2010 
V 10, 6 Access, defamation, insult, reputation, 
facts or value judgments, public debate, 
good faith 
Full text 242 
206 Animal Defenders 
International v. the United 
Kingdom [Grand Chamber] 
48876/08 22/04
/2013 
NV Public debate, ban on political advertising, 
NGO, powerful financial groups, access, 
influential media, alternative media, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 301 
302 Annen (No. 2) v. Germany 3682/10 20/09
/2018 
NV Anti-abortion website, “aggravated 
murder”, equation of abortion with 
Holocaust, civil injunction, protection of 
reputation, fair balance, fact or value 
judgment, distinction criticism and insult 
Full text 486 
303 Annen (No. 5) v. Germany 70693/11 20/09
/2018 
NV Anti-abortion website, link to list of 
doctors, “aggravated murder”, equation of 
abortion with Holocaust, civil injunction, 
protection of reputation, fair balance, 
factual basis, incitement to hatred and 
aggression 
Full text 486 
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305 Annen (No. 6) v. Germany 3779/11 18/10
/2018 
NV Anti-abortion campaigner, criminal 
conviction, online press release, stem cell 
research, personality rights, value 
judgements, public debate, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 490 
248 Arlewin v. Sweden 
 
22302/10 01/03
/2016 
V 6 Defamation proceedings, transfrontier 
television programme service, jurisdiction, 
EU law, right of access to court 
Full text 378 
27 Arslan v. Turkey 23462/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
202 Ashby Donald & Others v. 
France 
36769/08 10/01
/2013 
NV Intellectual property, unauthorised 
reproduction of fashion photos, Internet, 
margin of appreciation, news reporting 
exception, commercial speech 
Full text 293 
185 Avram & others v. 
Moldova 
41588/05 05/07
/2011 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, undercover 
video, journalism 
Full text 264 
187 Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany 
39954/08 07/02
/2012 
V Privacy, reputation, receive information, 
public interest, conflicting human rights 
Full text 260 
226 Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany (No. 2) 
48311/10 10/07
/2014 
V Protection of reputation, private life, value 
judgment, former Chancellor, public 
figure, degree of tolerance, public 
watchdog 
Full text 335 
272 Axel Springer SE and RTL 
Television GmbH v. 
Germany 
51405/12 21/09
/2017 
NV Restriction on publishing pictures of 
accused, court reporting, non-public 
figure, presumption of innocence  
Full text 426 
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118 Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey  50692/99 02/02
/2006 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, positive obligations, religion 
Full text 161 
84 Ayse Öztürk v. Turkey 24914/94 15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, terrorism, incitement 
to violence, public debate, positive 
obligation 
Full text 115 
62 B. & P. v. the United 
Kingdom 
36337/97 
and 
35974/97 
24/04
/2001 
NV Privacy, protection of vulnerable persons, 
necessity 
Full text 92 
70 Bankovic & others v. 
Belgium & others 
52207/99 12/12
/2001 
I NATO-bombing of TV station, 
inadmissible, jurisdiction, treaty 
obligations of State Parties 
Full text 102 
29 Başkaya & Okçuoğlu v. 
Turkey 
23536/94 
and 
24408/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
221 Bayar (nos. 1-8) v. Turkey 39690/06, 
40559/06,
48815/06, 
2512/07, 
55197/07, 
55199/07, 
55201/07 
and 
55202/07 
25/03
/2014 
V 10, 6 Criminal conviction, publication of 
declarations by illegal armed organisation, 
right to fair trial, fight against terrorism, 
no encouragement of violence, no hate 
speech 
Full text 327 
273 Becker v. Norway 21272/12 05/10
/2017 
V Journalist ordered to give evidence, 
protection of journalistic sources, bad faith 
of source, chilling effect 
Full text 428 
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251 Bédat v. Switzerland 
[Grand Chamber] 
56925/08 29/03
/2016 
NV 10 Criminal conviction, secrecy of criminal 
investigation, responsible journalism, 
accused’s private life 
Full text 384 
212 Belpietro v. Italy 43612/10 24/09
/2013 
V Freedom of parliamentary speech, 
parliamentary immunity, defamation, 
public officials, conviction, editorial 
control, chilling effect 
Full text 309 
51 Bergens Tidende v. 
Norway 
26132/95 02/05
/2000 
V Defamation, publication of photos, 
reputation, rights of others, good faith, 
public watchdog 
Full text 82 
301 Big Brother Watch and 
Others v. the United 
Kingdom 
58170/13, 
62322/14 
and 
24960/15 
13/09
/2018 
V 10, 
12, 
>GC 
Mass surveillance, bulk interception, 
protection of journalistic sources, 
confidential personal information, 
independent oversight, no limitation, 
chilling effect   
Full text 483 
25 Bladet Tromso & Stensaas 
v. Norway 
21980/93 20/05
/1999 
V Secret information, presumption of 
innocence, critical reporting, defamation, 
honour and reputation, good faith, public 
watchdog 
Full text 71 
231 Bohlen v. Germany 53495/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, 
humour, satire, fair balance 
Full text 345 
255 Boris Erdtmann v. 
Germany (dec.) 
56328/10 05/01
/2016 
I Criminal conviction, journalistic research, 
effectiveness of airport security checks, 
responsible journalism, disproportionate 
action of journalist   
Full text 393 
16 Bowman v. the United 
Kingdom  
24839/94 19/02
/1998 
V Political expression, monopoly position of 
the media, critical reporting 
Full text 62 
254 Brambilla and Others v. 
Italy 
22567/09 23/06
/2016 
NV Criminal conviction, illegal interception of 
police communications, responsible 
Full text 392 
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 journalism, duty to obey ordinary criminal 
law 
222 Brosa v. Germany 5709/09 17/04
/2014 
V Freedom of political expression, pre-
election, neo-Nazi organisation, private 
individual, public discussion, mayoral 
election, acceptable criticism, honour and 
social reputation, sufficient factual basis 
Full text 328 
313 Brzeziński v. Poland 47542/07 25/07
/2019 
V Elections, dissemination of false 
information, credible factual basis, 
admissible exaggeration or provocation, 
election law, chilling effect, political 
debate, apology and rectification, 
disproportionate interference  
Full text 507 
283 Butkevich v. Russia 5865/07 13/02
/2018 
V 5, 6, 
10  
 
Journalist, photographer, anti-
globalisation protest, news-gathering, 
strict scrutiny, threat to public order, 
proportionality of measures 
Full text 448 
308 Catt v. the United 
Kingdom 
43514/15 24/01
/2019 
V 8  Collection, retention and further use of 
personal data, activist, “domestic 
extremism”, privacy, disproportionate and 
unnecessary, sensitive nature of the data, 
ambiguous nature of legal framework, lack 
of appropriate safeguards, chilling effect  
Full text 497 
243 Cengiz and Others v. 
Turkey 
48226/10 
and 
14027/11 
01/12
/2015 
V YouTube, blanket blocking order, insulting 
to the memory of Atatürk, citizen 
journalism, not prescribed by law 
Full text 368 
194 Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and 
Di Stefano v. Italy 
38433/09 07/06
/2012 
V 10, 
AP-
1(1) 
Dominant position over the audiovisual 
media, allocation of frequencies, media 
pluralism, right to receive information 
Full text 278 
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297 Centrum för Rättvisa v. 
Sweden 
35252/08 19/06
/2018 
NV 8, 
>GC 
Confidentiality of online communication, 
privacy, surveillance, bulk interception, 
adequate and sufficient safeguards, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 475 
32 Ceylan v. Turkey 23556/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
130 Colaço Mestre & SIC v. 
Portugal 
11182/03 
and 
11319/03 
26/04
/2007 
V Interview, public interest, defamation, 
journalistic ethics 
Full text 180 
79 Colombani & others v. 
France 
51279/99 25/06
/2002 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public watchdog, public 
function of press 
Full text 110 
53 Constantinescu v. 
Romania  
28871/95 27/06
/2000 
NV Criminal defamation, criticism, public 
debate, interview, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 83 
92 Cordova v. Italy (Nos. 1 & 
2) 
40877/98 
and 
45649/99 
30/01
/2003 
V 6 Defamation, insult, duties and 
responsibilities, public interest, reputation 
Full text: 
No. 1 
No. 2 
126 
242 Couderc and Hachette 
Filipacchi Associés v. 
France [Grand Chamber] 
40454/07 10/11
/2015 
V Private life, freedom of expression, fair 
balance, debate of public interest, 
disclosure of the Prince’s fatherhood 
Full text 365 
106 Cumpana & Mazare v. 
Romania [Grand Chamber] 
33348/96 17/12
/2004 
V Defamation, insult, limits of acceptable 
criticism, factual basis or value judgments, 
reputation, privacy, chilling effect, public 
watchdog 
Full text 141 
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63 Cyprus v. Turkey 25781/94 10/05
/2001 
V Conflict between State Parties, censorship 
of school-books, restricted distribution 
and importation media 
Full text 93 
40 Dalban v. Romania 28114/95 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, exaggeration, 
criminal libel, duty of care for journalists, 
public function, privacy, public watchdog 
Full text 75 
117 Dammann v. Switzerland 77551/01 25/04
/2006 
V Confidential information, public 
discussion, vital role of press, public 
watchdog, newsgathering 
Full text 160 
246 De Carolis and France 
Télévisions v. France 
 
29313/10 21/01
/2016 
V Defamation proceedings, protection of 
reputation, Saudi prince, investigative 
journalism, sufficient factual basis 
Full text 374 
75 De Diego Nafría v. Spain 46833/99 14/03
/2002 
NV Defamation, criticism, limits of 
acceptable criticism, public interest, 
employment relation 
Full text 106 
9 De Haes & Gijsels v. 
Belgium 
19983/92 24/02
/1997 
V Defamation, criticism, duties and 
responsibilities, mode of expression, 
exaggeration, provocation, authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary, protection of 
journalistic sources, alternative evidence 
Full text 57 
214 Delfi AS v. Estonia 64569/09 10/10
/2013 
NV, 
>GC 
Internet news portal, grossly insulting 
remarks, readers’ comments, ISP liability 
(exemption), filter, notice-and-takedown, 
editorial control, economic interest 
Full text 313 
237 Delfi AS v. Estonia [Grand 
Chamber]  
64569/09 16/06
/2015 
NV Internet news portal, users’comments, 
offensive content, media publisher, duties 
and responsibilities, liability, notice-and-
takedown, E-commerce Directive, Internet 
service providers, economic interest 
Full text 353 
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86 Demuth v. Switzerland 38743/97 05/11
/2002 
NV Allocation of broadcasting licence, media 
pluralism, margin of appreciation 
Full text 117 
252 Diamant Salihu and others 
v. Sweden (dec.)  
33628/15 10/05
/2016 
I Criminal conviction, purchasing illegal 
firearms, newsgathering, duty to obey 
ordinary criminal law 
Full text 387 
73 Dichand & others v. 
Austria 
29271/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, offensive 
information, public interest, value 
judgments 
Full text 104 
88 Dicle on behalf of DEP 
(Democratic Party) v. 
Turkey  
25141/94 10/12
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, positive 
obligation 
Full text 119 
57 Du Roy & Malaurie v. 
France  
34000/96 03/10
/2000 
V Public interest, secrecy during 
investigation and enquiry procedures, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 88 
131 Dupuis & others v. France 1914/02 07/06
/2007 
V Confidential but well-known information, 
public interest, public watchdog, chilling 
effect, newsgathering 
Full text 181 
71 E.K. v. Turkey 28496/95 07/02
/2002 
V Book, political expression, vital role of 
press, receive information 
Full text 103 
304 E.S. v. Austria 38450/12 25/10
/2018 
NV Criminal conviction, disparagement of 
religious doctrines, Prophet Muhammad, 
paedophilia, margin of appreciation, co-
existence of different religions, positive 
obligations, tolerance 
Full text 488 
104 Editions Plon v. France 56148/00 18/05
/2004 
V Privacy, public interest, medical 
confidentiality, journalistic ethics, rights of 
others 
Full text 139 
299 Egill Einarsson v. Iceland 
(No. 2) 
31221/15 17/07
/2018 
NV 8 Public figure, critical and defamatory 
comment, Facebook page, protection of 
honour and reputation, private life, certain 
Full text 479 
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level of seriousness, rape, previous 
behaviour, full judicial satisfaction, margin 
of appreciation 
275 Einarsson v. Iceland 24703/15 07/11
/2017 
V 8 Value judgment, media personality, right 
to reputation, Instagram, fair balance, 
consequences of impugned publication 
Full text 432 
65 Ekin Association v. France 39288/98 17/07
/2001 
V Insult of foreigners, discrimination based 
on foreign origin 
Full text 96 
285 Endy Gęsina-Torres v. 
Poland (dec.) 
11915/15 15/03
/2018
w 
I Undercover television journalist, false 
identity, criminal conviction, news-
gathering activities, good faith, 
responsible journalism, necessary in 
democratic society, public interest, not 
accessory element of gathering 
information  
Full text 452 
204 Eon v. France 26118/10 14/03
/2013 
V Insult of President, discussion of matters 
of public interest, private life or honour, 
satire, chilling effect 
Full text 297 
119 Erbakan v. Turkey 59405/00 06/07
/2006 
V Political debate, political expression, hate 
speech, intolerance, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, religion 
Full text 162 
31 Erdoğdu and İnce v. 
Turkey 
25067/94 
and 
25068/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
52 Erdogdu v. Turkey 25723/94 15/06
/2000 
V Propaganda against the territorial integrity 
of the State, terrorism, access, receive 
Full text 83 
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information, prevention of disorder or 
crime 
236 Erla Hlynsdóttir v. Iceland 
(no. 3)  
54145/10 02/06
/2015 
V Reporting on criminal proceedings, public 
debate, responsible journalism, good faith, 
diligence 
Full text 351 
96 Ernst & others v. Belgium 33400/96 15/07
/2003 
V 10, 8 Protection of sources, journalism, 
overriding public interest 
Full text 131 
232 Ernst August von 
Hannover v. Germany  
53649/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, 
humour, satire, fair balance 
Full text 345 
150 Faccio v. Italy 33/04 31/03
/2009 
I Disproportionate measure, right to receive 
information, privacy, licence fee. 
Full text 210 
280 Faludy-Kovács v. Hungary 20487/13 23/01
/2018 
NV Reputation, newspaper headline, fair 
balance, negative consequences  
Full text 442 
171 Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 40984/07 22/04
/2010 
V Sensitive and offensive information, 
defamation, terrorism, historical truth, 
public watchdog, disproportionate 
sanction, order of immediate release from 
prison 
Full text 239 
66 Feldek v. Slovakia 29032/95 12/07
/2001 
V Facts or value judgments, political speech, 
public interest, common knowledge, limits 
of acceptable criticism 
Full text 97 
154 Féret v. Belgium 15615/07 16/07
/2009 
NV Hate speech, insult of foreigners, political 
expression, election campaign, public 
debate 
Full text 217 
135 Filatenko v. Russia 73219/01 06/12
/2007 
V Defamation, public interest, reputation, 
good faith, journalistic ethics 
Full text 187 
160 Financial Times & others 
v. the United Kingdom 
821/03 15/12
/2009 
V Protection of journalistic sources, a source 
acting in bad faith, public interest 
Full text 228 
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163 Flinkkilä & others v. 
Finland 
25576/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest 
Full text 233 
144 Flux (No. 6) v. Moldova 22824/04 29/07
/2008 
NV Criticism, sensationalism, defamation, 
journalistic ethics, unprofessional 
behaviour, chilling effect, lack of factual 
basis for allegations 
Full text 199 
268 Fouad Belkacem v. 
Belgium (dec.) 
34367/14 27/06
/2017 
NV  Criminal proceedings, incitement to 
discrimination, hatred and violence, public 
figure, YouTube videos, Article 17 
Full text 418 
193 Frasilă and Ciocirlan v. 
Romania 
25329/03 10/05
/2012 
V Positive obligations, access, rights of 
others, public debate, public watchdog, 
pluralism 
Full text 277 
203 Frederik Neij & Peter 
Sunde Kolmisoppi (The 
Pirate Bay) v. Sweden 
(dec.) 
40397/12 19/02
/2013 
I Copyright, The Pirate Bay, Internet file-
sharing service, illegal use of copyright-
protected music, conviction, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 295 
23 Fressoz & Roire v. France  29183/95 21/01
/1999 
V Confidential information, public interest, 
well-known information, privacy, 
journalistic ethics, tax reports, journalists 
committing offence and public interest
  
Full text 68 
277 Frisk and Jensen v. 
Denmark 
19657/12 05/12
/2017 
NV Incorrect factual basis, journalist, fair 
balance 
Full text 436 
276 Fuchsmann v. Germany 71233/13 19/10
/2017 
NV 8 Fair balance, allegations sufficiently 
serious, public figure, good faith 
Full text 434 
48 Fuentes Bobo v. Spain 39293/98 29/02
/2000 
V Offensive information, criticism, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations, reputation, rights of others, 
employment relations, dismissal 
Full text 80 
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76 Gaweda v. Poland 26229/95 14/03
/2002 
V Lack of clarity, accessible and foreseeable, 
printed media 
Full text 107 
34 Gerger v. Turkey 24919/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
269 Ghiulfer Predescu v. 
Romania 
29751/09 27/06
/2017 
V Defamation, live television show, mayor, 
criminal groups, limits of acceptable 
criticism, public interest, sufficient factual 
basis, good faith, chilling effect 
Full text 420 
175 Gillberg v. Sweden 41723/06 02/11
/2010 
NV 10, 
8, >GC 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 248 
192 Gillberg v. Sweden [Grand 
Chamber] 
41723/06 03/04
/2012 
NV Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 276 
114 Giniewski v. France 64016/00 31/01
/2006 
V Religion, defamation, religious insult, 
offensive information, hate speech 
Full text 155 
298 Gîrleanu v. Romania 50376/09 26/06
/2018 
V Investigative journalism, classified 
information, criminal conviction, public 
interest, disproportionate to aim pursued 
Full text 477 
134 Glas Nadezhda EOOD & 
Elenkov v. Bulgaria 
14134/02 11/10
/2007 
V 10, 
13 
Allocation of radio licence, religion, lack of 
motivation of the judgment, transparency, 
licensing procedure 
Full text 185 
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7 Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom 
17488/90 27/03
/1996 
V Protection of sources, public interest, 
responsible journalism, chilling effect, 
whistle-blowing  
Full text 53 
244 Görmüş and Others v. 
Turkey 
 
49085/07 19/01
/2016 
V Protection of journalistic sources, 
disclosure of confidential military 
information, whistle-blowers, seizure of 
computer data 
Full text 370 
289 GRA Stiftung gegen 
Rassismus und 
Antisemitismus v. 
Switzerland 
18597/13 09/01
/2018 
V NGO, website quoting politician’s speech, 
accusation of verbal racism, public debate, 
factual basis, chilling effect, fair balance 
Full text 458 
14 Grigoriades v. Greece 24348/94 25/11
/1997 
V Military discipline, limits of acceptable 
criticism, insult 
Full text 61 
109 Grinberg v. Russia 23472/03 21/07
/2005 
V Defamation, political expression, facts and 
value judgments, public function of press, 
public watchdog, limits of acceptable 
criticism, public function, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 146 
15 Guerra v. Italy 14967/89 19/02
/1998 
NV10; 
V8 
Right to receive information, positive 
obligations, effective protection, privacy 
Full text 61 
141 Guja v. Moldova 14277/04 12/02
/2008 
V Whistleblowing, public interest, 
journalistic ethics, duties and 
responsibilities, good faith, chilling effect, 
employment relation 
Full text 194 
99 Gündüz v. Turkey 35071/97 04/12
/2003 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, religious intolerance, positive 
obligations, shocking or offensive 
information, live studio debate, hatred or 
hostility, pluralism 
Full text 134 
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132 Hachette Filipacchi 
Associés v. France 
71111/01 14/06
/2007 
NV Rights of others, privacy, human dignity, 
very high circulation of information, 
accessibility and foreseeability 
Full text 182 
234 Haldimann and Others v. 
Switzerland  
21830/09 24/02
/2015 
V Hidden cameras, private life, public 
interest, personal reputation, ethics of 
journalism, good faith, accurate factual 
basis 
Full text 347 
271 Halldórsson v. Iceland 44322/13 04/07
/2017 
NV Defamation proceedings, journalist, 
audiovisual media, public figure, accurate 
factual basis, protection of journalistic 
sources  
Full text 424 
290 Hans Burkhard Nix v. 
Germany (dec.) 
35285/16 05/04
/2018
w 
I Blogger, photo of Himmler in Nazi 
uniform, accusation of racist and 
discriminatory behaviour, public official, 
ban on Nazi symbols, sufficient reasons, 
necessary in democratic society 
Full text 460 
44 Hashman & Harrup v. the 
United Kingdom 
25594/94 25/11
/1999 
V Unlawful action, concept of behaviour 
contra bonos mores, foreseeability 
Full text 77 
267 Herbert Haupt v. Austria 
(dec.) 
55537/10 02/05
/ 2017 
NV 8 Private life, positive obligations, 
defamation, television comedy show, 
politician, artistic expression 
Full text 416 
20 Hertel v. Switzerland 25181/94 25/08
/1998 
V Research paper, rights of others, necessity, 
commercial speech, academic freedom 
Full text 66 
309 Høiness v. Norway 43624/14 17/03
/2019 
NV 8 Liability, Internet portal, offensive content, 
anonymous comments, personal honour 
and reputation, level of seriousness,  fair 
balance, established system of moderation 
Full text 499 
266 Huseynova v. Azerbaijan 10653/10 13/04
/2017 
V 2 Journalist murdered, right to life, positive 
obligations, failure to carry out an 
effective investigation, chilling effect  
Full text 414 
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110 IA v. Turkey 42571/98 13/09
/2005 
NV Religious insult, rights of others, 
provocative opinions, abusive and  
offensive information 
Full text 148 
59 Ibrahim Aksoy v. Turkey  28635/95, 
30171/96 
and 
34535/97 
10/10
/2000 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence 
Full text 89 
165 Iltalehti & Karhuvaara v. 
Finland 
6372/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
18 Incal v. Turkey   09/06
/1998 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, limits of acceptable criticism, 
public interest, hate speech 
Full text 64 
108 Independent News and 
Media v. Ireland 
55120/00 16/06
/2005 
NV Political expression, defamation, libel, 
chilling effect, margin of appreciation 
Full text 144 
253 Instytut Ekonomichnykh 
Reform, TOV v. Ukraine 
61561/08 02/06
/2016 
V Defamation proceedings, public figure, 
political speech, satire, value judgments, 
sufficient factual basis 
Full text 389 
284 Ivashchenko v. Russia 61064/10 13/02
/2018 
V 8 Photojournalist, customs’ inspection of 
laptop, copying and retention of data, 
right to private life, adequate and effective 
safeguards 
Full text 450 
24 Janowski v. Poland  25716/94 21/01
/1999 
NV Journalism, insult, necessity, offensive and 
abusive verbal attacks 
Full text 69 
169 Jean-Marie Le Pen v. 
France 
18788/09 20/04
/2010 
I Offensive information, hate speech,  
political debate, reputation, rights of 
others, exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 236 
2 Jersild v. Denmark  15890/89 23/09
/1994 
V News reporting, interviews, anti-racism, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 48 
61 Jerusalem v. Austria 26958/95 27/02
/2001 
V Political expression, public debate, facts 
or value judgments 
Full text 91 
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164 Jokitaipale & others v. 
Finland 
43349/05 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
256 Jon Gaunt v. the United 
Kingdom (dec.) 
26448/12 06/09
/2016 
NV Broadcasting regulation, broadcasting 
regulator, manifestly insulting language, 
public figure 
Full text 394 
312 Kablis v. Russia 48310/16 
and 
59663/17 
30/04
/2019 
V 11, 
13, 10  
Activist, blocking of social networking 
account, right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly, prior restraint, overbroad 
legislation, no pressing social need, no 
relevant and sufficient reasons for 
interference 
Full text 505 
245 Kalda v. Estonia 
 
17429/10 19/01
/2016 
V Prisoner, access to Internet, right to 
receive information, role of Internet, 
security and economic considerations 
Full text 372 
258 Kaos GL v. Turkey 4982/07 22/11
/2016 
V Seizure of magazine, protection of minors, 
protection of public morals, LGBT, 
sexually explicit expression 
Full text 398 
85 Karakoç & others v. 
Turkey  
27692/95, 
28138/95 
and 
28498/95 
15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, public watchdog, 
separatist propaganda, positive obligation 
Full text 115 
30 Karataş v. Turkey 23168/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
97 Karkin v. Turkey 43928/98 23/09
/2003 
V Political expression, hate speech, 
discrimination, racism 
Full text 132 
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184 Karttunen v. Finland 1685/10 10/05
/2011 
I Internet, possession and reproduction of 
child pornography, illegal content, artistic 
expression 
Full text 262 
153 Kenedi v. Hungary 31475/05 26/05
/2009 
V 10, 
6, 13 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, public watchdog 
Full text 215 
307 Khadija Ismayilova v. 
Azerbaijan 
65286/13 
and 
57270/14 
10/01
/2019 
V 8, 10  Intimidation of journalist, hidden cameras 
in flat, intimate videos online, smear 
campaign, ineffective and flawed 
investigation, publication of status report 
of investigation, positive obligation, 
private life, chilling effect, environment 
protective of journalism 
Full text 495 
148 Khurshid Mustafa & 
Tarzibachi v. Sweden 
23883/06 16/12
/2008 
V Language of television, freedom to receive 
information, positive obligation, horizontal 
effect, disproportionality of the 
interference      
Full text 206 
98 Kizilyaprak v. Turkey 27528/95 02/10
/2003 
V Receive information, separatist 
propaganda, hate speech based on ethnic 
and regional differences 
Full text 133 
123 Klein v. Slovakia 72208/01 31/10
/2006 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, religion, critically comment 
Full text 169 
74 Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. 
KG v. Austria  
34315/96 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, publication of photos, 
vital role of press, public interest, privacy 
Full text 104 
161 Laranjeira Marques da 
Silva v. Portugal 
16983/06 19/01
/2010 
V Political expression, defamation, facts or 
value judgments, reputation, public 
interest 
Full text 230 
124 Leempoel & S.A. Ed. Cine 
Revue v. Belgium 
64772/01 09/11
/2006 
NV Censorship, privacy, strictly confidential 
correspondence, public interest  
Full text 170 
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21 Lehideux & Isorni v. 
France 
24662/94 23/09
/1998 
V Advertisement, reputation, rights of 
others, abuse of rights, historical research, 
second world war 
Full text 66 
146 Leroy v. France 36109/03 02/10
/2008 
NV Public interest, artistic expression, 
glorifying terrorism, political expression, 
activism, cartoon 
Full text 202 
218 Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther 
v. Norway 
13258/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 8 Public figures, respect for private life, 
wedding, accessibility to public, image, 
personality, reputation, fair balance 
Full text 321 
133 Lionarakis v. Greece 1131/05 05/07
/2007 
V 10, 6 Political expression, radio broadcast, 
defamation, facts or value judgments, 
value judgments with factual basis 
Full text 184 
56 Lopes Gomes da Silva v. 
Portugal 
37698/97 28/09
/2000 
V Vital role of press, political expression, 
limits of acceptable criticism, 
exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 86 
295 M.L. and W.W. v. Germany 60789/10 
and 
65599/10 
28/06
/2018 
NV 8 Criminal proceedings, anonymization of 
media reports, “right to be forgotten”, 
criminal records, privacy, ongoing public 
interest  
Full text 471 
278 MAC TV s.r.o. v. Slovakia 13466/12 28/11
/2017 
V No gratuitous personal attack, media 
outlet penalized, margin of appreciation 
Full text 438 
257 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság 
v. Hungary [Grand 
Chamber] 
18030/11 08/11
/2016 
V 
 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, non-governmental 
organisation, public watchdog 
Full text 396 
306 Magyar Jeti Zrt. v. Hungary 11257/16 04/12
/2018 
V Freedom of expression online, objective 
liability, media platform, hyperlink, 
defamatory content, chilling effect  
Full text 492 
279 Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya 
Párt v. Hungary 
201/17 23/01
/2018 
V, >GC Political party, communicative value, app 
for anonymously sharing photos of ballot 
papers, public interest, legitimate aim 
Full text 440 
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247 Magyar 
Tartalomszolgáltatók 
Egyesülete and Index.hu 
Zrt v. Hungary 
22947/13 02/02
/2016 
V Internet news portal, readers’ comments, 
ISP liability, commercial reputation, 
matters of public interest, notice-and-
take-down-system 
Full text 375 
126 Mamère v. France 12697/03 07/11
/2006 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation, libel, public 
interest, political expression, 
exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 174 
156 Manole & others v. 
Moldova 
13936/02 17/09
/2009 
V Broadcasting licences, political 
independence political independence of 
media, pluralism, censorship, public 
service broadcasting 
Full text 221 
296 Mariya Alekhina and 
Others v. Russia 
38004/12 17/07
/2018 
V 3, 5, 
6, 10 
Pussy Riot, punk band, political protest, 
religious hatred or enmity, 
disproportionate measures, public debate 
Full text 473 
69 Marônek v. Slovakia 32686/96 19/04
/2001 
V Well-known information, public interest, 
rule of law, good faith, reputation, rights 
of others 
Full text 101 
120 Matky v. Czech Republic 19101/03 10/07
/2006 
I Receive information, access to public or 
administrative documents, positive 
obligations, rights of others, national 
security, public health, public interest 
Full text 164 
228 Matúz v. Hungary 73571/10 21/10
/2014 
V Whistleblower, journalist, confidential 
information, censorship, public 
broadcasting organisation, public interest, 
severity of sanction 
Full text 339 
78 McVicar v. the United 
Kingdom 
46311/99 02/05
/2002 
NV Defamation, public interest, well-known 
sports figures, factual evidence 
Full text 109 
286 Mehmet Hasan Altan v. 
Turkey 
13237/17 20/03
/2018 
V 5, 10 Academic and journalist, critical views, 
military coup, Article 15 - derogation in 
Full text 454 
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time of emergency, Article 5 - right to 
liberty and security, pre-trial and 
continued detention, disproportionate, 
necessary, pressing social need, concrete 
evidence, chilling effect, intimidation of 
civil society, silencing of dissenting voices 
143 Meltex Ltd. & Mesrop 
Movsesyan v. Armenia 
32283/04 17/06
/2008 
V Non-discriminatory allocation of 
frequencies or broadcasting licences, 
licencing procedure 
Full text 197 
207 Meltex Ltd. v. Armenia 
(dec.) 
45199/09 21/05
/2013 
I Broadcasting licence, licensing body, 
arbitrary interference, procedural 
safeguards, domestic enforcement of 
Court’s judgment, fresh violation of 
freedom of expression 
Full text 303 
177 MGN Ltd. v. United 
Kingdom 
39401/04 18/01
/2011 
V Public interest, privacy, chilling effect, 
disproportionality of interference 
Full text 252 
265 Milisavljević v. Serbia 50123/06 04/04
/2017 
V Criminal proceedings, insult, public figure, 
human rights activist, journalistic freedom 
of expression 
Full text 412 
121 Monnat v. Switzerland 73604/01 21/09
/2006 
V Broadcasting, critical reporting, public 
interest, positive obligations, anti-
Semitism, politically engaged journalism, 
journalistic ethics, public watchdog 
Full text 166 
235 Morice v. France [Grand 
Chamber] 
29369/10 23/04
/2015 
V Defamation, investigative judges, lawyers, 
sufficient factual basis, public interest, 
value judgments, judicial proceedings, 
authority of judiciary, chilling effect 
Full text 349 
181 Mosley v. the United 
Kingdom 
48009/08 10/05
/2011 
NV 8 Privacy, positive obligation, 
prenotification, public interest, margin of 
appreciation, chilling effect 
Full text 256 
Back to overview of case-law 
554 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
195 Mouvement raëlien suisse 
v. Switzerland 
16354/06 13/07
/2012 
NV Internet, illegal content, poster campaign, 
aliens, proselytising speech, the protection 
of morals, health, rights of others and 
prevention of crime 
Full text 280 
95 Murphy v. Ireland 44179/98 10/07
/2003 
NV Broadcasting prohibition, religious 
advertising, margin of appreciation 
Full text 130 
209 Nagla v. Latvia 73469/10 16/07
/2013 
V Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, chilling effect, safeguards 
against abuse, pressing social need 
Full text 305 
200 Nenkova-Lalova v. 
Bulgaria 
35745/05 11/12
/2012 
NV Dismissal of journalist, disciplinary 
sanction 
Full text 289 
47 News Verlags GmbH v. 
Austria 
31457/96 11/01
/2000 
V Defamation, reputation, rights of others, 
public concern, publication of photos, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 79 
128 Nikowitz & Verlagsgruppe 
News GmbH v. Austria 
5266/03 22/02
/2007 
V Defamation, value judgments, well-known 
information, humorous commentary, 
acceptable satire, public interest 
Full text 177 
77 Nikula v. Finland 31611/96 21/03
/2002 
V Defamation, criticism, fair trial, potential 
chilling effect of criminal sanctions, 
lawyer 
Full text 108 
43 Nilsen & Johnsen v. 
Norway 
23118/93 25/11
/1999 
V Police brutality, defamation, receive and 
impart information, exaggeration, public 
debate, limits of acceptable criticism 
Full text 77 
239 Niskasaari and 
Otavamedia Oy v. Finland  
32297/10 23/07
/2015 
V Defamation proceedings, journalist’s 
reputation, scrutiny of journalists, 
comment and criticism 
Full text 359 
113 Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. 
Denmark 
40485/02 08/12
/2005 
NV Protection of sources, vulnerable persons, 
positive obligations, major crime 
Full text 153 
137 Nur Radyo v. Turkey 6587/03 27/11
/2007 
V Broadcasting licence, religion, shocking or 
offensive information, hate speech 
Full text 190 
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176 Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon 
Yayıncıliğı A.Ş. v. Turkey 
(No. 2) 
42284/05 12/10
/2010 
V Broadcasting licence, religion, rule of law, 
positive obligations  
Full text 251 
10 Oberschlick (No. 2) v. 
Austria 
20834/92 01/07
/1997 
V Political expression, defamation, insult, 
offensive information, limits of acceptable 
criticism 
Full text 58 
33 Okçuoğlu v. Turkey 24246/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
264 Ólafsson v. Iceland 58493/13 18/03
/2017 
V Defamation proceedings, political 
candidate, website liability, dissemination 
of others’ statements, journalistic ethics 
Full text 410 
262 Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia 42911/08 21/02
/2017 
V Electoral law, administrative offence, 
election campaigning, newspaper, normal 
journalistic coverage of a political debate 
Full text 406 
216 Österreichische 
Vereinigung zur 
Erhaltung, Stärkung und 
Schaffung eines 
wirtschaftlich gesunden 
land- und 
forstwirtschaftlichen 
Grundbesitzes v. Austria 
39534/07 28/11
/2013 
V NGO, gathering of information in public 
interest, public debate, right of access to 
information, positive State obligations, 
information monopoly, social watchdog 
Full text 317 
127 Österreichischer Rundfunk 
v. Austria 
35841/02 07/12
/2006 
V Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 176 
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103 Österreichischer Rundfunk 
v. Austria (dec.) 
57597/00 25/05
/2004 
I Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 138 
179 Otegi Mondragon v. Spain 2034/07 15/03
/2011 
V Political expression, insult, value 
judgments, honour, privacy, dignity, public 
debate, exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 254 
1 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. 
Austria  
13470/87 20/09
/1994 
NV Cinema, blasphemous film, religion, 
artistic expression, margin of appreciation, 
art house cinema 
Full text 47 
49 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey  23144/93 16/03
/2000 
V Critical media reporting, separatist 
propaganda, racism, political expression, 
positive obligations, horizontal effect of 
human rights 
Full text 80 
115 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey 64178/00, 
64179/00, 
64181/00, 
64183/00, 
64184/00 
30/03
/2006 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
Full text 156 
138 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey  11369/03 04/12
/2007 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
Full text 190 
41 Öztürk v. Turkey  22479/93 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, incitement to crime, 
hatred or hostility, public interest, 
prevention of disorder or crime 
Full text 75 
158 Pasko v. Russia 69519/01 22/10
/2009 
NV Confidential information, state secrets, 
national security, military information 
Full text 225 
91 Peck v. the United 
Kingdom 
44647/98 28/01
/2003 
V 8 Privacy in public areas, reasonable 
expectation of privacy, CCTV, media 
reporting 
Full text 124 
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94 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark 
49017/99 19/06
/2003 
NV 10, 
6, >GC 
Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 129 
105 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark [Grand Chamber] 
49017/99 17/12
/2004 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 140 
220 Pentikäinen v. Finland 11882/10 04/02
/2014 
NV, 
>GC 
Press photographer, demonstration, police 
order, conviction, no confiscation of 
equipment or photos, public interest, fair 
balance 
Full text 325 
241 Pentikäinen v. Finland 
[Grand Chamber] 
11882/10 20/10
/2015 
NV Press photographer, demonstration, police 
order, conviction, no confiscation of 
equipment or photos, public interest, fair 
balance 
Full text 363 
217 Perinçek v. Switzerland 27510/08 17/12
/2013 
V, >GC Genocide denial, Armenia, criminal 
conviction, racial discrimination, historical 
debate, public interest, negation of crimes 
against humanity 
Full text 319 
240 Perinçek v. Switzerland 
[Grand Chamber] 
27510/08 15/10
/2015 
V Genocide denial, Armenia, criminal 
conviction, racial discrimination, historical 
debate, public interest, negation of crimes 
against humanity 
Full text 361 
67 Perna v. Italy 48898/99 25/07
/2001 
V, >GC Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest  
Full text 98 
93 Perna v. Italy [Grand 
Chamber] 
48898/99 06/05
/2003 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation 
Full text 127 
145 Petrina v. Romania 78060/01 14/10
/2008 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, defamation, 
libel, reputation 
Full text 201 
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250 Pinto Coelho v. Portugal 
(no. 2) 
 
48718/11 22/03
/2016 
V Criminal conviction, broadcasting 
recordings of court hearing, journalistic 
reporting on matters of public interest 
Full text 382 
28 Polat v. Turkey 23500/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
5 Prager & Oberschlick v. 
Austria  
15974/90 26/04
/1995 
NV Critical reporting, offensive information, 
defamation, criticism, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 51 
227 Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria 8429/05 30/10
/2014 
V 8 Private life, confiscation of computers, 
illegal software, illegal distribution and 
reproduction, search-and-seizure, arbitrary 
interference, sufficient guarantees 
Full text 337 
314 Pryanishnikov 
v. Russia 
25047/05 10/09
/2019 
V Film producer, refusal of film reproduction 
licence, distribution of films, artistic 
expression, protection of children, 
pornography, protection of morals, based 
on assumptions, proportionality 
Full text 509 
12 Radio ABC v. Austria 19736/92 20/10
/1997 
V Private broadcasting, monopoly position 
of the media, positive obligations 
Full text 60 
101 Radio France v. France 53984/00 30/03
/2004 
NV Privacy, good name and reputation, 
responsible journalism, exaggeration, 
provocation 
Full text 136 
125 Radio Twist v. Slovakia 62202/00 19/12
/2006 
V Privacy, political information, public 
interest, use of illegally recorded 
telephone conversation 
Full text 172 
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311 Rebechenko v. Russia 10257/17 16/04
/2019 
V Blogger, YouTube video, reputation, 
political debate, good faith, value 
judgement, failure to analyse contents of 
video, discourage participation of the 
press, fair balance, pressing social need 
Full text 503 
26 Rekvényi v. Hungary 25390/94 20/05
/1999 
NV Politically neutral police force, national 
security, prevention of disorder 
Full text 72 
168 Renaud v. France 13290/07 25/02
/2010 
V Internet, political speech, criticism, 
emotional political debate, tolerance, facts 
or value judgments, chilling effect 
Full text 235 
197 Ressiot & others v. France 15054/07 
and 
15066/07 
28/06
/2012 
V Protection of sources, disproportionality of 
interference, searches of offices of 
newspapers, searches of homes 
Full text 284 
213 Ricci v. Italy 30210/06 08/10
/2013 
V Satirical television programme, disclosure 
of confidential images, suspended prison 
sentence, ethics of journalism, chilling 
effect 
Full text 311 
310 Richard Williamson v. 
Germany 
64496/17 31/01
/2019
w 
I Broadcast television interview, YouTube, 
Holocaust denial, criminal conviction, 
Article 17, national historical context 
Full text 501 
215 Ristamäki and Korvola v. 
Finland 
66456/09 29/10
/2013 
V Defamation, conviction, protection of 
reputation, public interest, tax inspection 
Full text 315 
90 Roemen & Schmit v. 
Luxembourg 
51772/99 25/02
/2003 
V Protection of sources, search of homes, 
privacy, responsible journalism 
Full text 122 
292 ROJ TV A/S v. Denmark 
(dec.) 
24683/14 24/05
/2018
w 
I Conviction of television broadcaster, 
terrorist offences, duties and 
responsibilities, violence and support for 
terrorist activity, wide audience, Article 17 
Full text 464 
Back to overview of case-law 
560 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
263 Rolf Anders Daniel Pihl v. 
Sweden (dec.) 
74742/14 09/03
/2017 
NV 8 Private life, positive obligations, website 
liability, anonymous online comment, 
chilling effect 
Full text 408 
225 Roşiianu v. Romania 27329/06 24/06
/2014 
V Right of access to public documents, 
public interest, journalism, efficient 
enforcement mechanisms, arbitrary 
restrictions, indirect censorship 
Full text 333 
180 RTBF v. Belgium 50084/06 29/03
/2011 
V Broadcasting, patients’ rights, impart 
information, prior restraint, censorship, 
foreseeability of law 
Full text 255 
261 Rubio Dosamantes v. 
Spain 
20996/10 21/02
/2017 
V 8 Private life, positive obligations, television 
programme, public figure, disclosure of 
intimate details, sexual orientation 
Full text 404 
287 Şahin Alpay v. Turkey 16538/17 20/03
/2018 
V 5, 10 Journalist, critical views, arrest and pre-
trial detention, military coup, public 
emergency threatening the life of the 
nation, danger democratic constitutional 
order, chilling effect, intimidation of civil 
society, silencing of dissenting voices  
Full text 454 
205 Saint-Paul Luxembourg 
S.A. v. Luxembourg 
26419/10 18/04
/2013 
V 10, 8 Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, identification of author, 
proportionality 
Full text 299 
223 Salumäki v. Finland 23605/09 29/04
/2014 
NV Newspaper article, insinuation, criminal 
conviction, private life, reputation, fair 
balance, public interest, presumption of 
innocence, margin of appreciation 
Full text 330 
174 Sanoma v. The 
Netherlands 
38224/03 14/09
/2010 
V Protection of journalistic sources, public 
interest, public watchdog 
Full text 246 
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238 Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy v. Finland  
931/13 21/07
/2015 
> GC 
NV 10, 
14; V 6 
Privacy, personal data, taxation data, 
public interest, data journalism, magazine 
and SMS-service, extent of publication, 
processing of personal data, journalistic 
activities, margin of appreciation, fair 
balance, length of proceedings 
Full text 356 
270 Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy v. Finland 
[Grand Chamber] 
931/13 27/06
/2017 
NV 10 
V 6 
Privacy, personal data, taxation data, public 
interest, data journalism, magazine and 
SMS-service, extent of publication, 
processing of personal data, journalistic 
activities, margin of appreciation, fair 
balance, length of proceedings 
Full text 422 
300 Savva Terentyev v. Russia 10692/09 28/08
/2018 
V Comments on blog, police officers, 
offensive, insulting and virulent, not 
incitement to hatred or violence, minor 
impact, criminal conviction, 
disproportionate, clear and precise 
definitions of offences 
Full text 481 
17 Schöpfer v. Switzerland 25405/94 20/05
/1998 
NV Limits of acceptable criticism, receive 
information, critical reporting, public 
interest  
Full text 63 
196 Schweizerische Radio- 
und Fernseh gesellschaft 
SRG v. Switzerland  
34124/06 21/06
/2012 
V Television interview, political and 
economic expression, rights of others, 
public interest, privacy, security, margin of 
appreciation, public interest 
Full text 282 
82 Seher Karatas v. Turkey  33179/96 09/07
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
incitement to hatred or hostility, national 
security 
Full text 112 
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281 Sekmadienis Ltd. v. 
Lithuania 
69317/14 30/01
/2018 
V Advertisements for a clothing line, 
religious figures, (not) gratuitously 
offensive, religious beliefs, public morals 
Full text 444 
260 Selmani & Others v. the 
former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia 
67259/14 09/02
/2017 
V Forcible removal, journalists, press gallery, 
national parliament, protests, legitimate 
public concern, behaviour of elected 
representatives, necessary in democratic 
society 
Full text 402 
54 Sener v. Turkey 26680/95 18/07
/2000 
V Vital role of press, positive obligations,  
political expression, public interest, 
receive information 
Full text 85 
182 Sigma Radio Television 
Ltd. V. Cyprus 
32181/04 
and 
35122/05 
21/07
/2011 
NV 10, 
14 
Rights of others, decisions by independent 
media regulators, budget neutrality, 
margin of appreciation, discrimination 
Full text 258 
288 Sinkova v. Ukraine 39496/11 27/02
/2018 
V 5, 
NV 10  
Performance-art protest at war memorial, 
film published online, criminal conviction, 
necessary in democratic society, more 
suitable ways to express views, insulting 
memory of killed soldiers and feelings of 
veterans, severe penalty upheld 
Full text 456 
183 Sipoş v. Romania 26125/04 03/05
/2011 
V 8 Journalism, defamation, insult, privacy, 
horizontal effect of human rights, positive 
obligations, chilling effect of criminal 
sanctions 
Full text 260 
166 Soila v. Finland 6806/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
249 Sousa Goucha v. Portugal 
 
70434/12 22/03
/2016 
NV 8, 
14 + 8 
Defamation proceedings, right to 
protection of reputation, sexual 
orientation joke, television host, public 
figure, fair balance 
Full text 380 
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83 Stambuk v. Germany 37928/97 17/10
/2002 
V Medical advertising, rights of others, 
protect health, commercial speech, public 
interest 
Full text 113 
186 Standard News Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria (No. 3) 
34702/07 10/01
/2012 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, public figure, 
defamation, libel  
Full text 266 
107 Steel & Morris v. the 
United Kingdom 
68416/01 15/02
/2005 
V 10, 6 Defamation, libel, potential chilling effect, 
reputation, public debate 
Full text 143 
22 Steel & others v. the 
United Kingdom  
24838/94 23/09
/1998 
V Necessity, public order, rule of law, 
authority of the judiciary, breach of peace, 
preventing disorder, rights of others 
Full text 67 
291 Stern Taulats and Roura 
Capellera v. Spain 
51168/15 
and 
51186/15 
13/03
/2018 
V Burning photo of Spanish royal couple, 
criminal conviction, political expression, 
symbolic speech, permissible degree of 
provocation, not hate speech or 
incitement to hatred or violence 
Full text 462 
116 Stoll v. Switzerland 69698/01 25/04
/2006 
V, >GC Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog, exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 158 
136 Stoll v. Switzerland [Grand 
Chamber] 
69698/01 10/12
/2007 
NV Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog, exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 188 
294 Stomakhin v. Russia 52273/07 09/05
/2018 
V Criminal proceedings, journalist, public 
interest, acceptable limits of criticism, 
dominant position of government, 
pressing social need, limited distribution 
Full text 468 
35 Sürek & Özdemir v. Turkey 23927/94 
and 
24277/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
Full text 73 
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hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
36 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) 26682/95 08/07
/1999 
NV Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
37 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 2) 24122/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
38 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 3) 24735/94 08/07
/1999 
NV Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
39 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4)  24762/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
198 Szima v. Hungary 29723/11 09/10
/2012 
NV Internet, criticism, labour union, 
disciplinary sanction 
Full text 285 
315 Szurovecz v. Hungary 15428/16 08/10
/2019 
V Journalistic access, centre for asylum 
seekers, press freedom, investigative 
journalism, first-hand observation, 
newsgathering, significant public interest 
Full text 511 
45 T. v. the United Kingdom 24724/94 16/12
/1999 
V 6 Fair trial, public interest Full text 78 
274 Tamiz v. the United 
Kingdom (dec.) 
3877/14 19/09
/2017 
I Anonymous defamatory comments, blog, 
personal honour and reputation, real and 
substantial tort, liability of  information 
society service providers for illegal 
content.  
Full text 430 
60 Tammer v. Estonia 41205/98 06/02
/2001 
NV Privacy, private information, politician, 
public interest, defamation 
Full text 90 
224 Taranenko v. Russia 19554/05 15/05
/2014 
V 10, 
11 
Freedom of assembly and association, 
leaflets, occupation of administrative 
premises, conviction, prison sentence, pre-
trial detention, chilling effect 
Full text 332 
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152 TASZ v. Hungary 37374/05 14/04
/2009 
V Access to information, public or official 
documents, open government, indirect 
censorship, personal information of a 
politician, social watchdog 
Full text 213 
55 Tele 1 
Privatfernsehgesellschaft 
MBH v. Austria 
32240/96 21/09
/2000 
V & 
NV 
Allocation of broadcasting licence, impart 
information, monopoly position of the 
media 
Full text 86 
199 Telegraaf Media 
Nederland Landelijke 
Media B.V. & Others v. the 
Netherlands 
39315/06 22/11
/2012 
V Protection of journalistic sources, 
intelligence and security services, 
surveillance, coercive measures, ex ante 
review 
Full text 287 
259 Terentyev v. Russia 25147/09 26/01
/2017 
V Defamation proceedings, blogger, artistic 
criticism, statements of fact and value 
judgments 
Full text 400 
68 Thoma v. Luxembourg 38432/97 29/03
/2001 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, quoting other media sources, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 100 
219 Tierbefreier E.V. v. 
Germany 
45192/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 10, 
14 
Association, animal rights, film, website, 
injunction, personality rights of company, 
debate on matters of public interest, 
unfair means 
Full text 323 
140 Tillack v. Belgium 20477/05 27/11
/2007 
V Protection of sources, searches of homes 
and workplaces, public watchdog 
Full text 192 
149 Times Newspapers Ltd. 
(Nos. 1 & 2) v. the United 
Kingdom 
3002/03 
and 
23676/03 
10/03
/2009 
NV Internet, internet publication rule, 
defamation, libel, education, historical 
research, responsible journalism, news 
archives 
Full text 208 
6 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the 
United Kingdom  
18139/91 13/07
/1995 
V Defamation, libel, crime reporting, 
disproportionate damages 
Full text 52 
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129 Tønsberg Blad AS & Marit 
Haukom v. Norway 
510/04 01/03
/2007 
V Criticism, defamation, reputation, right to 
receive information, public interest, good 
faith, journalistic ethics, duty to verify 
factual allegations 
Full text 178 
112 Tourancheau & July v. 
France 
53886/00 24/11
/2005 
NV Crime reporting, necessity, reputation, 
rights of others, presumption of innocence 
Full text 151 
167 Tuomela & others v. 
Finland  
25711/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
189 Tusalp v. Turkey 32131/08 
and 
41617/08 
21/02
/2012 
V Defamation, journalistic freedom of 
expression, value judgments, Prime 
Minister’s personality rights, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 270 
147 TV Vest SA Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v. Norway 
21132/05 11/12
/2008 
V Television, political advertising, positive 
obligation, margin of appreciation, 
pluralism 
Full text 204 
72 Unabhängige Initiative 
Informationsvielfalt v. 
Austria 
28525/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, political debate, 
public interest, value judgment 
Full text 104 
293 Unifaun Theatre 
Productions Limited and 
Others v. Malta 
37326/13 15/05
/2018 
V Theatrical production, blasphemous play, 
ban, not prescribed by law 
Full text 466 
229 Urechean and Pavlicenco 
v. Moldova  
27756/05 
and 
41219/07 
02/12
/2014 
V 6 Defamation proceedings, President, 
blanket immunity, right of access to courts 
Full text 341 
159 Ürper & others v. Turkey 14526/07, 
14747/07, 
15022/07, 
15737/07, 
36137/07, 
47245/07, 
20/10
/2009 
V Terrorism, suspension of publication and 
distribution of newspaper, public 
watchdog 
Full text 227 
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50371/07, 
50372/07 
and 
54637/07 
230 Uzeyir Jafarov v. 
Azerbaijan 
54204/08 29/01
/2015 
V 3 Violent attack, journalist, favourable 
environment, participation in public 
debate, effective investigation, prohibition 
of torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment 
Full text 343 
46 V. v. the United Kingdom  24888/94 16/12
/1999 
V 6 Fair trial, public interest 
 
Full text 78 
191 Vejdeland & others v. 
Sweden 
1813/07 09/02
/2012 
NV Hate speech, homophobia, insult 
homosexuals, pamphlets, school  
Full text 274 
3 Vereiniging Weekblad 
Bluf! v. the Netherlands  
16616/90 09/02
/1995 
V National security, sensitive information, 
State secrets, impart information 
Full text 49 
4 Vereinigung 
Demokratischer Soldaten 
Österreichs & Gubi v. 
Austria 
15153/89 19/12
/1994 
V Political expression, critical reporting, 
criticism, rights of others, reputation 
Full text 50 
157 VgT Vereinigung gegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland (No. 2) [Grand 
Chamber] 
32772/02 30/06
/2009 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 223 
64 VgT Vereinigung Tegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland 
24699/94 28/06
/2001 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 94 
102 Von Hannover v. Germany 59320/00 24/06
/2004 
V 8 Privacy in public areas, continual 
harassment, public interest, conflicting 
human rights   
Full text 137 
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188 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 2)  
40660/08 
and 
60614/08 
07/02
/2012 
NV 8 Privacy in public areas, public interest, 
entertainment press, conflicting human 
rights 
Full text 268 
211 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 3) 
8772/10 19/09
/2013 
NV 8 Photograph, injunction prohibiting further 
publication, debate of general interest, 
public figure, privacy, freedom of the 
press, positive obligations 
Full text 308 
139 Voskuil v. The Netherlands 64752/01 22/11
/2007 
V Confidential information, protection of 
sources, integrity of the police and judicial 
authorities, right to remain silent, public 
watchdog 
Full text 192 
210 Węgrzynowski and 
Smolczewski v. Poland 
33846/07 16/07
/2013 
NV 10, 
8 
Personality rights, online news media, 
digital archives, public watchdog, privacy, 
libel, rectification 
Full text 306 
122 White v. Sweden 42435/02 19/09
/2006 
NV 8 Privacy, good name and reputation, 
defamation, exaggeration, provocation, 
journalistic ethics, positive obligation, 
public interest, conflicting human rights 
Full text 168 
42 Wille v. Liechtenstein 28396/95 28/10
/1999 
V Political expression, insult, critical 
reporting, public debate, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 77 
80 Wilson & NUJ v. the 
United Kingdom 
30668/96, 
30671/96 
and 
30678/96 
02/07
/2002 
V 11 Journalism, freedom of assembly and 
association, necessity  
Full text 111 
8 Wingrove v. the United 
Kingdom 
17419/90 25/11
/1996 
NV Blasphemous film, artistic expression, 
rights of others, general verification 
system for videos, political speech, public 
interest, margin of appreciation, morals or 
religion 
Full text 55 
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111 Wirtschafts-Trend 
Zeitschriften-Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria 
58547/00 27/10
/2005 
V Limits of acceptable criticism, political 
expression, defamation, high degree of 
tolerance, public interest  
Full text 149 
155 Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland 20436/02 16/07
/2009 
V Public interest, pluralism, facts or value 
judgments, duties and responsibilities, 
good faith, employment relation 
Full text 219 
11 Worm v. Austria 22714/93 29/08
/1997 
NV Authority and impartiality of the judiciary, 
journalism, prejudice, crime reporting, fair 
trial 
Full text 59 
81 Yagmuredereli v. Turkey 29590/96 04/06
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
separatist propaganda, violence, national 
security 
Full text 112 
87  Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 28493/95 05/12
/2002 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, receive information, positive 
obligation 
Full text 119 
142 Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 
(No. 3) 
71353/01 22/04
/2008 
V Incitement to hatred or hostility, 
separatism, necessity 
Full text 196 
178 Yleisradio Oy & others v. 
Finland 
30881/09 08/02
/2011 
NV Defamation, confidential and sensitive 
information, privacy, private persons,  
Full text 253 
208 Youth Initiative for Human 
Rights v. Serbia 
48135/06 25/06
/2013 
V Access to documents held by public 
authorities, NGO, electronic surveillance 
measures, freedom of information 
legislation, public debate, public interest, 
public watchdog 
Full text 304 
13 Zana v. Turkey 18954/91 25/11
/1997 
NV Political expression, incitement to 
violence, terrorism 
Full text 61 
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          Armenia 
143 Meltex Ltd. & Mesrop 
Movsesyan v. Armenia 
32283/04 17/06
/2008 
V Non-discriminatory allocation of 
frequencies or broadcasting licences, 
licencing procedure 
Full text 197 
207 Meltex Ltd. v. Armenia 
(dec.) 
45199/09 21/05
/2013 
I Broadcasting licence, licensing body, 
arbitrary interference, procedural 
safeguards, domestic enforcement of 
Court’s judgment, fresh violation of 
freedom of expression 
Full text 303 
          Austria 
50 Andreas Wabl v. Austria  24773/94 21/03
/2000 
NV Political expression, defamation, Nazism, 
offensive information 
Full text 81 
73 Dichand & others v. 
Austria 
29271/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, offensive 
information, public interest, value 
judgments 
Full text 104 
304 E.S. v. Austria 38450/12 25/10
/2018 
NV Criminal conviction, disparagement of 
religious doctrines, Prophet Muhammad, 
paedophilia, margin of appreciation, co-
existence of different religions, positive 
obligations, tolerance 
Full text 488 
267 Herbert Haupt v. Austria 
(dec.) 
55537/10 02/05
/ 2017 
NV 8 Private life, positive obligations, 
defamation, television comedy show, 
politician, artistic expression 
Full text 416 
61 Jerusalem v. Austria 26958/95 27/02
/2001 
V Political expression, public debate,  facts 
or value judgments 
Full text 91 
74 Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. 
KG v. Austria  
34315/96 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, publication of photos, 
vital role of press, public interest, privacy 
Full text 104 
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128 Nikowitz & Verlagsgruppe 
News GmbH v. Austria 
5266/03 22/02
/2007 
V Defamation, value judgments, well-known 
information, humorous commentary, 
acceptable satire, public interest 
Full text 175 
47 News Verlags GmbH v. 
Austria 
31457/96 11/01
/2000 
V Defamation, reputation, rights of others,  
public concern, publication of photos, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 79 
10 Oberschlick (No. 2) v. 
Austria 
20834/92 01/07
/1997 
V Political expression, defamation, insult, 
offensive information, limits of acceptable 
criticism 
Full text 58 
216 Österreichische 
Vereinigung zur 
Erhaltung, Stärkung und 
Schaffung eines 
wirtschaftlich gesunden 
land- und 
forstwirtschaftlichen 
Grundbesitzes v. Austria 
39534/07 28/11
/2013 
V NGO, gathering of information in public 
interest, public debate, right of access to 
information, positive State obligations, 
information monopoly, social watchdog 
Full text 317 
103 Österreichischer Rundfunk 
v. Austria (dec.) 
57597/00 25/05
/2004 
I Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 138 
127 Österreichischer Rundfunk 
v. Austria 
35841/02 07/12
/2006 
V Public broadcasting organisation, 
publication of photos without consent, 
private interest, neo-Nazism 
Full text 176 
1 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. 
Austria  
13470/87 20/09
/1994 
NV Cinema, blasphemous film, religion, 
artistic expression, margin of appreciation, 
art house cinema 
Full text 47 
5 Prager & Oberschlick v. 
Austria  
15974/90 26/04
/1995 
NV Critical reporting , offensive information, 
defamation, criticism, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 43 
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12 Radio ABC v. Austria 19736/92 20/10
/1997 
V Private broadcasting, monopoly position 
of the media, positive obligations 
Full text 460 
186 Standard News Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria (No. 3) 
34702/07 10/01
/2012 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, public figure, 
defamation, libel  
Full text 266 
55 Tele 1 
Privatfernsehgesellschaft 
MBH v. Austria 
32240/96 21/09
/2000 
V & 
NV 
Allocation of broadcasting licence, impart 
information, monopoly position of the 
media 
Full text 86 
72 Unabhängige Initiative 
Informationsvielfalt v. 
Austria 
28525/95 26/02
/2002 
V Political expression, political debate, 
public interest, value judgment 
Full text 104 
4 Vereinigung 
Demokratischer Soldaten 
Österreichs & Gubi v. 
Austria 
15153/89 19/12
/1994 
V Political expression, critical reporting, 
criticism, rights of others, reputation 
Full text 50 
111 Wirtschafts-Trend 
Zeitschriften-Verlags 
GmbH v. Austria 
58547/00 27/10
/2005 
V Limits of acceptable criticism, political 
expression, defamation, high degree of 
tolerance, public interest  
Full text 149 
11 Worm v. Austria 22714/93 29/08
/1997 
NV Authority and impartiality of the judiciary, 
journalism, prejudice, crime reporting , fair 
trial 
Full text 59 
          Azerbaijan 
171 Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan 40984/07 22/04
/2010 
V Sensitive and offensive information, 
defamation, terrorism, historical truth, 
public watchdog, disproportionate 
sanction, order of immediate release from 
prison 
Full text 239 
266 Huseynova v. Azerbaijan 10653/10 13/04
/2017 
V 2 Journalist murdered, right to life, positive 
obligations, failure to carry out an 
effective investigation, chilling effect  
Full text 414 
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307 Khadija Ismayilova v. 
Azerbaijan 
65286/13 
and 
57270/14 
10/01
/2019 
V 8, 10  Intimidation of journalist, hidden cameras 
in flat, intimate videos online, smear 
campaign, ineffective and flawed 
investigation, publication of status report 
of investigation, positive obligation, 
private life, chilling effect, environment 
protective of journalism 
Full text 495 
230 Uzeyir Jafarov v. 
Azerbaijan 
54204/08 29/01
/2015 
V 3 Violent attack, journalist, favourable 
environment, participation in public 
debate, effective investigation, prohibition 
of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment 
Full text 343 
          Belgium 
70 Bankovic & others v. 
Belgium & others 
52207/99 12/12
/2001 
I NATO-bombing of TV station, 
inadmissible, jurisdiction, treaty 
obligations of State Parties 
Full text 102 
9 De Haes & Gijsels v. 
Belgium 
19983/92 24/02
/1997 
V Defamation, criticism, duties and 
responsibilities, mode of expression, 
exaggeration, provocation, authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary, protection of 
journalistic sources, alternative evidence 
Full text 57 
96 Ernst & others v. Belgium 33400/96 15/07
/2003 
V 10, 8 Protection of sources, journalism, 
overriding public interest 
Full text 131 
154 Féret v. Belgium 15615/07 16/07
/2009 
NV Hate speech, insult of foreigners, political 
expression, election campaign, public 
debate 
Full text 217 
268 Fouad Belkacem v. 
Belgium (dec.) 
34367/14 27/06
/2017 
NV  Criminal proceedings, incitement to 
discrimination, hatred and violence, public 
figure, YouTube videos, Article 17 
Full text 418 
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124 Leempoel & S.A. Ed. Cine 
Revue v. Belgium 
64772/01 09/11
/2006 
NV Censorship, privacy, strictly confidential 
correspondence, public interest  
Full text 1670 
180 RTBF v. Belgium 50084/06 29/03
/2011 
V Broadcasting, patients’ rights, impart 
information, prior restraint, censorship, 
foreseeability of law 
Full text 255 
140 Tillack v. Belgium 20477/05 27/11
/2007 
V Protection of sources, searches of homes 
and workplaces, public watchdog 
Full text 192 
          Bulgaria 
134 Glas Nadezhda EOOD & 
Elenkov v. Bulgaria 
14134/02 11/10
/2007 
V 10, 
13 
Allocation of radio licence, religion, lack of 
motivation of the judgment, transparency, 
licensing procedure 
Full text 185 
200 Nenkova-Lalova v. 
Bulgaria 
35745/05 11/12
/2012 
NV Dismissal of journalist, disciplinary 
sanction 
Full text 289 
227 Prezhdarovi v. Bulgaria 8429/05 30/10
/2014 
V 8 Private life, confiscation of computers, 
illegal software, illegal distribution and 
reproduction, search-and-seizure, arbitrary 
interference, sufficient guarantees 
Full text 337 
          Cyprus 
182 Sigma Radio Television 
Ltd. V. Cyprus 
32181/04 
and 
35122/05 
21/07
/2011 
NV 10, 
14 
Rights of others, decisions by independent 
media regulators, budget neutrality, 
margin of appreciation, discrimination 
Full text 258 
          Czech Republic 
120 Matky v. Czech Republic 19101/03 10/07
/2006 
I Receive information,  access to public or 
administrative documents, positive 
obligations, rights of others, national 
security, public health, public interest 
Full text 164 
          Denmark 
277 Frisk and Jensen v. 
Denmark 
19657/12 05/12
/2017 
NV Incorrect factual basis, journalist, fair 
balance 
Full text 436 
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2 Jersild v. Denmark  15890/89 23/09
/1994 
V News reporting, interviews, anti-racism, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 48 
113 Nordisk Film & TV A/S v. 
Denmark 
40485/02 08/12
/2005 
NV Protection of sources, vulnerable persons, 
positive obligations, major crime 
Full text 153 
94 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark 
49017/99 19/06
/2003 
NV 10, 
6, >GC 
Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 129 
105 Pedersen & Baadsgaard v. 
Denmark [Grand Chamber] 
49017/99 17/12
/2004 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest, defamation, 
libel, facts or value judgments 
Full text 141 
292 ROJ TV A/S v. Denmark 
(dec.) 
24683/14 24/05
/2018
w 
I Conviction of television broadcaster, 
terrorist offences, duties and 
responsibilities, violence and support for 
terrorist activity, wide audience, Article 17 
Full text 464 
          Estonia 
214 Delfi AS v. Estonia 64569/09 10/10
/2013 
NV, 
>GC 
Internet news portal, grossly insulting 
remarks, readers’ comments, ISP liability 
(exemption), filter, notice-and-takedown, 
editorial control, economic interest 
Full text 313 
237 Delfi AS v. Estonia [Grand 
Chamber]  
64569/09 16/06
/2015 
NV Internet news portal, users’ comments, 
offensive content, media publisher, duties 
and responsibilities, liability, notice-and-
takedown, E-commerce Directive, Internet 
service providers, economic interest 
Full text 353 
245 Kalda v. Estonia 
 
17429/10 19/01
/2016 
V Prisoner, access to Internet, right to 
receive information, role of Internet, 
security and economic considerations 
Full text 372 
60 Tammer v. Estonia 41205/98 06/02
/2001 
NV Privacy, private information, politician, 
public interest, defamation 
Full text 90 
          Finland 
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163 Flinkkilä & others v. 
Finland 
25576/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest 
Full text 233 
165 Iltalehti & Karhuvaara v. 
Finland 
6372/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
164 Jokitaipale & others v. 
Finland 
43349/05 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
184 Karttunen v. Finland 1685/10 10/05
/2011 
I Internet, possession and reproduction of 
child pornography, illegal content, artistic 
expression 
Full text 262 
77 Nikula v. Finland 31611/96 21/03
/2002 
V Defamation, criticism, fair trial, potential 
chilling effect of criminal sanctions, 
lawyer 
Full text 108 
239 Niskasaari and 
Otavamedia Oy v. Finland  
32297/10 23/07
/2015 
V Defamation proceedings, journalist’s 
reputation, scrutiny of journalists, 
comment and criticism 
Full text 359 
220 Pentikäinen v. Finland 11882/10 04/02
/2014 
NV, 
>GC 
Press photographer, demonstration, police 
order, conviction, no confiscation of 
equipment or photos, public interest, fair 
balance 
Full text 325 
241 Pentikäinen v. Finland 
[Grand Chamber] 
11882/10 20/10
/2015 
NV Press photographer, demonstration, police 
order, conviction, no confiscation of 
equipment or photos, public interest, fair 
balance 
Full text 363 
215 Ristamäki and Korvola v. 
Finland 
66456/09 29/10
/2013 
V Defamation, conviction, protection of 
reputation, public interest, tax inspection 
Full text 315 
223 Salumäki v. Finland 23605/09 29/04
/2014 
NV Newspaper article, insinuation, criminal 
conviction, private life, reputation, fair 
balance, public interest, presumption of 
innocence, margin of appreciation 
Full text 330 
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238 Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy v. Finland  
931/13 21/07
/2015 
NV 10, 
14; V 6 
Privacy, personal data, taxation data, public 
interest, data journalism, magazine and 
SMS-service, extent of publication, 
processing of personal data, journalistic 
activities, margin of appreciation, fair 
balance, length of proceedings 
Full text 356 
270 Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and 
Satamedia Oy v. Finland 
[Grand Chamber] 
931/13 27/06
/2017 
NV 10 
V 6 
Privacy, personal data, taxation data, public 
interest, data journalism, magazine and 
SMS-service, extent of publication, 
processing of personal data, journalistic 
activities, margin of appreciation, fair 
balance, length of proceedings 
Full text 422 
166 Soila v. Finland 6806/06 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
167 Tuomela & others v. 
Finland  
25711/04 06/04
/2010 
V Journalism, well-known public figures, 
privacy, public interest  
Full text 233 
178 Yleisradio Oy & others v. 
Finland 
30881/09 08/02
/2011 
NV Defamation, confidential and sensitive 
information, privacy, private persons,  
Full text 253 
          France 
202 Ashby Donald & Others v. 
France 
36769/08 10/01
/2013 
NV Intellectual property, unauthorised 
reproduction of fashion photos, Internet, 
margin of appreciation, news reporting 
exception, commercial speech 
Full text 293 
79 Colombani & others v. 
France 
51279/99 25/06
/2002 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public watchdog, public 
function of press 
Full text 110 
242 Couderc and Hachette 
Filipacchi Associés v. 
France [Grand Chamber] 
40454/07 10/11
/2015 
V Private life, freedom of expression, fair 
balance, debate of public interest, 
disclosure of the Prince’s fatherhood 
Full text 365 
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246 De Carolis and France 
Télévisions v. France 
 
29313/10 21/01
/2016 
V Defamation proceedings, protection of 
reputation, Saudi prince, investigative 
journalism, sufficient factual basis 
Full text 374 
131 Dupuis & others v. France 1914/02 07/06
/2007 
V Confidential but well-known information, 
public interest, public watchdog, chilling 
effect, newsgathering 
Full text 181 
57 Du Roy & Malaurie  34000/96 03/10
/2000 
V Public interest, secrecy during 
investigation and enquiry procedures, 
presumption of innocence 
Full text 88 
104 Editions Plon v. France 56148/00 18/05
/2004 
V Privacy, public interest, medical 
confidentiality, journalistic ethics, rights of 
others 
Full text 139 
65 Ekin Association v. France 39288/98 17/07
/2001 
V Insult of foreigners, discrimination based 
on foreign origin 
Full text 96 
204 Eon v. France 26118/10 14/03
/2013 
V Insult of President, discussion of matters 
of public interest, private life or honour, 
satire, chilling effect 
Full text 297 
23 Fressoz & Roire v. France  29183/95 21/01
/1999 
V Confidential information, public interest, 
well-known information, privacy, 
journalistic ethics, tax reports, journalists 
committing offence and public interest
  
Full text 69 
114 Giniewski v. France 64016/00 31/01
/2006 
V Religion, defamation, religious insult, 
offensive information, hate speech 
Full text 155 
132 Hachette Filipacchi 
Associés v. France 
71111/01 14/06
/2007 
NV Rights of others, privacy, human dignity, 
very high circulation of information, 
accessibility and foreseeability 
Full text 182 
169 Jean-Marie Le Pen v. 
France 
18788/09 20/04
/2010 
I Offensive information, hate speech,  
political debate, reputation, rights of 
others, exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 236 
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21 Lehideux & Isorni v. 
France 
24662/94 23/09
/1998 
V Advertisement, reputation, rights of 
others, abuse of rights, historical research, 
second world war 
Full text 64 
146 Leroy v. France 36109/03 02/10
/2008 
NV Public interest, artistic expression, 
glorifying terrorism, political expression, 
activism, cartoon 
Full text 202 
126 Mamère v. France 12697/03 07/11
/2006 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation, libel, public 
interest, political expression, 
exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 174 
235 Morice v. France [Grand 
Chamber] 
29369/10 23/04
/2015 
V Defamation, investigative judges, lawyers, 
sufficient factual basis, public interest, 
value judgments, judicial proceedings, 
authority of judiciary, chilling effect 
Full text 349 
101 Radio France v. France 53984/00 30/03
/2004 
NV Privacy, good name and reputation, 
responsible journalism, exaggeration, 
provocation 
Full text 136 
168 Renaud v. France 13290/07 25/02
/2010 
V Internet, political speech, criticism, 
emotional political debate, tolerance, facts 
or value judgments, chilling effect 
Full text 235 
197 Ressiot & others v. France 15054/07 
and 
15066/07 
28/06
/2012 
V Protection of sources, disproportionality of 
interference, searches of offices of 
newspapers,  searches of homes 
Full text 284 
112 Tourancheau & July v. 
France 
53886/00 24/11
/2005 
NV Crime reporting, necessity, reputation, 
rights of others, presumption of innocence 
Full text 151 
          Germany 
302 Annen (No. 2) v. Germany 3682/10 20/09
/2018 
NV Anti-abortion website, “aggravated 
murder”, equation of abortion with 
Holocaust, civil injunction, protection of 
Full text 486 
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reputation, fair balance, fact or value 
judgment, distinction criticism and insult 
303 Annen (No. 5) v. Germany 70693/11 20/09
/2018 
NV Anti-abortion website, link to list of 
doctors, “aggravated murder”, equation of 
abortion with Holocaust, civil injunction, 
protection of reputation, fair balance, 
factual basis, incitement to hatred and 
aggression 
Full text 486 
305 Annen (No. 6) v. Germany 3779/11 18/10
/2018 
NV Anti-abortion campaigner, criminal 
conviction, online press release, stem cell 
research, personality rights, value 
judgements, public debate, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 490 
187 Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany 
39954/08 07/02
/2012 
V Privacy, reputation, receive information, 
public interest, conflicting human rights 
Full text 268 
226 Axel Springer AG v. 
Germany (No. 2) 
48311/10 10/07
/2014 
V Protection of reputation, private life, value 
judgment, former Chancellor, public figure, 
degree of tolerance, public watchdog 
Full text 335 
272 Axel Springer SE and RTL 
Television GmbH v. 
Germany 
51405/12 21/09
/2017 
NV Restriction on publishing pictures of 
accused, court reporting, non-public figure, 
presumption of innocence  
Full text 426 
231 Bohlen v. Germany 53495/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, humour, 
satire, fair balance 
Full text 345 
255 Boris Erdtmann v. 
Germany (dec.) 
56328/10 05/01
/2016 
I Criminal conviction, journalistic research, 
effectiveness of airport security checks, 
responsible journalism, disproportionate 
action of journalist   
Full text 393 
222 Brosa v. Germany 5709/09 17/04
/2014 
V Freedom of political expression, pre-
election, neo-Nazi organisation, private 
Full text 328 
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individual, public discussion, mayoral 
election, acceptable criticism, honour and 
social reputation, sufficient factual basis 
232 Ernst August von 
Hannover v. Germany  
53649/09 19/02
/2015 
NV 8 Cigarette advertisements, reputation, 
privacy, debate of general interest, humour, 
satire, fair balance 
Full text 345 
276 Fuchsmann v. Germany 71233/13 19/10
/2017 
NV 8 Fair balance, allegations sufficiently 
serious, public figure, good faith 
Full text 434 
290 Hans Burkhard Nix v. 
Germany (dec.) 
35285/16 05/04
/2018
w 
I Blogger, photo of Himmler in Nazi uniform, 
accusation of racist and discriminatory 
behaviour, public official, ban on Nazi 
symbols, sufficient reasons, necessary in 
democratic society 
Full text 460 
295 M.L. and W.W. v. Germany 60789/10 
and 
65599/10 
28/06
/2018 
NV 8 Criminal proceedings, anonymization of 
media reports, “right to be forgotten”, 
criminal records, privacy, ongoing public 
interest  
Full text 471 
310 Richard Williamson v. 
Germany 
64496/17 31/01
/2019
w 
I Broadcast television interview, YouTube, 
Holocaust denial, criminal conviction, 
Article 17, national historical context 
Full text 501 
83 Stambuk v. Germany 37928/97 17/10
/2002 
V Medical advertising, rights of others, 
protect health, commercial speech, public 
interest 
Full text 113 
219 Tierbefreier E.V. v. 
Germany 
45192/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 10, 
14 
Association, animal rights, film, website, 
injunction, personality rights of company, 
debate on matters of public interest, unfair 
means 
Full text 323 
102 Von Hannover v. Germany 59320/00 24/06
/2004 
V8 Privacy in public areas, continual 
harassment, public interest, conflicting 
human rights   
Full text 137 
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188 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 2)  
40660/08 
and 
60614/08 
07/02
/2012 
NV 8 Privacy in public areas, public interest, 
entertainment press, conflicting human 
rights 
Full text 268 
211 Von Hannover v. Germany 
(No. 3) 
8772/10 19/09
/2013 
NV 8 Photograph, injunction prohibiting further 
publication, debate of general interest, 
public figure, privacy, freedom of the 
press, positive obligations 
Full text 308 
          Greece 
162 Alfantakis v. Greece 49330/0 11/02
/2010 
V Television interview, defamation, insult, 
reputation, live broadcasting, facts or 
value judgments 
Full text 232 
282 Alpha Doryforiki Tileorasi 
Anonymi Etairia v. Greece 
72562/10 22/02
/2018 
V 10 
NV 10 
V 6  
Broadcast, secretly filmed, public figure, 
public place, private premises, fair balance 
Full text 446 
14 Grigoriades v. Greece 24348/94 25/11
/1997 
V Military discipline, limits of acceptable 
criticism, insult 
Full text 61 
133 Lionarakis v. Greece 1131/05 05/07
/2007 
V 10, 6 Political expression, radio broadcast, 
defamation, facts or value judgments, 
value judgments with factual basis 
Full text 184 
          Hungary 
280 Faludy-Kovács v. Hungary 20487/13 23/01
/2018 
NV Reputation, newspaper headline, fair 
balance, negative consequences  
Full text 442 
153 Kenedi v. Hungary 31475/05 26/05
/2009 
V 10, 
6, 13 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, public watchdog 
Full text 215 
257 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság 
v. Hungary [Grand 
Chamber] 
18030/11 08/11
/2016 
V 
 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, non-governmental 
organisation, public watchdog 
Full text 396 
306 Magyar Jeti Zrt. v. Hungary 11257/16 04/12
/2018 
V Freedom of expression online, objective 
liability, media platform, hyperlink, 
defamatory content, chilling effect  
Full text 492 
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279 Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya 
Párt v. Hungary 
201/17 23/01
/2018 
V, >GC Political party, communicative value, app 
for anonymously sharing photos of ballot 
papers, public interest, legitimate aim 
Full text 440 
247 Magyar 
Tartalomszolgáltatók 
Egyesülete and Index.hu 
Zrt v. Hungary 
22947/13 02/02
/2016 
V Internet news portal, readers’ comments, 
ISP liability, commercial reputation, 
matters of public interest, notice-and-
take-down-system 
Full text 375 
228 Matúz v. Hungary 73571/10 21/10
/2014 
V Whistleblower, journalist, confidential 
information,  censorship, public 
broadcasting organisation, public interest, 
severity of sanction 
Full text 339 
26 Rekvényi v. Hungary 25390/94 20/05
/1999 
NV Politically neutral police force, national 
security, prevention of disorder 
Full text 72 
198 Szima v. Hungary 29723/11 09/10
/2012 
NV Internet, criticism, labour union, 
disciplinary sanction 
Full text 285 
315 Szurovecz v. Hungary 15428/16 08/10
/2019 
V Journalistic access, centre for asylum 
seekers, press freedom, investigative 
journalism, first-hand observation, 
newsgathering, significant public interest 
Full text 511 
152 TASZ v. Hungary 37374/05 14/04
/2009 
V Access to information, public or official 
documents, open government, indirect 
censorship, personal information of a 
politician, social watchdog 
Full text 213 
          Iceland 
275 Einarsson v. Iceland 24703/15 07/11
/2017 
V 8 Value judgment, media personality, right to 
reputation, Instagram, fair balance, 
consequences of impugned publication 
Full text 432 
299 Egill Einarsson v. Iceland 
(No. 2) 
31221/15 17/07
/2018 
NV 8 Public figure, critical and defamatory 
comment, Facebook page, protection of 
honour and reputation, private life, certain 
Full text 479 
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level of seriousness, rape, previous 
behaviour, full judicial satisfaction, margin 
of appreciation 
236 Erla Hlynsdóttir v. Iceland 
(no. 3)  
54145/10 02/06
/2015 
V Reporting on criminal proceedings, public 
debate, responsible journalism, good faith, 
diligence 
Full text 351 
271 Halldórsson v. Iceland 44322/13 04/07
/2017 
NV Defamation proceedings, journalist, 
audiovisual media, public figure, accurate 
factual basis, protection of journalistic 
sources  
Full text 424 
264 Ólafsson v. Iceland 58493/13 18/03
/2017 
V Defamation proceedings, political 
candidate, website liability, dissemination 
of others’ statements, journalistic ethics 
Full text 410 
          Ireland 
108 Independent News and 
Media v. Ireland 
55120/00 16/06
/2005 
NV Political expression, defamation, libel, 
chilling effect, margin of appreciation 
Full text 144 
95 Murphy v. Ireland 44179/98 10/07
/2003 
NV Broadcasting prohibition, religious 
advertising, margin of appreciation 
Full text 130 
          Italy 
212 Belpietro v. Italy 43612/10 24/09
/2013 
V Freedom of parliamentary speech, 
parliamentary immunity, defamation, 
public officials, conviction, editorial 
control, chilling effect 
Full text 309 
254 Brambilla and Others v. 
Italy 
 
22567/09 23/06
/2016 
NV Criminal conviction, illegal interception of 
police communications, responsible 
journalism, duty to obey ordinary criminal 
law 
Full text 392 
194 Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and 
Di Stefano v. Italy 
38433/09 07/06
/2012 
V 10; 
AP-
1(1) 
Dominant position over the audiovisual 
media, allocation of frequencies, media 
pluralism, right to receive information 
Full text 278 
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92 Cordova v. Italy (Nos. 1 & 
2) 
40877/98 
and 
45649/99 
30/01
/2003 
V 6 Defamation, insult, duties and 
responsibilities, public interest, reputation 
Full text: 
No. 1 
No. 2 
126 
150 Faccio v. Italy 33/04 31/03
/2009 
IA Disproportionate measure, right to receive 
information, privacy, licence fee. 
Full text 210 
15 Guerra v. Italy 14967/89 19/02
/1998 
NV10; 
V8 
Right to receive information, positive 
obligations, effective protection, privacy 
Full text 61 
67 Perna v. Italy 48898/99 25/07
/2001 
V, >GC Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, public interest  
Full text 98 
93 Perna v. Italy [Grand 
Chamber] 
48898/99 06/05
/2003 
NV Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, defamation 
Full text 127 
213 Ricci v. Italy 30210/06 08/10
/2013 
V Satirical television programme, disclosure 
of confidential images, suspended prison 
sentence, ethics of journalism, chilling 
effect 
Full text 311 
          Latvia 
209 Nagla v. Latvia 73469/10 16/07
/2013 
V Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, chilling effect, safeguards 
against abuse, pressing social need 
Full text 305 
          Liechtenstein 
42 Wille v. Liechtenstein 28396/95 28/10
/1999 
V Political expression, insult, critical 
reporting, public debate, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 77 
          Lithuania 
281 Sekmadienis Ltd. v. 
Lithuania 
69317/14 30/01
/2018 
V Advertisements for a clothing line, 
religious figures, (not) gratuitously 
offensive, religious beliefs, public morals 
Full text 444 
          Luxembourg 
90 Roemen & Schmit v. 
Luxembourg 
51772/99 25/02
/2003 
V Protection of sources, search of homes, 
privacy, responsible journalism 
Full text 122 
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205 Saint-Paul Luxembourg 
S.A. v. Luxembourg 
26419/10 18/04
/2013 
V Protection of journalistic sources, search 
and seizure, identification of author, 
proportionality 
Full text 299 
68 Thoma v. Luxembourg 38432/97 29/03
/2001 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, quoting other media sources, 
public watchdog, public function of press 
Full text 100 
          Malta 
293 Unifaun Theatre 
Productions Limited and 
Others v. Malta 
37326/13 15/05
/2018 
V Theatrical production, blasphemous play, 
ban, not prescribed by law 
Full text 466 
          Moldova 
185 Avram & others v. 
Moldova 
41588/05 05/07
/2011 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, undercover 
video , journalism 
Full text 264 
144 Flux (No. 6) v. Moldova 22824/04 29/07
/2008 
NV Criticism,  sensationalism, defamation, 
journalistic ethics, unprofessional 
behaviour, chilling effect, lack of factual 
basis for allegations 
Full text 199 
141 Guja v. Moldova 14277/04 12/02
/2008 
V Whistleblowing, public interest, 
journalistic ethics, duties and 
responsibilities, good faith, chilling effect, 
employment relation 
Full text 194 
156 Manole & others v. 
Moldova 
13936/02 17/09
/2009 
V Broadcasting licences, political 
independence political independence of 
media, pluralism, censorship, public 
service broadcasting 
Full text 221 
229 Urechean and Pavlicenco 
v. Moldova  
27756/05 
and 
41219/07 
02/12
/2014 
V 6 Defamation proceedings, President, 
blanket immunity, right of access to courts 
Full text 341 
          The Netherlands 
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174 Sanoma v. The 
Netherlands 
38224/03 14/09
/2010 
V Protection of journalistic sources, public 
interest, public watchdog 
Full text 246 
199 Telegraaf Media 
Nederland Landelijke 
Media B.V. & Others v. the 
Netherlands 
39315/06 22/11
/2012 
V Protection of journalistic sources, 
intelligence and security services, 
surveillance, coercive measures, ex ante 
review 
Full text 287 
3 Vereiniging Weekblad 
Bluf! v. the Netherlands  
16616/90 09/02
/1995 
V National security, sensitive information, 
State secrets, impart information 
Full text 49 
139 Voskuil v. The Netherlands 64752/01 22/11
/2007 
V Confidential information, protection of 
sources, integrity of the police and judicial 
authorities, right to remain silent, public 
watchdog 
Full text 192 
          Norway 
151 A. v. Norway 28070/06 09/04
/2009 
V 8 Crime reporting, defamation, presumption 
of innocence, privacy, margin of 
appreciation, moral and psychological 
integrity, protection of minors 
Full text 210 
273 Becker v. Norway 21272/12 05/10
/2017 
V Journalist ordered to give evidence, 
protection of journalistic sources, bad faith 
of source, chilling effect 
Full text 428 
51 Bergens Tidende v. 
Norway 
26132/95 02/05
/2000 
V Defamation, publication of photos, 
reputation, rights of others, good faith, 
public watchdog 
Full text 82 
25 Bladet Tromso & Stensaas 
v. Norway 
21980/93 20/05
/1999 
V Secret information, presumption of 
innocence, critical reporting, defamation, 
honour and reputation, good faith, public 
watchdog 
Full text 71 
309 Høiness v. Norway 43624/14 17/03
/2019 
NV 8 Liability, Internet portal, offensive content, 
anonymous comments, personal honour 
Full text 499 
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and reputation, level of seriousness, fair 
balance, established system of moderation 
218 Lillo-Stenberg and Sæther 
v. Norway 
13258/09 16/01
/2014 
NV 8 Public figures, respect for private life, 
wedding, accessibility to public, image, 
personality, reputation, fair balance 
Full text 320 
43 Nilsen & Johnsen v. 
Norway 
23118/93 25/11
/1999 
V Police brutality, defamation, receive and 
impart information, exaggeration, public 
debate, limits of acceptable criticism 
Full text 77 
129 Tønsberg Blad AS & Marit 
Haukom v. Norway 
510/04 01/03
/2007 
V Criticism, defamation, reputation, right to 
receive information, public interest, good 
faith, journalistic ethics, duty to verify 
factual allegations 
Full text 178 
147 TV Vest SA Rogaland 
Pensjonistparti v. Norway 
21132/05 11/12
/2008 
V Television, political advertising, positive 
obligation, margin of appreciation, 
pluralism 
Full text 204 
          Poland 
313 Brzeziński v. Poland 47542/07 25/07
/2019 
V Elections, dissemination of false 
information, credible factual basis, 
admissible exaggeration or provocation, 
election law, chilling effect, political 
debate, apology and rectification, 
disproportionate interference  
Full text 507 
285 Endy Gęsina-Torres v. 
Poland (dec.) 
11915/15 15/03
/2018
w 
I Undercover television journalist, false 
identity, criminal conviction, news-
gathering activities, good faith, 
responsible journalism, necessary in 
democratic society, public interest, not 
accessory element of gathering 
information  
Full text 452 
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76 Gaweda v. Poland 26229/95 14/03
/2002 
V Lack of clarity, accessible and foreseeable, 
printed media 
Full text 107 
24 Janowski v. Poland  25716/94 21/01
/1999 
NV Journalism, insult, necessity, offensive and 
abusive verbal attacks 
Full text 69 
210 Węgrzynowski and 
Smolczewski v. Poland 
33846/07 16/07
/2013 
NV 10, 
8 
Personality rights, online news media, 
digital archives, public watchdog, privacy, 
libel, rectification 
Full text 306 
155 Wojtas-Kaleta v. Poland 20436/02 16/07
/2009 
V Public interest, pluralism, facts or value 
judgments, duties and responsibilities, 
good faith, employment relation 
Full text 219 
          Portugal 
130 Colaço Mestre & SIC v. 
Portugal 
11182/03 
and 
11319/03 
26/04
/2007 
V Interview, public interest, defamation, 
journalistic ethics 
Full text 180 
161 Laranjeira Marques da 
Silva v. Portugal 
16983/06 19/01
/2010 
V Political expression, defamation, facts or 
value judgments, reputation, public 
interest 
 
Full text 230 
56 Lopes Gomes da Silva v. 
Portugal 
37698/97 28/09
/2000 
V Vital role of press, political expression, 
limits of acceptable criticism, 
exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 86 
250 Pinto Coelho v. Portugal 
(no. 2) 
 
48718/11 22/03
/2016 
V Criminal conviction, broadcasting 
recordings of court hearing, journalistic 
reporting on matters of public interest 
Full text 382 
249 Sousa Goucha v. Portugal 
 
70434/12 22/03
/2016 
NV 8, 
14 + 8 
Defamation proceedings, right to 
protection of reputation, sexual 
orientation joke, television host, public 
figure, fair balance 
Full text 380 
          Romania 
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172 Andreescu v. Romania 19452/02 08/06
/2010 
V 10, 6 Access, defamation, insult, reputation, 
facts or value judgments, public debate, 
good faith 
Full text 242 
53 Constantinescu v. 
Romania  
28871/95 27/06
/2000 
NV Criminal defamation, criticism, public 
debate, interview, rights of others, 
reputation 
Full text 83 
106 Cumpana & Mazare v. 
Romania [Grand Chamber] 
33348/96 17/12
/2004 
V Defamation, insult, limits of acceptable 
criticism, factual basis or value judgments, 
reputation, privacy, chilling effect, public 
watchdog 
Full text 141 
40 Dalban v. Romania 28114/95 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, exaggeration, 
criminal libel, duty of care for journalists, 
public function, privacy, public watchdog 
Full text 75 
193 Frasilă and Ciocirlan v. 
Romania 
25329/03 10/05
/2012 
V Positive obligations, access, rights of 
others, public debate, public watchdog, 
pluralism 
Full text 277 
269 Ghiulfer Predescu v. 
Romania 
29751/09 27/06
/2017 
V Defamation, live television show, mayor, 
criminal groups, limits of acceptable 
criticism, public interest, sufficient factual 
basis, good faith, chilling effect 
Full text 420 
298 Gîrleanu v. Romania 50376/09 26/06
/2018 
V Investigative journalism, classified 
information, criminal conviction, public 
interest, disproportionate to aim pursued 
Full text 477 
145 Petrina v. Romania 78060/01 14/10
/2008 
V 8 Privacy, positive obligation, defamation, 
libel, reputation 
Full text 201 
225 Roşiianu v. Romania 27329/06 24/06
/2014 
V Right of access to public documents, public 
interest, journalism, efficient enforcement 
mechanisms, arbitrary restrictions, indirect 
censorship 
Full text 333 
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183 Sipoş v. Romania 26125/04 03/05
/2011 
V 8 Journalism, defamation, insult, privacy, 
horizontal effect of human rights, positive 
obligations, chilling effect of criminal 
sanctions 
Full text 260 
          Russia 
283 Butkevich v. Russia 5865/07 13/02
/2018 
V 5, 6, 
10  
 
Journalist, photographer, anti-
globalisation protest, news-gathering, 
strict scrutiny, threat to public order, 
proportionality of measures 
Full text 448 
135 Filatenko v. Russia 73219/01 06/12
/2007 
V Defamation, public interest, reputation, 
good faith, journalistic ethics 
Full text 187 
109 Grinberg v. Russia 23472/03 21/07
/2005 
V Defamation, political expression, facts and 
value judgments, public function of press, 
public watchdog, limits of acceptable 
criticism, public function , margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 146 
284 Ivashchenko v. Russia 61064/10 13/02
/2018 
V 8 Photojournalist, customs’ inspection of 
laptop, copying and retention of data, 
right to private life, adequate and effective 
safeguards 
Full text 450 
312 Kablis v. Russia 48310/16 
and 
59663/17 
30/04
/2019 
V 11, 
13, 10  
Activist, blocking of social networking 
account, right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly, prior restraint, overbroad 
legislation, no pressing social need, no 
relevant and sufficient reasons for 
interference 
Full text 505 
296 Mariya Alekhina and 
Others v. Russia 
38004/12 17/07
/2018 
V 3, 5, 
6, 10 
Pussy Riot, punk band, political protest, 
religious hatred or enmity, 
disproportionate measures, public debate 
Full text 473 
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262 Orlovskaya Iskra v. Russia 42911/08 21/02
/2017 
V Electoral law, administrative offence, 
election campaigning, newspaper, normal 
journalistic coverage of a political debate 
Full text 406 
158 Pasko v. Russia 69519/01 22/10
/2009 
NV Confidential information, state secrets, 
national security, military information 
Full text 225 
314 Pryanishnikov 
v. Russia 
25047/05 10/09
/2019 
V Film producer, refusal of film reproduction 
licence, distribution of films, artistic 
expression, protection of children, 
pornography, protection of morals, based 
on assumptions, proportionality 
Full text 509 
311 Rebechenko v. Russia 10257/17 16/04
/2019 
V Blogger, YouTube video, reputation, 
political debate, good faith, value 
judgement, failure to analyse contents of 
video, discourage participation of the 
press, fair balance, pressing social need 
Full text 503 
300 Savva Terentyev v. Russia 10692/09 28/08
/2018 
V Comments on blog, police officers, 
offensive, insulting and virulent, not 
incitement to hatred or violence, minor 
impact, criminal conviction, 
disproportionate, clear and precise 
definitions of offences 
Full text 481 
294 Stomakhin v. Russia 52273/07 09/05
/2018 
V Criminal proceedings, journalist, public 
interest, acceptable limits of criticism, 
dominant position of government, 
pressing social need, limited distribution 
Full text 468 
224 Taranenko v. Russia 19554/05 15/05
/2014 
V 10, 
11 
Freedom of assembly and association, 
leaflets, occupation of administrative 
premises, conviction, prison sentence, pre-
trial detention, chilling effect 
Full text 332 
Back to overview of case-law 
593 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
258 Terentyev v. Russia 25147/09 26/01
/2017 
V Defamation proceedings, blogger, artistic 
criticism, statements of fact and value 
judgments 
Full text 400 
          Serbia 
265 Milisavljević v. Serbia 50123/06 04/04
/2017 
V Criminal proceedings, insult, public figure, 
human rights activist, journalistic freedom 
of expression 
Full text 412 
208 Youth Initiative for Human 
Rights v. Serbia 
48135/06 25/06
/2013 
V Access to documents held by public 
authorities, NGO, electronic surveillance 
measures, freedom of information 
legislation, public debate, public interest, 
public watchdog 
Full text 304 
          Slovakia 
66 Feldek v. Slovakia 29032/95 12/07
/2001 
V Facts or value judgments, political speech, 
public interest, common knowledge, limits 
of acceptable criticism 
Full text 97 
123 Klein v. Slovakia 72208/01 31/10
/2006 
V Responsible journalism, good name and 
reputation, religion, critically comment 
Full text 169 
278 MAC TV s.r.o. v. Slovakia 13466/12 28/11
/2017 
V No gratuitous personal attack, media 
outlet penalized, margin of appreciation 
Full text 438 
69 Marônek v. Slovakia 32686/96 19/04
/2001 
V Well-known information, public interest, 
rule of law, good faith, reputation, rights 
of others 
Full text 101 
125 Radio Twist v. Slovakia 62202/00 19/12
/2006 
V Privacy, political information, public 
interest, use of illegally recorded 
telephone conversation 
Full text 1672 
          Spain 
75 De Diego Nafría v. Spain 46833/99 14/03
/2002 
NV Defamation, criticism, limits of Full text 106 
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acceptable criticism, public interest, 
employment relation 
48 Fuentes Bobo v. Spain 39293/98 29/02
/2000 
V Offensive information, criticism, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations, reputation, rights of others, 
employment relations, dismissal 
Full text 80 
179 Otegi Mondragon v. Spain 2034/07 15/03
/2011 
V Political expression, insult, value 
judgments, honour, privacy, dignity, public 
debate, exaggeration, provocation 
Full text 254 
261 Rubio Dosamantes v. 
Spain 
20996/10 21/02
/2017 
V 8 Private life, positive obligations, television 
programme, public figure, disclosure of 
intimate details, sexual orientation 
Full text 404 
291 Stern Taulats and Roura 
Capellera v. Spain 
51168/15 
and 
51186/15 
13/03
/2018 
V Burning photo of Spanish royal couple, 
criminal conviction, political expression, 
symbolic speech, permissible degree of 
provocation, not hate speech or 
incitement to hatred or violence 
Full text 462 
          Sweden 
248 Arlewin v. Sweden 
 
22302/10 01/03
/2016 
V 6 Defamation proceedings, transfrontier 
television programme service, jurisdiction, 
EU law, right of access to court 
Full text 378 
297 Centrum för Rättvisa v. 
Sweden 
35252/08 19/06
/2018 
NV 8, 
>GC 
Confidentiality of online communication, 
privacy, surveillance, bulk interception, 
adequate and sufficient safeguards, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 475 
252 Diamant Salihu and others 
v. Sweden (dec.)  
33628/15 10/05
/2016 
I Criminal conviction, purchasing illegal 
firearms, newsgathering, duty to obey 
ordinary criminal law 
Full text 387 
203 Frederik Neij & Peter 
Sunde Kolmisoppi (The 
40397/12 19/02
/2013 
I Copyright, The Pirate Bay, Internet file-
sharing service, illegal use of copyright-
Full text 295 
Back to overview of case-law 
595 
No. Case Summaries Appn. No. Date Out- 
come 
Keywords HUDOC Page 
Pirate Bay) v. Sweden 
(dec.) 
protected music, conviction, margin of 
appreciation 
175 Gillberg v. Sweden 41723/06 02/11
/2010, 
>GC 
NV 10, 
8 
Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 248 
192 Gillberg v. Sweden [Grand 
Chamber] 
41723/06 03/04
/2012 
NV Access to information, public or official 
documents, confidential information, 
privacy, scientific research, open 
government, academic freedom 
Full text 276 
148 Khurshid Mustafa & 
Tarzibachi v. Sweden 
23883/06 16/12
/2008 
V Language of television, freedom to receive 
information, positive obligation, horizontal 
effect, disproportionality of the 
interference      
Full text 206 
263 Rolf Anders Daniel Pihl v. 
Sweden (dec.) 
74742/14 09/03
/2017 
NV 8 Private life, positive obligations, website 
liability, anonymous online comment, 
chilling effect 
Full text 408 
191 Vejdeland & others v. 
Sweden 
1813/07 09/02
/2012 
NV Hate speech, homophobia, insult 
homosexuals, pamphlets, school  
Full text 274 
122 White v. Sweden 42435/02 19/09
/2006 
NV 8 Privacy, good name and reputation, 
defamation, exaggeration, provocation, 
journalistic ethics, positive obligation, 
public interest, conflicting human rights 
Full text 168 
          Switzerland 
251 Bédat v. Switzerland 
[Grand Chamber] 
56925/08 29/03
/2016 
NV 10 Criminal conviction, secrecy of criminal 
investigation, responsible journalism, 
accused’s private life 
Full text 384 
117 Dammann v. Switzerland 77551/01 25/04
/2006 
V Confidential information, public 
discussion, vital role of press, public 
watchdog, newsgathering 
Full text 160 
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86 Demuth v. Switzerland 38743/97 05/11
/2002 
NV Allocation of broadcasting licence, media 
pluralism, margin of appreciation 
Full text 117 
289 GRA Stiftung gegen 
Rassismus und 
Antisemitismus v. 
Switzerland 
18597/13 09/01
/2018 
V NGO, website quoting politician’s speech, 
accusation of verbal racism, public debate, 
factual basis, chilling effect, fair balance 
Full text 458 
234 Haldimann and Others v. 
Switzerland  
21830/09 24/02
/2015 
V Hidden cameras, private life, public 
interest, personal reputation, ethics of 
journalism, good faith, accurate factual 
basis 
Full text 347 
20 Hertel v. Switzerland 25181/94 25/08
/1998 
V Research paper, rights of others, necessity, 
commercial speech, academic freedom 
Full text 66 
121 Monnat v. Switzerland 73604/01 21/09
/2006 
V Broadcasting, critical reporting , public 
interest, positive obligations, anti-
Semitism, politically engaged journalism, 
journalistic ethics, public watchdog 
Full text 166 
195 Mouvement raëlien suisse 
v. Switzerland 
16354/06 13/07
/2012 
NV Internet, illegal content, poster campaign, 
aliens, proselytising speech, the protection 
of morals, health, rights of others and 
prevention of crime 
Full text 280 
217 Perinçek v. Switzerland 27510/08 17/12
/2013 
V, >GC Genocide denial, Armenia, criminal 
conviction, racial discrimination, historical 
debate, public interest, negation of crimes 
against humanity 
Full text 319 
240 Perinçek v. Switzerland 
[Grand Chamber] 
27510/08 15/10
/2015 
V Genocide denial, Armenia, criminal 
conviction, racial discrimination, historical 
debate, public interest, negation of crimes 
against humanity 
Full text 361 
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17 Schöpfer v. Switzerland 25405/94 20/05
/1998 
NV Limits of acceptable criticism, receive 
information, critical reporting , public 
interest  
Full text 63 
196 Schweizerische Radio- 
und Fernseh gesellschaft 
SRG v. Switzerland  
34124/06 21/06
/2012 
V Television interview, political and 
economic expression, rights of others, 
public interest, privacy, security, margin of 
appreciation, public interest 
Full text 282 
116 Stoll v. Switzerland 69698/01 25/04
/2006 
V, >GC Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog,  exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 158 
136 Stoll v. Switzerland [Grand 
Chamber] 
69698/01 10/12
/2007 
NV Confidential information, criticism, public 
watchdog, exaggeration, provocation, 
public debate, journalistic ethics 
Full text 188 
64 VgT Vereinigung Tegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland 
24699/94 28/06
/2001 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 94 
157 VgT Vereinigung gegen 
Tierfabriken v. 
Switzerland (No. 2) [Grand 
Chamber] 
32772/02 30/06
/2009 
V Television, political advertising, horizontal 
effect of human rights, positive 
obligations 
Full text 223 
          ”The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” 
260 Selmani & Others v. the 
former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia 
67259/14 09/02
/2017 
V Forcible removal, journalists, press gallery, 
national parliament, protests, legitimate 
public concern, behaviour of elected 
representatives, necessary in democratic 
society 
Full text 402 
          Turkey 
100 Abdullah Aydin v. Turkey 42435/98 09/03
/2004 
V Political expression, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, social, ethnic and regional 
differences 
Full text 135 
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201 Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey 3111/10 18/12
/2012 
V Internet, defamation, blocking of Google 
Sites, disproportionate measure, 
prescribed by law 
Full text 291 
170 Akdas v. Turkey 41056/04 16/02
/2010 
V Artistic expression, obscene or immoral 
information, fiction, 
exaggeration, humorous, duties and 
responsibilities, protection of morals  
Full text 238 
58 Akkoç v. Turkey 22947/93 
and 
22948/93 
10/10
/2000 
NV Interview, disciplinary sanction, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence, armed 
resistance or an uprising 
Full text 94 
173 Aksu v. Turkey 4149/04 
and 
41029/04 
27/07
/2010, 
>GC 
NV 14, 
8 
Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation,  racial 
discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy 
Full text 244 
190 Aksu v. Turkey [Grand 
Chamber] 
4149/04 
and 
41029/04 
15/03
/2012 
NV 8 Positive obligations, vulnerable groups, 
margin of appreciation,  racial 
discrimination, racism, cultural diversity, 
privacy  
Full text 272 
27 Arslan v. Turkey 23462/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
118 Aydin Tatlav v. Turkey  50692/99 02/02
/2006 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, positive obligations, religion 
Full text 161 
84 Ayse Öztürk v. Turkey 24914/94 15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, terrorism, incitement 
to violence, public debate, positive 
obligation 
Full text 115 
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29 Başkaya & Okçuoğlu v. 
Turkey 
23536/94 
and 
24408/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
221 Bayar (nos. 1-8) v. Turkey 39690/06, 
40559/06,
48815/06, 
2512/07, 
55197/07, 
55199/07, 
55201/07 
and 
55202/07 
25/03
/2014 
V 10, 6 Criminal conviction, publication of 
declarations by illegal armed organisation, 
right to fair trial, fight against terrorism, no 
encouragement of violence, no hate speech 
Full text 327 
243 Cengiz and Others v. 
Turkey 
48226/10 
and 
14027/11 
01/12
/2015 
V YouTube, blanket blocking order, insulting 
to the memory of Atatürk, citizen 
journalism, not prescribed by law 
Full text 368 
32 Ceylan v. Turkey 23556/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
63 Cyprus v. Turkey 25781/94 10/05
/2001 
V Conflict between State Parties, censorship 
of school-books, restricted distribution 
and importation media 
Full text 93 
88 Dicle on behalf of DEP 
(Democratic Party) v. 
Turkey  
25141/94 10/12
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, positive 
obligation 
Full text 119 
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71 E.K. v. Turkey 28496/95 07/02
/2002 
V Book, political expression, vital role of 
press, receive information 
Full text 103 
119 Erbakan v. Turkey 59405/00 06/07
/2006 
V Political debate, political expression, hate 
speech, intolerance, incitement to hatred 
or hostility, religion 
Full text 162 
31 Erdoğdu and İnce v. 
Turkey 
25067/94 
and 
25068/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
52 Erdogdu v. Turkey 25723/94 15/06
/2000 
V Propaganda against the territorial integrity 
of the State, terrorism, access, receive 
information, prevention of disorder or 
crime 
Full text 83 
34 Gerger v. Turkey 24919/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
244 Görmüş and Others v. 
Turkey 
 
49085/07 19/01
/2016 
V Protection of journalistic sources, 
disclosure of confidential military 
information, whistle-blowers, seizure of 
computer data 
Full text 370 
99 Gündüz v. Turkey 35071/97 04/12
/2003 
V Critical media reporting, political 
expression, religious intolerance, positive 
obligations, shocking or offensive 
information, live studio debate, hatred or 
hostility, pluralism 
Full text 134 
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110 IA v. Turkey 42571/98 13/09
/2005 
NV Religious insult, rights of others, 
provocative opinions, abusive and  
offensive information 
Full text 148 
59 Ibrahim Aksoy v. Turkey  28635/95, 
30171/96 
and 
34535/97 
10/10
/2000 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, incitement to violence 
Full text 89 
18 Incal v. Turkey   09/06
/1998 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, limits of acceptable criticism, 
public interest, hate speech 
Full text 64 
258 Kaos GL v. Turkey 4982/07 22/11
/2016 
V Seizure of magazine, protection of minors, 
protection of public morals, LGBT, 
sexually explicit expression 
Full text 398 
85 Karakoç & others v. 
Turkey  
27692/95, 
28138/95 
and 
28498/95 
15/10
/2002 
V Political expression, public watchdog, 
separatist propaganda, positive obligation 
Full text 115 
30 Karataş v. Turkey 23168/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
97 Karkin v. Turkey 43928/98 23/09
/2003 
V Political expression, hate speech, 
discrimination, racism 
Full text 132 
98 Kizilyaprak v. Turkey 27528/95 02/10
/2003 
V Receive information, separatist 
propaganda, hate speech based on ethnic 
ad regional differences 
Full text 133 
286 Mehmet Hasan Altan v. 
Turkey 
13237/17 20/03
/2018 
V 5, 10 Academic and journalist, critical views, 
military coup, Article 15 - derogation in 
Full text 454 
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time of emergency, Article 5 - right to 
liberty and security, pre-trial and 
continued detention, disproportionate, 
necessary, pressing social need, concrete 
evidence, chilling effect, intimidation of 
civil society, silencing of dissenting voices 
137 Nur Radyo v. Turkey 6587/03 27/11
/2007 
V Broadcasting licence, religion, shocking or 
offensive information, hate speech 
Full text 190 
176 Nur Radyo Ve Televizyon 
Yayıncıliğı A.Ş. v. Turkey 
(No. 2) 
42284/05 12/10
/2010 
V Broadcasting licence, religion,  rule of law, 
positive obligations,  
Full text 251 
33 Okçuoğlu v. Turkey 24246/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
49 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey  23144/93 16/03
/2000 
V Critical media reporting, separatist 
propaganda, racism, political expression, 
positive obligations , horizontal effect of 
human rights 
Full text 680 
115 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey 64178/00, 
64179/00, 
64181/00, 
64183/00, 
64184/00 
30/03
/2006 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
Full text 156 
138 Özgür Radyo v. Turkey  11369/03 04/12
/2007 
V Suspension of broadcasting licences, 
political expression, positive obligations, 
hate speech, political expression, public 
order 
Full text 190 
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41 Öztürk v. Turkey  22479/93 28/09
/1999 
V Political expression, incitement to crime, 
hatred or hostility, public interest, 
prevention of disorder or crime 
Full text 75 
28 Polat v. Turkey 23500/94 08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
287 Şahin Alpay v. Turkey 16538/17 20/03
/2018 
V 5, 10 Journalist, critical views, arrest and pre-
trial detention, military coup, public 
emergency threatening the life of the 
nation, danger democratic constitutional 
order, chilling effect, intimidation of civil 
society, silencing of dissenting voices  
Full text 454 
82 Seher Karatas v. Turkey  33179/96 09/07
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
incitement to hatred or hostility, national 
security 
Full text 112 
54 Sener v. Turkey 26680/95 18/07
/2000 
V Vital role of press, positive obligations,  
political expression, public interest, 
receive information 
Full text 85 
35 Sürek & Özdemir v. Turkey 23927/94 
and 
24277/94 
08/07
/1999 
V Offensive information, political 
expression, (separatist) propaganda, limits 
of acceptable criticism, right to receive 
information, duties and responsibilities, 
hate speech or promotion of violence, 
pluralism 
Full text 73 
36 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 1) 26682/95 08/07
/1999 
NV Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
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37 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 2) 24122/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
38 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 3) 24735/94 08/07
/1999 
NV Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
39 Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4)  24762/94 08/07
/1999 
V Idem. 
 
Full text 73 
189 Tusalp v. Turkey 32131/08 
and 
41617/08 
21/02
/2012 
V Defamation, journalistic freedom of 
expression, value judgments, Prime 
Minister’s personality rights, margin of 
appreciation 
Full text 270 
159 Ürper & others v. Turkey 14526/07, 
14747/07, 
15022/07, 
15737/07, 
36137/07, 
47245/07, 
50371/07, 
50372/07 
and 
54637/07 
20/10
/2009 
V Terrorism, suspension of publication and 
distribution of newspaper, public 
watchdog 
Full text 227 
81 Yagmuredereli v. Turkey 29590/96 04/06
/2002 
V Political expression, criticism, terrorism, 
separatist propaganda, violence, national 
security 
Full text 112 
87  Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 28493/95 05/12
/2002 
V Political expression, separatist 
propaganda, receive information, positive 
obligation 
Full text 119 
142 Yalçin Küçük v. Turkey 
(No. 3) 
71353/01 22/04
/2008 
V Incitement to hatred or hostility, 
separatism, necessity 
Full text 196 
13 Zana v. Turkey 18954/91 25/11
/1997 
NV Political expression, incitement to 
violence, terrorism 
Full text 61 
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           Ukraine 
253 Instytut Ekonomichnykh 
Reform, TOV v. Ukraine 
61561/08 02/06
/2016 
V Defamation proceedings, public figure, 
political speech, satire, value judgments, 
sufficient factual basis 
Full text 389 
288 Sinkova v. Ukraine 39496/11 27/02
/2018 
V 5, 
NV 10  
Performance-art protest at war memorial, 
film published online, criminal conviction, 
necessary in democratic society, more 
suitable ways to express views, insulting 
memory of killed soldiers and feelings of 
veterans, severe penalty upheld 
Full text 456 
          The United Kingdom 
89 A. v. the United Kingdom 35373/97 17/12
/2002 
NV 6, 
8, 13, 
14 
Political expression, right of access, 
defamation, discrimination, privacy 
 
Full text 122 
19 Ahmed & others v. the 
United Kingdom 
22954/93 02/09
/1998 
NV Impart information, political expression, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 65 
206 Animal Defenders 
International v. the United 
Kingdom [Grand Chamber] 
48876/08 22/04
/2013 
NV Public debate, ban on political advertising, 
NGO, powerful financial groups, access, 
influential media, alternative media, 
margin of appreciation 
Full text 301 
62 B. & P. v. the United 
Kingdom 
36337/97 
and 
35974/97 
24/04
/2001 
NV Privacy, protection of vulnerable persons, 
necessity 
Full text 92 
301 Big Brother Watch and 
Others v. the United 
Kingdom 
58170/13, 
62322/14 
and 
24960/15 
13/09
/2018 
V 10, 
12, 
>GC 
Mass surveillance, bulk interception, 
protection of journalistic sources, 
confidential personal information, 
independent oversight, no limitation, 
chilling effect   
Full text 483 
16 Bowman v. the United 
Kingdom  
24839/94 19/02
/1998 
V Political expression, monopoly position of 
the media, critical reporting 
Full text 62 
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308 Catt v. the United 
Kingdom 
43514/15 24/01
/2019 
V 8  Collection, retention and further use of 
personal data, activist, “domestic 
extremism”, privacy, disproportionate and 
unnecessary, sensitive nature of the data, 
ambiguous nature of legal framework, lack 
of appropriate safeguards, chilling effect  
Full text 497 
160 Financial Times & others 
v. the United Kingdom 
821/03 15/12
/2009 
V Protection of journalistic sources, a source 
acting in bad faith, public interest 
Full text 228 
7 Goodwin v. the United 
Kingdom 
17488/90 27/03
/1996 
V Protection of sources, public interest, 
responsible journalism, chilling effect, 
whistle-blowing  
Full text 53 
44 Hashman & Harrup v. the 
United Kingdom 
25594/94 25/11
/1999 
V Unlawful action, concept of behaviour 
contra bonos mores, foreseeability 
Full text 77 
256 Jon Gaunt v. the United 
Kingdom (dec.) 
26448/12 06/09
/2016 
NV Broadcasting regulation, broadcasting 
regulator, manifestly insulting language, 
public figure 
Full text 394 
78 McVicar v. the United 
Kingdom 
46311/99 02/05
/2002 
NV Defamation, public interest, well-known 
sports figures, factual evidence 
Full text 109 
177 MGN Ltd. v. United 
Kingdom 
39401/04 18/01
/2011 
V Public interest, privacy, chilling effect, 
disproportionality of interference 
Full text 252 
181 Mosley v. the United 
Kingdom 
48009/08 10/05
/2011 
NV 8 Privacy, positive obligation, 
prenotification, public interest, , margin of 
appreciation, chilling effect 
Full text 256 
91 Peck v. the United 
Kingdom 
44647/98 28/01
/2003 
V 8 Privacy in public areas, reasonable 
expectation of privacy, CCTV, media 
reporting 
Full text 124 
107 Steel & Morris v. the 
United Kingdom 
68416/01 15/02
/2005 
V 10, 6 Defamation, libel, potential chilling effect, 
reputation, public debate 
Full text 143 
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22 Steel & others v. the 
United Kingdom  
24838/94 23/09
/1998 
V Necessity, public order, rule of law, 
authority of the judiciary, breach of peace, 
preventing disorder, rights of others 
Full text 67 
45 T. v. the United Kingdom 24724/94 16/12
/1999 
V 6 Fair trial, public interest Full text 78 
274 Tamiz v. the United 
Kingdom (dec.) 
3877/14 19/09
/2017 
I Anonymous defamatory comments, blog, 
personal honour and reputation, real and 
substantial tort, liability of information 
society service providers for illegal 
content.  
Full text 430 
149 Times Newspapers Ltd. 
(Nos. 1 & 2) v. the United 
Kingdom 
3002/03 
and 
23676/03 
10/03
/2009 
NV Internet, internet publication rule, 
defamation, libel, education, historical 
research, responsible journalism, news 
archives 
Full text 208 
6 Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the 
United Kingdom  
18139/91 13/07
/1995 
V Defamation, libel, crime reporting, 
disproportionate damages 
Full text 52 
46 V. v. the United Kingdom   16/12
/1999 
V 6 Fair trial, public interest 
 
Full text 78 
80 Wilson & NUJ v. the 
United Kingdom 
30668/96, 
30671/96 
and 
30678/96 
02/07
/2002 
V 11 Journalism, freedom of assembly and 
association, necessity  
Full text 111 
8 Wingrove v. the United 
Kingdom 
17419/90 25/11
/1996 
NV Blasphemous film, artistic expression, 
rights of others, general verification 
system for videos, political speech, public 
interest, margin of appreciation, morals or 
religion 
Full text 55 
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Appendix IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Treaty Series - No. 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, 
as amended by Protocols No. 11 and 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rome, 4.XI.1950 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Text amended by the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194) as from the date of its 
entry into force on 1 June 2010.  
The text of the Convention had been previously amended according to the provisions of 
Protocol No. 3 (ETS No. 45), which entered into force on 21 September 1970, of 
Protocol No. 5 (ETS No. 55), which entered into force on 20 December 1971 and of 
Protocol No. 8 (ETS No. 118), which entered into force on 1 January 1990, and comprised also 
the text of Protocol No. 2 (ETS No. 44) which, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 3 
thereof, had been an integral part of the Convention since its entry into force on 
21 September 1970. All provisions which had been amended or added by these Protocols 
were replaced by Protocol No. 11 (ETS No. 155), as from the date of its entry into force on 
1 November 1998. As from that date, Protocol No. 9 (ETS No. 140), which entered into force 
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on 1 October 1994, was repealed and Protocol No. 10 (ETS no. 146) had lost its purpose.  
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  The governments signatory hereto, being members of the Council of Europe, 
 
  Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948; 
 
  Considering that this Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective 
recognition and observance of the Rights therein declared; 
 
  Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater 
unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be 
pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; 
 
  Reaffirming their profound belief in those fundamental freedoms which are the 
foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained on the one 
hand by an effective political democracy and on the other by a common 
understanding and observance of the human rights upon which they depend; 
 
  Being resolved, as the governments of European countries which are like-minded 
and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of 
law, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights 
stated in the Universal Declaration, 
 
  Have agreed as follows: 
 
  Article 1 – Obligation to respect human rights 
 
  The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention. 
 
 Section I – Rights and freedoms 
 
  Article 2 – Right to life 
 
 1 Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 
 
 2 Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
 
  a in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
 
  b in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 
detained; 
 
  c in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
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  Article 3 – Prohibition of torture 
 
  No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
 
  Article 4 – Prohibition of slavery and forced labour 
 
 1 No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. 
 
 2 No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. 
 
 3 For the purpose of this article the term “forced or compulsory labour” shall not 
include: 
 
  a any work required to be done in the ordinary course of detention imposed 
according to the provisions of Article 5 of this Convention or during conditional 
release from such detention; 
 
  b any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in 
countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory 
military service; 
 
  c any service exacted in case of an emergency or calamity threatening the life or 
well-being of the community; 
 
  d any work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations. 
 
  Article 5 – Right to liberty and security 
 
 1 Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of 
his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed 
by law: 
 
  a the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; 
 
  b the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non- compliance with the lawful 
order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed 
by law; 
 
  c the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing 
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having 
committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent 
his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; 
 
  d the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational 
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the 
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competent legal authority; 
 
  e the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious 
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants; 
 
  f the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an 
unauthorised entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being 
taken with a view to deportation or extradition. 
 
 2 Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he 
understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him. 
 
 3 Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.c of 
this article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by 
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time 
or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for 
trial. 
 
 4 Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to 
take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily 
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful. 
 
 5 Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the 
provisions of this article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
 
  Article 6 – Right to a fair trial 
 
 1 In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall 
be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part 
of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private 
life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the 
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice. 
 
 2 Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty according to law. 
 
 3 Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights: 
 
  a to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of 
the nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
 
  b to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence; 
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  c to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, 
if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free 
when the interests of justice so require; 
 
  d to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same 
conditions as witnesses against him; 
 
  e to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak 
the language used in court. 
 
  Article 7 – No punishment without law 
 
 1 No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at 
the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the 
one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 
 
 2 This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or 
omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations. 
 
  Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life 
 
 1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
 
 2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
  Article 9 – Freedom of thought, conscience and religion  
 
 1 Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
 
 2 Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
  Article 10 – Freedom of expression 
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 1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference 
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States 
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 
 
 2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, 
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of 
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder 
or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation 
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
 
  Article 11 – Freedom of assembly and association 
 
 1 Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of 
association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests. 
 
 2 No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the 
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the 
administration of the State. 
 
  Article 12 – Right to marry 
 
  Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right. 
 
  Article 13 – Right to an effective remedy 
 
  Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
 
  Article 14 – Prohibition of discrimination 
 
  The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
  Article 15 – Derogation in time of emergency 
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 1 In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High 
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this 
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law. 
 
 2 No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts 
of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision. 
 
 3 Any High Contracting Party availing itself of this right of derogation shall keep the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it 
has taken and the reasons therefor. It shall also inform the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe when such measures have ceased to operate and the provisions 
of the Convention are again being fully executed. 
 
  Article 16 – Restrictions on political activity of aliens 
 
  Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14 shall be regarded as preventing the High 
Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens. 
 
  Article 17 – Prohibition of abuse of rights 
 
  Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the 
destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation 
to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention. 
 
  Article 18 – Limitation on use of restrictions on rights 
 
  The restrictions permitted under this Convention to the said rights and freedoms 
shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been 
prescribed. 
   
 
 Section II – European Court of Human Rights 
 
  Article 19 – Establishment of the Court 
 
  To ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting 
Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto, there shall be set up a European 
Court of Human Rights, hereinafter referred to as "the Court".  It shall function on a 
permanent basis. 
 
  Article 20 – Number of judges 
 
  The Court shall consist of a number of judges equal to that of the High Contracting 
Parties.   
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  Article 21 – Criteria for office 
 
 1 The judges shall be of high moral character and must either possess the 
qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of 
recognised competence. 
 
 2 The judges shall sit on the Court in their individual capacity. 
 
 3 During their term of office the judges shall not engage in any activity which is 
incompatible with their independence, impartiality or with the demands of a full-
time office; all questions arising from the application of this paragraph shall be 
decided by the Court. 
 
  Article 22 – Election of judges 2 
 
  The judges shall be elected by the Parliamentary Assembly with respect to each 
High Contracting Party by a majority of votes cast from a list of three candidates 
nominated by the High Contracting Party.   
 
  Article 23 – Terms of office and dismissal 3 
 
 1 The judges shall be elected for a period of nine years.  They may not be re-elected.  
 
 2 The terms of office of judges shall expire when they reach the age of 70. 
 
 3 The judges shall hold office until replaced.  They shall, however, continue to deal 
with such cases as they already have under consideration. 
 
 4 No judge may be dismissed from office unless the other judges decide by a majority 
of two-thirds that that judge has ceased to fulfil the required conditions. 
 
  Article 24 – Registry and rapporteurs 2 
 
 1 The Court shall have a registry, the functions and organisation of which shall be laid 
down in the rules of the Court.  
 
 2 When sitting in a single-judge formation, the Court shall be assisted by rapporteurs 
who shall function under the authority of the President of the Court. They shall form 
part of the Court’s registry. 
 
  Article 25 – Plenary Court 4 
 
 
2 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
3 Article renumbered, heading and text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
4 Article renumbered, heading and text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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  The plenary Court shall 
 
  a elect its President and one or two Vice-Presidents for a period of three years; 
they may be re-elected; 
 
  b set up Chambers, constituted for a fixed period of time; 
 
  c elect the Presidents of the Chambers of the Court;  they may be re-elected; 
 
  d adopt the rules of the Court; 
 
  e elect the Registrar and one or more Deputy Registrars; 
 
  f make any request under Article 26, paragraph 2. 
 
  Article 26 – Single-judge formation, committees, Chambers and Grand Chamber 1 
 
 1 To consider cases brought before it, the Court shall sit in a single-judge formation, 
in committees of three judges, in Chambers of seven judges and in a Grand Chamber 
of seventeen judges. The Court’s Chambers shall set up committees for a fixed 
period of time. 
 
 2 At the request of the plenary Court, the Committee of Ministers may, by a unanimous 
decision and for a fixed period, reduce to five the number of judges of the Chambers. 
 
 3 When sitting as a single judge, a judge shall not examine any application against 
the High Contracting Party in respect of which that judge has been elected. 
 
 4 There shall sit as an ex officio member of the Chamber and the Grand Chamber the 
judge elected in respect of the High Contracting Party concerned. If there is none or 
if that judge is unable to sit, a person chosen by the President of the Court from a 
list submitted in advance by that Party shall sit in the capacity of judge. 
 
 5 The Grand Chamber shall also include the President of the Court, the Vice-
Presidents, the Presidents of the Chambers and other judges chosen in accordance 
with the rules of the Court. When a case is referred to the Grand Chamber under 
Article 43, no judge from the Chamber which rendered the judgment shall sit in the 
Grand Chamber, with the exception of the President of the Chamber and the judge 
who sat in respect of the High Contracting Party concerned. 
 
  Article 27 – Competence of single judges 5 
 
 1 A single judge may declare inadmissible or strike out of the Court’s list of cases an 
application submitted under Article 34, where such a decision can be taken without 
further examination. 
 
5 New article according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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 2 The decision shall be final. 
 
 3 If the single judge does not declare an application inadmissible or strike it out, that 
judge shall forward it to a committee or to a Chamber for further examination. 
 
  Article 28 – Competence of committees 6 
 
 1 In respect of an application submitted under Article 34, a committee may, by a 
unanimous vote, 
 
  a declare it inadmissible or strike it out of its list of cases, where such decision 
can be taken without further examination; or 
 
  b declare it admissible and render at the same time a judgment on the merits, if 
the underlying question in the case, concerning the interpretation or the 
application of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, is already the subject of 
well-established case-law of the Court. 
 
 2 Decisions and judgments under paragraph 1 shall be final. 
 
 3 If the judge elected in respect of the High Contracting Party concerned is not a 
member of the committee, the committee may at any stage of the proceedings invite 
that judge to take the place of one of the members of the committee, having regard 
to all relevant factors, including whether that Party has contested the application 
of the procedure under paragraph 1.b. 
 
  Article 29 – Decisions by Chambers on admissibility and merits 7 
 
 1 If no decision is taken under Article 27 or 28, or no judgment rendered under Article 
28, a Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and merits of individual applications 
submitted under Article 34. The decision on admissibility may be taken separately. 
 
 2 A Chamber shall decide on the admissibility and merits of inter-State applications 
submitted under Article 33. The decision on admissibility shall be taken separately 
unless the Court, in exceptional cases, decides otherwise.  
 
  Article 30 – Relinquishment of jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber 
 
  Where a case pending before a Chamber raises a serious question affecting the 
interpretation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, or where the resolution 
of a question before the Chamber might have a result inconsistent with a judgment 
previously delivered by the Court, the Chamber may, at any time before it has 
rendered its judgment, relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, 
 
6 Heading and text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
7 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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unless one of the parties to the case objects. 
 
  Article 31 – Powers of the Grand Chamber 8 
 
  The Grand Chamber shall 
 
  a determine applications submitted either under Article 33 or Article 34 when a 
Chamber has relinquished jurisdiction under Article 30 or when the case has 
been referred to it under Article 43;  
 
  b decide on issues referred to the Court by the Committee of Ministers in 
accordance with Article 46, paragraph 4; and 
 
  c consider requests for advisory opinions submitted under Article 47. 
 
  Article 32 – Jurisdiction of the Court 1 
  
 1 The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto which 
are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47. 
 
 2 In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court shall 
decide. 
 
  Article 33 – Inter-State cases 
 
  Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach of the 
provisions of the Convention and the protocols thereto by another High Contracting 
Party.   
 
  Article 34 – Individual applications 
 
  The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one 
of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the 
protocols thereto.  The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way 
the effective exercise of this right. 
 
  Article 35 – Admissibility criteria 1 
 
 1 The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and 
within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.   
 
 2 The Court shall not deal with any application submitted under Article 34 that 
 
8 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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  a is anonymous; or 
 
  b is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the 
Court or has already been submitted to another procedure of international 
investigation or settlement and contains no relevant new information. 
 
 3 The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under 
Article 34 if it considers that : 
 
  a the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the 
Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual 
application; or 
 
  b the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for 
human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires 
an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may 
be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic 
tribunal. 
 
 4 The Court shall reject any application which it considers inadmissible under this 
Article.  It may do so at any stage of the proceedings.   
 
  Article 36 – Third party intervention 9 
 
 1 In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, a High Contracting Party one 
of whose nationals is an applicant shall have the right to submit written comments 
and to take part in hearings. 
 
 2 The President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration of 
justice, invite any High Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings or 
any person concerned who is not the applicant to submit written comments or take 
part in hearings. 
 
 3 In all cases before a Chamber or the Grand Chamber, the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights may submit written comments and take part in 
hearings. 
 
  Article 37 – Striking out applications 
 
 1 The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out 
of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that 
 
  a the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or  
 
 
9 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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  b the matter has been resolved; or  
 
  c for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to 
continue the examination of the application. 
 
  However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for 
human rights as defined in the Convention and the protocols thereto so requires. 
 
 2 The Court may decide to restore an application to its list of cases if it considers that 
the circumstances justify such a course.  
 
  Article 38 – Examination of the case 10 
 
  The Court shall examine the case together with the representatives of the parties 
and, if need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the 
High Contracting Parties concerned shall furnish all necessary facilities.  
 
  Article 39 – Friendly settlements 11 
 
 1 At any stage of the proceedings, the Court may place itself at the disposal of the 
parties concerned with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the 
basis of respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols 
thereto. 
 
 2 Proceedings conducted under paragraph 1 shall be confidential. 
 
 3 If a friendly settlement is effected, the Court shall strike the case out of its list by 
means of a decision which shall be confined to a brief statement of the facts and of 
the solution reached. 
 
 4 This decision shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall 
supervise the execution of the terms of the friendly settlement as set out in the 
decision. 
 
  Article 40 – Public hearings and access to documents 
 
 1 Hearings shall be in public unless the Court in exceptional circumstances decides 
otherwise. 
 
 2 Documents deposited with the Registrar shall be accessible to the public unless the 
President of the Court decides otherwise. 
 
  Article 41 – Just satisfaction 
 
 
10 Heading and text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
11 Heading and text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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  If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the protocols 
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only 
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction 
to the injured party. 
 
  Article 42 – Judgments of Chambers 
 
  Judgments of Chambers shall become final in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 44, paragraph 2. 
 
  Article 43 – Referral to the Grand Chamber 
 
 1 Within a period of three months from the date of the judgment of the Chamber, any 
party to the case may, in exceptional cases, request that the case be referred to the 
Grand Chamber. 
 
 2 A panel of five judges of the Grand Chamber shall accept the request if the case 
raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the 
Convention or the protocols thereto, or a serious issue of general importance. 
 
 3 If the panel accepts the request, the Grand Chamber shall decide the case by means 
of a judgment. 
 
  Article 44 – Final judgments 
 
 1 The judgment of the Grand Chamber shall be final. 
 
 2 The judgment of a Chamber shall become final  
 
  a when the parties declare that they will not request that the case be referred to 
the Grand Chamber; or 
 
  b three months after the date of the judgment, if reference of the case to the 
Grand Chamber has not been requested; or  
 
  c when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request to refer under Article 
43. 
 
 3 The final judgment shall be published. 
 
  Article 45 – Reasons for judgments and decisions 
 
 1 Reasons shall be given for judgments as well as for decisions declaring applications 
admissible or inadmissible. 
 
 2 If a judgment does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous opinion of the 
judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion. 
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  Article 46 – Binding force and execution of judgments 12 
 
 1 The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court 
in any case to which they are parties.   
 
 2 The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, 
which shall supervise its execution. 
 
 3 If the Committee of Ministers considers that the supervision of the execution of a 
final judgment is hindered by a problem of interpretation of the judgment, it may 
refer the matter to the Court for a ruling on the question of interpretation. A referral 
decision shall require a majority vote of two thirds of the representatives entitled to 
sit on the Committee. 
 
 4 If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to 
abide by a final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, after serving 
formal notice on that Party and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two 
thirds of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee, refer to the Court 
the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its obligation under paragraph 
1. 
 
 5 If the Court finds a violation of paragraph 1, it shall refer the case to the Committee 
of Ministers for consideration of the measures to be taken. If the Court finds no 
violation of paragraph 1, it shall refer the case to the Committee of Ministers, 
which shall close its examination of the case. 
 
  Article 47 – Advisory opinions 
 
 1 The Court may, at the request of the Committee of Ministers, give advisory opinions 
on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the 
protocols thereto. 
 
 2 Such opinions shall not deal with any question relating to the content or scope of 
the rights or freedoms defined in Section I of the Convention and the protocols 
thereto, or with any other question which the Court or the Committee of Ministers 
might have to consider in consequence of any such proceedings as could be 
instituted in accordance with the Convention. 
 
 3 Decisions of the Committee of Ministers to request an advisory opinion of the Court 
shall require a majority vote of the representatives entitled to sit on the Committee. 
 
  Article 48 – Advisory jurisdiction of the Court 
 
  The Court shall decide whether a request for an advisory opinion submitted by the 
 
12 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
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Committee of Ministers is within its competence as defined in Article 47. 
 
  Article 49 – Reasons for advisory opinions 
 
 1 Reasons shall be given for advisory opinions of the Court. 
 
 2 If the advisory opinion does not represent, in whole or in part, the unanimous 
opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion. 
 
 3 Advisory opinions of the Court shall be communicated to the Committee of 
Ministers. 
 
  Article 50 – Expenditure on the Court 
 
  The expenditure on the Court shall be borne by the Council of Europe. 
 
  Article 51 – Privileges and immunities of judges 
 
  The judges shall be entitled, during the exercise of their functions, to the privileges 
and immunities provided for in Article 40 of the Statute of the Council of Europe 
and in the agreements made thereunder. 
 
 Section III  – Miscellaneous provisions 
 
  Article 52 – Inquiries by the Secretary General 
 
  On receipt of a request from the Secretary General of the Council of Europe any High 
Contracting Party shall furnish an explanation of the manner in which its internal 
law ensures the effective implementation of any of the provisions of the Convention. 
 
  Article 53 – Safeguard for existing human rights 
 
  Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of 
the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws 
of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party.  
 
  Article 54 – Powers of the Committee of Ministers 
 
  Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the powers conferred on the Committee 
of Ministers by the Statute of the Council of Europe. 
 
  Article 55 – Exclusion of other means of dispute settlement 
 
  The High Contracting Parties agree that, except by special agreement, they will not 
avail themselves of treaties, conventions or declarations in force between them for 
the purpose of submitting, by way of petition, a dispute arising out of the 
interpretation or application of this Convention to a means of settlement other than 
Back to overview of case-law 
625 
those provided for in this Convention. 
 
  Article 56 – Territorial application  
 
 1 Any State may at the time of its ratification or at any time thereafter declare by 
notification addressed to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe that the 
present Convention shall, subject to paragraph 4 of this Article, extend to all or any 
of the territories for whose international relations it is responsible. 
 
 2 The Convention shall extend to the territory or territories named in the notification 
as from the thirtieth day after the receipt of this notification by the Secretary General 
of the Council of Europe. 
 
 3 The provisions of this Convention shall be applied in such territories with due 
regard, however, to local requirements. 
 
 4 Any State which has made a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of this 
article may at any time thereafter declare on behalf of one or more of the territories 
to which the declaration relates that it accepts the competence of the Court to 
receive applications from individuals, non-governmental organisations or groups of 
individuals as provided by Article 34 of the Convention. 
 
  Article 57 – Reservations  
 
 1 Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of 
ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the 
Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in 
conformity with the provision. Reservations of a general character shall not be 
permitted under this article. 
 
 2 Any reservation made under this article shall contain a brief statement of the law 
concerned. 
 
  Article 58 – Denunciation  
 
 1 A High Contracting Party may denounce the present Convention only after the 
expiry of five years from the date on which it became a party to it and after six 
months' notice contained in a notification addressed to the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe, who shall inform the other High Contracting Parties. 
 
 2 Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the High Contracting Party 
concerned from its obligations under this Convention in respect of any act which, 
being capable of constituting a violation of such obligations, may have been 
performed by it before the date at which the denunciation became effective. 
 
 3 Any High Contracting Party which shall cease to be a member of the Council of 
Europe shall cease to be a Party to this Convention under the same conditions. 
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 4 The Convention may be denounced in accordance with the provisions of the 
preceding paragraphs in respect of any territory to which it has been declared to 
extend under the terms of Article 56. 
 
  Article 59 – Signature and ratification 13 
 
 1 This Convention shall be open to the signature of the members of the Council of 
Europe. It shall be ratified. Ratifications shall be deposited with the Secretary 
General of the Council of Europe. 
 
 2 The European Union may accede to this Convention. 
 
 3 The present Convention shall come into force after the deposit of ten instruments 
of ratification. 
 
 4 As regards any signatory ratifying subsequently, the Convention shall come into 
force at the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification. 
 
 5 The Secretary General of the Council of Europe shall notify all the members of the 
Council of Europe of the entry into force of the Convention, the names of the High 
Contracting Parties who have ratified it, and the deposit of all instruments of 
ratification which may be effected subsequently. 
 
 
  Done at Rome this 4th day of November 1950, in English and French, both texts 
being equally authentic, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the 
archives of the Council of Europe. The Secretary General shall transmit certified 
copies to each of the signatories. 
 
 
 
 
13 Text amended according to the provisions of Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194). 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 
